govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_25-cr-00081-2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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SECOND 
MEMORANDUM & 
DECISION ON 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
 
3:25-CR-81 (VDO) 
UNITED STATES, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
-against- 
 
MOETIES BROWN, 
 
Defendant. 
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VERNON D. OLIVER, United States District Judge: 
Defendant Moeties Brown is charged in a three -count superseding indictment (the 
“Indictment”) with possessing with the intent to distribute fentanyl (Count One), possessing 
firearms in furtherance of a drug -trafficking offense (Count Two), and illegally possessing 
firearms and ammunition as a convicted felon (Count Three), all on November 20, 2024.1 
Before the Court are the Defendant ’s latest motions in limine: (1) seeking to preclude 
evidence of an interaction leading up to Mr. Brown’s arrest , and (2) seeking to preclude 
evidence of an unidentified powder.2 
I. DISCUSSION 
A. Defendant’s Motion in Limine at ECF No. 121 
The Defendant’s motion in limine to permit the Defendant to preclude evidence of an 
interaction leading up to Mr. Brown’s arrest is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 
PART. 
 
1 ECF No. 50. 
2 ECF Nos. 121, 122. The Court previously adjudicated the parties’ past motions in limine at ECF 
No. 112. 

2 
Defendant moves the Court “ to exclude any testimony, argument, or exhibits 
suggesting that the defendant’s act of walking around a corner was ‘ consistent with’ a drug 
transaction.”3 Defendant also asserts that the “ Government should also be precluded from 
using the discovery of a blue fold on the ground, or the recovery of a syringe from another 
individual, to imply that a narcotics transaction occurred….” 4 The Government responds that 
Defendant’s objections “go to weight, not admissibility, of the evidence.”5 
At the outset, the Court notes that the Government states, in its response, that “it will 
not elicit testimony from any fact witness that Defendant’s conduct was “consistent with a 
drug transaction.”6 Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks 
to preclude evidence of the Defendant’s act of walking around a corner as “consistent with” a 
drug transaction. This includes the preclusion of any evidence of the syringe recovered 
following the relevant incident. 
The preclusion of the blue wax fold discovered on the ground following the interaction, 
however, is a different matter. “As a general matter, all relevant evidence is admissible under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence unless specifically excluded.” United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 
201, 209 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 402). “Relevance under the FRE is a low 
threshold, easily satisfied.” United States v. Gramins , 939 F.3d 429, 450 (2d Cir. 2019). 
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 
 
3 ECF No. 121 at 1. 
4 Id. 
5 ECF No. 127 at 1. 
6 Id. 

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would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 401. 
Evidence tending to show that the Defendant distributed drugs on the date charged in 
the Indictment is direct, relevant evidence of the crime charged in the Indictment and, 
specifically, the Defendant’s intent to distribute drugs. See United States v. Teague , 93 F.3d 
81, 82–84 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that prior sales were admissible as direct evidence of 
possession with the intent to distribute and as Rule 404(b) evidence to show the “proper 
purpose[s]” of “state of mind, such as intent and knowledge”). Given that drug distribution is 
evidence of both intent to distribute and the charged crime of possession, any evidence in this 
case that tends to prove distribution satisfies Rule 401’s “very low standard,” is material to a 
fact of consequence, and is rel evant. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; United States v. White, 692 F.3d 
235, 246 (2d Cir. 2012). 
Evidence illustrating the circumstances surrounding the blue wax fold near Defendant’s 
residence, such as witness testimony and pictures of the fold, is relevant. The discovery of the 
blue wax fold in the location of the interaction, and the later discovery of multiple “identical” 
blue wax folds in a large garbage bag found outside the back door of the Defendant’s residence, 
is probative of whether the Defendant possessed narcotics with the intent to distribute them. 
This evidence therefore satisfies Rule 401’s low threshold for relevance. Moreover, the Court 
cannot conclude at this stage that the probative value of this evidence is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury under 
Rule 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to the introduction of the blue wax 
fold. The Government is permitted to “ (a) ask officers about what they saw and learned (the 

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Defendant getting out of the car that contained fentanyl, the Defendant walking around the 
corner, the Defendant meeting with a person very briefly, the Defendant having cash on him 
when stopped by police, finding a blue wax fold on the ground near the transaction, and, among 
other things, finding identical blue wax folds during the search around the Defendant’s 
residence); and (b) show jurors the actual evidence and pictures of, among other things, the 
blue wax fold found on the ground [and] the actual blue wax folds found during the officers’ 
later search….”
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Any argument concerning the lapse of time between the observed interaction and the 
recovery of the blue wax fold goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The 
possibility that the blue wax fold was recovered sometime after the interaction may be explored 
through cross-examination and competing argument before the jury, but it does not render the 
evidence irrelevant under Rule 401 or inadmissible under Rule 403. 
The Government’s use of this evidence shall be limited to the theory of relevance 
articulated in its briefing and permitted by this Order. To the extent the Government believes 
that subsequent developments at trial have opened the door to additional testimony or argument 
concerning the interaction, the Government shall first request to be heard outside the presence 
of the jury before introducing such evidence or argument. 
B. Defendant’s Motion in Limine at ECF No. 122 
The Defendant’s motion in limine to permit the Defendant to preclude evidence of an 
unidentified powder is DENIED. 
 
7 ECF No. 127 at 9. 

5 
Defendant moves “ to preclude the admission of any evidence regarding the white 
powder found in the defendant’s refrigerator” because it is not relevant.8 
As the Court has already noted, “[r]elevance under the FRE is a low threshold, easily 
satisfied.” United States v. Gramins , 939 F.3d 429, 450 (2d Cir. 2019) . Courts have 
consistently ruled that objections as to lack of basis for categorizing a substance as a “cutting 
agent” go to weight and not admissibility, see United States v. Taylor, 23-cr-62 (OAW), 2025 
WL 243391 at *3 (D. Conn Jan. 20, 2025), and that evidence of cutting agents is admissible 
in narcotics trafficking cases, see United States v. Willis , 14 F.4th 170, 184 (2d Cir. 2021) 
(evidence of cutting agents admissible); United States v. Swinton, 19- cr-65 (JAM), 2022 WL 
3053767 at *1 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2022) (same); United States v. Reddick, 284 F. Supp. 3d 159, 
162 (D. Conn. 2018) (same). 
The Honorable Omar A. Williams recently rejected a near identical argument where 
the defendant objected to the United States’ introduction of “white bindings items” arguing 
the evidence “would confuse the jury because there [was] no chemical analysis confi rming it 
[was] a binding agent.” Taylor , 2025 WL 243391 at *3. Judge Williams held that the 
arguments set forth by defense counsel “may be raised through cross-examination and closing 
arguments in challenging the weight of the evidence,” but that the evide nce was admissible 
under Rule 404 as “highly probative of [the defendant’s] knowledge and intent. Id. (cleaned 
up). 
Here, the unidentified white powder was recovered alongside other evidence the 
Government contends is indicative of narcotics trafficking, including digital scales, packaging 
 
8 ECF No. 122 at 1. 

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materials, bulk fentanyl, and loaded firearms. The Government does not intend to represent 
that the substance itself was a controlled substance and, in fact, the parties anticipate stipulating 
that DEA testing revealed no controlled substances within the powder. Rather, the Government 
seeks to introduce the evidence as circumstantial evidence of narcotics distribution activity 
through both fact testimony and expert testimony regarding common drug-trafficking practices 
and the use of cutting agents or diluents. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that 
the evidence is relevant to the Defendant’s alleged intent to distribute narcotics and satisfies 
Rule 401’s “low threshold” for admissibility. See Gramins, 939 F.3d at 450. 
To the extent Defendant argues there is an insufficient evidentiary basis to characterize 
the substance as a cutting agent, that objection goes to the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility. Defendant remains free to challenge through cross -examination, competing 
evidence, and closing argument whether the unidentified powder was in fact related to 
narcotics trafficking and whether the jury should draw the inferences urged by the 
Government. But the Court cannot conclude that the evidence is so lacking in probative value, 
or so unfairly prejudicial, as to warrant exclusion under Rule 403. Accordingly, the 
Defendant’s motion to preclude evidence relating to the unidentified white powder is 
DENIED. 
II. CONCLUSION
 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Brown’s motion in limine (ECF No. 121) to 
preclude any evidence of an interaction leading up to his arrest is GRANTED IN PART AND 
DENIED IN PART. Mr. Brown’s motion in limine (ECF No. 122) to preclude any evidence 
in the Government’s case in chief of an “unidentified powder” is DENIED. 
 

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SO ORDERED. 
Hartford, Connecticut 
May 13, 2026 
 
/s/Vernon D. Oliver 
VERNON D. OLIVER 
United States District Judge 

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