14 F.3d 1213

PELL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Although I regard the majority opinion well reasoned and scholarly, I am unable to agree with the result it has reached, and therefore respectfully dissent.
Glaser, although still in his early thirties, spent a goodly proportion of his twenties in the toils of the law in Minnesota. As the majority opinion observed of his penchant “Glaser returned to his profession. Soon he was back in prison.”
It appears to me that it is sufficient for disposition of this appeal by looking only at his first go around with imprisonment. While he served one continuous term, it was because he was serving three sentences concurrently. This by the nature of such was for separate convictions on three counts of felony burglary, each being a separate crime of violence pursuant to Minnesota statute § 624.712, subd 5. Separate sentences of 37 months, 32 months and 37 months were entered. Although all were served concurrently, it in my opinion, provides without more a basis for activation of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
Whether it is activated in his case depends upon the extent to which his slate is cleaned by the benevolent policy of Minnesota with regard to convicted criminals who have served three sentences of imprisonment.
On June 17, 1986, Minnesota discharged Glaser from his 1983 burglary convictions. This certificate specifically stated: “ *NOTE: Be advised that this certificate does not relieve you of the disabilities imposed by the Federal Gun Control Act.” By this language, Minnesota told Glaser “point blank that weapons are not kosher.” Erwin, 902 F.2d at 513. This identical notice language was approved in United States v. Davis, 936 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.1991):
Thus not only were Davis’s full civil rights with respect to firearms not restored, but also he was given explicit notice of that fact in a manner that we believe sufficient to satisfy the ‘unless’ clause of § 921(a)(20). By flagging Davis’s continuing disabilities under the Federal Gun Control Act, the letter made it plain that the restoration of his civil rights by the state of Minnesota was less than complete and did not include the right to ‘ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.’ This is all the ‘unless’ clause of § 921(a)(20) requires.
Davis, 936 F.2d at 357.
Given this explicit notice, the Eight Circuit counted the burglary conviction for which discharge had been given as one of the three predicate convictions for the application of § 924(e)(1). Similarly, in the case before us, the form discharge given to Glaser clearly told him that he was not receiving a full restoration of his civil rights because the disabilities under federal law were still applicable to him.
It is to be noted that the Eight Circuit was unaware of the point made in the majority opinion that there is no “Federal Gun Control Act.” Even if there is no statute with that exact name tag, we are here dealing with federal statutes which expressly are concerned with gun control. What should have been clear to Glaser was at least as to guns there was a notification that his slate was less than clean. It would be stretching imagination beyond the breaking point to think he may have said to himself: “Ha! There just isn’t any such statute.”
I agree with the majority opinion that the Eighth Circuit was not “binding” on a district court in the Seventh Circuit. Yet it being from a federal court which includes the state of Minnesota, its opinions on state laws involved in federal cases is entitled to substantial respect just as we would expect similar respect to be accorded in other circuits to a decision of this circuit on Wisconsin law involved in a federal case before us.
While, of course, I do not rest my dissent on the following observation, I find in this case very little reason for thinking in the case of Glaser that he would have been deterred from following his “profession” if this restoration to civil rights document had spelled out in painful detail that under no circumstances was he to have any traffic with guns.

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