govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_24-cr-00013-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR LACK 
OF JURISDICTION 
 
3:24-CR-13 (VDO) 
UNITED STATES, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
-against- 
 
DAVID M. FELSKE, 
 
Defendant. 
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VERNON D. OLIVER, United States District Judge: 
In November 2015, Defendant David Felske was sentenced in the Northern District of 
Indiana to 100 months’ imprisonment followed by a term of 36 months’ supervised release.
1 
On January 16, 2024, after he was released from custody and began serving his term of 
supervised release, jurisdiction of Mr. Felske ’s case was transferred to the District of 
Connecticut.2 
On December 22, 2025, Defendant David Fe lske appeared for a revocation hearing, 
where the Court imposed sentence after finding th at he violated the terms of his supervised 
release (the “December 22, 2025 Revocation”). 3 The Court revoked Mr. Felske’s supervised 
release and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment, followed by a new 18-month term of 
supervised release. 4 In granting counsel’s request to defer imprisonment, the judgment 
provided that Mr. Felske “shall surrender for service of senten ce at the institution designated 
 
1 ECF No. 1 at 11–12. 
2 Id. at 1. 
3 ECF No. 56. 
4 ECF No. 58. 

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by the Bureau of Prisons: before 2 p.m. on February 5, 2026,” a little over five weeks after the 
date of sentencing.5 
On January 9, 2026, the United States Probatio n Department filed a violation petition 
(“Second Violation Petition”), alleging that Mr. Felske committed two additional violations of 
his conditions of supervised release. 6 The Second Violation Petition alleges that, after Mr. 
Felske’s revocation hearing but before his self-surrender date of February 5, 2026, Mr. Felske 
(1) violated the condition that he reside at the Residential Reentry Center and (2) violated the 
condition that he not unlawfully use any contro lled substance. 7 After Mr. Felske’s initial 
appearance on the Second Violation Petition on January 14, 2026, the Court ordered the parties 
to file simultaneous briefs on the threshold issue of jurisdiction.8 The Court also modified the 
judgment by ordering that Mr. Felske “shall se lf-surrender to the United States Marshals 
effective immediately.”9 Mr. Felske is currently serving his term of imprisonment based on the 
Court’s December 22, 2025 Revocation. 
Pending before the Court is Mr. Felske ’s motion to dismiss the pending Second 
Violation Petition for lack of jurisdiction.10 The motion is ripe as of February 23, 2026.11 
 
5 Id. 
6 ECF No. 60. 
7 Id. 
8 ECF No. 67. 
9 ECF No. 75. 
10 ECF No. 76. 
11 ECF Nos. 77, 80, 81, 84, 85. 

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I. LEGAL STANDARD 
The statutory regime under the Sentencing Reform Act empowers a district court “to 
impose at the time of sentenci ng a post-imprisonment term of supervised release as an 
additional component of the sentence.” United States v. Fernandez , 152 F.4th 124, 130 (2d 
Cir. 2025) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)). “A defe ndant must comply with conditions set by a 
district court as part of the term of supervised release.” Id. “Imposition of supervised release 
is authorized by the original conviction, and so too are the consequences of its violation.” 
United States v. McNeil , 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005). “A violation of an imposed 
condition could result in the revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release and require 
that the defendant ‘serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by 
statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release.’” Fernandez, 152 F.4th 
at 131 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e )(3)). To “revoke” in the supe rvised release context, the 
Supreme Court has held, means “to call or su mmon back,” without the implication that no 
further supervised release is subsequently possible. United States v. Vargas, 564 F.3d 618, 622 
(2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. United States , 529 U.S. 694, 706 ( 2000)). The Second 
Circuit has not yet ruled on whet her a defendant remains subject to conditions of supervised 
release after revocation but before self-surrender. United States v. Banks , 763 F. App’x 132, 
134 n.3 (2d Cir. 2019). 
II. DISCUSSION 
Upon due consideration, this Court finds th at it lacks jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e)(3) to revoke Mr. Felske’s supervised release at this j uncture, where Mr. Felske is 
currently serving a term of imprisonment as a direct result of the December 22, 2025 
Revocation of his supervised release. As mentioned, in December 2025, the Court revoked Mr. 

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Felske’s supervised release and sentenced hi m to six months’ imprisonment, followed by a 
new 18-month term of supervised release. The n, in setting a date for Mr. Felske to self-
surrender, the Court did not explicitly articulate that Mr. Felske remained subject to supervised 
release and its conditions (as opposed to pretri al release) after revocation but before self-
surrender. Because at the time of the filing of the Second Violation Petition the Court had 
already revoked supervised release and imposed sentence on Mr. Felske, and modified the 
judgment to order Mr. Felske to serve his term of imprisonment, the Court cannot again modify 
that sentence. There cannot be subsequent vi olations of a previously revoked term of 
supervised release after a sent ence has been imposed for that revocation. Nor can the Court 
revoke a term of supervised release for the separate reason that Mr. Felske is currently serving 
a term of imprisonment. See United States v. Wing, 682 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2012); but see 
United States v. Harris, 878 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2017). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the preceding reasons, the motion to dismiss the Second Violation Petition is 
granted. 
 
SO ORDERED. 
Hartford, Connecticut 
May 14, 2026 
 
/s/Vernon D. Oliver 
VERNON D. OLIVER 
United States District Judge 
 
 

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