govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-3_24-cr-00067-0

- 1 - 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
LOUISVILLE DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH LANHAM (01), 
LAURA LANHAM (03), 
 
Defendants. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 
) 
) 
 
 
 
Criminal Action No. 3:24-CR-067-CHB-
01, 03 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER 
 
 
 *** *** *** *** 
 This matter is before the Court on three motions. First, Defendant Joseph Lanham1 filed a 
Motion to Suppress Cell Phone Data and Text Message Records (“ First Motion to Suppress”) . 
[R. 46]. The United States filed a response opposing the Motion to Suppress, [R. 57], and Joseph 
Lanham replied. [R. 66]. Meanwhile, Defendant Laura Lanham filed a Motion to Adopt and Join 
in Co -Defendant Joseph Lanham’s Motion to Suppress Cell Phone Data and Text Message 
Records (“Motion to Join”). [R. 58]. The United States did not respond to that motion. Joseph then 
filed a Motion for Hearing, requesting that the Court schedule a hearing on the First Motion to 
Suppress. [R. 64]. The United States thereafter filed a response in opposition to the Moti on for 
Hearing. [R. 74]. Joseph then sought an extension of time to file rep lies to the United States’ 
responses to his various motions, including a second motion to suppress, [R. 62], which the Court 
will address by separate order. [R. 83]. Inexplicably, he also requested an extension of time to file 
a reply regarding the First Motion to Suppress, despite having already filed a reply. Id.; see also 
[R. 66 (Reply to First Motion to Suppress)]. Nevertheless, his request was granted, [R. 84], and he 
 
1 For clarity, the Court will refer to Joseph and Laura Lanham by their first names. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 2 - 
 
filed an additional reply that addresses his First Motion to Suppress, as well as his second 
suppression motion. [R. 88]. This matter is therefore ripe for review . For the following reasons, 
the Court will grant the Motion to Join, [R. 58], but will deny the Motion for Hearing, [R. 74], and 
the Motion to Suppress, [R. 46]. 
I. BACKGROUND2 
On June 4, 2024, Defendants Joseph, Laura, and Richard “Ricky” Elble II were indicted 
by a grand jury for Money Laundering Conspiracy (Count 1), Monetary Transactions in Proceeds 
of Specified Unlawful Activity (Counts 2–5), Obstruction of Proceedings Before Departments and 
Agencies (Count 6), and Falsification of Records in a Federal Investigation (Count 7 ). [R. 1]. 
Joseph was indicted on all counts, while Laura was only indicted on Counts 1 and 3, and Elble was 
indicted only on Count 1. Id. All of the defendants have pled not guilty to the charges in the 
Indictment. See [R. 11]; [R. 23]; [R. 24]. 
According to the facts alleged in the Indictment, Joseph “engaged in narcotics trafficking 
activities for which he received cash proceeds” and “ purchased numerous vehicles, vessels, and 
properties, using various methods to conceal his actual ownership and control over his real and 
personal property, as well as their source,” including having Laura, his mother, and Elble, a relative 
by marriage , act “as nominee purchasers and owners in his transactions and [carry] ou t other 
transactions on his behalf.” See [R. 1, ¶¶ 2–4]. 
On April 29, 2025, Joseph filed his First Motion to Suppress. [R. 46]. His motion seeks to 
exclude “all of the data and text message records obtained from the forensic search of all of the 
Defendants’ cellular phones.” Id. at 1. As already explained, Laura seeks to join this motion, 
 
2 The Court has provided a detailed factual overview of this case in its Memorandum Opinion and Order on the parties’ 
second suppression motion. That Memorandum Opinion and Order also thoroughly explains how the various premises 
warrants, which authorized the seizure of the cell phones, are supported by probable cause. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 3 - 
 
[R. 58]. Joseph also requests a hearing on this motion. [R. 64]. These three motions are ripe for 
review, see [R. 57], [R. 66], [R. 74], [R. 88], and the Court will address each in turn. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C) permits defendants to file pretrial motions 
to suppress evidence, which are “appropriate when evidence sought to be introduced in a criminal 
case is alleged to have been unlawfully obtained.” United States v. Guzman, No. 5:10-CR-00020, 
2011 WL 1899767, *1 (W.D. Ky. May 19, 2011) (citation omitted), “‘The proponent of a motion 
to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by 
the challenged search or seizure. ’” United States v. Richards , 659 F.3d 527, 536 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978) ). Should a court find that evidence was 
unlawfully obtained, “the Supreme Court has long held that evidence collected in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment may be excluded from the criminal trial of the victim of the unlawful search.” 
See United States v. Novak , 814 F. App’x 1009, 1012 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 648 (1961)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Join, [R. 58] 
 
The Court first considers Laura’s Motion to Join. [R. 58]. No response was filed to this 
motion, and the Court therefore understands that the United States has no objection to Laura’s 
request. Accordingly, the Court will grant Laura’s Motion to Join, [R. 58]. 
B. Motion for Hearing, [R. 64] 
Next, the Court briefly addresses the Motion for Hearing. [R. 64]. In his single-sentence 
motion, Joseph asks the Court “to schedule a hearing on [the First Motion to Suppress].” Id. at 1. 
The Court understands that Joseph seeks oral argument on his motion; however, he has offered no PageID #:
<pageID>
- 4 - 
 
explanation as to why oral argument would be helpful to the Court or necessary for the resolution 
of the motion. Indeed, his motion is wholly lacking in any argument or citation to authority. See 
id. Moreover, having reviewed the motion and the extensive briefing on this matter, the Court does 
not believe that oral argument is necessary. 
Additionally, in his second reply brief, which addressed several pending motions, Joseph 
states that “the affidavits supporting the warrants to search and seize the property from homes, 
vehicles, and cell phones to extract and download cell phone data were based on false information 
and mere speculation.” [R. 88, p. 2]. From the best the Court can tell, this argument relates only to 
Joseph’s second suppression motion, in which Joseph requests a Franks hearing on the various 
premises warrants. See id. Those premises warrants are not at issue in this case, as explained below, 
and are instead addressed by separate order. Moreover, to the extent this is an attempt to request a 
Franks hearing with respect to the warrants that authorize data extraction from the cell phones, it 
is improper to raise such arguments for the first time in a reply brief, and the Court will not consider 
it. See Ryan v. Hazel Park , 279 F. App ’x 335, 339 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. 
Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2008)) (“Generally, this Court has found that an issue raised 
for the first time in a reply to a response brief in the district court is waived .”); see also Settle v. 
Parris, No. 3:19 -CV-32, 2021 WL 1566074, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2021) (“[O]rdinarily, 
courts do not consider an argument that a party raises for the first time in a reply brief.”); Laughlin 
v. United States, No. 20-5433, 2020 WL 9423256, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2020). 
The Court will therefore deny the Motion for Hearing. [R. 64]. Having addressed both the 
Motion to Join, [R. 58], and the Motion for Hearing, [R. 64], the Court next turns to the First 
Motion to Suppress. [R. 46]. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 5 - 
 
C. First Motion to Suppress, [R. 46] 
Defendants’ First Motion to Suppress seeks to exclude “all of the data and text message 
records obtained from the forensic search of all of the [d]efendants’ cellular phones.” [R. 46, p. 1].3 
As grounds for the Motion, Defendants argue “[t]he warrants executed to obtain said cell phone 
data used overbroad language, lacked sufficient particularity, lacked specificity in the Forensic 
Analysis section regarding search methodologies, and created a chain of custody issue through 
multi-agency handling of the data.” Id. The United States, in response, argues that a defendant 
lacks the ability to challenge any searches other than those of their own cellphones and that the 
warrants were constitutionally valid. See generally [R. 57]. 
Before turning to the merits of the defendant’s arguments, the Court will first address the 
timeliness and the scope of the motion. 
1. The Timeliness of the Motion 
Joseph’s First Motion to Suppress was filed on April 29, 2025. [R. 46]. Laura’s Motion to 
Join was filed on June 13, 2025. [R. 58]. However, according to Joseph’s Order Following 
Arraignment and Scheduling Order, [R. 11], his deadline for filing defensive motions, including 
motions to suppress, was thirty-five days after his arraignment, or July 11, 2024. Id. at 5; see also 
[R. 24, p. 5 (setting Laura’s dispositive motions deadline as thirty-five days after her arraignment, 
or July 18, 2024)]. No other orders extended this deadline, and no such extension was requested. 
However, neither the United States nor the defendants discuss the motion’s untimeliness. While 
the Court could deny the First Motion to Suppress on this ground alone, see generally United States 
v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961 , 964 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)), given the United 
 
3 For the remainder of this opinion, the Court uses “Defendants” to refer only to Joseph Lanham and Laura Lanham. 
Elble has not joined the First Motion to Suppress. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 6 - 
 
States’ lack of objection and the length of time before trial, it will nonetheless evaluate the merits 
of the motion. 
2. The Scope of the Motion 
Next, the Court must determine exactly which warrants and which searches are challenged 
in the instant motion. The motion lists and attaches eight state court warrants that Defendants 
characterize as having “authorized the extraction” of the challenged information. [R. 46, pp. 1 –
2].4 However, the Court has reviewed each of the state court warrants and understands that four of 
the warrants are for premises, and three of those premises warrants permitted only the seizure of 
the cell phones themselves, not the extraction of data from the phones . See [R. 46-1 (“the 
Johnsontown Warrant”)]; [R. 46 -2 (“the Nanisinh Warrant”)]; [R. 46 -3 (“the Pine Lake 
Warrant”)]. Only one premises warrant authorized a data search of any seized cellphones. [R. 46-
4, pp. 11 –13 (“ the Sea Wave Warrant”)]. Importantly, however, that specific premises is not 
alleged to belong to either Joseph or Laura Lanham. See id. at 7 (alleging it to be the residence of 
Brian Reed Jr.). Instead, Joseph and Laura’s primary addresses are respectively alleged to be on 
Pine Lake Drive, [R. 46 -5, p. 2], and Johnsontown Way, [R. 48 -8, p. 2]. As already explained, 
neither the Pine Lake Warrant nor the Johnsontown Warrant permitted data extraction from any 
 
4 The United States asserts that a federal warrant was issued after Lanham’s arrest, “allowing searches of three 
additional cell phones seized from [his] truck after his arrest .” [R. 57, pp. 2 –3]; see also [R. 57-2 (Federal Warrant 
and Affidavit)]. However, as the United States points out, Joseph “has not directly challenged the federal warrant.” 
Id. at 3. Then, in his second reply brief, Joseph argues that “[t]he state court warrants, and the federal court warrant, 
lacked any methodology or forensic analysis except for that they intended to search the entire phone data.” [R. 88, p. 
4 (emphasis added)]. It is improper to challenge the federal warrant for the first time in his reply brief (indeed, his 
second reply brief). See Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-1635, 2014 WL 12584328, at *1 (N.D. Ohio 
Feb. 25, 2014). Moreover, Joseph has not discussed that warrant in any detail, nor developed any specific arguments 
relating to that warrant. The Court therefore declines to address it further but notes that any such challenge would be 
even more untimely and undeveloped. See Members Heritage Credit Union v. N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., No. 5:21-
CV-207, 2023 WL 4876383, at *13 (E.D. Ky. July 31, 2023) (explaining that the party’s argument “is wholly 
undeveloped, and the Court need not consider it ”). Regardless, the Court has reviewed the federal warrant and its 
detailed affidavit, [R. 57-2], and finds that , to the extent Joseph challenges that warrant, such arguments would fail 
for the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 7 - 
 
seized cellphones. See [R. 46-3, pp. 2, 7]; [R. 46 -1, p. 9]. The Court therefore understands that 
Defendants are not challenging the four premises warrants in the First Motion to Suppress, as those 
warrants did not authorize data extraction from Joseph or Laura’s cell phones.5 
Upon seizing various cell phones pursuant to the above -listed premises warrants, officers 
then sought and received four additional warrants for “[a]ny/all electronic data contained in [the] 
[p]hones.” See [R. 46-5, p. 6 (Warrant re: Joseph’s Phones)]; [R. 46-6, p. 6 (Warrant re: Joseph’s 
Son’s Phone) ]; [R. 46-7, p. 6 (Warrant re: Brian Reed’s Phones) ]; [ R. 46 -8, p. 6 (Warrant re: 
Laura’s Phones)]. Only two of these warrants related to the cell phones seized from the Pine Lake 
premises (Joseph’s primary addr ess) and the Johnsontown premises (Laura’s primary address). 
See [R. 46-5]; [R. 46-8]. The other warrants for cellphone searches involved a phone seized from 
a traffic stop of Joseph’s son, see [R. 46-6], and two cellphones seized pursuant to the Sea Wave 
Warrant belonging to its resident, see [R. 46-7]. The Court understands that these four warrants, 
each of which permits the extraction of data from the cell phones addressed therein , are the 
warrants at issue in the First Motion to Suppress. 
However, Defendants do not have standing to challenge each of these four warrants. The 
Sixth Circuit, acknowledging Supreme Court precedent, has noted that “Fourth Amendment rights 
are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. ” 
United States v. Pearce , 531 F.3d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133–34 (quoting Alderman v. United States , 394 U.S. 165, 174 
(1969))). The Supreme Court has also held that, 
“[i]n order to qualify as a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure one 
must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was 
directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only thorough the use of 
 
5 To the extent the defendants challenge the premises warrants on other grounds, they do so in a second suppression 
motion, [R. 62], which the Court addresses by separate order. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 8 - 
 
evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone 
else.” 
Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134 –35); see also Minnesota v. Carter , 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) 
(“[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that 
he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is 
reasonable. . . .” (emphasis added)). 
In United States v. Molina, 569 F. Supp. 3d 596 (E.D. Ky. 2021), the district court affirmed 
the magistrate judge’s finding that the defendant “did not have standing to challenge the search of 
[a co-defendant’s] phone” that was seized pursuant to a warrant for their shared residenc e. Id. at 
604, 608. The magistrate judge had found that the defendant 
ha[d] neither asserted nor demonstrated any ownership or possessory interest in any 
of [his co -defendant’s] cell phones. “[B]ecause Fourth Amendment rights are 
personal, suppression of evidence as the product of a Fourth Amendment violation 
can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search 
itself, not by those who are aggrieved so lely by the introduction of damaging 
evidence.” Critically, a person “with no possessory interest” in property has no 
standing to challenge the searc h of that property on Fourth Amendment privacy 
grounds. 
Id. at 621 (first quoting United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760, 768 (6th Cir. 2017) ; then quoting 
United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 626 (6th Cir. 2015)). 
 Similarly, Defendants Joseph and Laura have “neither asserted nor demonstrated any 
ownership or possessory interest ” in the cellphones that did not belong to them—namely, those 
belonging to Joseph’s son, [R. 46-6], or to their associate, Brian Reed, [R. 47-7]; [R. 46-4]. See 
Molina, 569 F. Supp 3d at 621. Indeed, neither Joseph nor Laura have addressed this issue, despite 
it being raised by the United States, see [R. 57, pp. 2–4], and they do not dispute that they are only 
entitled to seek suppression of the evidence obtained from their cell phones. See [R. 66 (Reply)]. 
The Court thus finds that, “because Fourth Amendment rights are personal,” Powell, 847 F.3d at 
768, Joseph has standing only to challenge the warrant issued for his cellphones, [R. 46-5]. For the PageID #:
<pageID>
- 9 - 
 
same reason, Laura has standing only to challenge the warrant issued for her cellphones, [R. 46 -
8]. Therefore, the Court will evaluate the First Motion to Suppress only as to the warrants 
permitting data extraction from Joseph and Laura’s cellphones. See [R. 46 -5]; [R. 46 -8] 
(collectively “the cellphone warrants”). 
Having addressed both the scope of the motion as well as its timeliness, the Court now 
turns to Defendants’ arguments : first, that the warrants were overly broad and lacked sufficient 
particularity; second, that the warrants lacked specificity regarding the methods of extraction; and 
finally, that the search warrants created chain of custody and related issues. 
3. Overbreadth and Lack of Particularity 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. “The text of the [Fourth] Amendment thus expressly imposes two 
requirements. First, all searches and seizures must be reasonable. Second, a warrant may not be 
issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set 
out with particularity.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (citation omitted). 
Defendant’s first argument focuses on the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.6 
More specifically, the motion first asserts that the warrants “used overbroad language [and] lacked 
sufficient particularity.” [R. 46, p. 1]. The challenged language in the cellphone warrants permitted 
law enforcement to search: 
 
6 In their First Motion to Suppress, [R. 46], Defendants do not argue that the search warrants permitting data 
extraction lacked probable cause. To the extent they challenge probable cause relating to the premises warrants, they 
do so in a second suppression motion that the Court addresses by separate order. See [R. 62]. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 10 - 
 
[a]ny/ all electronic data contained in Phones seized . . . to include data that may 
identify the owner or user of the cellular phone, address books and calendars, audio 
and video clips, contact lists, call histories and call logs, text messages (SMS), 
multimedia messages (MMS), recorded messages, subscriber information modules 
(SIM Cards), E-mail messages and attachments (whether read or unread), Internet 
World Wide Web (WWW) browser files (including but not limited to, browser 
history, browser cache, stored cookies, browser favorites, auto complete from 
history and stored passwords), photographs, global position system (GPS) data 
including coordinates, way points and tracks, access to social media applications 
and/ or other data contained therein including all mobile apps and any other data 
that may be evidence of narcotics trafficking in violation of KRS 218A. 
[R. 46-5, p. 6]; [R. 46-8, p. 5]. Defendants argue that this language is improper because: (1) the 
cellphone warrants “do not define a specific date range”; (2) they “lack limiting language to restrict 
the search to communications or data reasonably tied to narcotics trafficking”; and (3) “[t]he term 
‘any other data that may be evidence’ is overly vague and invites an exploratory rummaging of the 
entire device.” [R. 46, p. 2]. In response, the United States argues that “ [a] cell phone warrant is 
not automatically overbroad because it allows for the whole device to be searched,” and “the 
affidavits and warrants supporting searches of the Defendant [s’] phones seek evidence related to 
marijuana trafficking and money laundering activity and provide support for why such evidence 
is likely to be found on [the] devices.” [R. 57, pp. 4–5]. 
As previously explained, “[t]he Fourth Amendment demands that a search warrant 
‘particularly describ[e]’ the places law enforcement may search and the things they may seize.” 
United States v. Castro, 881 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV), cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1447 (2021) ; see also King , 563 U.S. at 459 . This particularity requirements 
prevents “the use of general warrants authorizing wide -ranging rummaging searches that violate 
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 
286 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “the scope of a warrant 
should be confined to evidence relating to a specific crime, supported by probable cause.” Id. 
However, the Sixth Circuit has noted that, PageID #:
<pageID>
- 11 - 
 
“while a general order to explore and rummage is not permitted, the degree of 
specificity required is flexible and will vary depending on the crime involved and 
the types of items sought.” Therefore, “a description is ‘valid if it is as specific as 
the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.’” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 The Sixth Circuit’s Castro case is instructive. In Castro, the defendant challenged the 
particularity of the warrants authorizing a search of her cellphone . See Castro, 881 F.3d at 964–
66. The d efendant first challenged the language permitting law enforcement to search for 
information relating to “ a crime” and suggested it should have said “the crime.” Id. at 964–65 
(emphasis added). The Court explained, however, that “[a] warrant that empowers police to search 
for something satisfies the particularity requirement if its text constrains the search to evidence of 
a specific crime. ” Id. at 965 (citations omitted). The affidavit in Castro described “evidence of 
probable cause that [the defendant] participated in several armed robberies,” and the warrant also 
stated that there was “probable cause to believe that evidence of violations of Texas Penal Code 
29.03 (Aggravated Robbery)[] exist[ed]” on the phone. Id. The language identifying the specific 
crimes at issue “served as a ‘global modifier’ that limited the scope of the warrant.” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 233 (6th Cir. 2014) ); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 
427 U.S. 463, 479, 480–81 (1976) (holding that language in warrant s permitting the search of 
“other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime ” did not make the warrant fatally general 
because it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants refer[red] only to the 
crime” articulated in the warrant ”) (internal quotation marks omitted ). And while the sentence 
cited by the defendant referenced “a crime” rather than “the crime” of aggravated robbery, the 
Court found that such language must be read in the context of the warrant as a whole. Id. When 
“[r]ead as a whole, the warrants told officers they could search only for evidence related to the 
aggravated burglary.” Id. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 12 - 
 
 Relatedly, the Court acknowledges that the “‘[f]ailure to limit broad descriptive terms by 
relevant dates, when such dates are available to the police, will render a warrant overbroad. ’” 
United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1140 (2011). However, 
the Sixth Circuit has found that “failure to specify a timeframe does not make [a] detailed warrant 
overbroad” when a “warrant specifie[s] a subject -matter limitation sufficient to limit the warrant 
to evidence of the crimes described in the affidavit.” United States v. Sullivan, 751 F. App’x 799, 
804–05 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding an otherwise “detailed warrant ” for a laptop search was not 
overbroad when the affidavit limited the search to evidence of child pornography as described in 
the affidavit), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2481 (2023); see also United States v. Glatz, No. 3:19-CR-
218-TAV-DCP, 2023 WL 4503981, at *30 (E.D. Tenn. May 1, 2023), report and recommendation 
adopted, 2023 WL 4351503 (E.D. Tenn. July 5, 2023) (explaining that the failure to limit the 
seizure of electronic evidence to a specific time frame “does not turn [a] state search warrant into 
a general warrant . . . [because] ‘a subject matter limitation,’ such as the limitation provided by the 
specific crime can ‘fulfill the same function as a time limitation would have done .’” (citation 
modified) (quoting United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 1999))). 
 In the present case, the warrants for Joseph and Laura’s cell phones were limited to “ data 
that may be evidence of narcotics trafficking in violation of KRS 218A.” [R. 46-5, p. 6]; [R. 46-8, 
p. 5]. The affidavit details law enforcement’s lengthy investigation into the defendants’ alleged 
drug trafficking activities, as well as an explanation by the affiant as to how his training and 
experience had informed his awareness of how traffickers use cellphones. See [R. 46-5, pp. 2–4]; 
[R. 46-8, pp. 2–4]. Thus, read as a whole, the warrants told law enforcement officers that they 
could search only for evidence of narcotics trafficking. Therefore, Defendants’ argument that the PageID #:
<pageID>
- 13 - 
 
warrants “lack limiting language to restrict the search to communications or data reasonably tied 
to narcotics trafficking,” is wholly without merit , as is their argument regarding the lack of a 
specific date range . [R. 46, p. 2], Here, the above -described “subject-matter limitation [is] 
sufficient to limit the warrant to evidence of the crimes described in the affidavit ,” such that the 
lack of a specific data range does not make the warrant impermissibly broad. See Sullivan, 751 F. 
App’x at 805. For the same reason, the warrant is not “overly vague” nor does it “invite[] an 
exploratory rummaging.” Sullivan, 751 F. App’x at 804; Castro, 881 F.3d at 965. 
 The defendants’ remaining argument is that the language “any other data that may be 
evidence” is “overly vague and invites an exploratory rummaging of the entire device.” [R. 46, 
p. 2]. For support, Defendants rely on a nonbinding case from the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals. [R. 46, pp. 2–3 (discussing Burns v. United States, 235 A.3d 758 (D.C. 2020))]. However, 
that case is unpersuasive and easily distinguished. In Burns, the court found the warrant’s 
permission to search the phones for “any evidence” of the indicated homicide was too broad when 
the affidavit set forth probable cause only for text messages and calls from a single night and 
location data for two days, “[b] ut beyond those discrete items, the affidavits stated no facts that 
even arguably provided a reason to believe that any other information or data on the phones had 
any nexus to the investigation.” Id. at 769, 774. In this case, however, the affidavits attached to the 
warrants for Defendants’ cell phones plainly explain the probable cause for the expansive search 
by providing a description of the lengthy investigation and an explanation by the affiant as to how 
his training and experience had informed his awareness of how traffickers use cellphones. See 
[R. 46-5, pp. 2–4]; [R. 46 -8, pp. 2–4]. Defendants wholly fail to discuss this language in their 
motion. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 14 - 
 
And perhaps more importantly, Defendants do not argue that the affidavits in this case 
“could have provided a more specific description of the items subject to seizure.” Burns, 235 A.3d 
at 777. This distinguishes the case from Burns, where the warrants could have been limited to a 
search for the limited number of text messages and calls (occurring on a single day) and the 
location data (spanning only two days). Id. Instead, the affidavits in this case “made robust 
showings of probable cause for a range of relevant evidence likely to be contained within the 
phones’ data,” and there is nothing to indicate that the affiant had “a way of knowing in advance 
precisely where within that data the evidence would be found. ” Id. at 776 (distinguishing Burns 
from cases “in which the affidavits submitted in support of the warrants made robust showings of 
probable cause for a range of relevant evidence likely to be contained within the phones’ data, 
without a way of knowing in advance precisely where within that data the ev idence would be 
found”). 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has explained t hat warrants for electronic data are often 
permissibly broad, given that it is frequently difficult to discern in what format the information 
will be. United States v. Bass, 785 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that “[t]he affidavit set 
forth a substantial basis to believe such evidence [of the alleged crime] existed on [the defendant’s] 
cell phone, but it was unclear as to the particular format in which the evidence existed” (emphasis 
in original)), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 884 (2015). In Bass, the warrant at issue authorized the search 
for any records of communication, indicia of use, ownership, or possession, including electronic 
calendars, address books, e-mails, and chat logs. Id. at 1050. At the time the warrant issued, “the 
officers could not have known whether this information was located in the phone or in what 
format.” Id. “Thus,” the Sixth Circuit explained, “the broad scope of the warrant was reasonable 
under the circumstances at that time.” Id. So too here. In this case, as in Bass, “[t]he affidavit set PageID #:
<pageID>
- 15 - 
 
forth a substantial basis to believe ” evidence of the crime of narcotics trafficking “ existed on 
[Defendants’] cell phone[s], but it was unclear as to the particular format in which the evidence 
existed.” Id. at 1049; see generally [R. 46-5]; [R. 46-8]. 
Because the warrants authorizing the search of the Defendants’ cellphones were 
sufficiently particular and not overly broad , the Court will not suppress the data retrieved from 
their cellphones on this ground. 
4. Specificity Regarding Search Methods and Forensic Tools 
Next, Defendants argue that “[t]he warrants’ authorizations for extraction by ‘unspecified 
forensic tools and examiners, ’ including ‘offsite facilities, ’ violates fundamental due process 
rights”7 because “[t]his lack of specificity and oversight in tool selection and examiner conduct 
undermines the reliability and constitutionality of the evidence obtained. ” [R. 46, p. 3]. More 
specifically, Defendants argue that “the warrants in this case do not provide a detailed description 
of the methodology that would be used to conduct the forensic examination of the cell phones that 
were seized,” and they “do not specify how non -relevant data would be handled to avoid over 
seizure of information outside the scope of the warrant.” Id. at 4. This argument can best be 
summarized as follows: “Without a search protocol to narrow the examination to only material 
authorized by the warrant, the search becomes indistinguishable from a general search, which the 
Fourth Amendment explicitly prohibits.” Id. 
The challenged portions of the warrants read: 
This device is to be analyzed by Detective Matthew Pribble of the Jeffersontown 
Police Department and/ or a certified cellular forensic examiner and/ or any federal, 
local, and state law enforcement agents, including technical personnel located at 
offsite locations. 
 
7 Defendants cite to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 
579 (1993), but make no substantive arguments relating to these two cases. See [R. 46, p. 3]. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 16 - 
 
Based upon my knowledge, training and experience, as well as information related 
to me by agents and others involved in the forensic examination of cellular phones, 
I know that it may be necessary for a certified cellular forensic examiner to perform 
a detailed off-site analysis on this cellular phone because cellular phone searches 
involve highly technical, complex, and dynamic processes. 
The cellular phone is in possession of the Jeffersontown Police Department and 
may be transported to a specialized law enforcement forensic facility or may be 
examined at the Jeffersontown Police Department by a certified forensic examiner 
where the cell phones may be subject to an in -depth forensic examination of the 
data by use of specialized software and techniques accepted by the computer 
forensic scientific community 
[R. 46-5, p. 6]; [R. 46-8, pp. 5–6]. 
In arguing that this description is unconstitutional, Defendants point to a single out -of-
circuit district court case, Matter of the Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI 013888003738427 
(hereinafter In Re iPhone ), 31 F. Supp. 3d 159 (D. D.C. 2014) , in which t he magistrate judge 
“required [the United States to submit] an intended search protocol so that [he] could better 
understand the scope of the warrant ,” such as “[w] hether the target devices would be imaged in 
full, for how long those images will be kept, and what will happen to data that is seized but is 
ultimately determined not to be within the scope of the warrant.” Id. at 165. Binding Sixth Circuit 
case law, however, has denounced such a requirement. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “[g]iven 
the unique problem encountered in computer searches, and the practic al difficulties inherent in 
implementing universal search methodologies, the majority of federal courts have eschewed the 
use of a specific search protocol and, instead, have employed the Fourth Amendment ’s bedrock 
principle of reasonableness on a case-by-case basis.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 538 (emphasis added) 
(discussing computer searches) ; see also United States v. Jefferson , No. 14 -20119, 2015 WL 
3576035, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2015), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Johnson, 726 F. App’x 
393 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. on other grounds Jefferson v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 2772 (2019) (examining In Re iPhone , 31 F. Supp. 3d 15 9, finding “no Sixth PageID #:
<pageID>
- 17 - 
 
Circuit precedent—or even appellate precedent outside this Circuit —requiring that a warrant to 
search a cell phone specify a search protocol to satisfy the Fourth Amendment ,” and quoting 
Richards, 659 F.3d at 538). 
The Sixth Circuit has also recognized that, “[a]s is the case with paper documents, on 
occasion in the course of a reasonable search, investigating officers may examine, ‘at least 
cursorily,’ some ‘innocuous documents . . . in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among 
those papers authorized to be seized.’” Richards, 659 F.3d at 539 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11). “In other words,” the Court explained, “so long as the computer 
search is limited to a search for evidence explicitly authorize d in the warrant, it is reasonable for 
the executing officers to open the various types of files located in the computer ’s hard drive in 
order to determine whether they contain such evidence.” Id. at 540 (citation modified) (citation 
omitted). Indeed, t he Court has explicitly “disagree[d]” with a defendant’s argument that a 
warrant’s “failure to describe with particularity the computer files to be searched or to require the 
use of a search protocol resulted in an unconstitutional general search.” United States v. Evers, 669 
F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Neuhard, 770 F. App’x 251, 254 (6th Cir. 
2019) (discussing Richards and Evers in the context of a cellphone search when the defendant 
“complain[ed] that the warrant did not include a search protocol,” but noting Sixth Circuit 
“precedent does not require a search protocol in all cases”), cert. denied, 150 S. Ct. 570 (2019). 
It is therefore evident from the case law that the Sixth Circuit does not require a strict search 
protocol to be outlined in a search warrant. See Richards, 659 F.3d at 538; Evers, 669 F.3d at 653; 
Neuhard, 770 F. App’x at 254. As previously discussed, the warrants at issue in this case contain 
sufficient limiting language by identifying the specific crime for which investigators could look 
for evidence. See, e.g., Richards, 659 F.3d at 539 –40 (collecting cases). Law enforcement was PageID #:
<pageID>
- 18 - 
 
permitted only to seize “data that may be evidence of narcotics trafficking in violation of KRS 
218A,” [R. 46-5, p. 6]; [R. 46 -8, p. 5], and therefore the warrants “ did not permit a free -ranging 
search.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 541 –42 (finding a warrant permitting the search of a whole 
computer server not overbroad because the warrant ’s scope was limited to the crime alleged); 
United States v. Lostutter, No. 5:16-CR-62-DCR-REW, 2016 WL 8761771, at *9 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 
24, 2016), recommended disposition adopted [R. 67, therein] (noting that “[the d]efendant cite[d] 
no authority for the proposition that searching officers must follow a specific search protocol,” and 
finding “the Sixth Circuit has eschewed imposing on officers specific computer -search steps or 
protocol,” and “ the Supreme Court has been clear that the Fourth Amendment does not require 
‘search warrants [to] include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be 
executed.’” (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98 (2006)) (citing Richards, 659 F.3d 
at 538))). 
Moreover, as argued by the United States, Defendants’ Motion “ offers no support for the 
idea that the facility, examiner, or software application to be used must be identified within a cell 
phone search warrant.” [R. 57, p. 9]. The Court could not independently locate any such authority 
The Court therefore cannot agree that the “ lack of specificity and oversight in tool selection and 
examiner conduct undermine [d] the reliability and constitutionality of the evidence obtained .” 
[R. 46, p. 3] . Especially when, as noted by the United States, the warrants “ provide[] enough 
specificity to ensure reliable practices [were] used to conduct the search [es], while providing 
flexibility in terms of where and how th e search[es] will be conducted,” [R. 57, pp. 8–9], in their 
language permitting the phones to be examined by “ a certified forensic examiner where the cell 
phones may be subject to an in -depth forensic examination of the data by use of specialized 
software and techniques accepted by the computer forensic scientific community .” [R. 46-5, p. 6 PageID #:
<pageID>
- 19 - 
 
(emphasis added)]; [R. 46-8, p. 6 (emphasis added)]. According to representations by the United 
States, the data was extracted using “Cellebrite UFED software, which is specifically designed for 
this type of extraction and forensic examination of cell phones. ” [R. 57, p. 9]; see also United 
States v. Anderson , 563 F. Supp. 3d 691, 696 (E.D. Mich. 2021), aff’d No. 22-1237, 2023 WL 
3413905 (6th Cir. May 12, 2023) (noting that “C ellebrite [ ] has been tried and tested by 
Government attorneys in federal courts across the country”). 
In sum, while the warrants at issue in this case did not include a search protocol, the Sixth 
Circuit does not require that a search warrant include such protocols. See Richards, 659 F.3d at 
538; Evers, 669 F.3d at 653; Neuhard, 770 F. App ’x at 254. Instead, courts undertake “a 
reasonableness analysis on a case-by-case basis.” Neuhard, 770 F. App’x at 254 (quoting Richards, 
659 F.3d at 539. Generally, “ ‘so long as the computer search is limited to a search for evidence 
explicitly authorized in the warrant, ’” as is the case here, “ ‘it is reasonable for the executing 
officers to open the various types of files ’ stored on the seized devices ‘in order to determine 
whether they contain such evidence. ’” Id. (quoting Richards, 659 F.3d at 540). For al l of the 
reasons set forth above, the Court has no reason to believe that this general rule leads to 
unreasonable results in this case. Id. 
Therefore, the lack of specified search protocols or methodologies do es not make the 
warrants unconstitutionally overbroad. The warrants, instead, are limited in scope to evidence of 
narcotics trafficking and may be analyzed only by “techniques accepted by the computer forensic 
scientific community,” of which Cellebrite is certainly one. See [R. 46-5, p. 6]; [R. 46-8, p. 6]. 
Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Suppress will also be denied on these grounds. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 20 - 
 
5. Chain of Custody and Related Issues 
Defendants finally argue that the warrants improperly permitted a range of law 
enforcement personnel to access the phones’ data, without safeguards as to “how many parties will 
access the data,” “who will be responsible for maintaining its integrity,” “whether all accessing 
parties are bound by the same evidentiary rules or privacy standards,” and “if the data will be 
retained, duplicated, or shared beyond the scope of the original warrant.” [R. 46, pp. 4 –5]. 
Defendants claim that “[t]his multi-agency handling of the data raises chain of custody issues, risk 
of unauthorized data dissemination, and/or loss of judicial oversight, which violates Kentucky’s 
standards for evidence handling and due process.” 8 Id. at 5. Defendants also argue that there was 
a “substantial delay” between the phones’ seizures and the forensic searches. See id. The United 
States responded, correctly classifying Defendants’ argument as “ devoid of any relevant legal 
authority calling for suppression,” and concerned with only “hypothetical risks that might emerge 
in execution of the search warrant[s].” [R. 57, p. 10]. 
First, the Court notes that Defendants devote, at most, two sentences to this argument, and 
they fail to cite any legal authority whatsoever in support of their position . See [R. 46, pp. 4 –5]. 
This undeveloped argument need not be considered by the Court. See Members Heritage , 2023 
WL 4876383, at *13 (explaining that the party’s argument “is wholly undeveloped, and the Court 
need not consider it ”); Brown v. Astrue , No. 09-CV-384-HRW, 2010 WL 4878866, at *3 (E.D. 
Ky. Nov. 24, 2010) (“Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort 
 
8 The Court is at a loss as to why counsel has referenced Kentucky’s “standards for evidence handling and due 
process,” nor is it clear what is meant by “loss of judicial oversight.” [R 46, p. 5]. To the extent Defendants attempt 
to raise an argument on these points, such arguments are so undeveloped that the Court cannot and will not address 
them. See Members Heritage, 2023 WL 4876383, at *13 (explaining that the party’s argument “is wholly undeveloped, 
and the Court need not consider it ”); Brown v. Astrue , No. 09-CV-384-HRW, 2010 WL 4878866, at *3 (E.D. Ky. 
Nov. 24, 2010) (“Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed 
argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal 
way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”) (citing McPherson v. Kelsey , 125 F.3d 989, 995 –96 (6th Cir. 
1997)). PageID #:
<pageID>
- 21 - 
 
at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a 
possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”) (citing 
McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)). In any case, the argument is without 
merit. 
The United States argues—and Defendants do not dispute —that collaboration of 
“[n]umerous law enforcement agencies ” is “routine[]” in investigating a cas e, and “[t]here is 
nothing unusual about this kind of coordination, nor is it the kind of activity typically described in 
warrants or their supporting affidavits.” See [R. 57, p. 12]; see generally [R. 66]; [R. 88]. Indeed, 
according to the representations of the United States, the Jeffersontown Police Department does 
not have the internal capabilities to conduct cellphone data extraction and “must rely on partner 
agencies.” Id. at 9. In this case, Joseph’s phones (and, presumably, Laura’s phones) were sent to a 
United States Secret Service facility. Id.; see also [R. 57-2 (documenting the chain of custody)]. 
Defendants offer no authority to suggest such collaboration is atypical , nor any evidence to 
substantiate their speculative chain of custody or improper dissemination concerns. See [R. 46, pp. 
4–5]. And, as already noted, they have failed to cite any legal authority supporting their position. 
Moreover, they have not explained why such concerns would invalidate the warrant such that all 
evidence obtained from the warrant should be excluded, when other arguments, advanced at trial, 
may be utilized to address chain of custody and related issues. Where a defendant challenges the 
chain of custody of evidence, “such challenges go to the weight of the evidence, absent a clear 
showing of abuse of discretion, and do not affect admissibility” as a motion to suppress or motion 
in limine would. United States v. Hillman , 42 F.3d 1389 at *3 (6th Cir. 1994) ; see also United 
States v. Sexton, 119 F. App’x 735, 746 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[C]hallenges to the chain of custody go PageID #:
<pageID>
- 22 - 
 
to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.”) , vacated in part on other grounds , No. 02-
5781, 2005 WL 6011238, at *1. 
Finally, Defendants argue “ there was a substantial delay between the seizure of the 
Defendant[s’] phone[s] and the execution of the forensic search ,” such that they had “ concerns 
about the staleness of the information obtained and whether probable cause remained valid at the 
time of the search.” Id. at 5. The Court notes that these vague and unsupported “concerns” about 
staleness and probable cause are not sufficient to warrant suppression. See generally United States 
v. Chaar, 137 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating, when evaluating whether probable cause was 
sufficient to support a warrant, that “we require more than mere conjecture to suppress evidence”). 
And, perhaps more importantly, the Court does not understand Defendants to be challenging 
probable cause. Instead, while it is difficult to discern the precise parameters of Defendants’ 
arguments, given the lack of development and citation to legal authority , from the best the Court 
can tell, Defendants argue that the delay between the seizure and the search was unreasonable. 
Based on the dates given in the warrants, the delay between the cellphones’ lawful seizure pursuant 
to the Pine Lake and Johnsontown Warrants and the issuance of the cellphone warrants was about 
six days. See [R. 46-1, p. 11]; [R. 46-3, pp. 7–9]; [R. 46-5, pp. 2, 6]; [R. 46-6, pp. 2, 6]. The United 
States’ uncontested representation is that, at least as to Joseph (and presumably as to Laura), the 
cellphones were sent for the forensic searches the day the warrant for its data was issued. [R. 57, 
p. 12]. The searches were complete, and the phones were returned to the Jeffersontown Police 
within twenty-seven days of the request for forensic analysis. [R. 57-3, p. 3]. 
The sole case on which Defendants rel ies from the Fourth Circuit and similar cases f rom 
within the Sixth Circuit are easily distinguishable. In United States v. Pratt, 915 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 
2019), as well as in United States v. Sykes , 65 F.4th 867 (6th Cir. 2023), the Fourth and Sixth PageID #:
<pageID>
- 23 - 
 
Circuits recognized that cellphone searches can be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if 
there is a significant and unjustified delay between the seizure of the phone and the issuance of a 
warrant for a forensic search. Pratt, 915 F.3d at 271–72; Sykes, 65 F.4th at 877–78. In other words, 
those courts acknowledged that suppression may be justified due to an unreasonable delay in 
reviewing seized evidence. However, in both cases, the initial seizure was warrantless (though 
otherwise justified). See Pratt, 915 F.3d at 270; Sykes, 65 F.4th at 873; see also United States v. 
Barnett, No. 6 :21-CR-13-GFVT-HAI-2, 2022 WL 17548069, at *2 –3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 
2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. United States v. Taylor , No. 6 :21-CR-13-
GFVT-HAI-1, 2022 WL 16922105 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2022) (noting the difference in cases 
involving warrantless seizures and those in which the seizures were justified by a search warrant); 
Taylor, 2022 WL 16922105 , at *14 (noting the defendant was “mistake[n]” in “ relying on cases 
involving warrantless seizure,” such as Pratt). 
A sister court in the Eastern District of Kentucky has previously explained the distinction 
between a delay following a warrantless seizure and a delay following a warrant-backed seizure. 
Barnett, 2022 WL 17548069, at *6. The Barnett court explained that, when a defendant’s “phone 
was seized pursuant to [a] residential warrant,” “[i]n terms of the allowable timeframes,” the court 
was “in a different universe from cases involving warrantless seizures.” Id. at *6 (collecting cases). 
This is because “[a]fter a court finds probable cause and issues a warrant to search, the 
government’s interest in the items increases considerably. ” United States v. Witherspoon , No. 
6:23-CR-39-REW-HAI, 2025 WL 1085553, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 29, 2025), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 6:23 -CR-39-REW-HAI, 2025 WL 830990 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 17, 
2025). In such cases , “courts routinely uphold delays of multiple months between issuance of a 
search warrant (or a warrant-backed seizure) and the ultimate analysis of the seized devices. ” Id. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 24 - 
 
(citations omitted). Thus, regarding Barnett, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report 
and recommendation denying suppression , stating that “c aselaw on retention of electronic 
containers of data generally permits large delays between seizure pursuant to a warrant and 
subsequent review of the computer’s contents” and that “the Sixth Circuit has expressly validated 
warrants that authorize the seizure of computer equipment for subsequent off-site review.” Taylor, 
2022 WL 16922105, at *14 (citing Evers, 669 F.3d at 653). 
In this case, even if the initial seizure had been warrantless, a six-day delay (between the 
seizure and the issuance of a warrant for data extraction) would not be unreasonable after 
“balancing the individual ’s possessory interest in the object seized against the law -enforcement 
interests justifying the seizure and retention .” See Sykes , 65 F.4th at 878 ; cf. United States v. 
Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1034 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding a six-day delay not unreasonable even after 
a warrantless seizure). But the Court’s analysis is even stronger here, where the initial seizure of 
the cell phones was pursuant to a valid warrant, and as such, Defendants had little possessory 
interest in the cellphones , and the warrant “justified the government ’s interference with [their] 
possessory interest [s] in the phone [s].” Cf. Taylor , 2022 WL 16922105, at *14 (calling the 
residential warrant authorizing the seizure of the defendant’s cellphone “t he albatross that 
prevent[ed] [the defendant’s] arguments from taking flight ”). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has 
recognized that “[w]hen there is a reasonable belief that a cellphone contains evidence of a crime, 
there is greater justification for retention of that cellphone, pursuant to a valid warrant. ” United 
States v. Whipple, 92 F.4th 605, 614 n.11 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Sykes, 65 F.4th at 879). The valid PageID #:
<pageID>
- 25 - 
 
premises warrants, as well as the cellphone warrants, make clear that probable cause existed to 
believe the phones may contain evidence of narcotics trafficking. Cf. id.9 
Similarly, a twenty -seven day delay (between the issuance of the warrant and the 
completion of the search ) is not unreasonable . See [R. 57, p. 11]; [ R. 57-3, p. 3]; cf. id. at 614 
(explaining that “[t]he federal rules of criminal procedure give law enforcement the authority to 
conduct searches of lawfully seized phones after they are seized,” and “[a] substantial amount of 
time can be involved in the forensic imaging and review of information on cellphones” (citation 
modified) (first citing United States v. Cleveland, 907 F.3d 423, 430–31 (6th Cir. 2018); then citing 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 ; finally citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, advisory committee ’s note to 2009 
amendments)); Witherspoon, 2025 WL 1085553, at *7 (noting that, after a warrant had been issued 
permitting the search of the seized device, “the government’s interest in the items increases 
considerably,” and “courts routinely uphold delays of multiple months between issuance of a 
search warrant . . . and the ultimate analysis of the seized devices”). 
In sum, the Court holds there was no constitutional issue with the warrant permitting inter-
agency cooperation in the investigation and analysis of the cellphones. The Court also holds there 
was no unreasonable delay between the seizure of the phones, the procurement of the warrants for 
their contents, and the forensic search. As such, the Motion to Suppress will be denied. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is HEREBY ORDERED 
as follows: 
1. Defendant Laura Lanham’s Motion to Join, [R. 58], is GRANTED. 
 
9 Again, the Court notes that Defendants have not argued that the warrants lacked probable cause, at least for purposes 
of this First Motion to Suppress. See [R. 46]. To the extent they challenge probable cause as to the premises warrants, 
they do so in a second suppression motion, [R. 62], which the Court addresses by separate order. PageID #:
<pageID>
- 26 - 
 
2. Defendant Joseph Lanham’s Motion for Hearing, [R. 64], is DENIED. 
3. The First Motion to Suppress, [R. 46], is DENIED. 
This the 14th day of October, 2025. PageID #:
<pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight