govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_26-cv-00961-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
RAEDEN WALLINGFORD , 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
SALLIE MAE BANK, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
Civil Action No. 26 - 961 (LLA) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff Raeden Wallingford, proceeding pro se, brought this suit in the Superior Court of 
the District of Columbia against Sallie Mae Bank (“Sallie Mae”), alleging false credit reporting of 
a delinquent student loan. ECF No. 1-1, at 52-53.1 Pending before the court are Ms. Wallingford’s 
motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction . ECF Nos. 3, 11. For the 
reasons explained below, the court will deny the motions. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Ms. Wallingford is a former student at Howard University. ECF No. 1-1, at 52; see ECF 
No. 3, at 2. She resides in subsidized housing with her “co-signer” in Raeford, North Carolina. 
ECF No. 3, at 2; ECF No. 5-1, at 2. Howard University’s financial portal reflects a total account 
balance of $0.00 for Ms. Wallingford’s student account. ECF No. 1-1, at 53; see id. at 58. The 
portal does not display any financial history between Howard and Sallie Mae, id. at 58, and 
“reports that no documents are available to substantiate and verify the alleged debt,” ECF No. 3, 
 
1 When citing Ms. Wallingford’s filings, the court refers to the CM/ECF-generated numbers at the 
top of each page rather than any internal pagination. 

2 
at 2. It also shows Ms. Wallingford’s “[l]egally entitled federal aid (Pell Grant)” as “cancelled or 
missing, despite no change in student eligibility.” ECF No. 1-1, at 60. Sallie Mae, 
Ms. Wallingford’s loan servicer, reports that Ms. Wallingford owes a debt exceeding $102,000. 
ECF No. 3, at 2. Since February 2026, Sallie Mae has pursued collection of Ms. Wallingford’s 
“non-existent debt.” ECF No. 5-1, at 4; see ECF No. 5-3 (documenting communications that 
Ms. Wallingford and her “co-signer” received from Sallie Mae). 
Ms. Wallingford filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on 
February 25, 2026, ECF No. 1-1, at 3-12, and amended her complaint on March 4, see id. at 52-53. 
In her amended complaint, Ms. Wallingford raises one count of breach of contract, alleging that 
Sallie Mae’s “failure to accurately maintain the status quo of a ‘disputed’ account and the threat 
of derogatory reporting constitute[] a breach of the loan agreement.” Id. at 53. She seeks a 
“judgment declaring [her] account balance as $0.00 and an injunction against false reporting.” Id. 
Sallie Mae removed the action to this court on March 19. ECF No. 1. 
On March 20, Ms. Wallingford filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3, and she submitted various exhibits in support of her motion, 
see ECF Nos. 5, 7. The court granted Sallie Mae’s motion for an extension of time to respond to 
Ms. Wallingford’s amended complaint, ECF No. 4, and directed Sallie Mae to respond to both 
Ms. Wallingford’s amended complaint and motion for preliminary relief by April 16, 2026, see 
Mar. 26, 2026 Minute Order. The court denied Ms. Wallingford’s motion for reconsideration of 
that extension. ECF Nos. 8, 9; see Apr. 10, 2026 Minute Order. On April 8, Ms. Wallingford filed 
a renewed motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 11, and 
the court directed Sallie Mae to respond to any new arguments in its forthcoming opposition , see 
Apr. 14, 2026 Minute Order. Sallie Mae then filed its opposition , ECF No. 13, and moved to 

3 
dismiss, ECF No. 14. Ms. Wallingford filed a reply, ECF No. 16, and a supplemental declaration 
in support of her motion for preliminary relief, ECF No. 17. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are ‘extraordinary remed[ies] 
that should be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden 
of persuasion.’” Lofton v. District of Columbia, 7 F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (D.D.C. 2013) (alteration 
in original) (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 
2006)). To receive a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, the moving party 
must show (1) “that [she] is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that [she] is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the balance of equities tips in [her] 
favor,” and (4) “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Ms. Wallingford seeks a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 
enjoining Sallie Mae from “all derogatory credit reporting regarding [Ms. Wallingford] and [her] 
co-signer” and ordering Sallie Mae to “retract” the April 6, 2026 reporting and “delete the false 
delinquency statuses associated with all loans under” her accoun t. ECF No. 11, at 4; see ECF 
No. 3, at 5. The court concludes that Ms. Wallingford has failed to carry her burden to receive a 
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. 
First, Ms. Wallingford has not shown that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her 
claim. In her amended complaint, Ms. Wallingford raises one claim of breach of contract , and 
while she alleges that Sallie Mae’s inaccurate credit reporting “constitutes a breach of the loan 

4 
agreement,” ECF No. 1-1, at 53, she does not allege any facts regarding that loan agreement or the 
contractual obligation that Sallie Mae allegedly violated. Moreover, Ms. Wallingford’s contract 
claim is likely preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., 
which preempts all “ claims made under state law concerning the furnishing and correcting of 
information to credit reporting agencies.” Asterbadi v. Cenlar Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 25-CV-1847, 
2026 WL 158482 , at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2026) (quoting Pleznac v. Equity Residential Mgmt., 
L.L.C., 320 F. Supp. 3d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 2018)); see 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F). Ms. Wallingford 
also asserts in her motion s for preliminary relief that Sallie Mae’s actions violate the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and FCRA. ECF No. 3, at 3; ECF No. 11, at 3. As with her 
contract claim, Ms. Wallingford does not allege any facts supporting claims under these statutes. 
Specifically, Ms. Wallingford does not allege that Sallie Mae is a “debt collector” for purposes of 
the FDCPA, which requires that her loan was in default when Sallie Mae acquired it. See Parker 
v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP , 831 F. Supp. 2d 88 , 94 (D.D.C. 2011). And the FCRA does 
not provide a basis for the equitable relief Ms. Wallingford seeks. ECF No. 1-1, at 53; see Brown 
v. Pa. Higher Educ. Agency , No. 19-CV-979, 2019 WL 2103127 , at *2 (D.D.C. May 14, 2019) 
(“Nothing in the text of the FCRA ‘allows private litigants to maintain a claim for injunctive relief,’ 
and ‘courts that have considered [the] issue have overwhelmingly concluded that the FCRA 
precludes private litigants from seeking equitable relief.’” (alteration in original) (first quoting 
Washington v. CSC Credit Servs. Inc. , 199 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2000); then quoting 
Owner-Operator Indep. Driver Ass’n, Inc. v. Usis Com. Servs., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007 
(D. Colo. 2005))). Accordingly, even construing her filings liberally and assuming that she has 
asserted claims under the FDCPA and FCRA, the court cannot conclude that Ms. Wallingford is 
likely to prevail on her claims. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) 

5 
(noting that the mov ant carries the burden of justifying, by a clear showing, her entitlement to 
relief). 
Ms. Wallingford has also failed to demonstrate that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm 
absent preliminary relief. “[P]roving ‘irreparable’ injury is a considerable burden” and requires 
“proof that the movant’s injury is ‘ certain, great and actual —not theoretical —and imminent, 
creating a clear and present need for extraordinary equitable relief to prevent harm.’” Power 
Mobility Coal. v. Leavitt, 404 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Wis. Gas Co. v. Fed. 
Energy Regul. Comm’n , 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). Ms. Wallingford 
alleges that Sallie Mae’s derogatory credit reporting “creates an imminent risk of displacement 
and homelessness” because it may disqualify her and her co-signer from their subsidized housing, 
“where eligibility is strictly credit -dependent.” ECF No. 11, at 2; see ECF No. 3, at 2. In her 
renewed motion, Ms. Wallingford alleges that Sallie Mae reported her delinquency to Equifax on 
April 6, 2026, meaning the “‘threatened’ harm has become a reality.” ECF No. 11, at 2; see ECF 
Nos. 11-5, 11-6. Ms. Wallingford further alleges that her co-signer’s credit score dropped from 
the high 600s to 566 following Sallie Mae’s reporting and that, on April 17, her co-signer’s Best 
Buy credit card was summarily closed for “credit risk.” ECF No. 17-1 ¶¶ 2, 4-5. 
While “impending homelessness” may constitute irreparable harm, Cabrera v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Lab., 792 F. Supp. 3d 91, 105 (D.D.C. 2025) (quoting Nat’l Job Corps Ass’n v. Dep’t of Lab., 
788 F. Supp. 3d 642 , 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)), appeal dismissed, No. 25-5340, 2025 WL 3635881 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2025), Ms. Wallingford has not established that such harm is “certain to occur 
in the near future,” Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674. Ms. Wallingford asserts that she could become 
ineligible for her subsidized housing because “significant debt that would reduce ability to pay 
rent” is a criterion for eligibility. ECF No. 5-1, at 2; see ECF No. 5-2, at 1 (management 

6 
company’s screening criteria); ECF No. 16, at 6 (arguing that her “housing is contingent upon a 
credit profile that [Sallie Mae] is actively damaging with inaccurate reporting”). But this claim of 
harm is too attenuated from Sallie Mae’s derogatory reporting and too speculative to justify 
preliminary relief. As Sallie Mae points out, Ms. Wallingford has not provided “any evidence—
such as a notice from her housing provider, correspondence regarding an eligibility review, or 
documentation of any pending adverse housing action,” ECF No. 13, at 6, demonstrating that she 
is likely to lose her eligibility imminently, see Hanson v. District of Columbia, 120 F.4th 223, 245 
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (“‘[S]imply showing some possibility of irreparable injury’ is not sufficient to 
make the irreparable harm showing needed to obtain preliminary relief.” (quoting Nken v. Holder, 
556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)) ). The court therefore cannot credit Ms. Wallingford’s conclusory 
allegation that loss of housing “is a mathematical certainty.” ECF No. 16, at 4. 
Ms. Wallingford also alleges that Sallie Mae’s reporting has recently c aused her 
co-signer’s credit score to fall and credit line to be summarily closed. ECF No. 17-1 ¶¶ 2, 4. She 
asserts that without the credit line, her household is “in a state of ‘financial blackout,’ unable to 
access the credit necessary for . . . immediate needs,” id. ¶ 7. Th e only imminent harm 
Ms. Wallingford cites is an inability to “fund schooling supplies for [her] minor brother who 
resides with [her] .” Id. ¶ 6. While the court is sympathetic to Ms. Wallingford’s financial 
difficulties, this alleged harm is insufficient to meet the “considerable burden” of establishing 
irreparable injury for purposes of preliminary relief. Power Mobility Coal., 404 F. Supp. 2d at 204. 
Because Ms. Wallingford has failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or 
irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, she is not entitled to a temporary restraining order or a 
preliminary injunction. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297 (explaining that 
a “movant’s failure to show any irreparable harm is . . . grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary 

7 
injunction, even if the other three factors . . . merit such relief); see also Pennsylvania v. DeVos , 
480 F. Supp. 3d 47, 68 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Plaintiffs’ inability to show a likelihood of success on the 
merits or irreparable harm likely ends the matter there.”). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Ms. Wallingford’s Motion for a 
Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 3, and Renewed Motion for 
a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 11, are DENIED. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
LOREN L. ALIKHAN 
United States District Judge 
Date: May 14, 2026 

Passage view · GavelSight