29 F.3d 720

MIKVA, Chief Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the majority’s analysis. I write separately only to emphasize what appellees (plaintiffs below) did not allege as a basis for standing. Had the public interest organizations and individuals challenging the Secretary’s regulations alleged an interest in protecting the well-being of specific laboratory animals (an interest predating this litigation), I think appellees would have had standing to challenge those regulations for providing insufficient protection to the animals. Such allegations would satisfy the requirements for constitutional standing, as enumerated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). This claim would also place appellees within the “zone of interests” of the Animal Welfare Act: the Act, too, aspires to protect laboratory animals. See Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 394-403, 107 S.Ct. 750, 754-59, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). But appellees never made this claim, and they had the burden of demonstrating the specific basis of their standing. Lujan, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2136-37. I therefore concur in the dismissal of their suit.

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