govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-4_26-cv-00345-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
OWENSBORO DIVISION 
 
BETHANY GILL PLAINTIFF 
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-CV-345-JHM 
BRANDON HATTON DEFENDANT 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
On review of Plaintiff Bethany Gill’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff makes the financial showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court, 
therefore, GRANTS the motion (DN 3). 
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court will conduct its initial review 
of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th 
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) . For the reasons 
that follow, this case will be dismissed. 
I. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 
 Plaintiff, a resident of Florida, sues Brandon Hatton, the father of her minor child. 1 The 
crux of her complaint concerns the behavior of Defendant duri ng and related to ongoing custody 
and child support proceedings in state court. Her complaint references child support proceedings 
in Florida and a Kentucky Fami ly Court case. She acknowle dges that domestic and custody 
matters are generally handled in state court, but she states that she seeks federal review for alleged 
interstate threats under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, the federal criminal stal king statute. The complaint 
also references the Uniform Child Custody Juri sdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). She 
 
1 Plaintiff has another case pending against De fendant Hatton and multiple other Defendants. Gill v. Owensboro 
Health, Inc., 4:25-cv-183-JHM. PageID #:
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further requests that the Court report “any evidence concerning alle ged criminal conduct” to the 
proper law enforcement agency. 
 As relief, she requests a dismissal, stay, or review of “Kentu cky related custodial 
proceedings;” an order that the minor be returned to her; and the referral of alleged criminal 
conduct to the proper authorities. 
II. STANDARD 
Upon review under § 1915(e); McGore, 114 F.3d at 608-09, the Court must dismiss a case 
at any time if it determines that an action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 
See § 1915(e)(2)(B). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, 
USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). This Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less 
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). 
It is axiomatic that federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and their powers 
are enumerated in Article III of the Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 
U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is well 
established that federal courts are courts of limited jurisd iction, possessing only that power 
authorized by the Constitution and statute.”). “J urisdiction defines the contours of the authority 
of courts to hear and decide cases, and, in so doing, it dictates the sc ope of the judiciary's 
influence.” Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin & Assocs. Inc., 150 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 1998), overruled 
on other grounds by Cobb v. Contract Transp., Inc. , 452 F.3d 543, 548–49 (6th Cir. 2006). The PageID #:
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party that seeks to invoke a federal district court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the 
court’s authority to hear the case. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Federal courts have an independent 
duty to determine whether they have jurisdiction and to “‘pol ice the boundaries of their own 
jurisdiction.’” Douglas, 150 F.3d at 607 (quoting Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 
F.3d 162, 165 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h )(3), “[i]f the court 
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. § 2261A 
The complaint states that it involves federa l question jurisdiction and is brought under 18 
U.S.C. § 2261A. Section 2261A is a criminal statute. “It is well settled that the question of whether 
and when prosecution is to be instituted is within the discretion of the Attorney General.” Powell 
v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Only federal prosecutors, and not private 
citizens, have the authority to initiate federal criminal charges. Sahagian v. Dickey, 646 F. Supp. 
1502, 1506 (W.D. Wis. 1986); see also United States v. Nixon , 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) 
(“Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute 
a case.”); Saro v. Brown, 11 F. App’x 387, 388 (6th Cir. 2001) (“A private citizen has no authority 
to initiate a federal criminal prosecution; th at power is vested excl usively in the executive 
branch.”). Nor does § 2261A authorize any private civil cause of action. See Dixon v. Ford Motor 
Co., No. 19-1031, 2020 WL 13560450, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2020) (holding that defendant was 
entitled to summary judgment b ecause § 2261A provides no private civil cause of action). Thus 
this statute does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction in this Court. See Wieland v. Germantown 
Fire Dep’t, No. 2:22-CV-02651-TLP-CGC, 2023 WL 11822196, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 26, 2023). PageID #:
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B. UCCJA 
The UCCJA does not provide a private right of action in federal court. See Thompson v. 
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988); Mensah v. St. Joseph Cnty. Fam. Indep. Agency , 187 F.3d 
636 (6th Cir. 1999) (“If Mensah felt aggrieved by the Michigan court order, his remedy was to 
appeal through the state courts ,” not by invoking the UCCJA); DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal 
Court, 874 F.2d 510, 513 (8th Cir. 1989). “[T]he UCCJEA is not federal law. It is rather a uniform 
law that has been adopted by several states[.]” Dennison v. Stowers, No. 122CV00336JLTSKO, 
2022 WL 2214254, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2022) (quoting Cathey v. Harrison, No. 1:16–CV–
00545–LJO–MJS, 2016 WL 4494446, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016)), report and 
recommendation adopted sub nom. Dennison v. Whitten Stowers , No. 1:22-CV-0336 JLT SKO, 
2022 WL 2918327 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2022). Thus, Plaintiff has no federal claim under the 
UCCJEA, and she has not met her burden of es tablishing federal-question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. 
And Plaintiff does not allege any other plau sible federal claim. The “well-pleaded 
complaint” rule requires that “a federal question be presented on the face of the complaint.” Mich. 
S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Cntys. , 287 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). The Court, having 
read the complaint liberally finds no fede ral claim apparent from the complaint. Erickson v. 
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“The pleadings of pro se litigants must be liberally construed and 
‘held to less stringent standards than form al pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (quoting Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
C. Diversity Jurisdiction 
 Likewise, Plaintiff fails to establish diversity jurisdiction. For a federal court to have 
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, there must be complete PageID #:
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diversity—which means that plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant—
and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 
(1996). Here, according to the complaint, Plaintiff resides in Florida and Defendant resides in 
Kentucky. But Plaintiff does not ask for damages and fails to allege facts supporting a finding that 
the amount in controversy would exceed $75,000. 
D. Abstention 
Moreover, Plaintiff seeks this Court’s involvement in ongoing state court proceedings in 
Kentucky and Florida. However, Younger v. Harris “requires a federal c ourt to abstain from 
granting injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial 
proceedings.” O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1971)). “The Younger abstention doctrine provides that a federal court should 
abstain from interfering in a state court action when (1) ther e is an ongoing state judicial 
proceeding, (2) the state proceed ing implicates important state in terests, and (3) there is an 
adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Graves v. 
Mahoning Cnty., 534 F. App’x 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 775 
(6th Cir. 2008); Am. Family Prepaid Legal Corp. v. Columbus Bar Ass’n, 498 F.3d 328, 332 (6th 
Cir. 2007)). All three factors supporting abstention are present in this case. The matters presented 
in the complaint involve ongoing family court disput es and implicate important state interests in 
determining the disposition of those actions. See Zak v. Pilla, 698 F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1982); 
Izazaga v. Fleming, No. 5:14-CV-00213-GNS, 2015 WL 1284158, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2015). 
And there is no indication that the claims raised by Plaintiff could not be raised in the state court 
proceedings. Therefore, the Younger abstention doctrine would prevent the Court from providing 
the relief she seeks even if the Court had jurisdiction. PageID #:
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“Although a district court may allow a plaintiff to amend [her] complaint before entering 
a sua sponte dismissal, it is not required to do so, LaFountain [v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th 
Cir. 2013], and leave to amend should be denied if the am endment would be futile.” Bishawi v. 
Ne. Ohio Corr. Ctr., 628 F. App’x 339, 347 (6th Cir. 2014)). Here, amendment would be futile. It 
is clear from the face of the complaint that th e Court lacks subject ma tter jurisdiction, and the 
nature of the asserted claims precludes any possibi lity that Plaintiff could cure the jurisdictional 
defect by amendment. See, e.g. , Dennison, 2022 WL 2214254, at *3 (where compla int lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction and no amendment could remedy defect, amendment would be futile). 
 Finally, it is not this Court’s role to “refer” allegedly criminal matters to the proper 
authorities. Nothing prevents Plaintiff from reporting possible crimes to law enforcement.2
IV . CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, the Court will, by separate Order, dismi ss this case for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Date: 
cc: Plaintiff, pro se
4414.009
2 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s other filings: her motion for immediate relief and a temporary restraining order 
(TRO) (DN 1-17) and emergency supplemental affidavit (DNs 5 and 7). Plaintiff’s proposed emergency order (DN 1-
9) seeks the cessation of Defendant’s alleged harassment, the minor’s immediate return, and for Defendant to provide 
certain documentation. Since then, she has filed an “Eme rgency Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Domestic 
Violence Protections for Minor Child” (DNs 5 and 7 (duplicate of DN 5)). The affidavit acknowledges that her 
concerns “have been reported to family court authorities and law enforcement.” The Court has also reviewed her 
Emergency Motion for Expedited Federal Review/Prosecution for RICO/Retaliation/Kidnapping & Attempted 
Murder/Color of Law Violations/Review of Long Complaint, ADA Accommodation for Procedural 
Requirements/Formatting Defects and Waiver of Certificate of Service Due to Investigative Interference Concerns, 
and Protective Relief, Motion for Judicial Notice of Prior Exhibits/Complaints to Be Considered and Referred to FBI 
Emergently (DN 8). 
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