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govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_24-cv-01735-1

U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut · 2026-05-13

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:11:33

1 
 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
VICTORINOX SWISS ARMY, INC. 
V. Case No. 24-CV-1735 
TRADE CHANNEL LLC 
 
 RULING AND ORDER 
 This case involves the validity of service 
of process on a limited liability company 
registered in Delaware, based in Israel, and 
doing business on the Internet through a 
storefront maintained by Amazon.com Inc. 
Plaintiff’s return of service shows that a 
process server in Florida left a copy of the 
summons and complaint with the person in charge 
of a commercial mail delivery service at an 
address in Orlando, which was the address 
provided by defendant’s Amazon storefront.
1 
 
1 The return contains a typographical error – it 
identifies the person who took the summons and 
complaint as “Gabrielle Garnder” rather than “Gabrielle 
Gardner.” Defendant concedes that it previously 
maintained a private mailbox at the mail delivery 
service in Orlando operated by Ms. Gardner. 

2 
 
Defendant claims that it did not receive the 
papers and became aware of this suit only after 
Amazon alerted it to entry of a default 
judgment. It now moves pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(4) to set aside the default judgment on 
the ground that the attempted service of process 
was not authorized by applicable law. I agree 
and therefore grant the motion. 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(A) 
provides that a business entity may be served 
with process “in the manner prescribed by Rule 
4(e)(1) for serving an individual.” Rule 
4(e)(1), in turn, provides that an individual 
may be served by “following state law for 
serving a summons in an action brought in courts 
of general jurisdiction in the state where the 
district court is located or where service is 
made.“ 
 Plaintiff contends these subsections of 
Rule 4 authorized it to serve defendant by 
following a Florida statute that allows for 
“substituted service” on an individual at a 
mailbox address when no other address is 

3 
 
discoverable through public records. See Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 48.031(6)(a)(West).2 
 Defendant contends that plaintiff was 
required to follow Florida’s long-arm statute 
providing for “substituted service” on foreign 
business entities engaging in business in the 
state. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.181(2)(West). 
It is undisputed that this statute, which 
provides for service on the Secretary of State, 
does not authorize mailbox service on a foreign, 
unregistered LLC.
3 
 
2 The statute provides: 
If the only address for a person to be served which is 
discoverable through public records is a private 
mailbox, a virtual office, or an executive office or 
mini suite, substituted service may be made by leaving 
a copy of the process with the person in charge of the 
private mailbox, virtual office, or executive office or 
mini suite, but only if the process server determines 
that the person to be served maintains a mailbox, a 
virtual office, or an executive office or mini suite at 
that location. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.031(6)(a)(West). 
 
3 The statute provides: 
The acceptance by any individual who is a resident of 
any other state, territory, or commonwealth, or of any 
foreign country, or by any foreign business entity of 
the privilege extended by law to nonresidents to 

4 
 
 Plaintiff’s position concerning the meaning 
of Rule 4(h)(1)(A) – that by incorporating Rule 
4(e)(1), it permits a business entity to be 
served by following state law for serving an 
individual – reveals an ambiguity in the text of 
these subsections of Rule 4. Literally 
construed, they do seem to permit serving a 
business entity by following state law for 
serving an individual. Yet plaintiff cites no 
case, and none has been found, in which a 
plaintiff purporting to serve a business entity 
pursuant to state law - as permitted by Rule 
 
operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or 
business venture in this state, or to have an office or 
agency in this state, is deemed to constitute an 
appointment by the individual or foreign business 
entity of the Secretary of State of this state as its 
agent on whom process in any action or proceeding 
against the individual or foreign business entity, or 
any combination thereof, arising out of any transaction 
or operation connected with or incidental to the 
business or business venture may be served as 
substituted service in accordance with this chapter. 
The acceptance of the privilege is signification of the 
agreement of the respective individual or foreign 
business entity that the process served against it in 
accordance with this chapter is of the same validity as 
if served personally on the individual or foreign 
business entity. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.181(2) (West). 
 

5 
 
4(h)(1)(A) through Rule 4(e)(1) - used the state 
statute for serving an individual, rather than 
the statute for serving such a business entity. 
The absence of any such precedent over the more 
than three decades that these provisions have 
been in effect strongly suggests that 
practitioners and courts alike have not 
understood the provisions to permit this manner 
of service. 
 Fundamentally, Rule 4 has always been 
understood to provide a plaintiff with the 
option of serving a defendant either in 
accordance with federal requirements specified 
in the Rule for that class of defendant or by 
following state law.
4 When a plaintiff opts to 
follow state law, service is sufficient if it is 
made in a manner that would be acceptable in 
state court. In other words, when a plaintiff 
opts to use state law to serve a defendant, 
state law is controlling. See generally 4A 
 
4 Rule 4(h)(1) follows this pattern. It permits service 
pursuant to either subsection (A), which incorporates 
state law, or subsection (B), which sets forth its own 
requirements. 

6 
 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1092 (4th ed.)(Rule 4 authorizes service on 
business entities in accordance with state law). 
 Plaintiff’s reading of Rule 4(h)(1)(A) is 
contrary to this understanding and has a 
paradoxical effect: it would allow a party 
choosing to follow state law, here the law of 
Florida, to serve process in a manner state law 
does not permit. There is no indication that 
Congress, in providing plaintiffs with the 
option of serving business entities in 
accordance with state law, as permitted by Rule 
4(h)(1)(A), meant to authorize service on 
business entities in a manner contrary to state 
law. Rather, by incorporating Rule 4(e)(1), 
Congress appears to have intended to make 
business entities amenable to service in the 
same manner as individuals – that is, in the 
manner prescribed by the applicable state law. 
 Accordingly, I conclude that plaintiff, in 
exercising its option to serve defendant by 
following Florida law, was required to comply 
with the relevant Florida statute. See Cruz v. 

7 
 
Petty Transp., LLC, No. 6:08CV498-ORL-22KRS, 
2008 WL 4059828, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 
2008)(“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 
4(h)(1), through Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), 
permits service of process on a corporation in 
this district “following state law for serving a 
summons in an action brought” in Florida. Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1).”). 
 Florida’s statutes relating to service of 
process are numerous and interrelated and 
determining which one applies in a given set of 
circumstances is not always straightforward. 
Based on the record before me, the relevant 
statute here is contained in Florida’s Revised 
Limited Liability Company Act, which provides: 
“If a foreign limited liability company 
transacts business in this state without a 
certificate of authority or cancels its 
certificate of authority, it appoints the 
[D]epartment [of State] as its agent for service 
of process for rights of action arising out of 
the transaction of business in this state.” 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 605.0904(6) (West). See Tuscan 

8 
 
River Est., LLC v. U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Ass'n as 
Tr. of Greene St. Funding Tr., 351 So. 3d 1233, 
1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)(“If Tuscan River 
were transacting business without a certificate 
of authority, then section 605.0904 would 
clearly apply.”); Magnolia Court, LLC v. Moon, 
LLC, 299 So. 3d 423, 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2019)(Section 605.0904(6) makes the Secretary of 
State the statutory equivalent of the designated 
agent of the LLC for service of process). In 
practical effect, this statute is like the long-
arm statute on which defendant relies in that 
both require service on the Secretary of State.
5 
 Under Rule 60(b)(4), a default judgment is 
void if it is rendered by a court that lacks 
jurisdiction over the parties. See City of New 
York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 
138–39 (2d Cir. 2011); “R” Best Produce, Inc. v. 
DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 
5 If one must choose between § 48.181(2) and § 
605.0904(6), which I do not think is strictly 
necessary, the latter should be given precedence 
because it is the more specific provision governing 
foreign LLCs operating without a certificate of 
authority. 

9 
 
Plaintiff does not dispute that this court’s 
personal jurisdiction over defendant depends on 
the validity of the service of process. Because 
plaintiff did not serve the Secretary of State, 
its attempted service of process is invalid. As 
a result, personal jurisdiction is lacking and 
the default judgment is therefore void. See 
Mobil Cerro Negro, Limited v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, 863 F.3d 96, 124-25 (2d 
Cir. 2017)(vacating judgment as void because 
improper service deprived district court of 
personal jurisdiction). 
 Plaintiff argues with some force that it 
would be inequitable to vacate the default 
judgment. At this stage, however, my task is 
limited to determining whether plaintiff’s 
attempted service of process complied with the 
requirements of Florida law. When, as here, a 
judgment is void for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, the court has no discretion to 
deny a motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 
60(b)(4). See Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. 
Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir.2003). 

10 
 
 Accordingly, the motion to vacate the 
default judgment is granted. A telephone 
conference will be conducted regarding further 
proceedings. 
 So ordered this 13
th day of May 2026. 
 ____/s/ RNC___________________ 
 Robert N. Chatigny 
 United States District Judge 

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