govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-3_24-cv-00489-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
LOUISVILLE DIVISION 
 
JOSIE SAMANTHA HART PLAINTIFF 
 
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-489-JHM 
 
DAVID PUCKETT, et al. DEFENDANTS 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
This matter is before the Court on the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants 
Jerry Collins and David Puckett and Defendant Aaron Green (DN s 25, 26). Plaintiff Josie 
Samantha Hart has filed a “Motion for Final Judgment ” (DN 29), which is reproduced and 
submitted as a response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment . (DN 30). Defendants 
have replied to Plaintiff ’s submissions. (DNs 31, 32). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment will be granted, and Plaintiff’s motion for final judgment will be 
denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants alleging violations of 
her constitutional rights arising out of a period of pretrial detention at the Louisville Metro 
Department of Corrections (LMDC). (DN 1). 
Plaintiff, a transgender female, alleges that she was sent to LMDC following her arrest, 
where Defendants Collins and Puckett placed her in a “single cell” on the “male side” of the jail 
after receiving information confirming Plaintiff ’s female name and gender. (DN 1, PageID.4; 
DN 6). She states that these Defendants “never placed me back on female side, ” despite 
identification listing her gender as female. (DN 1, PageID.4). Plaintiff alleges that at some point 
during her incarceration , LMDC classification changed her gender from female to male “for no PageID #:
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reason[,] allowing male guards to strip search me. ” (Id., PageID.5). She states that that she 
remained in a single cell for 17 months and “[took] a plea deal just to get out .” (Id.). Plaintiff 
avers that these actions violated her First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.). 
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Green imposed cruel and unusual punishment against 
her by “putting me on razor restrictions for no reason,” and “never allowing me to go to [general] 
population.” (Id.). 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A , the Court screened Plaintiff ’s complaint and permitted 
Fourteenth Amendment due process claims to proceed against Defendants Collins, Puckett, and 
Green in their individual capacities based on her allegations that Collins and Puckett wrongfully 
classified Plaintiff as male, resulting in her being housed on the male side of the LMDC and being 
strip-searched by male guards, and that Green placed her on razor restrictions and denied her access 
to general population. (DN 8). 
A. 
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants Collins and Puckett argue that Plaintiff 
fails to prove she was housed in administrative segregation without due process , fails to assert a 
cognizable injury under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and fails to support her claims 
concerning strip searches by male officers. Collins and Puckett further argue that Plaintiff does 
not establish sufficient involvement by either Defendant in Plaintiff’s classification or in any strip 
searches to invoke supervisory liability . Finally, Collins and Puckett assert they are entitled to 
qualified immunity. (DN 25-1, PageID.173-184). In support of their motion, Defendants Collins 
and Puckett submit the following evidence: Plaintiff’s release report; LMDC Identification Bureau 
notification of Plaintiff’s name and gender change; sworn affidavits of Defendant Puckett and non-
party LMDC employee Meagan Kilkelly; LMDC’s Gender Nonconforming Classification and PageID #:
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Classification Assessment Policies; Plaintiff ’s Offender Notes; and Plaintiff ’s medical records. 
(DN 27-1 through DN 27-8). 
Defendant Green seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to identify 
any portion of the record, or present any affirmative evidence, demonstrating that Green was 
responsible for placing Plaintiff on a razor restriction; she failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
as required by the PLRA; and she does not establish a violation of her constitutional due process 
rights. Green also argues that he is qualifiedly immune from suit. (DN 26 -1, PageID.190-199). 
As evidence, Green submits his sworn affidavit and Plaintiff’s Offender Notes. (DNs 26-2 through 
DN 26 -3). Where relevant, Green incorporates by reference the evidence, arguments, and 
authorities put forward by Defendants Collins and Puckett in their motion for summary judgment. 
B. 
 In Plaintiff’s response and “Motion for Final Judgment,” she asserts that: (1) her gender is 
female for legal and medical purposes and that she has previously been incarcerated as such ; 
(2) she is not a “predator” nor did she indicate to LMDC officials that she feared for her safety; 
(3) she suffered harassment by LMDC staff regarding her gender/sexual identity; (4) she was strip- 
searched and frisked by male officers; (5) LMDC staff altered the documents identifying her 
gender; (6) she was placed on razor restriction “for no reason on multiple occasions to try to hurt 
me;” (7) on on e occasion she “acted . . . suicidal trying to get moved to different areas ” which 
resulted in her staying in isolation for 155 days and locked down for up to 23.5 hours per day; 
(8) she does not have male genitalia “and even if [she] did it was court ordered . . . that [she be] 
moved to the female side” of the jail; and (9) she remained in a single cell for 17 months “hurt and 
alone.” (DNs 29, 30). PageID #:
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Plaintiff previously submitted a pretrial memorandum, which the Court also considers. To 
her memorandum she attaches a Kentucky Uniform Citation; LMDC Identification Bureau 
notification of Plaintiff’s name and gender change; internal LMDC e -mail confirming name and 
gender change; and one page of Offender Notes. (DN 23). 
C. 
 In their reply, Defendants Collins and Puckett assert that Plaintiff cannot defeat the motion 
for summary judgment, nor is she entitled to judgment in her favor because her submissions are 
unsworn and unsupported by evidence, do not reference the record or cite to case law, and contain 
no facts or arguments beyond the initial complaint. (DN 31, PageID.305 -310). They cite the 
Court’s previous Order setting forth the summary judgment rule and providing Plaintiff guidance 
on how to respond. (DN 28). According to Collins and Puckett, Plaintiff’s lack of proper response 
renders their motion for summary judgment unopposed and her claims waived. (DN 31, 
PageID.309). They also reiterate their arguments that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law and 
that they are entitled to qualified immunity. ( Id., PageID.310-313). Defendant Green’s reply is 
substantially similar in all material respects. (DN 32). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Before the Court may grant a motion for summary judgment, it must find that there is “no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact ” and that the moving party is “entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of specifying the 
basis for its motion and identifying that portion of the record that demonstrates the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the 
moving party satisfies this burden, the non -moving party thereafter must produce specific facts PageID #:
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demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 
248-49 (1986). 
Assuming the moving party satisfies its burden of production, the nonmovant “must—by 
deposition, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file—show specific facts that 
reveal a genuine issue for trial.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). The non -moving party’s evidence is to be believed, Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 
Court must be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
The fact that a plaintiff is pro se does not lessen his or her obligations under Rule 56. “The 
liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of substantive law, and the 
liberal standards that apply at the pleading stage do not apply after a case has progressed to the 
summary judgment stage.” Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. 
May 5, 2010) (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit has made clear that, when opposing summary 
judgment, a party cannot rely on allegations or denials in unsworn filings and that a party’s “status 
as a pro se litigant does not alter [this] duty on a summary judgment motion.” Viergutz v. Lucent 
Techs., Inc ., 375 F. App ’x 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010). However, “courts should consider the 
allegations in a pro se prisoner’s verified complaints (which are effectively affidavits) before 
entering judgment against him[.]” Miller v. Jones, 483 F. App’x 202, 203 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 
Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 902–04, 905 (6th Cir. 1992)). PageID #:
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III. DISCUSSION 
A. 
The following facts are drawn from the parties ’ submissions and are undisputed unless 
otherwise noted. 
Plaintiff was housed at LMDC as a pretrial detainee from August 30, 2022, to January 5, 
2024. (DN 27-1). Plaintiff was booked into LMDC under the name “Josiah Hart” and was initially 
classified as male. On November 4, 2022, Plaintiff’s name was changed to “Josie Hart” and gender 
changed to female within LMDC’s systems. (DN 27-2).1 A security decision was made, however, 
to place Plaintiff in administrative segregation in a single cell on the male side of the facility. 
(DN 27-3). Defendant Puckett’s affidavit states that this determination was made by the Special 
Management Unit (SMU) Committee upon learning that Plaintiff had not fully transitioned from 
male to female insofar as she possessed male genitalia. Because Plaintiff presented a security risk 
to the safety of female inmates in the female unit and to her own safety in the male unit , single-
cell administrative segregation in the male unit “was the only safe place she could be housed .” 
(Id.; see also DN 27-4 [Kilkelly Aff.]). 
Puckett attests that LMDC received credible information that Plaintiff was still at least 
partially biologically male. (Id.; DN 27-4). During a previous incarceration in 2022, Plaintiff had 
been classified as female and placed in a single cell on the female side of LMDC. However, during 
that same period of incarceration , Plaintiff was observed masturbating from which it was 
discovered that she possessed male genitalia. (Id.; DN 27-4). According to Puckett, w hile not 
every transgender inmate who has not fully transitioned presents a sufficient security risk to be 
 
1 Plaintiff states that she was initially booked into LMDC as female and LMDC “later changed her gender in their 
official records to male. ” (DN 23, PageID.152). Plaintiff’s submissions are unsworn and the assertions of fact are 
unsupported by citations to the record. Notwithstanding the leniency afforded to pro se litigants, the Court may 
disregard any unsworn statement of fact. See Zainalian v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 3 F. App’x 429, 431 (6th Cir. 2001). PageID #:
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housed in administrative segregation, Plaintiff was identified as a heightened risk because of her 
“antisocial and predatory behavioral history at LMDC ” during previous periods of incarceration. 
(Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff represented both a security risk to other inmates and a target for 
violence were she to be housed with the general male population. ( Id.). Puckett states that t he 
SMU Committee regularly reviewed the Plaintiff’s status and determined that her placement was 
appropriate. (Id.). 
The LMDC Gender Nonconforming Classification Policy No. 4-1.02 defines 
“transgender” as “[a] person whose gender identity (i.e., internal sense of feeling male or female) 
is different from the person ’s assigned sex at birth. ” (DN 27 -5, PageID.221 ). The General 
Guidelines state that when a transgender or intersex individual is identified while in custody, 
“LMDC Staff shall question the individual to identify genital status . . . . in a respectful and 
confidential manner.” (Id., PageID.222). Pursuant to this policy, LMDC staff is prohibited from 
“search[ing] or physically examin [ing] a transgender or intersex inmate for the sole purpose of 
determining the inmate’s genital status.” If unknown, genital status “may be determined during 
conversations with the inmate, by reviewing medical records, or, if necessary, by learning that 
information as part of a broader medical examination conducted in private by a medical 
practitioner.” (Id.). 
As to Housing Assignments, Policy No. 4-1.02 provides that “[a]ll transgender and intersex 
inmates shall be classified based on security and safety needs, and housing availability. ” (Id., 
PageID.222). Additionally, 
In deciding whether to assign a transgender or intersex inmate to a facility for male 
or female inmates, and in making other housing and programming assignments, 
LMDC shall consider on a case-by-case basis whether a placement would ensure 
the inmate ’s health and safety, and whether the placement would present 
management or security problems. PageID #:
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(Id.). This policy also allows for protective custody for transgender inmates where “there is reason 
to believe the inmate presents a heightened risk to themselves, to others or when the inmate fears 
they may become victimized in general population.” (Id., PageID.223). “Every thirty (30) days, 
LMDC shall afford each inmate a review to determine whether there is a continuing need for 
separation from the general population.” (Id.).2 
 Plaintiff’s Offender Notes reveal that on August 30, 2022, she was initially placed in a 
single cell per “mental health ” and required administrative segregation due to “inmate being 
transgendered” and having a “history of being in a single cell. ” (DN 27-7, PageID.230). On 
September 27, 2022, Plaintiff requested protective custody. Puckett denied that request as she was 
currently in administrative segregation “due to being transgender and fearing for [her] safety. ” 
(Id., PageID.232). Puckett indicated that he would address her request at the next SMU meeting 
when her status would be reviewed. (Id.). 
 The following month, Plaintiff requested to have her classification changed from male to 
female, consistent with her legal documentation. Puckett noted that this would have to be directed 
to LMDC records staff, and that Plaintiff had not yet completed tr ansitioning to female but once 
that occurred, Plaintiff’s status might be changed. (Id., PageID.233). 
An LMDC Identification Bureau memorandum dated November 4, 2022 (“Notification of 
additional and/or correctional information”), notified multiple LMDC departments, including 
records and classification, the Jefferson County District Court Clerk, Circuit Cou rt Clerk, and 
 
2 Defendants Collins and Puckett refer to LMDC’s Special Management Unit Policy, see DN 25-1, PageID.168-69, 
which purportedly governs the SMU and administrative segregation. However, the policy that is cited and attached 
as an exhibit—Policy No. 05-1.02, Classification Assessment—does not appear to contain these provisions. (DN 27-
6). PageID #:
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Pre-trial Services Department of Plaintiff’s name change from Josiah S. Hart to Josie Samantha 
Hart and gender change from male to female. (DN 27-2). 
 On November 5, 2022, Classification Coordinator Meagan Kilkelly directed that Plaintiff 
be moved to a female cell, the day after the Identification Bureau memorandum was issued 
changing Plaintiff’s name and gender in LMDC ’s systems. ( DN 27-7, PageID.236). However, 
that move was cancelled before it was implemented. Notes reflect that although Plaintiff was listed 
as female in the “XJail system,” a body scan during Plaintiff’s arrest revealed the presence of male 
genitalia. ( Id., PageID.237). Kilkelly explains in her affidavit that Plaintiff “was identified as 
female in LMDC ’s electronic management system because that is how she identifies herself, 
however, this is not determinative of her housing situation.” (DN 27-4). 
From November 2022 to January 2024, Plaintiff made multiple requests to have her 
classification and/or housing assignment changed. Puckett denied Plaintiff’s requests, citing 
Kilkelly’s assignment of Plaintiff to the current housing location, Plaintiff’s special housing needs, 
safety concerns, and the fact that she still possessed male genitals and had not yet completed the 
physical transition to female. (DN 27 -7, PageID.238, 240 -247).3 Plaintiff’s segregation status 
was reviewed by the SMU Committee. (Id., PageID.231, 234, 242). 
Plaintiff’s private medical records reveal that Plaintiff had an orchiectomy performed in 
April of 2021. (DN 27-8, PageID.275). During a June 18, 2021, consultation for gender-affirming 
vaginoplasty surgery, the examining physician noted that Plaintiff had a circumcised phallus and 
prior orchiectomy. The doctor opined that Plaintiff was “not able to give informed consent for this 
major operation at this time[,]” noting observing that Plaintiff’s answers to questions were “fairly 
incongruent” and “a mismatch between her level of attention and the seriousness considering major 
 
3 While Plaintiff primarily requested to be moved to the female side of the jail, she apparently requested to be placed 
in the male general population on at least two occasions. PageID #:
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surgical intervention.” (Id., PageID.292-294). Additional private medical records reveal that in 
February of 2022, Plaintiff was status-post orchiectomy and “want[ed] to have surgery in future.” 
(Id., PageID.276-79). On April 6, 2022, Plaintiff was observed to have normal appearing genitalia 
with testes absent bilaterally. (Id., PageID.287). 
During a mental health visit at LMDC on November 15, 2022, Plaintiff told the provider 
that “she is upset because ‘they got me over here with males and I have female parts. ’ [Patient] 
stated she did not have a penis, however reports she wouldn’t let medical look at her because they 
don’t like her.” (Id., PageID.254). The following day, an LMDC medical provider noted: 
[Patient] is upset due to being on the male side, states she had penis removed. 
[R]eviewed notes [;] still has penis, had bilateral orchiectomy in the past and 
explained this to [patient] on reasoning why she is housed on male side. [Patient] 
was seen masturbating to staff in the past while on J2 and had to be moved. 
 
(Id., PageID.265) (cleaned up). Another medical note from the same date indicates that Plaintiff 
reported to the provider that she “has a vagina,” but “refused to have genital area assessed.” The 
provider “reviewed notes and patient had a bilateral orchiectomy in the past. [E]xplained to 
[patient] that since she still has a penis and was found masturbating to staff in the past, she would 
still be housed on male side no matter how she identifies at this time.” (Id., PageID.272). 
An LMDC mental health note entry dated April 12, 2023, shows that Plaintiff “understands 
she can’t be housed around men. [Patient] states that she has had her testicles removed and she 
should be housed with the women but doesn ’t want to be and she dislikes medical and refuses to 
let them touch her.” (Id., PageID.250). In May 2023, Plaintiff demanded to be moved to female 
segregation. The provider noted that Plaintiff “has an extensive [history] of exposing self to others 
and admits to indecent exposure in the past during this interaction.” (Id., PageID.252). 
During a medical visit at LMDC on November 10, 2023, Plaintiff reported that she had her 
penis removed, however, medical notes indicated that she did no t but did have a bilateral PageID #:
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orchiectomy in the past. Plaintiff declined to have her genital area assessed during the visit. (Id., 
PageID.265). On the same date, Plaintiff reported to the LMDC mental health provider that “while 
‘anatomically male,’ [patient] prefers to be called a female due to ‘receiving surgery’ and self-
identification as such.” (Id., PageID.262). 
B. 
1. Defendants Collins and Puckett 
Plaintiff challenges her placement in a single cell and in administrative segregation on the 
male side of LMDC on due process grounds. 4 (DN 1, 6). Defendants Collins and Puckett argue 
that they are entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine dispute as to whether 
Plaintiff received due process. (DN 25-1, PageID.173-176). 
In support of their argument, Collins and Puckett cite to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 
(1995), for the proposition that a prisoner is entitled to the protections of due process only when a 
deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life ” or “will inevitably affect the duration of [her] sentence,” 515 U.S. 472, 
487, and to Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983) (abrogated on other grounds by Sandin, 
515 U.S. at 484) , which observed the need for periodic reviews when a prisoner is placed in 
extended administrative segregation. 
In the Sixth Circuit, whether the Sandin “hardship test” governs the procedural due process 
claims of pretrial detainees is unsettled. See Johnson v. Grayson Cnty., KY Det. Ctr., No. 21-5772, 
2022 WL 3479501, at *2 (6th Cir. May 27, 2022) ( observing that “several of our sister circuits 
 
4 While Plaintiff’s complaint alleged being strip-searched by male officers, she stated no additional facts pertaining to 
the searches in her complaint or any subsequent submissions. There is no Fourth Amendment claim before the Court, 
so Plaintiff’s gender identity, the gender of the guards conducting the searches, and the fact of the searches being 
conducted are considered as part of her broader due process claim. PageID #:
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have held that Sandin’s atypical and significant hardship standard does not govern procedural due 
process claims brought by pretrial detainees” but the Sixth Circuit has “no precedent deciding this 
issue either way. ”) (citing Dilworth v. Adams , 841 F.3d 246, 252 (4th Cir. 2016) (collecting 
cases)); see also Cornett v. Webb , No. CIV.A. 02 -400, 2004 WL 3437504, at *5 (E.D. Ky. 
May 13, 2004) (recognizing “some issue” as to whether Sandin applies to pretrial detainees and 
collecting cases). 
Some courts in this Circuit have applied Sandin in determining whether a liberty interest 
is implicated by a pretrial detainee ’s administrative segregation. See, e.g ., Polk v. Parnell , 
132 F.3d 33 (6th Cir. 1997) (short stay in disciplinary segregation was not such an atypical and 
significant hardship as to create a liberty interest requiring due process); Webb v. Bucholtz , 
No. 1:20-CV-1036, 2021 WL 804721, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2021) ( finding that detainee’s 
10-month placement in segregation fail ed to implicate a liberty interest entitling him to due 
process); Elliot v. Conner, No. 3:23 -CV-01008, 2023 WL 7545036, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 
2023) (evaluating whether segregation of detainee from the general jail population involves the 
deprivation of a liberty interest under Sandin). Other courts have considered whether the 
segregation amounts to “punishment” under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). See, e.g., 
Evans v. Bonner, No. 18-2726-JDT-CGC, 2019 WL 5269103, at *4-5 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 2019) 
(detainee’s allegation that he was kept in administrative segregation without reason stated a viable 
due process claim under Bell); Bennett v. Woosley, No. 4:22-CV-34-CRS, 2023 WL 8705413, at 
*3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 15, 2023) (pretrial detainee ’s segregation did not amount to punishment , 
reasoning that “[p]rison officials may segregate pretrial detainees for security purposes .”); 
Montgomery v. Gentry , No. 3:20 -CV-00406, 2020 WL 14009839, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 11, 
2020) (pretrial detainee ’s complaint alleging that his housing classification to administrative PageID #:
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segregation allowed the inference of an intent to punish under Bell).5 The Court finds that on the 
present record, Plaintiff’s claim fails under both Sandin and Bell, as discussed below. 
Mere placement in administrative segregation is “not an atypical and significant hardship, 
as intended by Sandin.” Rimmer-Bey v. Brown , 62 F.3d 789, 790 –91 (6th Cir. 1995). Courts 
generally consider the nature and duration of a stay in segregation in determining whether it 
imposes an atypical and significant hardship. See Harden-Bay v. Rutter , 524 F.3d 789, 795 -96 
(6th Cir. 2008). The Sixth Circuit also considers the following factors, in their totality, when 
determining whether an inmate’s segregation implicates a liberty interest by imposing atypical and 
significant hardship: (1) the reasons for an inmate’s continued confinement in segregation; (2) the 
conditions of an inmate’s confinement “‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life ’”; and 
(3) the impact the confinement will have on the inmate’s sentence. Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 
812 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472, 483). 
Without any factual development or citation to record evidence, Plaintiff states only that 
she “had no contact with humans at all for 155 days and I was locked down for 23 to 23.5 hours a 
day for a chance to shower.” (DN 29). The 155 days Plaintiff spent in administrative segregation, 
standing alone, is insufficient to trigger a liberty interest. See, e.g., Baker, 155 F.3d at 813 (finding 
that segregation for 30 months did not create a liberty interest violative of due process); Bradley 
v. Evans, 229 F.3 d 1150, 2000 WL 1277229, at *5 -7 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000) ( 14 months of 
segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship); Collmar v. Wilkinson , 
No. 97 –4374, 1999 WL 623708, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 1999) (neither eight months 
 
5 One district court, in observing that “[t]here is some question as to whether Sandin provides the proper measure for 
changes in the conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees[,]” suggested that Sandin’s hardship test could arguably 
be “flexible enough to address the conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees. ” Lyons v. Barry Cnty. Jail , 
No. 1:24-CV-1162, 2025 WL 262142, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2025). For example, “for pretrial detainees, the test 
could evaluate whether the deprivation is atypical and significant in relation to the normal incidents of life in pretrial 
detention.” Id. at *8-9 (finding that pretrial detainee failed to state a due process claim regardless of the standard 
employed). PageID #:
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administrative segregation nor 14 days disciplinary segregation was atypical and significant ); 
Albiola v. Pugh , No. 4:14 -CV-1645, 2015 WL 1915289, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2015) 
(137-day segregation). Other than the fact of isolation, Plaintiff does not allege facts describing 
the conditions of her segregation, much less conditions that (1) differ “‘in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life ’” or (2) differ from conditions experienced by other segregated inmates. 
See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 487; see also, Baker, 155 F.3d at 813 . Plaintiff therefore does not 
raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her administrative segregation presented an atypical and 
significant hardship under Sandin. See Freeman v. Troutt, No. 3:10-CV-0697, 2012 WL 5439160, 
at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 7, 2012) (pretrial detainee “failed to offer any evidence comparing his 
administrative confinement ‘to the ordinary incidents of prison life ’ and thus “failed to create a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his 97 or 98 –day segregation imposed an ‘atypical 
and significant hardship’”). 
Under Bell, a pretrial detainee can establish that he or she was subjected to unconstitutional 
punishment by showing either (1) “an expressed intent to punish on the part of the detention facility 
officials,” or (2) that “a restriction or condition is not rationally related to a legitimate government 
objective or is excessive in relation to that purpose.” J.H. v. Williamson Cnty., 951 F.3d 709, 717 
(6th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)). 
Thus, “a defendant does not violate a pretrial detainee ’s rights if the defendant has a legitimate 
governmental objective for imposing the restrictions or conditions. ” Patton v. Shelby Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Office, No. 2:20-cv-2438, 2021 WL 3891588, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2021) (citing 
Martucci v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
While Plaintiff asserts that she has “not once in my entire life ever been a predator, ” and 
“at no given time did I say I was afraid [or] scared for my life ” (DN 29), the evidence plainly PageID #:
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contradicts these unsworn statements. Plaintiff’s institutional and medical records indicate, inter 
alia, an “extensive history of exposing self to others, ” and “[suicidal ideations] subsequent to 
gender dysphoria.” (DN 27-8, PageID.252, 262 ). As to the rationale for Plaintiff ’s single-cell, 
administrative segregation placement, LMDC’s Classification Coordinator Meagan Kilkelly 
attests that Plaintiff was identified as a “heightened risk because of her antisocial and predatory 
behavioral history at LMDC. ” (DN 27-4). Plaintiff was further determined to be too great of a 
risk to be placed in the general population. She could neither be housed with men as she was a “a 
potential target for victimization, ” nor with women due to presenting a security risk to female 
inmates and possessing male genitalia. ( Id.). Plaintiff’s unsworn and unsupported statement 
cannot serve to create a genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff ’s administrative segregation 
was not rationally related to the legitimate governmental objectives of safety and security . See 
generally, Jones v. City of Franklin , 677 F. App ’x 279, 282 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[C]onclusory 
allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not evidence, and are not sufficient to 
defeat a well -supported motion for summary judgment. ”). Because Plaintiff ’s placement in 
administrative segregation was not punitive in nature, her due process claim must fail, and 
summary judgment is warranted in favor of Defendants Collins and Puckett. 
See Martucci, 944 F.2d at 294 (finding that pretrial detainee’s segregated confinement for security 
reasons was not impermissible punishment because it was reasonably related to a legitimate 
government objective); Bennett, 2023 WL 8705413, at *3 (uncontroverted evidence showed that 
detainee’s segregation was not punitive and was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental 
objective of ensuring the safety and security of jail, staff, and other inmates). 
The Court also addresses Plaintiff’s apparent argument she should be classified and 
assigned housing at LMDC consistent with her identification documents, medical and jail records, PageID #:
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and social history recognizing her gender as female. However, “Courts have held that prisoners 
generally do not have a liberty interest in avoiding being transferred to another prison, or in being 
housed in a particular institution.” Eagle v. Wash. State Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:24-CV-01388-JCC-
BAT, 2025 WL 270555, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 
2025 WL 660621 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 2025) (citing Olim v. Wakinekona , 461 U.S. 238, 245 
(1983), and Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225–27 (1976)). This precedent has been applied in 
the context of transgendered inmates. See id. (male-to-female transgender inmate had no liberty 
interest in being housed in a women’s facility); see also, e.g., Millhouse v. Gill, No. 2:25-CV-491, 
2026 WL 266441, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2026) (any Fourteenth Amendment due process 
claim pertaining to transgender inmate ’s housing assignment would be subject to dismissal for 
failure to state a claim) (citing Eagle, 2025 WL 270555, at *4)); Aliahmed v. Troxler, 839 F. App’x 
675, 677 (3d Cir. 2021) (transgender plaintiff lacked a cognizable liberty interest in being confined 
in a particular institution and was thus unlikely to succeed on claim for injunctive relief seeking 
transfer to women’s prison); Gordon v. Inslee, No. 3:21-CV-5802-BJR-DWC, 2023 WL 2874062, 
at *8 –9 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2023), report and recommendation adopted , 2023 WL 2864187 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 2023) (granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on transgender 
prisoner’s due process claim based on the failure to transfer her to a women’s prison on the grounds 
that plaintiff had no liberty interest in being housed in any particular prison or with any particular 
cellmate); Minor v. Tome , No. CV225579MASLHG, 2023 WL 2401511, at *3 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 8, 2023) (dismissing inmate’s due process claim on initial review, acknowledging the absence 
of binding precedent establishing a rule that “it is improper to ever house a transgender inmate in 
a male prison,” and that “persuasive precedent instead suggests that there is no clearly established 
law setting forth rules for the housing and placement of transgender inmates ”) (citing Minor v. PageID #:
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Dilks, No. 19-18261, 2022 WL 3369707, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2022) ). Thus, to the extent 
Plaintiff’s due process claim is based upon the propriety of her placement relative to her gender 
identity, it too would fail as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, Defendants Collins and Puckett are entitled to summary judgment on 
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim pertaining to classification and segregation. 
As such, the Court need not reach these Defendants’ remaining contentions. 
2. Defendant Green 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Green imposed cruel and unusual punishment by placing 
her on razor restrictions “for no reason” and “never allowing [her] to go to [general] population.” 
(DN 1, Page.ID.5).6 
Defendant Green argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff does not 
raise a genuine dispute as to Green ’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation, fails to 
demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies, and does not establish a constitutional 
violation. Additionally, Green argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (DN 26 -1, 
PageID.191). Plaintiff’s response states only that “they put me on razor restriction for no reason 
on multiple occasions to try to hurt me. ” (DNs 29, 30). Regardless of the theory under which 
Plaintiff seeks to pursue her claim concerning her razor restriction, she fails to establish a 
constitutional infirmity. 
Of the record evidence, a n entry dated September 29, 2022 , in Plaintiff’s Offender Notes 
reads “[Plaintiff] was denied a razor due to comments about using the razor to cut private parts. ” 
(DN 26-3, PageID.202 ). Another note dated October 1 4, 2022, states, “Inmate was [placed] 
(10/1/22) at the request of Lt. Stansfield [sic] as when inmate went to return a razor after razor 
 
6 Plaintiff’s claim of being denied access to general population is subsumed by her due process claims based on 
classification and housing, which have been dismissed for the reasons set forth above. PageID #:
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call, the blade was missing and above stated [s]he didn’t know where it was.” (Id., PageID.203). 
On October 25, 2022, Timothy Stanfield wrote, “Inmate can be removed from razor restriction on 
11/1/22. That would be a 30 day restriction.” (DN 27-7, PageID.236). 
The next relevant entry is dated August 29, 2023, and shows that Puckett inquired as to 
whether Plaintiff, who was on razor restriction until November 20, 2023, could shave under 
observation by a staff member. (DN 26-3, PageID.206). Green apparently responded that, “Inmate 
is on a razor restriction until 11/20 due to an incident. When an inmate is on razor restriction, they 
absolutely do not receive a razor. If they are needing to shave, they will need to wait until gym 
time or request to utilize hair clippers from gym time.” (Id.). On September 1, 2023, a comment 
states that, “inmate was allowed to use a razor under officer supervision.” (Id., PageID.206). The 
record also reflects at least two placements on suicide watch due to suicidal ideation and self-harm. 
(DN 26-3, PageID.204-205; DN 27-8, PageID.250-263). 
First, u nder a due process analysis, Plaintiff fails to set forth facts or cite evidence 
suggesting that razor restriction was an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin. 
See, e.g., Bean v. McQuiggin, No. 2:07-CV-113, 2008 WL 4151351, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 
2008) (plaintiff’s allegations did not show that permanent razor restriction imposed an atypical 
and significant hardship); Cates v. Brennan, No. 2:06 -CV-109, 2006 WL 1625316, at *3 (W.D. 
Mich. June 7, 2006) (“[S]hower and razor restriction for 30 days does not constitute an atypical 
and significant hardship.”). And despite her unsupported assertions that she was placed on razor 
restriction for “no reason” and “to hurt” her, the record evidence shows that the razor restriction 
was implemented for non-punitive, i.e., safety and security reasons. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 53 9 
(“[I]f a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal —if it is arbitrary or 
purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is PageID #:
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punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees. ”); see also, Bennett, 
2023 WL 8705413, at *4 (detainee’s en hanced security measures , including sack lunches and 
frequent cell searches, were constitutionally permissible where uncontroverted evidence showed 
they were imposed not for punishment but for safety and security). Thus, Plaintiff has not raised 
a genuine dispute as to whether the razor restriction violated her due process rights. See generally, 
Gooden v. City of Memphis Police Dep ’t, 67 F. App'x 893, 895 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory 
allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not evidence, and are not enough to 
defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment.”). 
Plaintiff’s claim likewise fails under a Fourteenth Amendment conditions - of-
confinement/deliberate indifference analysis. See generally, Bensfield v. Murray, No. 4:21-CV-
P104-JHM, 2022 WL 508902, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 18, 2022) (The Fourteenth Amendment 
applies to conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees and requires a showing 
of: (1) conditions of incarceration posing a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff, and 
(2) that defendants acted deliberately and recklessly in the face of an obvious or known, 
unjustifiably high risk of harm.) (citations omitted). 
Plaintiff has not alleged an “extreme deprivation ” which deprived her of the “minimal 
civilized measure of life ’s necessities.” Hadix v. Johnson , 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted). “With respect to access to laundry services, showers, and razors, the 
Constitution only requires that prisoners be allowed to maintain hygiene. ” Pann v. Hadden , 
No. 1:22 -CV-76, 2022 WL 765494, at *14 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2022) (citing Ziegler v. 
Michigan, 59 F. App ’x 622, 624 (6th Cir. 2003) ). Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting that 
she was unable to maintain hygiene, and the record shows that Plaintiff was able to shave under 
staff observation. See Polk v. Parnell , 132 F.3d 33 (6th Cir. 1997) (table) (upholding grant of PageID #:
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summary judgment where the plaintiff’s “allegations that the defendants . . . provided insufficient 
razors for shaving . . . fail even to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation .”); Bean, 
2008 WL 4151351, at *8 ( prisoner’s placement on permanent razor restriction failed to state a 
claim under the Eighth Amendment where he did not “allege or show that he was denied basic 
human needs and requirements .”).7 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim of 
unconstitutional conditions stemming from her razor restriction, and Defendant Green is entitled 
to summary judgment on this claim. Having found that summary judgmentis warranted in Green’s 
favor for these reasons, the Court need not reach his remaining contentions. 
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants ’ motions for summary judgment (DN s 25, 26 ) are 
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s “Motion for Final Judgment” (DN 29) is DENIED. 
The Court will enter a separate Judgment dismissing the action.
Date:
cc: Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of record
4414.015
7 The objective prong of a conditions-of-confinement claim, which requires a showing of a substantial risk of serious 
harm, is the same under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . Mitchell v. Phillips, No. 5:24-CV-P53-JHM, 
2024 WL 4729313, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 8, 2024) (citing Hyman v. Lewis, 27 F.4th 1233, 1237 (6th Cir. 2022)).
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