210 F. Supp. 200

ARTHUR J. STANLEY, Jr., District Judge
(digsenting).
* cann°t agree with the conclusion that questioned statute is unconstitution-
That debt adjustment is a business afifeeting the public interest is not questioned. It has been the subject of legislation in many states. (See the summary of state statutes appearing in the opinion in American Budget Corp. v. Furman, 67 N.J.Super. 134,170 A.2d 63.) Regulation of the business, therefore, is a proper function of the state in the exercise of its police power. j believe that the Act under attack is an effort on the part of tbe legislature of Kansas to impose reasonable and necessary regulations on a business affecting the financial stability of the citizens of Kansas,
The Acj. ideg in effect tbat debt adjustment as therein defined may be en_ gaged in only by attorneys, and then only when carried on “incidentally in the lawful practice of law.” It is true that a lawyer who has abandoned his general practice to devote his full time to debt adjustment would be in violation of the statute. I feel sure that this is exactly what the legislature intended. An attorney engaged in general practice, when consulted by a client whose financial affairs had become involved, would, quite naturally, explore all avenues open to his client. He would inquire as to the possibility of defenses to the claims, consider the applicability of exemption laws, explain the advantages and disadvantages of bankruptcy, and might or might not suggest the initiation of a debt adjustment scheme. One admitted to the Bar but who had chosen to become a debt adjuster and to limit himself to that one narrow field would be likely to adopt a different approach to the problem. He would not be expected to advise his client to seek relief through another means than that in which he specialized exclusively. (If he did, would he not by so doing bring himself within the proviso so that he would not then be barred by the statute?)
In arriving at a decision as to the necessity or reasonableness of the regulation, it is not essential that the court agree with the methods adopted by the lawmakers, or that it be concerned with the wisdom of the legislation. The scope of the court’s inquiry should be limited to whether any state of facts, known or reasonably to be assumed, support the legislative judgment. American Budget Corp. v. Furman, supra; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563.
I am more impressed by the reasoning of the Superior Court of New Jersey in American Budget Corp. v. Furman, supra, than by that of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Stone, 191 Pa.Super. 117, 155 A.2d 453. The Pennsylvania court leans heavily on Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 37 S.Ct. 662, 61 L.Ed. 1336. As the New Jersey court points out, quoting Staten Island Loaders, Inc. v. Waterfront Commission, 117 F.Supp. 308 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1953), “* * * the U. S. Supreme Court has withdrawn from this extreme view of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘ * * * and has made it increasingly clear that it is not for the judiciary to decide whether the legislature has chosen the best remedy to meet an evil * * ”
. I would hold that the Kansas Act is not invalid as in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and could deny the injunction.

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