govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_24-cv-01735-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
VICTORINOX SWISS ARMY, INC. and 
VICTORINOX AG, 
: 
: 
: 
 
 Plaintiffs, : 
 : 
v. : Case No. 3:24-cv-1735 (RNC) 
 : 
TRADE CHANNEL LLC and JOHN DOES : 
1-10, : 
 : 
 Defendants. : 
 
RULING AND ORDER 
 
In this action for trademark infringement, plaintiffs 
Victorinox Swiss Army, Inc. and Victorinox AG (collectively 
“plaintiffs” or “Victorinox”) allege that since February 2024 or 
earlier, defendant Trade Channel LLC (“the defendant”) has 
advertised and sold a high volume of non-genuine goods bearing 
Victorinox’s registered trademarks on Amazon.com. The defendant 
was served with the summons and complaint in November 2024 but 
has failed to appear or otherwise defend the claims. The 
complaint alleges that Victorinox sent the defendant cease-and-
desist letters accusing it of infringement in February, March, 
August, and September 2024, all of which the defendant also 
apparently ignored. A default against the defendant having been 
entered by the Clerk, the plaintiffs now move pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) for entry of a default 
judgment. They request that the judgment include: (1) a 

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permanent injunction preventing the defendant from continuing to 
infringe; (2) an award of $84,217.13 in damages; and (3) an 
order freezing the funds in the defendant’s account with 
Amazon.com, Inc. so they can be used to satisfy the damages 
award. For reasons stated below, the motion is granted in full. 
I. 
“On a motion for default judgment after default has 
entered, ‘a court is required to accept all of the [plaintiff’s] 
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences 
in [the plaintiff’s] favor, but it is also required to determine 
whether the [plaintiff’s] allegations establish [the 
defendant’s] liability as a matter of law.’” Mirlis v. Greer, 
80 F. 4th 377, 383 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 
577 F. 3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
In this case, the plaintiffs’ allegations, accepted as 
true, plausibly establish, directly or by reasonable inference, 
the defendant’s liability as a matter of law on all counts in 
the complaint. 
A. Counts 1, 2, and 4: Trademark Infringement and Unfair 
Competition 
“To sufficiently state claims for trademark infringement 
and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must 
show first, that its mark is protected, and second, that the 
defendant’s use in commerce of the allegedly infringing mark 

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would likely cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
affiliation of the defendant’s goods with plaintiff’s goods.” 
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. JAND, Inc., 119 F. 4th 234, 246 (2d Cir. 
2024) (citations omitted). “The test for trademark infringement 
and unfair competition under Connecticut law is identical to the 
test under the Lanham Act.” Verilux, Inc. v. Hahn, No. 3:05-cv-
-00254 (PCD), 2007 WL 2318819, at *10 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2007). 
The first part of this test is satisfied. Victorinox’s 
trademarks are registered with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, which is “prima facie evidence that they are 
valid and protectable.” Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Prod. Studio, Inc., 
88 F. 4th 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2023). 
As to the second part, in determining whether a plaintiff 
has plausibly demonstrated a likelihood of confusion, courts 
consider the Polaroid factors. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad 
Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). “Those 
factors include the following: (1) strength of plaintiff’s 
trademark; (2) the degree of similarity between the two marks; 
(3) the proximity of the products and their competitiveness with 
one another; (4) evidence that the senior user may ‘bridge the 
gap’ by developing a product for sale in the market of the 
alleged infringer’s product; (5) evidence of actual consumer 
confusion; (6) evidence that defendant adopted the imitative 
mark in bad faith; (7) quality of the defendant’s products; and 

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(8) sophistication of consumers in the relevant market.” Adidas 
Am., Inc. v. Thom Browne Inc., 599 F. Supp. 3d 151, 160 
(S.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495). “The 
Polaroid factors are not exclusive and no single factor is 
dispositive.” Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, 
Inc. v. Security Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 2016). 
Analysis of these factors “is not mechanical, but rather, 
focuses on the ultimate question of whether, looking at the 
products in their totality, consumers are likely to be 
confused.” Star Indus. Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 384 
(2d Cir. 2005). 
Analyzed in light of the Polaroid factors, the plaintiffs’ 
allegations establish the requisite likelihood of confusion as 
to the origin, sponsorship, or affiliation of the parties’ 
products. 
As to the first factor, Victorinox’s trademarks are 
strong. “To gauge a mark’s strength, we consider two factors: 
its inherent distinctiveness, and its distinctiveness in the 
marketplace.” Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 
739, 743 (2d Cir. 1998). “[R]egistered trademarks are presumed 
to be distinctive and should be afforded the utmost protection.” 
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 
867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986). As discussed, the trademarks at issue 

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here are registered with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office. 
As to the second factor, the marks used by the defendant 
are not only similar to Victorinox’s registered marks but 
identical to them. 
The third factor “focuses on whether the parties’ products 
compete in the same or similar channels of trade.” Hope 
Organics LLC v. Preggo Leggings LLC, No. 1:21-cv-02416 (TMR), 
2021 WL 5919367, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2021) (citing Cadbury 
Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 73 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
Here, the defendant has sold on Amazon the same types of 
products listed for sale by authorized sellers of the 
plaintiffs’ products – multifunctional pocketknives and cutlery. 
Because “the parties’ products are already in direct 
competition, ‘there is really no gap to bridge, and [the fourth] 
factor is [thus] irrelevant to the Polaroid analysis.’” Hope 
Organics LLC, 2021 WL 5919367, at*7 (quoting Star Indus. Inc., 
412 F.3d at 387). 
The fifth factor asks whether there is evidence of actual 
consumer confusion. “Although actual confusion need not be 
shown to prevail under the Lanham Act,” “[t]here can be no more 
positive or substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion.” 
LVL XIII Brands, Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 209 F. 
Supp. 3d 612, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d, 720 F. App’x 24 (2d 

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Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). “To be relevant under the 
Lanham Act, the confusion must be of a type that ‘could inflict 
commercial injury [on the plaintiff] in the form of either a 
diversion of sales, damage to goodwill, or loss of control over 
reputation.’” Id. (quoting Lang v. Ret. Living Pub. Co., 949 
F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991)). In this case, the complaint 
cites several negative consumer reviews of such a type. See 
Hope Organics LLC, 2021 WL 5919367, at *8 (“[I]t is not 
extraordinary in today’s Internet age for consumers to 
communicate with brands in the form of online comments and 
reviews, and for parties to rely on such comments to present any 
evidence of actual confusion.”). In the cited reviews, the 
consumers complain that the products they received were 
“previously used, damaged, or dirty,” with one further stating, 
“I do not recommend.” ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 42–45. 
The plaintiffs contend that the sixth factor – the 
defendant’s bad faith in adopting the mark - should weigh in 
their favor because the defendant failed to comply with 
numerous cease-and-desist letters. I agree that the defendant’s 
nonresponsiveness, viewed in the context provided by the 
plaintiffs’ allegations as a whole, is suggestive of bad faith. 
It is at least arguable, however, that more must be shown to 
support a reasonable inference of bad faith. See Disney 

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Enters., Inc. v. Sarelli, 322 F. Supp. 3d 413, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). Accordingly, I treat this factor as neutral. 
The plaintiffs concede that the seventh factor is neutral, 
and they provide no evidence with respect to the eighth factor. 
Looking at the factors in their totality, I conclude that 
the plaintiffs have demonstrated the requisite likelihood of 
confusion. 
Because the plaintiffs’ marks are protected, and the 
defendant’s use of the marks likely causes confusion, the 
plaintiffs have sufficiently established the defendant’s 
liability as a matter of law for trademark infringement and 
unfair competition. 
B. Count 3: False Advertising 
The plaintiffs’ allegations also establish the defendant’s 
liability for false advertising as a matter of law. “To prevail 
on a Lanham Act false advertising claim, a plaintiff must 
establish that the challenged message is (1) either literally or 
impliedly false, (2) material, (3) placed in interstate 
commerce, and (4) the cause of actual or likely injury to the 
plaintiff.” Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision 
Diagnostics, GmBH, 843 F.3d 48, 65 (2d Cir. 2016). Each of 
these elements is satisfied. 
 Crediting the plaintiffs’ allegations, the defendant made 
false statements by marketing as “New” on Amazon’s website 

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products that in fact were repackaged. Under Amazon’s policies, 
a product may be marketed as “New” only if it is brand new and 
in its original packaging. ECF No. 1, at ¶ 118. The complaint 
alleges that the defendant shipped products it listed as “New” 
in packaging that differed from Victorinox’s original packaging. 
Id. at ¶¶ 120–24. The message that these products were “New” 
was therefore literally false. See Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. 
DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2007)(message is 
literally false “[i]f the words or images, considered in 
context, necessarily imply a false message”). 
The message was material because it “misrepresented an 
inherent quality or characteristic” of the plaintiffs’ products 
in a way that was likely to influence consumer purchasing 
decisions. See Church & Dwight Co., 843 F.3d at 70-71 (stating 
that, in many cases, a finding of actual or likely injury to the 
plaintiff will satisfy the materiality standard). The message 
was placed in interstate commerce. See Unlimited Cellular, Inc. 
v. Red Points Sols. SL, 677 F. Supp. 3d 186, 203 (S.D.N.Y 2023) 
(false advertising on e-commerce websites undoubtedly occurs in 
interstate commerce). And the complaint plausibly alleges that 
Victorinox has suffered damage to its goodwill, reputation, and 
profits because of the defendant’s false advertising. In 
particular, the complaint cites multiple negative reviews from 

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consumers who ordered products labeled as “New” but received 
damaged or defective products. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs have established the 
defendant’s liability as a matter of law for false advertising. 
C. Count 5: Deceptive Trade Practices 
The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
42-110b, prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce.” To determine whether a practice is unfair, courts 
consider “(1)[w]hether the practice, without necessarily having 
been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it 
has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — 
in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some 
common law, statutory, or other established concept of 
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to 
consumers.” Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 275 Conn. 105, 
154-55 (2005). “All three criteria do not need to be satisfied 
to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair 
because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or 
because to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Id. (quoting 
Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 250 Conn. 334, 
367-68 (1999)). All three criteria are satisfied here. As just 
discussed, Victorinox’s allegations establish as a matter of law 

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that the defendant’s conduct violated the Lanham Act and 
Connecticut common law. Moreover, Victorinox has plausibly 
alleged that the defendant engaged in unethical or unscrupulous 
behavior by deceiving consumers regarding the condition and 
origin of its products. This deception substantially injured 
consumers by inducing them to pay for products that were not 
actually “New” or genuine Victorinox products. Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs have established the defendant’s liability as a 
matter of law for deceptive trade practices. 
D. Count 6: Tortious Interference 
Under Connecticut law, the elements of tortious 
interference with contractual relations are “(1) the existence 
of a contractual or beneficial relationship, (2) the 
[defendant’s] knowledge of that relationship, (3) the 
[defendant’s] intent to interfere with the relationship, (4) the 
interference was tortious, and (5) a loss suffered by the 
plaintiff that was caused by the [defendant’s] tortious 
conduct.” Companions & Homemakers, Inc. v. A&B Homecare Sols., 
LLC, 348 Conn. 132, 144 (2023). Here, the plaintiffs’ 
allegations establish as a matter of law that the defendant 
tortiously interfered with Victorinox’s contractual relations 
with authorized sellers. 
Accepting the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Victorinox 
entered into agreements with “authorized sellers” that allowed 

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them to market and sell genuine Victorinox products online to 
end-use consumers but not re-sellers. Victorinox first alerted 
the defendant to the existence of these contractual 
relationships in a cease-and-desist letter dated February 19, 
2024. The letter informed the defendant that Victorinox’s 
contracts with authorized sellers prohibited them from selling 
Victorinox products to unauthorized sellers like the defendant. 
Nevertheless, the defendant continued to induce authorized 
sellers to breach their contracts by selling products to the 
defendant; and the defendant then resold the products on Amazon, 
committing the independent tort of trademark infringement. This 
conduct harmed Victorinox’s brand reputation and relationships 
with authorized sellers. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have 
established the defendant’s liability as a matter of law for 
tortious interference. 
E. Additional Factors 
“In deciding whether to enter default judgment, courts in 
this Circuit typically focus on three factors: (1) whether the 
default was willful, (2) whether denying the application for 
default would prejudice the movant, and (3) whether a 
meritorious defense exists.” Cartagena-Cordero v. Five Star 
Cars, LLC, No. 3:19-cv-01728 (SRU), 2020 WL 5912601, at *1 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 6, 2020) (citing Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, 277 F. 
App’x 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2008); Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 

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249 F.3d 167, 171–74 (2d Cir. 2001)). All three factors weigh 
in favor of granting a default judgment here. 
The defendant was properly served on November 19, 2024, yet 
it has failed to answer or otherwise respond, just as it failed 
to respond to the series of cease-and-desist letters previously 
issued by Victorinox. The defendant’s continued 
nonresponsiveness supports a finding that its default is 
willful. 
As to the second factor, “[w]hen a plaintiff has no 
additional steps available to secure judicial relief, it would 
prejudice that plaintiff to deny that plaintiff’s motion for a 
default judgment.” Cartagena-Cordero, No. 3:19-cv-01728 (SRU), 
2020 WL 5912601, at *6 n.12. That is the case here. 
Finally, “[a] sufficient showing of a meritorious defense 
would consist of ‘evidence of facts that, if proven at trial, 
would constitute a complete defense.’” Cartagena-Cordero, 2020 
WL 5912601, at *6 n.11 (quoting SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 
740 (2d Cir. 1998)). “Courts have held that where a plaintiff 
has established a defendant’s liability and the defendant has 
not filed an answer, the plaintiff has satisfied this element.” 
Id. (citing Andrus v. Juniper Grp., Inc., No. 2:08–cv–01900 
(JS)(AKT), 2011 WL 4532694, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011)). 
As discussed above, the plaintiffs’ allegations, accepted as 
true, plausibly establish the defendant’s liability as a matter 

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of law on all the counts in the complaint, and there is no 
reason to think the defendant might nevertheless have a complete 
defense to any of them. See Andrus, 2011 WL 4532694, at *7 
(entering default judgment in part because “the Court is unable 
to determine whether [defendant] has a meritorious defense as no 
such defense has been presented”). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ 
motion for default judgment is granted. 
II. 
The plaintiffs request that the judgment include a 
permanent injunction preventing the defendant from continuing to 
infringe Victorinox’s trademark rights. This request is also 
granted. 
Under the Lanham Act, a court has the “power to grant 
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such 
terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation 
of any right of the registrant of a mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116. A 
permanent injunction may be entered when the plaintiff 
demonstrates: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; 
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 

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(2006). All four factors support entry of a permanent 
injunction against further infringement by the defendant. 
Under the Lanham Act, “[a] plaintiff seeking any such 
injunction shall be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 
irreparable harm upon a finding of a violation identified in 
this subsection in the case of a motion for a permanent 
injunction. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). See, e.g., Johnson v. 
Mi Rancho, No. 3:19-cv-00862 (MPS), 2021 WL 6498264, at *7 (D. 
Conn. Aug. 16, 2021) (“Plaintiffs enjoy a presumption of 
irreparable harm, satisfying the first permanent injunction 
factor” because “[d]efendants have defaulted, admitting their 
liability.”). 
An award of money damages, in an amount permitted by law, 
would be inadequate to address the reputational injury to 
Victorinox caused by the defendant’s sale of defective and 
damaged products bearing Victorinox’s trademarks. See id. 
(citing Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 87 F. Supp. 3d 672, 
677-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)) (finding that monetary damages do not 
compensate for reputational damage to a brand). And there is no 
assurance such an award would be effective in halting the 
defendant’s unlawful conduct. 
The balance of hardships weighs in Victorinox’s favor 
because it would serve to protect the plaintiffs’ legitimate 

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interest without prejudicing any legitimate interest of the 
defendant. 
Finally, an injunction would benefit the public. See 
N.Y.C. Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 
2d 305, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he public has an interest in 
not being deceived — in being assured that the mark it 
associates with a product is not attached to goods of unknown 
origin and quality.”); U.S. Polo Ass’n v. PRL USA Holdings, 
Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The consuming 
public has a protectable interest in being free from confusion, 
deception and mistake.”). And, in general, “the public interest 
is served by the protection of property interests in 
trademarks.” Lavatec Laundry Tech., GmbH v. Lavatec Inc., No. 
3:13-cv-00056 (SRU), 2014 WL 6633047, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 
2014). 
III. 
The plaintiffs next request an award of damages in the 
amount of $84,217.13. Under the Lanham Act, a trademark owner 
may recover, “subject to the principles of equity . . . (1) 
defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, 
and (3) the costs of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
“In order to recover an accounting of an infringer’s 
profits, a plaintiff must prove that the infringer acted in bad 
faith” or “willfully infringe[d].” Int’l Star Class Yacht 

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Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, USA, 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 
1996). “[A] defendant’s knowledge that its actions constitute 
an infringement establishes that the defendant acted willfully.” 
Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 
(2d Cir. 1986). The defendant was on notice as of February 2024 
that it was infringing the plaintiffs’ trademarks, yet it 
continued to engage in infringement. This is sufficient to 
support a finding that the defendant willfully infringed. See 
Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 
689 F. Supp. 2d 585, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), amended on 
reconsideration (Mar. 23, 2010) (“Courts have repeatedly found 
willfulness where a defendant receives a cease and desist letter 
but continues the infringing conduct.”) 
To quantify the defendant’s profits, a plaintiff need only 
show the amount of the defendant’s revenue; “a defendant bears 
the burden to prove any ‘deductions’ from its gross revenue in 
calculating profits.” Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Ashley Reed 
Trading, Inc., 507 F. App’x 26, 32 (2d Cir. 2013). If the 
defendant “fail[s] to present any specific evidence of its 
costs,” the court makes no deductions from the total revenue 
figure when awarding disgorged profits. Id. The plaintiff must 
provide a “basis upon which the court may establish damages with 
reasonable certainty.” House v. Kent Worldwide Mach. Works, 
Inc., 359 F. App’x 206, 207 (2d Cir. 2010). It may establish 

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such a basis with affidavits and documentary evidence. See 
Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
Victorinox provides an affidavit detailing how it 
calculated the defendant’s total revenue from sales of 
infringing products between October 31, 2021, and January 30, 
2025. See ECF No. 21-2. Victorinox explains that it performed 
the calculation on data it received from Amazon pursuant to a 
subpoena. See id. at ¶¶ 4-10. The plaintiffs have submitted 
the data provided by Amazon. See id. at 21-176. The 
plaintiffs’ calculation based on the data generates a total of 
$84,217.13 in revenue. This total appears to be accurate. 
IV. 
Finally, the plaintiffs request an order requiring Amazon 
to freeze all funds in the defendant’s Amazon account to satisfy 
the judgment. Federal courts have inherent equitable power to 
freeze assets to assure the availability of funds to satisfy a 
final judgment under the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & 
Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 
1995) (“A request for equitable relief invokes the district 
court’s inherent equitable powers to order preliminary relief, 
including an asset freeze, in order to assure the availability 
of permanent relief.”); Spin Master Ltd. v. Alan Yuan’s Store, 
325 F. Supp. 3d 413, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (allowing asset 

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restraint to remain in place post-judgment under Lanham Act to 
“aid in the enforcement of the judgment” by preventing 
defendants from hiding assets). This equitable power permits 
courts to order that third parties freeze defendants’ assets. 
See, e.g., Lovesac Co. v. www.lovesac.com, No. 2:22-cv-00056 
(JNP), 2022 WL 504192, at *5 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2022) (freezing 
assets in defendants’ PayPal accounts containing profits of 
alleged counterfeiting scheme). 
Revenue earned by third-party sellers on Amazon are 
deposited into sellers’ Amazon accounts and may be disbursed 
every 14 days. ECF No. 21-2, at ¶¶ 12–13. Since the funds are 
direct proceeds of the defendant’s infringement, freezing them 
to satisfy the judgment is an appropriate exercise of equitable 
power. 
V. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ motion is granted in full. 
The Clerk may enter judgment and close the file. 
So ordered this 14th day of October 2025. 
 
 /s/ RNC 
Robert N. Chatigny 
 United States District Judge 

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