govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_25-cv-00602-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
KAHIEM WESTHOOK, * 
 
 Plaintiff * 
 
v. * Civ. No. DLB-25-602 
 
WARDEN BAILEY, et al., * 
 
 Defendants * 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
On June 23, 2025, K aheim Westhook, proceeding without counsel, filed an amended 
complaint against Warden Bailey of Eastern Correctional Institution (“ECI”) and Correctional 
Officer II Wilkerson , alleging excessive use of force. ECF 5 . Westhook filed the amended 
complaint in response to this Court’s Order directing him to correct deficiencies noted in 
Westhook’s original complaint. ECF 4. The Court directed Westhook to describe how the named 
defendants participated in the alleged constitutional violations, what actions the defendants took 
that amounted to excessive force beyond using mace, and any injuries he suffered, such as how he 
was unable to practice his chosen religion or injuries he sustained during the use of force. Id. The 
Court also notified Westhook that restoration of good conduct credits is unavailable through a civil 
rights suit. See Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289, 295 (4th Cir. 2022). Westhook was forewarned 
that if the amended complaint did not adequately address those deficiencies, this action would be 
subject to dismissal without further notice. ECF 4. Because the amended complaint does not 
comply with the Court’s directives and does not state a claim, it is dismissed without prejudice. 
I. Background 
Westhook alleges that, on November 14, 2024, while he was incarcerated at ECI, Officer 
Wilkerson told him that she “Hated Fake Black Prison Muslims such as [Westhook]” and that “she 

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would see to it that something happen[ed] to [him].” ECF 5, at 8. Westhook alleges that Wilkerson 
then insisted that he share a cell with an inmate “known for serious sexual assault” who either 
“identified himself as a ‘Homo-Sexual’” or was transgender. Id. at 8, 9. He states Wilkerson knew 
the inmate could harm him. Id. at 9. Westhook states that he “refused to let the inmate in” the cell, 
as a result of which Wilkerson pushed him and sprayed him with mace, which caused him to hit 
his head on the floor, and wrote him up for an infraction. Id. Westhook claims that being sprayed 
with mace was an excessive use of force and that forcing him into a cell with this inmate was a 
failure to protect him. Id. He also believes this was “[b]ecause of [his] religious belief.” Id. at 8. 
Westhook claims he told Wilkerson that his religion did not allow him to be around people 
who are transgender , and he alleges he “often end [s] up in segregation for protection” from 
transgender people. Id. at 10. He claims that the presence of transgender people in prison with him 
has caused him nightmares that disturb his sleep, and he may require psychiatric help. Id. He states 
“they have now transfer[red] [him] out of school and institution with no reason.” Id. He believes 
his due process rights were violated when he was housed with this inmate and transferred without 
an explanation. Id. 
Westhook seeks reinstatement of his good conduct credits, $1.4 million i n damages, and 
the appointment of a “special investigator . . . to investigate the abuse & discrimination in all MD. 
institution[s].” Id. at 9. 
II. Discussion 
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in this 
Court without prepaying the filing fee. To guard against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute 
requires dismissal of any claim that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief 
may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), 1915A(b). 

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“[P]ro se filings are ‘h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 
lawyers.’” Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 272 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 
519, 520 (1972)). Accordingly, the Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally. Bing v. Brivo 
Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020). But “liberal construction does not require [the Court] 
to attempt to ‘discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff[;]’” the Court need only “determine 
the actual meaning of the words used in the complaint.” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 
(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Thus, 
a pro se complaint “still ‘must contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on 
its face.’” Thomas v. The Salvation Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, at 637 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). 
Westhook’s amended complaint adds some factual allegations but still fails to state a claim 
on which relief may be granted. 
Under Section 1983, a plaintiff may file suit against any person who, acting under color of 
state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or imm unities secured 
by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a 
source of substantive rights, but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 
conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 
137, 144 n.3 (1979)); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009). Two 
elements are essential to state a claim under § 1983: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered a 
deprivation of “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United 
States; and (2) the act or omission causing the deprivation must have been committed by a person 
acting under color of law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

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A. Eighth Amendment Claims 
Westhook claims the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by housing him 
with an inmate who was homosexual or transgender and by pushing him and spraying him with 
mace. 
“The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.’” Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 97 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 102 (1976)). Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must “take reasonable measures to 
guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1986)). 
“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay 
for their offenses against society.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Rhodes 
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 
“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment ’s cruel -and-unusual-punishment clause 
when they are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to an inmate’s safety . . . .” King v. Riley, 
76 F.4th 259, 264 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. 825; Estelle, 429 U.S. 97). To prevail 
on a failure-to-protect claim, the prisoner must establish an objective and a subjective element. Id. 
First, he must show an objectively “substantial risk of serious harm .” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 834); see Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004). Second, the 
prisoner must show that the defendant “ subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm ” and 
“subjectively recognized that his actions were ‘ inappropriate in light of that risk .’” Anderson v. 
Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 545 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303) (emphasis in 
Anderson removed). 
Westhook offers nothing more than his subjective speculation that his would- be cellmate 
presented a threat to his safety based on his perception that the inmate was homosexual or 

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transgender and, due to those characteristics, posed a risk to his safety . Westhook offers no basis 
for his conclusory statement that the inmate had a reputation for being sexually predatory, other 
than alleging that the inmate was either homosexual or transgender. Westhook has failed to allege 
an objectively “substantial risk of serious harm” posed by the inmate. He has failed to allege an 
Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. 
Westhook has also failed to allege an Eighth Amendment excessive-use-of-force claim. For 
excessive force, the inmate must show that the officer used force and caused “more than de 
minimus pain or injury,” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (1996), and did so “maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” rather than “in a good faith effort to 
maintain or restore discipline,” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley, 475 
U.S. at 320–21). Unlike for other Eighth Amendment claims, the inmate “need not show that such 
force caused an ‘extreme deprivation’ or ‘serious’ or ‘significant’ pain or injury to establish a cause 
of action” for excessive force. Williams , 77 F.3d at 761 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). The 
absence of significant injury alone is not dispositive of a claim of excessive force. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 
559 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2010). This is not to say that any use of force may support an excessive force 
claim: “An inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ that causes no discernible injury almost 
certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.” Id. at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). 
The requirement that an officer act “‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 
causing harm’” is “a higher standard” than the subjective component for other Eighth Amendment 
claims. See Williams, 77 F.3d 761 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21). “When prison officials 
maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always 
are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 
(citation omitted). Factors for consideration are: “(1) ‘the need for the application of force’; (2) 

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‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used’; (3) the extent of any 
reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) ‘any efforts 
made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 239 (2008) 
(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). 
Westhook alleges Wilkerson pushed and maced him, but he does not allege any physical 
injury. Moreover, Westhook alleges he was maced when he refused to comply with an order to 
allow another inmate into his cell. Thus, Westhook has failed to allege more than de minimum 
injury or malicious or sadistic conduct. He has not stated an Eighth Amendment excessive-use-of-
force claim. 
Westhook’s Eighth Amendment claims are dismissed. 
B. Fifth Amendment Claim 
Westhook claims his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated when he 
was forced to share his cell with a homosexual or transgender inmate. 
It is well-settled that a prisoner’s liberty interests are “generally limited to freedom from 
restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life.” See Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) . Assigning 
Westhook a cellmate not of his choosing does not qualify as an atypical and significant hardship. 
See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“[T]he decision where to house inmates is at the core 
of prison administrators’ expertise.”); see also Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 734 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(“In formulating and executing decisions relating to cell assignments, [the courts] must allow 
prison authorities the discretion to take into account the particular safety and security concerns 
facing [the] inmates . . . .”); Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he security and 
custody classification of state prison inmates is a matter for state prison -official discretion whose 

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exercise is not subject to federal procedural due process constraints.”). Westhook has not stated a 
Fifth Amendment due process claim. This claim is dismissed. 
C. First Amendment Claim 
Westhook claims that being forced to share his cell with a homosexual or transgender 
inmate also violated his First Amendment free exercise rights. 
“Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many 
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” 
O’lone v. Est . of Shabazz , 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (quotation marks omitted) . However, 
incarcerated individuals retain a right to reasonable opportunities for free exercise of religious 
beliefs without concern for the possibility of punishment. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 
(1972). To state a claim for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate must allege: (1) a 
sincere religious belief; and (2) a prison practice or policy that “substantially burdens” the 
inmate’s ability to practice their religion. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 168 (4th Cir. 2017). “A 
practice or policy places a substantial burden on a persons religious exercise when it ‘put[s] 
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Hammock 
v. Watts, 146 F.4th 349, 365 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th 
Cir. 2018)). 
Westhook fails to allege that being housed in the same cell as someone whose sexual 
preference or gender identity differs from his own “substantially burdens” his ability to practice 
his religion. The First Amendment claim is dismissed. 
III. Conclusion 
Westhook’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. His amended complaint is 
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 

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Accordingly, it is this 11th day of May, 2026, by the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that: 
1. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 2) IS GRANTED; 
2. The amended complaint IS DISMISSED; 
3. The Clerk SHALL PROVIDE a copy of this Order to Westhook; and 
4. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case. 
 
____________________________ 
 Deborah L. Boardman 
 United States District Judge 
 

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