govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-01706-0

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
UNI
TED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
C
.N.,
Plaintiff, 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY, 
Defendant. 
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C
ivil Action No. 25-01706 (SRC) 
OP
INION 
CH
ESLER, District Judge 
This matter comes before the Court on appeal by Plaintiff C.N. (“Plaintiff”) of the final 
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) determining that she was not 
disabled under the Social Security Act (“Act”). This Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g) and, having considered the submissions of the parties without oral argument, 
pursuant to L. CIV. R. 78.1(b), finds that the Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED. 
I. BACKGROUND
In brief, this appeal arises from Plaintiff’s application for benefits, alleging disability 
beginning October 16, 2020. A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Trina Moore 
(the “ALJ”) on February 28, 2024, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March 28, 2024. 
Plaintiff sought review of the decision from the Appeals Council. After the Appeals Council 
denied Plaintiff’s request for review on January 28, 2025, the ALJ’s decision became the 
Commissioner’s final decision, and Plaintiff filed this appeal. PageID:
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In the decision of March 28, 2024, the ALJ found that, at step one, Plaintiff had not engaged 
in substantial gainful activity since the onset date of September 8, 2022. ( Tr. 19.) At step two, 
the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments of fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, diabetes 
mellitus, restless legs syndrome, lupus, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative 
joint disease of the shoulder, and asthma. Id. At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s 
impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal the severity of any 
of the listed impairments set forth in the Listing of Impairments. Id. At step four, the ALJ found 
that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 
20 CFR § 416.967(b), except she is limited to never climbing ladders, ropes, scaffolds or crawling; 
frequently handling and fingering bilaterally; avoiding concentrated exposure to extreme 
temperatures, wetness humidity, and pulmonary irritants; avoiding all exposure to hazards such as 
unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts and uneven terrain. The ALJ further found that 
she retains the ability to carry out simple routine tasks on a continuous basis with simple 
instructions and simple work-related decisions; no assembly line or production rate pace work; no 
work in tandem; occasional interaction with co -workers and supervisors; no constant interaction 
with the public in a customer service setting, and is able to tolerate occasional changes in the work 
setting and work processes. Id. at 21. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had no past relevant 
work. Id. at 25. At step five, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform a significant number 
of jobs existing in the national economy. Id. at 26. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 
had not been disabled within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 27. 
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and the 
case remanded with three principal arguments: (1) the ALJ failed to provide the required PageID:
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supportability analysis as to the opinions of the agency reviewers; (2) the ALJ’s determination that 
Plaintiff can perform frequent handling and fingering bilaterally is not supported by substantial 
evidence and (3) the ALJ failed to perform an evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
As to the burden of proof, Plaintiff bears the burden in the first four steps of the analysis 
of demonstrating how his impairments, whether individually or in combination, amount to a 
qualifying disability. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). As to the harmless error 
doctrine, the Supreme Court explained its operation in a similar procedural context in Shinseki v. 
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009), which concerned review of a governmental agency 
determination. The Court stated: “the burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls 
upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Id. In such a case, “the claimant has the 
‘burden’ of showing that an error was harmful.” Id. at 410. Plaintiff thus bears the burden, on 
appeal, of showing not merely that the Commissioner erred, but also that the error was harmful. 
At the first four steps, this requires that Plaintiff also show that, but for the error, s he might have 
proven her disability. In other words, when appealing a decision at the first four steps, if Plaintiff 
cannot articulate the basis for a decision in h er favor, based on the existing record, s he is quite 
unlikely to show that an error was harmful. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. The ALJ Provided An Adequate Supportability Analysis as to the Opinions of the 
Agency Reviewers 
 
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide an adequate supportability analysis of the 
opinions of the two agency reviewers as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and 20 C.F.R. § 
416.920c(b). (Pl.’s Br. at 18-20). PageID:
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For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, such as the instant case, the ALJ considers 
medical opinions when assessing the RFC, but will not “defer or give any specific evidentiary 
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 
finding(s), including those from [the claimant’s own] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). 
Rather, the ALJ assesses the persuasiveness of medical opinions, and in doing so, need only 
explain how she considered the “most import ant” factors of “supportability” (i.e., how well the 
medical source supported the opinion with objective medical evidence and explanation) and 
“consistency” (i.e., how consistent the opinion is with other evidence). 20 C.F.R. §§ 
416.1520c(a), 416.1920c(b)(2)-(3). T he ALJ “need not reiterate the magic words ‘support’ or 
‘consistent’ for each doctor,” and may “weave [discussion of] supportability and consistency 
throughout her analysis.” Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2024). 
Moreover, the ALJ’s decision must be “read as a whole.” Jones v. Barnhart , 364 F.3d 501, 505 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
The ALJ’s determination reads as follows: 
In July 2023, the claimant ’s record was reviewed by State agency 
medical consultant Mohammad Rizwan (Exhibit 2A, at 4 -5). Dr. 
Rizwan concluded that the claimant could perform light exertional 
work and needed to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme, cold, 
extreme heat, wetness, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases and 
poor ventilation. On reconsi deration in September 2023, State 
agency medical consultant Leonard Nicosia affirmed Dr. Rizwan ’s 
opinion (Exhibit 4A, at 5-6). The undersigned finds the opinions of 
Dr. Rizwan and Dr. Nicosia persuasive . The claimant's ability to 
perform light exertional is consistent with repeated findings of 
normal strength and a non-antalgic gait. In April 2023, the claimant 
had an antalgic gait but improved tolerance to sitting and standing 
(Exhibit 6F, at 49). The claimant's lower back pain improved 
significantly with epidural steroid injections and medial branch 
blocks. Pulmonary examinations in the record are consistently 
normal but her history of asthma reasonably supports environmental PageID:
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limitations including a need to avoid concentrated exposure to 
extreme temperatures, wetness humidity, and pulmonary irritants. 
The record shows repeated complaints of hand and wrist symptoms 
but diagnostic imaging showed mostly normal or mild findings 
(Exhibit 6F, at 1, 38, 120, 123). Dr. Merlin found the claimant's 
grasping strength and manipulative functions unimpaired (Exhibit 
5F, at 2). Nevertheless, a limitation to frequent handling and 
fingering bilaterally is warranted by Dr. Gartshteyn's findings of 
right wrist discomfort with range of motion, Heberden and 
Bouchard nodes and PIP joint tenderness (Exhibit 2F, at 35) and Dr. 
Kang's findings of tenderness along the proximal and DIP joints of 
her hands with mild coldness and some bluish discoloration fr om 
Raynaud's (Exhibit 6F, at 48). 
 
(Tr. 24-25). 
 
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide the supportability analysis as to the medical 
opinions of the two agency reviewers as required by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c (b). ( Pl.’s Br. at 19). 
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to sufficiently explain why these opinions had persuasive 
value for the RFC analysis, and limited her discussion to only a consistency analysis. Id. at 20. 
 The Court disagrees. The ALJ had no obligation to use the word “supportability” in her 
analysis. As made clear by the Third Circuit in Zaborowski, the ALJ “need not reiterate the magic 
words ‘support’ or ‘consistent’ for each doctor,” and may “weave [discussion of] supportability 
and consistency throughout her analysis.” 115 F.4th at 639. T he ALJ was permitted to weave her 
discussion of both supportability and consistency throughout her analysis, which she did. Id. 
 In the paragraph just quoted above, the ALJ began by summarizing the opinions of each 
state agency examiner, followed by his determination that found the two opinions to be persuasive. 
The remainder of the paragraph summarizes the evidence of record that is consistent with, and 
thereby supportive of, the two opinions. Although the word “supportability” does not appear in 
that paragraph, it is clear to this Court that the ALJ cited the evidence of record that “fit with the PageID:
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other evidence of [the claimant’s] condition . . .” Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 640. In the words of 
the Third Circuit, “[t]here was no need to say more than that.” Id. 
As to the “other evidence” that the ALJ cited in that paragraph, f or example, the ALJ 
referenced Dr. Merlin’s finding that Plaintiff’s “grasping strength and manipulative functions” 
were unimpaired. (Tr. 25; Ex. 5F at 2). Also, the ALJ found “a limitation to frequent handling 
and fingering bilaterally is warranted” specifically as a result of Dr. Gartshteyn’s findings of right 
wrist discomfort with range of motion, H eberden and Bouchard nodes and PIP joint tenderness 
(Exhibit 2F, at 35) and Dr. Kang's findings of tenderness along the proximal and DIP joints of her 
hands with mild coldness and some bluish discoloration from Raynaud's (Exhibit 6F, at 48), all of 
which speak directly to supportability and consistency. (Tr. 24-25). Again, “[t]here was no need 
to say more than that.” Id. 
Because the ALJ’s discussion of the opinions of the two state agency reviewers clearly 
wove supportability and consistency into the analysis, as required by Zaborowski , the Court is 
satisfied that the ALJ’s supportability analysis is sufficient under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and 20 
C.F.R. § 416.920c(b). 
B. The RFC Limitation for Frequent Handling and Fingering Is Supported by 
Substantial Evidence 
 
The ALJ’s RFC determination reads as follows: 
“After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she is 
limited to never climbing ladders, ropes, scaffolds or crawl ing; 
frequently handling and fingering bilaterally; avoiding concentrated 
exposure to extreme temperatures, wetness humidity, and 
pulmonary irritants; avoiding all exposure to hazards such as 
unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts and uneven terrain. 
She retains the ability to carry out simple routine tasks on a PageID:
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continuous basis with simple instructions and simple work- related 
decisions; no assembly line or production rate pace work; no work 
in tandem; occasional interaction with co -workers and supervisors; 
no constant interaction with the public in a customer service setting; 
and is able to tolerate occasional changes in the work setting and 
work processes.” 
 
(Tr. 21). 
Plaintiff argues that this RFC limitation is unsupported because the ALJ interpreted raw 
medical data. (Pl.’s Br. at 21-22). Defendant responds that the RFC is an administrative finding 
reserved to the ALJ, the ALJ may formulate an RFC without a corresponding medical opinion, 
and the ALJ reasonably considered the evidence in the record. (Def.’s Opp. at 4- 7). The Court 
agrees with Defendant. 
An RFC determination is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and must 
be based on “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945( a)(3). The 
Third Circuit has repeatedly held that an ALJ is not required to adopt a specific medical opinion 
or identify a physician who assessed the exact limitations included in the RFC. See Chandler v. 
Commissioner of Social Security, 667 F.3d at 359, 362 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Here, the ALJ relied on clear statements of medical opinion from medical sources . For 
example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had reported dropping items due to trouble with fine motor 
manipulation, as well as Dr. Yevgeniya Gartshteyn’s findings of “discomfort with [range of 
motion] of the [right] wrist” (Ex. 6F at 5, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 30, 36, Ex. 7F at 10, 13, 17, 21, 25, 29, 
35, 41). 
The ALJ balanced these clinical findings with references to treatment records and medical 
opinions that suggested that Plaintiff retained the unimpaired capacity for fingering and handling. 
The ALJ noted the observation of Dr. Francky Merlin, the consultative examiner, that Plaintiff’s PageID:
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“[g]rasping strength and manipulative functions are not impaired” (Tr. 24, Ex. 5F at 2). The ALJ 
noted that, although the record reflected repeated complaints of hand and wrist symptoms, 
“diagnostic imaging showed mostly normal or mild findings ,” (Tr. 24), referencing Dr. Kang’s 
report finding intact ligaments, no fractures or contusions, no muscular strain or atrophy, no visible 
nerve damage, and “normal” or “unremarkable” impressions of Plaintiff’s wrists . (Ex. 6F at 1, 
38, 120, 123). The ALJ f ound the prior administrative medical findings persuasive, except for 
the portion regarding no manipulative limitations and, to Plaintiff’s benefit, found that an RFC 
limitation for frequent handling and fingering was appropriate. (Tr. 24- 25). As explained in 
Titterington v. Barnhart, “there is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular 
findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC. Surveying the medical evidence 
to craft an RFC is part of the ALJ's duties .” 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006) . The ALJ 
explained how the limitations in the RFC were derived from the medical evidence of record, 
including the opinions of physicians. Plaintiff has failed to persuade this Court that the ALJ erred 
in the analysis of the medical evidence. 
Plaintiff also argues that the record supports a more restrictive limitation, but the presence 
of evidence supporting a contrary conclusion does not undermine the ALJ’s determination so long 
as substantial evidence supports it. The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its 
judgment for that of the ALJ. Williams v. Sullivan , 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). The 
ALJ appropriately relied on statements of medical opinion and other medical evidence , as 
explained above. The possibility that another finder of fact might have arrived at a different 
determination does not alter this Court’s determination that the RFC determination is supported 
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Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination 
that Plaintiff retained the capacity for frequent handling and fingering. 
C. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints 
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her subjective complaints 
regarding the severity of her symptoms. (Pl.’s Br. at 25-31). The Court disagrees. 
An ALJ must consider a claimant’s subjective complaints, including pain and other 
symptoms, but is not required to accept them as fact. Rather, the ALJ must evaluate whether such 
statements are consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record. See 
C.F.R. § 416.929; SSR 16-3p. On judicial review, the agency’s factual findings are “‘conclusive’ 
if supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” See Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Although an ALJ must carefully consider a claimant’s subjective 
complaints, “the ALJ is not required to credit them,” particularly where her statemen ts are 
undermined by other evidence. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 363 
 Here, the ALJ clearly considered Plaintiff’s testimony that she experienced significant 
pain, fatigue, and limitations in her ability to sit, stand, walk, and use her hands. (Tr. 22- 23). 
The ALJ then compared these allegations to the record evidence and found that Plaintiff’s 
statements were “not entirely consistent” with the same. (Tr. 23). 
Here, the ALJ followed the regulatory framework and found that the record supported 
limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to work but did not support her allegations of disabling symptoms 
and cited several reasons why . (Tr. 21 -25). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically 
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms she alleged, but 
Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms PageID:
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were not entirely consistent with the evidence in the record. (Tr. 22). The ALJ explained that 
she found that the objective medical evidence was inconsistent with the severity and degree of 
limitations Plaintiff alleged . (Tr. 22 -25). The ALJ discussed clinical examination findings 
related to tenderness and decrease range of motion in the spine, shoulder, and right wrist and hand. 
(Tr. 22-24, 301, 348, 350, 359, 364, 504, 559). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s grasp and 
manipulative functions were not impaired, she had non- antalgic gait, straight leg raising was 
negative, and strength and sensation were intact . (Tr. 23-24, 301-02, 551, 553, 556, 559, 562, 
565, 586, 571, 575, 578, 581, 583, 586, 588, 591, 594, 792, 794, 797). Moreover, the ALJ 
highlighted that while Plaintiff’s diagnostic imaging was largely unremarkable, the MRIs did show 
signs of tenosynovitis and underlying inflammatory arthritis . (Tr. 23, 509- 12, 549, 631, 634). 
The ALJ also noted that though Plaintiff testified her pain was a nine out of ten in severity, (Tr. 
44-45), she rated her overall pain only a five -to-six out of ten at times (Tr. 22, 301, 575, 588; see 
also Tr. 581, 583 rating pain four-to-five out of ten; Tr. 559, 562, 637, 792, 794 rating pain six-to-
seven out of ten). The ALJ thus had substantial evidence to support her determination that the 
objective medical evidence was inconsistent with the severity and degree of limitations Plaintiff 
alleged. (Tr. 22 -25). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2) (“Objective medical evidence of this type is 
a useful indicator to assist us in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence 
of your symptoms and the effect those symptoms, such as pain, may have on your abili ty to 
work.”). 
 Importantly, as explained supra, the ALJ did not reject outright Plaintiff’s complaints of 
pain and limitations . Instead, the ALJ acknowledged them in part by incorporating multiple 
limitations into the RFC, including restrictions to light work, environmental limitations, and PageID:
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limitations to simple, routine tasks with reduced social interaction. (Tr. 21). This reflects a 
reasonable evaluation of the evidence rather than an improper dismissal of Plaintiff’s subjective 
complaints as suggested by Plaintiff. 
 Plaintiff’s argument again amounts to a request that the Court reweigh the evidence and 
reach a different conclusion. However, the Court’s role is limited to determining whether the 
ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, not whether the Court would have reached 
a different result. See Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. The Court is satisfied that the ALJ’s findings 
are supported by substantial evidence as required by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)) 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported 
by substantial evidence. The Commissioner’s decision will therefore be AFFIRMED. 
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. 
 ____________________________ 
 S TANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
Dated: May 13, 2026 
/s/ Stanley R. Chesler PageID:
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