govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-4_26-cv-00278-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
OWENSBORO DIVISION 
 
XIUHUA LIN, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
JASON WOOSLEY, et al., 
 
 Respondents. 
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Civil Action No. 4:26-CV-278-CHB 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER 
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This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [R. 1], filed on 
April 20, 2026 by Petitioner Xiuhua Lin. Therein, Petitioner alleges that Respondents —which 
include Jason Woosley, Warden of Grayson County Jail; Samuel Olson, Field Office Director of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) ; Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General of the United 
States; and the Executive Office for Immigration Review —have detained her in violation of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (hereinafter, “INA”) and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. [R. 1, pp. 16–19]. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause, [ R. 6], on April 21, 2026, 
setting an evidentiary hearing date and establishing a briefing schedule for the parties. In response, 
the parties submitted briefs, [R. 10 (Respondents’ Response); R. 13 (Petitioner’s Reply)], and filed 
a joint motion to forego the evidentiary hearing. [R. 9]; see also [R. 12]. The matter has thus been 
fully briefed and is ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Petitioner’s 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. PageID #:
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I. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner is a fifty-five-year-old citizen of China who has been present in the United States 
since January 2020. [R. 1, ¶¶ 17, 51]; [R. 10-2, p. 2]. Prior to her detention, she was employed in 
Lexington, Kentucky, and “maintain[ed] a stable source of income and a fixed residence.” [R. 1, 
¶ 54]. 
On March 31, 2026, Petitioner was arrested while working in Lexington, Kentucky. [R. 1, 
¶ 52]. After ICE databases revealed that Petitioner lacked appropriate immigration documents, a 
Warrant for Arrest was issued, which cited 8 U.S.C. § 1226, codified as Section 236 of the INA, 
as the statute authorizing the arrest. [R. 10 -3]. Petitioner was thereafter transported to the 
Louisville ICE Field Office for processing. [R. 10, p. 2]. That same day, March 31, 2026, DHS 
initiated immigration removal proceedings against Petitioner pursuant to 8 U .S.C. § 1229a by 
filing a Form I-862, Notice to Appear (hereinafter, “NTA”). [ R. 10-1]; see also [R. 1, ¶ 53]. The 
NTA charges Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)1 as being 
“present in the United States without being admitted or paroled ” and being “an immigrant at the 
time of application for admission, whose visa has been issued without compliance with the 
provisions of Section 203 of” the INA, [R. 10-1, pp. 2, 5], and further alleges the following: 
1. You are not a citizen or national of the United States; 
2. You are a native of CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF and a citizen of 
CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF; 
3. You entered the United States at or near unknown place, or about unknown 
date; 
4. You were not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration 
Officer. 
5. You are in possession of an visa (sic) that was issued without compliance with 
the provisions of section 203 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
 
 
1 The NTA cites to “212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act” and “212(a)(7)(i)(II) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act.” [R. 10-1, p. 5]. The Court will instead use U.S.C. citations throughout for uniformity. PageID #:
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Id. at 2. 
By way of background, o n July 8, 2025, DHS, in coordination with the United States 
Department of Justice, issued a new policy entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention 
Authority for Applicants for Admission,” which provides that all “applicants for admission” 
should be deta ined pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, rather than § 1226. See ICE Memo: Interim 
Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission , American Immigration 
Lawyers Association (July 8, 2025), https://www.aila.org/library/ ice-memo-interim-guidance-
regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission [https://perma.cc/6JYU -M2SY]. In 
a reversal of longstanding ICE policy, the change effectively subjects all persons who previously 
entered the United States without insp ection to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), 
regardless of how long they have been present in the United States or whether they were detained 
at or near the United States border or other ports of entry. See id. 
After ICE took custody of Petitioner, Petitioner requested a bond redetermination hearing 
in front of an Immigration Judge (hereinafter, “IJ”) pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. See [R. 1-3]. On 
April 14, 2026 , the IJ issued a decision denying Petitioner’s request for change in her custody 
status, citing “[n]o jurisdiction.” Id. As long as the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(1) are 
met,2 the IJ’s bond decision is stayed until either the Board of Immigration Appeals (hereinafter, 
“BIA”) resolves any appeal or ninety days pass, whichever occurs first. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(4). 
 
2 Automatic stays are preserved if the DHS attorney files alongside a notice of the appeal a “certification by a senior 
legal official” stating that: 
 
(i) The official has approved the filing of the notice of appeal according to review procedures 
established by DHS; and 
 
(ii) The official is satisfied that the contentions justifying the continued detention of the alien have 
evidentiary support, and the legal arguments are warranted by existing law or by a non -frivolous 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existi ng precedent or the establishment of 
new precedent. PageID #:
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On April 20, 2026, Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which Petitioner alleged violations of the INA and the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. See [R. 1]. Petitioner argues that § 1225 of the INA “does not 
apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States 
prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings.” Id. ¶ 60. Petitioner therefore 
argues that her detention is authorized under § 1226 of the INA, not under § 1225. See, e.g., id. 
Accordingly, Petitioner argues that she is entitled to a bond hearing before a neutral IJ pursuant to 
§ 1226(a). See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 59–62. Respondents assert that Petitioner’s detention is proper under 
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA because Petitioner qualifies as an “applicant for admission,” a category 
of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention pending removal proceedings. See, e.g. , [R. 10, 
pp. 1–2]. Respondents “rely on and incorporate by reference the legal arguments from the briefs 
the government filed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the four §§ 1225/1226 appeals that 
are currently pending” with that Court. Id. at 3. Those cases are Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Case 
No. 25-1965 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2025); Alvarez v. Noem, Case No. 25-1969 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2025); 
Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft , Case No. 25 -1978 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025); Pizarro Reyes v. 
Raycraft, Case No. 25-1982 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). Respondents concede that the “relevant facts 
in all four matters on appeal” are “similar to the relevant facts in this matter” and the only “relevant 
legal question” is whether the Petitioner is detained under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) or Section 1226. 
[R. 10, p. 3]. 
In her prayer for relief, Petitioner seeks, among other things, a declaration that her detention 
is unlawful, immediate release from custody, or alternatively, “a prompt individualized bond 
 
 
8 C.F.R. § 1006.6(c)(1). PageID #:
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hearing.” [R. 1, p. 23]. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Habeas relief is available where a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The right to petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus is “‘available to every individual detained within the United States,’” Montiel v. 
Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026) (quoting Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)), including “non-citizens in immigration-related matters.” Id. 
(citations omitted). The petiti oner seeking habeas relief bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his detention was unlawful. See Freeman v. Pullen , 658 F. 
Supp. 3d 53, 58 (D. Conn. 2023) (citations omitted); Lallave v. Martinez , 609 F. Supp. 3d 164, 
171 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (citation omitted). 
Section 2241 confers jurisdiction on federal courts to review noncitizens’ claims 
challenging the constitutionality of their detention during the pendency of removal proceedings. 
See Demore v. Kim , 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (“Section 1226(e) contains no explicit provision 
barring habeas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar respondent's constitutional 
challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.”). Although § 1226(e) provides 
that “[n]o court may set aside any action o r decision by the Attorney General under this section 
regarding the detention or release of any [noncitizen] or the . . . denial of bond or parole,” the 
Supreme Court has recognized that district courts retain jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions 
concerning issues that are collateral or ancillary to removal proceedings. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (“Section 1226(e) does not preclude challenges to the statutory 
framework that permits [an] alien’s detention without bail.” (quotations omitted) (citing Demore, 
538 U.S. at 517)). Because Petitioner challenges the statutory and constitutional validity of her PageID #:
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detention, and does not directly challenge her removal proceedings, the court finds that it has 
jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims. 
III. ANALYSIS3 
A. Section 1225 Versus Section 1226 
The relevant facts are undisputed. Concerning the legal arguments, Respondents’ argument 
regarding the applicability of Section 1225 versus Section 1226 is nearly identical to their 
argument in Martinez-Elvir v. Olson , 807 F. Supp. 3d at 735 –42, and therefore the Court fully 
incorporates by reference its reasoning and decision in that action. There, this Court held that “the 
statutory text, context, and legislative history of Sections 1225 and 1226, considered alongside 
longstanding federal immigration prac tice, renders § 1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable ” to the 
petitioner’s detention. Id. at 742. Although this Court’s decision contrasted with the BIA’s holding 
in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (2025), this Court cited in support (1) the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 413, alongside the ambiguity of § 1225; (2) “t he 
statutory context, scheme, and text of § 1225 ”; and (3) numerous other federal courts concurring 
with its interpretation of § 1225. Id. at 741–42. 
Respondents’ incorporated brief cites to several nonbinding district courts, and one BIA 
decision, to support their interpretation .4 See [R. 10-4]. However, the Court is not persuaded by 
 
3 Neither party has asserted any exhaustion-related arguments, see [R. 10], and no applicable statute or rule mandates 
exhaustion. See Martinez-Elvir v. Olson, 807 F.Supp.3d 725, 733, 733 n.4 (W.D. Ky. 2025) (noting no awareness of 
statutes or regulations requiring exhaustion). However, because many decisions in similar cases by district courts 
within the Sixth Circuit discuss this principal, the Court incorporates its analysis on exhaustion of remedies from a 
previous case, Marintez-Elvir, 807 F.Supp.3d at 732–35, and the Court waives the exhaustion requirement for the 
same reasons stated therein. 
 
4 None of the cases cited by the United States are controlling authority within the Sixth Circuit. Further, the BIA is 
neither binding, nor should be viewed as persuasive authority, on any district court. See Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 413 
(“[C]ourts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute 
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these decisions for the reasons previously explained in Marintez-Elvir, 807 F.Supp.3d at 735–42, 
incorporated here by reference. 
Moreover, the Court’s holding in Martinez-Elvir aligns with the Second Circuit’s recent 
unanimous opinion in Cunha v. Freden, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026), 
which discusses the identical Section 1225 v ersus Section 1226 issue raised here. There, the 
Second Circuit held that the 
government’s attempt to muddy these textually clear waters defies the statute’s 
context, structure, history, and purpose; contradicts the Supreme Court’s dicta in 
Jennings and longstanding Executive Branch practice; and its interpretation of the 
statute raises serious constitutional questions that should be avoided even if the 
statutory language were ambiguous. 
 
Id. at *23. 
In sum, the plain meaning of “seeking admission” in Section 1225(b)(2)(A) — 
presently pursuing lawful entry into the United States —is not undermined by any 
of the other statutory provisions to which the government retreats to find support. 
Therefore, we find no basis to justify departing from the unambiguous meaning of 
the text, under which Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention, because he 
is not “seeking admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 
 
Id. at *13. Judge Cabranes, concurring, further wrote that “no one can seriously contend that 
Petitioner is ‘seeking admission’ twenty -one years after he entered the country. The words, 
properly defined, are clear. That ought to be the end of the matter.” Id. at *24 (Cabranes, J. 
concurring). 
As Judge Jennings noted in a recent decision, the Second Circuit noted that divided panels 
in two other circuits have agreed with the government, see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 
494, 508 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1138 (8th Cir. 2026), while the Seventh 
Circuit has preliminarily reached the same conclusion as the Second Circuit in reviewing a stay 
motion, see Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025). 
See Chunjuan Lin v. Woosley, No. 4:26-CV-280-RGJ, 2026 WL 1180452, at * 2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. PageID #:
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30, 2026). This Court recognizes the present circuit split. However, for the reasons set forth in 
Martinez-Elvir and those in the Second Circuit’s opinion, this Court agrees “with the decisions of 
over 370 district judges across the Nation who (as of mid -February 2026) have also rejected the 
government’s position” (over ninety percent of district court judges). Cunha, 2026 WL 1146044 
(citing American Immigration Council and American Immigration Lawyers Association Amici Br. 
at 5 n.6 (citing Kyle Cheney, Even Trump ’s Own Appointees are Ruling Against ICE ’s Mass 
Detention Strategy, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2026) [https://tinyurl.com/yc7e5sbd])). Accordingly, the 
Court finds § 1226, not § 1225, applies to Petitioner’s detention.5 
B. Due Process 
As stated, Petitioner is detained under § 1226. Respondents contend that because Petitioner 
is properly detained under § 1225, not § 1226, she has “receiv[ed] the process Congress provided.” 
[R.10, p. 4]; see also id. at 16 (“The Court should deny the petition, because Petitioner is lawfully 
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and the Agency has provided all the due process to which 
Petitioner is entitled.”). Otherwise, Respondents do not substantively address the alleged violation 
of due process raised by Petitioner. See [R. 10, pp. 3 –5]. Instead, their due process argument 
appears to rely entirely on their argument that Petitioner is detained under § 1225. Id. However, 
because the Court has found that Petitioner’s detention is guided by § 1226, the Court must now 
 
5 Respondents spend several pages of their brief arguing that the Court should not consider or give preclusive effect 
to Bautista v. Santacruz, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2025), a class action out of the Central District of California. 
See [R. 10, pp. 6 –14]. In that case, the district court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the class (i.e., 
noncitizens without lawful status who entered the United States without inspection and were not apprehended upon 
arrival), in which the court declared that § 1226(a) is the appropriate authority governing detention of such class 
members, and as a result, the recent DHS policy authorizing detention under § 1225 violates the INA. See generally 
Samayoa v. Smith, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2026 WL 483243, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2026) (discussing Bautista). But even 
without considering this decision, the Court finds that § 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention, for all the reasons already 
stated. See Rodriguez v. Noem, 2026 WL 116412, at *9 n.8 (W.D. Ky. Jan 15, 2026) ( “For now, the Court ‘rests its 
decision’ on the independent merits of [the petitioner’s] petition without relying on Bautista.” (citation omitted)). PageID #:
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determine whether her continued detention pursuant to § 1226 is in violation of her right to due 
process of law. 
Petitioner presently remains in ICE custody, to the best of this Court’s knowledge. 
Petitioner alleges that, and the Court must determine whether, her continued detention violates her 
Fifth Amendment right to due process. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends to all 
persons, including non -citizens, regardless of their immigration status. A.A.R.P. v. Trump , 605 
U.S. 91, 94 (2025); see also Trump v. J.G.G. et al., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam) (“It is 
well established that the Fifth Amendme nt entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of 
removal proceedings.” (citation and quotations omitted)). In determining whether a civil detention 
violates a detainee’s due process rights, the Mathews v. Eldridge three-part balancing test applies. 
424 U.S. 319 (1976). Under that framework, the Court weighs three factors: (1) “the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.” Id. at 335. Respondents argue that because Petitioner has received “notice of the relevant 
charges of removability and a hearing before an immigration judge,” she has not been denied due 
process. [R. 10, p. 4]. The Court will consider Respondent’s argument in light of the three Mathews 
factors. 
1. Private Interest 
Respondents do not dispute Petitioner’s significant private interest in not being detained. 
See [R. 10, pp. 3–5]. “[T]he interest in being free from physical detention” is “the most elemental 
of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U.S. 507, 529, (2004). In fact, “[f]reedom from PageID #:
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imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at 
the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
690 (2001). In assessing the liberty interest at stake, courts can consider the detainee’s condition 
of confinement in order to determine if those conditions are indistinguishable from criminal 
incarceration. Martinez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 8, 2025). 
Here, Petitioner is being held at the Grayson County Detention Center, where she is 
separated from her home and her community. See generally [R. 1, ¶ 54]. The fact that Petitioner 
has received notice of the relevant charges of removability and was able request a bond 
redetermination before an IJ does not diminish Petitioner’s current interest —being free from 
allegedly unlawful detention. Therefore, the Court finds that the first Mathews factor strongly 
favors Petitioner. See Barrera v. Tindall, No. 3:25-CV-541-RGJ, 2025 WL 2690565, at *6 (W.D. 
Ky. Sep. 19, 2025) ; Singh v. Lewis, No. 4:25-CV-96-RGJ, 2025 WL 2699219, at *4 (W.D. Ky. 
Sep. 22, 2025); Patel v. Tindall, No. 3:25-CV-373-RGJ, 2025 WL 2823607, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 
3, 2025). 
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
The second Mathews factor addresses the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s 
liberty interest due to Petitioner’s continued detention without any determination as to her flight 
risk or danger to the community . See 424 U.S. at 335. The Court here finds that this factor also 
weighs in Petitioner’s favor; because Petitioner has been denied a bond hearing before a neutral 
IJ, there is no evidence in the record that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community . 
See Lopez Benitez v. Francis , 795 F.Supp.3d 475, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). Therefore, the risk of 
erroneously depriving Petitioner of physical freedom is impermissibly high. See Lopez-Campos v. 
Raycraft, 797 F.Supp.3d 771, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (“[T]he risk of erroneously depriving [ the PageID #:
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petitioner] of his freedom is high if the IJ fails to assess his risk of flight and dangerousness.”). 
Without the bond hearing before a neutral IJ that she is entitled to under § 1226(a), Petitioner will 
never be able to present the compelling reasons that she is neither a flight risk nor a danger. 
3. Respondents’ Interest 
The third and final Mathews factor pertains to Respondents’ interest in the procedure at 
issue, as well as the financial or administrative burdens associated with alternative procedures. 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The Court nevertheless recognizes the Respondents’ strong interest in 
ensuring that noncitizens—criminal or otherwise—do not harm citizens or the community and that 
they appear for future immigration proceedings. These interests manifest in the IJ’s bond 
determination where the IJ assesses a noncitizen’s danger to the commun ity and flight risk. See 
Sampiao, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12 (“The government does, indeed, have a legitimate interest in 
ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and preventing harms to the 
community.”). A “routine bond hearing” before an IJ , however, imposes a “minimal” burden on 
Respondents, as these procedures are already well -established. Hyppolite v. Noem , 2025 WL 
2829511, at *15 (E.D. N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025). Therefore, “existing statutory and regulatory safeguards 
adequately serve the governmental interest in promoting public safety.” Günaydin v. Trump, 2025 
WL 1459154, at *10 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025). Accordingly, the Court finds the third Matthews 
factor also favors Petitioner. 
As a whole, then, all three Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner. The Court agrees 
with Petitioner that her detention under § 1225’s mandatory detention framework violates her due 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the above -stated reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s Petition and order that 
Respondents either release her or imminently provide a bond hearing before a neutral IJ .6 
Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as 
follows: 
1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [R. 1], is GRANTED. 
2. Respondents SHALL immediately release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide 
her with a bond hearing before a neutral IJ under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven 
(7) days of the date of this Order. 
3. Respondents are ENJOINED from pursuing detention on the basis of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 
4. Respondents SHALL file a Status Report with this Court on or before May 20, 
2026 to certify compliance with this Order. The Status Report SHALL include: (1) 
if and when Petitioner’s bond hearing occurred; (2) if bond was granted or denied; 
and (3) if denied, the reasons for the denial. 
This the 11th day of May, 2026. 
 
 
6 Respondents argue that, even if the § 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention, that provision “does not provide for 
immediate release.” [R. 10, pp. 14 –15]. Instead, Respondents argue, “[i]t provides for detention until a bond 
proceeding is adjudicated.” Id. at 15. The Court’s order allows Respondents to provide just such a bond hearing, so 
the Court finds this argument to be moot. PageID #:
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