govinfo:USCOURTS-tned-3_20-cr-00008-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No.: 3:20 -CR-8-TAV-JEM-2 
 ) 
RAYMOND G. EDWARDS, JR., ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on defe ndant’s pro se motio n for compassionate 
release, pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 444] and counseled supplement 
thereto [Sealed Doc. 447]. The governme nt has responded [Sealed Doc. 450] and 
defendant has replied [Sealed Doc. 455]. Fo r the reasons set forth more fully below, 
defendant’s motion for compassionate release [Docs. 444, 447] is GRANTED. 
I. Background 
On October 4, 2021, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or 
more of methamphetamine and 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(B) (Count 1) and conspiracy to commit 
money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 
(Count 11) [Docs. 231, 270]. Defendant was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment (with 
credit of 24 months to be applied toward that sentence), to be followed by 5 years of 
supervised release [Doc. 399]. Defendant is presently scheduled for release on November 

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2, 2035. Inmate Locator, Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last 
visited April 27, 2026). 
I. Legal Standard 
A court generally lacks “the authority to change or modify [a sentence, once 
imposed,] unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.” United States v. 
Thompson, 714 F.3d 946, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 
326 (6th Cir. 2010)). The First Step Act of 2018’s amendment of § 3582(c)(1)(A) revised 
one such exception. First St ep Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 
(2018). Prior to the First Step Act, a district court could grant relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A) 
only on motion of the Director of the Bur eau of Prisons. Now a court may modify a 
defendant’s sentence upon a mo tion by a defendant if the defendant has exhausted all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of th e Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the 
defendant’s behalf or after the lapse of 30 da ys from the receipt of such a request by the 
warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
If the defendant surmounts this preliminary hurdle, the Court may grant a sentence 
reduction “after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the ex tent that they are 
applicable” if it finds: 
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or 
 
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in 
prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense 
or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a 
determination has been made by the Dire ctor of the Bureau of Prisons that 
the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community, as provided under section 3142(g); 

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and that such a reduction is consiste nt with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . . 
 
Id. Defendant seeks relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) [Doc. 444; Sealed Doc. 447]. 
If the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, courts must then follow the statute’s 
three-step test: 
At step one, a court must “find[ ]” whether “extraordi nary and compelling 
reasons warrant” a sentence reduction. At step two, a court must “find[ ]” 
whether “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The Commission’s policy statement 
on compassionate release resides in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Thus, if § 1B1.13 is 
still “applicable,” courts must “fo llow the Commission’s instructions in 
[§ 1B1.13] to determine the prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification 
and the extent of the reduction authorized.” At step three, “§ 3582(c)[(1)(A)] 
instructs a court to consider any app licable § 3553(a) factors and determine 
whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and two] is 
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” 
 
United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1107–08 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). 
In considering a compassionate release moti on, “district courts may deny compassionate 
release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and 
do not need to address the others” but must “address all three steps” if granting such a 
motion. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). 
II. Analysis 
A. Exhaustion 
The Court first examines whether defe ndant has satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s 
exhaustion requirement, which is a mandatory prerequisite to consideration of a 
compassionate release request on the merits. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 

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(6th Cir. 2020). “When ‘prope rly invoked,’ mandatory claim-processing rules ‘must be 
enforced.’” Id. at 834 (quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi. , 138 S. Ct. 
13, 17 (2017)). The only exceptions to such a mandatory claim-processing rule are waiver 
and forfeiture. Id. (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). 
In this case, the government concedes that the exhaustion requirement has been 
satisfied [Sealed Doc. 450, p. 2]. Accord ingly, the Court will proceed to evaluate 
defendant’s motion per the three-step test explained above. 
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons 
 
Turning to whether defendant has set fo rth extraordinary and compelling grounds 
for relief, the Court first notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
previously held that “[i]n cases where incarcerated persons file motions for compassionate 
release, federal judges may skip step two of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry and have full 
discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’ without consulting the policy statement 
of § 1B1.13.” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1111 (6th Cir. 2020). This was so 
because the applicable policy statement, United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13, as 
written at the time, did not contemplate inma te-filed motions for compassionate release, 
but instead, was limited to circumstances where the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion on an 
inmate’s behalf. Id. at 1109–10; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2018). 
However, the Sentencing Commission amende d the policy statement in § 1B1.13, 
effective November 1, 2023, to encompass inmate-filed motions for compassionate release. 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023). It thus appears that the Sixth Circuit’s prior ruling that § 1B1.13 

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is not an applicable policy statement to inma te-filed motions for compassionate release is 
no longer consistent w ith the Guidelines. See United States v. Nash , No. 23-3635, 2024 
WL 1979067, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024) (noting the amendment to § 1B1.13 and stating 
that “prior to [the date of amendment ], no guideline policy st atement applied to 
compassionate-release motions brought by defendants, and a district court could deny a 
defendant-filed motion without reference to any policy statement”); see also United States 
v. Ringgold, No. ELH-17-232, 2023 WL 7410895, at *5–6 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2023) (“[I]t 
appears that the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281, to the effect that 
‘§ 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable’ policy stat ement,’ is no longer consistent with the 
Guidelines. This is because the Policy Statement is now expressly applicable to 
defendant-filed motions pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).”). However, “[t]he new 
policy statement largely preserves the discreti on district courts held to consider any 
extraordinary and compelling reason for release.” United States v. Davis, No. 3:20-cr-16, 
2023 WL 7356579, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 7, 2023). 
As amended, § 1B1.13(b) states that “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons exist 
under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof,” and discusses when 
the medical circumstances of the defendant , the age of the defe ndant, the family 
circumstances of the defendant, the defendant’s victimization in custody, and other reasons 
may constitute extraordin ary circumstances. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2025). 

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Although defendant raises several grounds as “extra ordinary and compelling” 
grounds for relief under § 1B1.13, because the Court finds that defendant has established 
an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A), as discussed in 
detail infra, the Court need not address defendant’s other grounds. 
Addressing a defendant’s medical circum stances, § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) indicates that 
extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction exist when: 
The defendant is suffering from a te rminal illness (i.e., a serious and 
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life 
expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not 
required. Examples include metasta tic solid-tumor ca ncer, amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia. 
 
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). “End-stage 
organ disease is listed as an example of a terminal illness in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) 
(2023). Whether a defendant is diminished in his ability to care for himself is not relevant 
to whether his medical condition qualifies un der U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) (2023).” 
United States v. Merriweather, No. 15-cr-40046, 2024 WL 4264253, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 
23, 2024). 
 There seems to be no dispute amongst the parties that defendant has been diagnosed 
with cirrhosis of the liver [ See Doc. 44, pp. 1, 4; Sealed Doc. 447, pp. 5, 7; Sealed Doc. 
450, pp. 4–5; Sealed Doc. 455, pp. 3–4; see also Sealed Doc. 447-1, p. 216]. Nor does it 
appear that the parties would dispute whethe r end-stage liver disease would qualify as an 
extraordinary and compelling reason for rele ase under § 3582(c)(1)(A). The dispute, 
rather, arises as to whether defendant’s cirrhosis is an “end-stage organ disease” within the 

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meaning of § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A), and, specifically , whether his cirrhosis has progressed to 
“end-stage” at this juncture. 
 Defendant alleges that he “has been diag nosed with untreatable stage 4 cirrhosis of 
the liver—organ failure—and has been given an end-of-life trajectory” [Doc. 444, p. 1]. 
Defendant alleges that the medical professionals he has visited classified his cirrhosis as 
“terminal” and/or “end-stage,” and that the doctor “explicitly explained that his diagnosis 
was terminal” [Id. at 4]. Defendant states that he was told that he had approximately 18 to 
48 months to live [ Id.]. Further, in the supplement, coun sel states that defendant’s liver 
disease is “end stage” [Sealed Doc. 447, pp. 5, 7]. 
 The government, however, argues that defendant cites only a single passing 
reference in his prison records for the proposition that his cirrhosis is “end-stage,” and not 
the report of any specialist who has evaluated him [Sealed Doc. 450, p. 4]. The government 
contends that other notes in his medical record indicate that defendant’s liver function was 
“well preserved” and his “liver func tion tests were within normal limits” [ Id.]. The 
government thus contends that the medical records do not corroborate defendant’s assertion 
that his liver cirrhosis is a terminal illness [Id. at 5]. 
 Defendant replies that the BOP’s own me dical records categorize his liver disease 
as “end stage” [Sealed Doc. 455, p. 3]. Additionally, his lab results from October 2025 
include a “MELD” score, which stands fo r Model for End-Stag e Liver Disease, a 
calculation that would be unnecessary if defendant’s medical circumstances did not include 
“end stage” liver disease [ Id.]. Defendant argues that, while the medical records reflect 

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that his liver function tests were within nor mal limits, that result doe s not mean that his 
liver is normal, and patients with cirrhosis can have normal liver function tests [ Id. at 4]. 
He also notes that his most recent lab resu lts show abnormal resu lts for serum albumin, 
bilirubin, and prothrombin time, all of which are related to liver function [Id.]. Moreover, 
a recent clinical encounter indicated that his health is declining and his “prognosis is poor” 
[Id. (citing Sealed Doc. 447-1, p. 6)]. 
 The Court notes that the medical record be fore it, while lengthy, is not particularly 
detailed regarding the extent of defendant’s liver conditio n. The words “terminal,” 
“end-of-life trajectory,” “untreatable,” and “stage 4” are not contained in the medical 
records [See Sealed Doc. 447-1; Sealed Doc. 451]. The medical records largely reflect that 
defendant has been diagno sed with “unspecified cirrhosis of the liver” [ See Sealed Doc. 
447-1, pp. 4, 7, 24, 33, 216, 288, 291, 331]. However, during a BOP medical examination 
on September 11, 2025, the provid er noted that “patient diag nos[ed] with end stage liver 
disease” [ Id. at 82]. The government labels this exam note a “passing reference” to 
defendant’s liver disease being “end stage,” but provides no explanation for why the BOP 
provider would include such a designation in defendant’s medical records if it was 
inaccurate. Moreover, there is no contradictory informati on contained in defendant’s 
medical records, that is to say, there is no indication that defendant’s liver disease is, for 
example, “stage 2” or “early stage.” Inst ead, the only reference the Court has located 
within the medical records to any “stage” of defendant’s disease is this reference to “end 
stage liver disease” [See id.]. Additional details contained in defendant’s medical records 

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further support taking the statement that defendant has “end stage liver disease [see id.] at 
face value. For example, on December 8, 2025, another BOP provider noted that 
defendant’s “prognosis is poor and he is seeing GI regularly for the liver disease” [ Id. at 
6]. 
Further, defendant’s medical records repeatedly reference a diagnosis of ascites in 
combination with the cirrhosis, and the need for paracentesis [See e.g., Sealed Doc. 447-1, 
p. 30 (indicating that abdominal CT from Ma y 2025 showed “cirrhotic liver with sequela 
of portal HTN, splenomegaly , and large volume ascites”); Sealed Doc. 447-1, p. 123 
(noting a diagnosis of “[a]lcoholic cirrhosis of liver with ascites” and indicating a plan of 
to “[w]orkup the liver disease and paracentes is large-volume”); Seal ed Doc. 451, p. 2 
(“Needs paracentesis for large volume ascites”)]. “Ascites form when fluid builds up [in] 
[the] peritoneal cavity” of the abdomen. Paracentesis, CLEVELAND CLINIC, available at 
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/procedures/paracentesis (last viewed Apr. 28, 2026). 
“Paracentesis is a procedure that drains ex cess fluid [e.g., ascites] from [a person’s] 
abdomen.” Id. 
Ascites appears to be a symptom of end-stage liver disease. See Ascites, AM. LIVER 
FOUND., https://liverfoundation.org /liver-diseases/complications-of-liver-disease/ascites/ 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2026) (“[A]scites is a condition caused by advanced cirrhosis”); Naga 
P. Chalasani, Raj K. Vuppalanchi, and Clayton Spiceland, Ascites: A Common Problem in 
People with Cirrhosis , A M. COLL. OF GASTROENTEROLOGY, available at 
https://gi.org/topics/ascites/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2026) (““The development of ascites can 

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indicate serious liver disease”); Rahul Kura pati, Shravan Katta, and Maria C. O’Rourke, 
Paracentesis, S TATPEARLS PUBL’G, available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK435998/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2026) (“Patients 
with cirrhosis and ascites have an estimated 1-year mortality of 20%”). “Ascites is a 
landmark in the progression into the decompensated phase of cirrhosis and is associated 
with a poor prognosis and quality of life; mortality is estimat ed to be 50% in 2 years.” 
Giulia-Anna Perri, Ascites in patients with cirrhosis , 59 C AN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1297–99 
(Dec. 2012), available at https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3860926/. 
Moreover, “[a]t end-stage cirrhosis, ascites causes symptoms including abdominal 
distention, nausea and vomiting, early satiet y, dyspnea, lower-extremity edema, and 
reduced mobility.” Id. Of particular note, defendant appears to have developed many of 
these complications [See Sealed Doc. 447-1, pp. 7, 166, 330, 352 (observing that defendant 
had a distended abdomen at medical exams); id. at 41, 127, 294 (noting defendant 
experiencing nausea and vomiting); id. at 30 (stating defendant’s “appetite remains poor”); 
id. at 30, 41, 294, 342 (indicating occasional shortness of breath); id. at 24, 32, 33, 107, 
128, 157, 216, 299, 354 (referencing defendant’s edema in both legs); id. at 6 (stating 
defendant’s “mobility is declining and he is now wheelchair bound with only being able to 
take a few steps”). Viewing all of these facts from defendant’s medical record together, it 
appears that those records support the statement that defendant is suffering from end-stage 
liver disease. 

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The government directs the C ourt’s attention to a portio n of defendant’s medical 
record indicating that a nurse practitioner in the hepatology field found that defendant’s 
liver function as “well preserved,” indicatin g that it was “unclear why he would have 
developed cirrhosis and why th e ascites is present” and de fendant could “start with 
conservative treatment” [Sealed Doc. 450, p. 4 (citing Doc. 447-1, p. 353)]. But the Court 
notes that that this record is from an encounter on July 2, 2025 [Doc. 447-1, p. 353]. And 
in that same record, the nurse practitioner suggested the “conservative treatment” of 
“increase[ing] diuretics to see if any improvement,” spec ifically recommending to 
“increase Aldactone to 150mg and increase Lasix to 60 mg daily” and if “still having 
significant ascites and/or leg edema, would consider diagnostic paracentesis to help 
determine etiology of the ascites” [ Id.]. Consistent with those recommendations, 
defendant’s medical records refl ect that, at least as of A ugust 11, 2025, defendant was 
receiving 150 mg of spironolac tone (Aldactone) and 60 mg of furosemide (Lasix) daily 
[Id. at 28–29, 301]. And that same month, a provider reported that defendant was “not 
responding to current furosemide/Aldactone combo” [Id. at 126]. Indeed, exam notes from 
a December 2025 virtual appointment with the same nurse practitioner indicate that, despite 
the increases to these medications after defendant’s July visit, he “report[ed] no change in 
fluid status after this increase” [ Id. at 30, 32]. Thus, despite the recommendation of a 
“conservative treatment,” it appears that the recommended “conservative treatment” has 
been ineffective in treating defendant’s liver disease, which has continued to progress since 
that July 2025 exam. 

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The government also points to a notation in defendant’s medical records that “[h]is 
liver function tests were within normal limits” during an emergency room visit in October 
2025 [Sealed Doc. 450, p. 4 (citing Sealed Doc. 447-1, p. 32)]. Defendant replies that 
normal liver function tests do not always mean the liver is normal, and, of the routine liver 
function tests, only serum albumin, bilirubin, and prothrombin time (“PT”) provide useful 
information on how well the liver is functioning [Sealed Doc. 455, p. 4]. And, according 
to defendant, the most recent lab results av ailable show abnormal results for all three of 
these numbers [Id. (citing Sealed Doc. 447-1, pp. 307–08, 313)]. 
Labs from the October 2025 emergency room visit reflect a serum albumin level of 
3.2g/dL and a total bilirubin le vel of 1.7 mg/dL [Sealed Doc. 447-1, p. 32]. Normal 
albumin levels for an adult are 3.5 to 5.5 g/dL. Albumin Blood Test, CLEVELAND CLINIC, 
available at https://my.cleve landclinic.org/health/diagnostics/22390-albumin-blood-test 
(last visited May 7, 2026). Normal total bilirubin is between 0.2 and 1.3 mg/dL. Bilirubin 
Test, C LEVELAND CLINIC, available at 
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diagnostics/17845-bilirubin (last visited May 7, 
2026). Accordingly, neither defendant’s serum albumin nor total bilirubin levels fell 
within the “normal” ranges at the time of his October 2025 emergency room visit. 
Additionally, medical records reflect that de fendant’s PT was “out of range” as of 
September 16, 2025 [Sealed Doc. 447-1, p. 247]. And lab work in August 2025 also 
reflected that defendant’s serum albumin and PT were both “out of range” [Id. at 249]. 

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Ultimately, viewing the medical records as a whole, the Court finds sufficient 
evidence that defendant is suffering from “end stage” liver disease. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that defendant has established extrao rdinary and compelling grounds for release 
under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). The Court now turns to the § 3553(a) factors. 
C. Section 3553(a) Factors 
Section “3582(c)[(1)(A)] instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) 
factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and 
two] is warranted in whole or in part unde r the particular circumstances of the case.” 
United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1108 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). 
The “overarching” inquiry under § 3553(a) is whether the sentence imposed is “sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary , to comply with the purpo ses” outlined in § 3553(a) 
paragraph (2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also Pepper v. United States , 526 U.S. 476, 491 
(2011). To this end, § 3553(a) directs the Co urt to consider the nature and circumstances 
of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence 
imposed, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, any pertinent 
policy statement, the need to avoid unwarrant ed sentencing disparities, and the need to 
provide restitution to any victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
Considering the § 3553(a) factors in light of defendant’s instant motion, the Court, 
after due consideration, finds that the balance of these factors do not preclude the granting 
of compassionate release. The Court has cons idered the nature and circumstances of the 
defendant’s offenses and defendant’s history and characteristics, including the defendant’s 

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personal characteristics, criminal history, and post-sentencing conduct. The Court has also 
considered the need for the se ntence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate 
deterrence, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the 
defendant with needed edu cation and training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment. The Court has also considered the kinds of sentences available and the 
sentencing range, the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, and the need to provide 
restitution to any victims. 
The Court recognizes the seriousness of this conduct. However, the Court also notes 
that defendant has a relatively minor criminal history, with a total criminal history score of 
zero [Revised Presentence Investigation Re port (“RPSR”) ¶ 68]. And, since his 
incarceration, defendant has incurred only th ree minor disciplinary infractions [Sealed 
Doc. 447-4]. The Court also notes that, while incarcerated, defendant has completed 
several hours of educational or vocational cour ses [Sealed Doc. 447-3, p. 4]. Defendant 
has also completed a drug education program [Id. at 6]. 
Significantly, the Court also notes that defendant will remain subject to an five-year 
term of supervised release [See Doc. 397]. During this time, he will be required to comply 
with a number of conditions, including par ticipating in a program for the testing and 
treatment of drug and/or alcohol abuse. It is imperative that defe ndant comply with all 
conditions of supervised release, includi ng remaining drug-free, abstaining from other 
criminal activity, and complying with all instructions of the probation officer. The Court 

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would impress upon defendant that, failure to comply with the requirements of supervised 
release may result in revocation of his supervised release and further incarceration. 
Ultimately, having considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and the record before 
it, the Court finds that these factors suppor t defendant’s compassi onate release. The 
exhaustion requirement has been satisfied, an extraordinary and compelling reason exists, 
and the applicable § 3553(a) fa ctors support compassionate release; therefore, the Court 
finds compassionate release to be appropri ate. Defendant’s motion for compassionate 
release [Doc. 444] is hereby GRANTED. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth more fully abov e, defendant’s motion for compassionate 
release [Doc. 444] is GRANTED and defendant’s sentence is REDUCED to time served. 
Except as otherwise provided in this order, all provisions of the amended judgment dated 
April 5, 2022 [Doc. 399] shall remain in effect. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
s/ Thomas A. Varlan 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 
 

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