govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-2_18-cr-20072-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
CORRINE MAYO, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 

 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Corrine Mayo’s Motion for Sentence 
Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (Doc. 66) and Motion to Construe Motion for Sentence 
Reduction Under Amendment 833 as a Motion for Compassionate Release Due to Non-
Retroactivity of Amendment 833 (Doc. 70).1 The motions are fully briefed, and the Court is 
prepared to rule. As explained more fully below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to 
construe her motion for sentence reduction as a motion for compassionate release and dismisses 
Defendant’s motion for compassionate release for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
I. Background and Amendment 833 
On September 28, 2020, Defendant Corrine Mayo entered a guilty plea to Count One of 
the seven-count Superseding Indictment, charging a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for 
possession with the intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine.2 On January 6, 
 
1 Defendant filed these motions pro se. Thus, the Court construes her pleadings liberally and holds them 
“to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th 
Cir. 1991). But the Court will not act as advocate. Id. 
2 Doc. 24. 

2 
2021, the Court sentenced Defendant to a term of 222 months’ imprisonment. Defendant’s 
scheduled release date is July 18, 2033. 
 Defendant filed her first motion on December 30, 2025, asking the Court for a sentence 
reduction based on Amendment 833 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. She argues that 
under this amendment, her offense level should be reduced by two levels. The Government 
responded by arguing that Amendment 833 is not retroactive, so it does not apply to Defendant. 
The Government is correct. Amendment 833 to the Sentencing Guidelines became effective on 
November 1, 2025.3 But the Sentencing Commission has not made Amendment 833 
retroactively applicable to offenders who are currently incarcerated.4 
Defendant then filed her second motion, acknowledging that Amendment 833 is not 
retroactive, and asking this Court to construe her December 30, 2025 motion as a motion for 
compassionate release instead. The Court grants Defendant’s motion to construe her motion 
under the compassionate release statute. 
II. Compassionate Release Standards 
“‘Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of imprisonment 
once it has been imposed, but th[at] rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions.’ One 
such exception is contained in § 3582(c)(1).”5 Section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First 
Step Act of 2018,6 permits a court to reduce a term of imprisonment “upon motion of the 
 
3 U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual app. C, vol. IV, amend. 833 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025). 
4 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)&(d) (“In a case in which a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the 
guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the 
Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (d) below, the court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment as 
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).”). Amendment 833 is not listed under subsection (d). 
5 United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 830 (10th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Freeman v. 
United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011)). 
6 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. 

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defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of 
the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from 
the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.” 
Before reducing a term of imprisonment, a court must find that (1) “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons warrant” a sentence reduction, (2) such a reduction “is consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” and (3) the applicable 
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support such a reduction.7 The court may 
deny a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion “when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is 
lacking and do[es] not need to address the others.”8 If the court grants the motion, however, it 
must address all three steps.9 
III. Discussion 
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule 
that the Government may waive or forfeit.10 But when “properly invoked,” mandatory claim-
processing rules “must be enforced.”11 Here, the Government invokes the exhaustion 
requirement and argues that the Court should dismiss Defendant’s motion without reaching the 
merits because she fails to show that she has satisfied the statute’s exhaustion requirement. 
Defendant filed a reply that attaches an email she sent to “customersupport@bars2bridges.org.” 
 
7 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir. 2021). 
8 United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 942 (10th Cir. 2021) (emphasis omitted) (quoting McGee, 992 F.3d at 
1043). 
9 McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043. 
10 United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021). 
11 Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 20 (2017); see also United States v. Johnson, 
849 F. App’x 750, 753 (10th Cir. 2021) (explaining that the statute’s exhaustion rule “is mandatory, rather than 
judicially waivable”); United States v. Gieswein, No. 21-6056, 2021 WL 4852420, at *2 n.2 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 
2021) (“[Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s] exhaustion requirement, though nonjurisdictional, remains a mandatory claim-
processing rule that the court must enforce when the government invokes it, as it does here.”). 

4 
In that email, she states that she sent a request for compassionate release to the prison warden on 
January 18, 2026, but that she had no way of printing and sending a copy because the prison 
printer was broken. 
To exhaust administrative remedies, “a defendant must file a request with the warden of 
his institution of incarceration.”12 Although Defendant represents that she exhausted her 
administrative remedies in her email to a third party, she provides no proof that she submitted a 
request to the warden and that the warden did not respond after 30 days. Because the exhaustion 
requirement is a mandatory condition that has been properly invoked by the Government, the 
Court must dismiss Defendant’s compassionate release motion without prejudice to refiling if 
and when she exhausts her administrative remedies.13 
Defendant asserts in her motion that exhaustion would be futile because her claim 
concerning sentencing disparities is a “purely judicial issue beyond BOP authority.”14 But there 
is no authority for the Court to judicially waive the mandatory exhaustion rule under similar 
circumstances. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Defendant’s motion for compassionate 
release for failure to exhaust. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendant Corrine Mayo’s 
Motion to Construe Motion for Sentence Reduction Under Amendment 833 as a Motion for 
Compassionate Release Due to Non-Retroactivity of Amendment 833 (Doc. 70) is granted. 
Defendant’s Motion for Sentence Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (Doc. 66), construed 
 
12 United States v. Gieswein, No. 22-6014, 2022 WL 2841835, at *2 (10th Cir. July 21, 2022). 
13 See United States v. Purify, No. 20-5075, 2021 WL 5758294, at *4 n.3 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2021) (“Like 
dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, dismissals for failure to exhaust are ordinarily without prejudice.”). 
14 Doc. 70 at 2. 

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as a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), is dismissed for failure 
to exhaust. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 Dated: May 11, 2026 
 S/ Julie A. Robinson 
JULIE A. ROBINSON 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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