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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

GARY STANHOPE : CIVIL CASE NO.
Plaintiff, : 3:24-CV-1342 (JCH)
:
:
v. :
:
LIVE NATION WORLDWIDE, INC. :
D/B/A XFINITY THEATRE : MAY 11, 2026
Defendant. :

RULING ON MOTION TO PRECLUDE TESTIMONY OF RUSSELL KOLINS (Doc. No.
58)

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Live Nation Worldwide, Inc. d/b/a Xfinity Theatre ("Live Nation") brings
this Motion against Plaintiff Gary Stanhope ("Mr. Stanhope") to preclude the testimony
and reports of Mr. Stanhope’s security expert, Russell Kolins ("Mr. Kolins") due to Mr.
Kolins’ alleged lack of qualification as an expert for (1) large concert venue security; (2)
the alleged unreliability of Mr. Kolins’ analyses; (3) and the claimed lack of "fit" of his
opinions to the facts of the case. See Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Preclude ("Mot. to Preclude") (Doc. No. 58, 59). Mr. Stanhope
opposes the Motion. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Preclude ("Pltf's Opp'n") (Doc. No. 64-1). Live Nation submitted a Reply in further
support of its own Motion. See Live Nation's Reply Brief in Further Support of Motion to
Exclude the Testimony of Russell Kolins’ ("Def's Reply") (Doc. No. 67).
For the reasons stated below, the court denies Live Nation’s Motion to Preclude
(Doc. No. 58).

II. BACKGROUND
On July 30, 2022, Mr. Stanhope attended a Luke Bryan concert at the Xfinity
Theatre in Hartford, Connecticut with friends. The group stood on the asphalt walkway
in the general admission area, between Sections 500 and 600, behind the railing
separating the lawn from the reserved seating. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Mr.
Stanhope was assaulted and sustained serious injuries. See Hartford Police
Department Incident Report ("Police Report") (Doc. No. 64-15) at 3. Mr. Stanhope does
not recall the assault. See Deposition of Gary Stanhope ("Stanhope Dep.") at 51–52
(Doc. No. 59-5). The assault was witnessed by Mark Pennell. See Deposition of Mark
Pennell ("Pennell Dep.") at 38 (Doc. No. 59-12).
Live Nation deployed 132 trained crowd managers for the event: 116 security
personnel and sixteen uniformed officers from Hartford Police. See Deposition of
Michael Andrews ("Andrews Dep.") at 44–47, 78 (Doc. No. 59-1). This spread of
security yielded a security-to-patron ratio of approximately 1:164, well exceeding the
NFPA Life Safety Code 101 standard of 1:250. Id. at 78.
Multiple witnesses who attended the concert with Mr. Stanhope testified that they
observed security staff, EMTs, and Hartford Police before the incident, but not in the
immediate area of the assault. See Deposition of Heather Kennett ("Kennett Dep.") at
43–47 (Doc. No. 59-10); Deposition of Traci Hershman ("Hershman Dep.") at 47–48
(Doc. No. 59-8); Deposition of David Thibodeau ("Thibodeau Dep.") at 30–31 (Doc. No.
59-9).
Mr. Kolins, Mr. Stanhope’s liability expert, issued an initial report on July 12,
2025, and a supplemental report on September 10, 2025, after he was deposed on

September 5, 2025. See Kolins Initial Report (Doc. No. 59-19); Kolins Supplemental
Report (Doc. No. 64-7); Deposition of Russell Kolins ("Kolins Dep.") (Doc. No. 59-14).
Mr. Kolins' relevant experience consists of two venues: a New Jersey bar he
owned from 1981 to 1991 with a maximum outdoor concert capacity of 5,000, and an
Atlantic City adult entertainment club of roughly 2,500 capacity that he consulted on in
the 1990s. See Kolins Dep. at 30–31 (Doc. No. 59-14). He acknowledged that fights
occurred regularly at the latter venue despite his security plan. Id. Since the 1990s, Mr.
Kolins has worked solely as a consultant. Id.
Mr. Kolins opines that Live Nation failed to adequately deploy security, failed to
conduct a written risk assessment, and failed to implement adequate security policies
and procedures. See Kolins Initial Report at 4 (Doc. No. 59-19). His initial report was
written before several fact witness depositions were available. See Kolins Dep. at 4–8
(Doc. No. 59-14). After reviewing those depositions, Mr. Kolins issued a supplemental
report on September 10, 2025, which incorporated the additional testimony, updated his
analysis of foreseeability and crowd density, and further articulated the bases for his
deployment and documentation opinions. See Kolins Supp. Report at 1–12 (Doc. No.
64-7).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. Rules of Evid. 702. The District Court acts as a gatekeeper, charged with the task
of deciding whether the expert's testimony satisfies Rule 702’s general requirements.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592-97 (1993). In defining the
gatekeeping role of the District Court, the Second Circuit has distilled Rule 702’s
requirements into three broad criteria: (1) qualifications, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance
and assistance to the trier of fact. See Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396-
97 (2d Cir. 2005).
If an expert meets the threshold requirement of qualification, the court must
determine whether the expert's testimony itself is reliable. In Daubert, the Supreme
Court identified several factors that may be considered in assessing reliability:
(1) whether a theory or technique “can be (and has been) tested,” (2) “whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication,” (3) a
technique's “known or potential rate of error,” and “the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation” and (4) whether a particular technique
or theory has gained “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community.

See Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94 (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
These factors, however, do not constitute a “definitive checklist or test.” See Kumho
Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999). Instead, the inquiry is a flexible
one and must be “tied to the facts of a particular case” with attention to “the nature of
the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.” Id.
Further, it bears noting that the Second Circuit has endorsed a broad standard of
admissibility for expert testimony. See generally Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc., 126 F.4th
109 (2d Cir. 2025).

IV. DISCUSSION
Live Nation seeks to preclude the testimony of Mr. Kolins due to his lack of
qualifications, the lack of identifiable methodology, and the lack of fit of his opinions to
the facts of the case. See Mot. to Preclude at 1. Depositions were ongoing for fact
witnesses when the initial report and deposition of Mr. Kolins took place on September
5, 2025; the parties were both aware of a supplemental report to be issued after Mr.
Kolins reviewed the ongoing fact witness depositions and the defendant declined to re-
notice Mr. Kolins’ deposition after the supplemental report was issued. See Pltf’s Opp’n
at 1.
A. Mr. Kolins is Qualified
An expert’s credentials do not need to be unassailable in order for their testimony
to be admissible. See TC Systems Inc. v. Town of Colonie, 213 F.Supp. 2d 171, 174-
76 (NDNY 2002). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states that “[i]f scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.”
Mr. Kolins satisfies the requirements. He possesses years of experience as a
security consultant, holds a certification and bachelor’s degree in Security Management,
and served as leadership at the ASIS International Hospitality, Entertainment, and
Tourism Security Council. See generally Mr. Kolins’ CV (Doc. No. 64-3). Mr. Kolins has
been admitted to testify as a security expert in other courts and has spoken on premises
security and crowd management. Id.

Live Nation argues that Mr. Kolins has never managed a 22,000-person venue
and thus lacks the necessary qualifications. See Mot. to Preclude at 13. However, Mr.
Kolins does not need to match the exact subtype of security venue. See Evers v.
Hoffman, No. 25-CV-2423, 2026 WL 555407, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2026) (holding
that a general biomechanic degree and education; not only medical training, qualified an
expert to testify on general traffic accident injury mechanism and opine on the force
sustained in medical injuries); see, also, Sullivan v. Metro-N. Commuter R. Co., 292
Conn. 150, 160-61 (2009) (holding a security expert was qualified to testify on railroad
security as the matter at hand was not specific to railroad stations). Live Nation is free
to cross-examine Mr. Kolins on his experience with large venue management at trial
and provide its own expert who, in its opinion, is better suited for the facts at hand;
however, Mr. Kolins meets the standards for qualification.
B. Mr. Kolins’ Methodology is Reliable
Live Nation argues that Mr. Kolins’ expert testimony is not based on an
identifiable methodology. See Mot. to Preclude at 16. It asserts that Mr. Kolins’ report
and depositions reveal no identifiable methodology for his conclusions and that he did
not review any history of prior incidents, did not review crime data, did not read witness
depositions, or conduct a site visit. Id.
Mr. Stanhope argues that Mr. Kolins’ methodology uses authorities in the field
and follows the standards of the International Association of Professional Security
Consultants (IAPSC). See Pltf’s Opp’n at 12. Mr. Kolins focused on the deployment of

security personnel and submitted a supplemental report after reviewing the witness
depositions which were ongoing during the time of his initial report.1 Id. at 10, 12.
The Daubert inquiry is fluid and will necessarily vary from case to case and the
Supreme Court has identified a number of factors bearing on reliability that district
courts may consider, such as: “(1) whether a theory or technique can be and has been
tested . . . (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication . . . (3) a technique's known or potential rate of error, and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation . . . (4) whether a
particular technique or theory has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community. See Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 266 (2d Cir.
2002) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). These factors do not constitute a
definitive checklist or test but rather an inquiry that is flexible. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
593.
In his Supplemental Report, Exhibit 5 (Doc. No. 64-7), Mr. Kolins details his
methodology and application to the facts of this case. He utilizes authorities such as the
American National Standards Institute on Crowd Management and the International
Association of Venue Managers. Id. at 2, 3. Mr. Kolins then details how he took the
various factors from the methodology and applied them to the facts at hand. Id. Mr.
Kolins discusses the foreseeability of crowd density and congestion, as well as alcohol
sales. Id. at 3-5. Mr. Kolins analyzes the deployment of security personnel and

1 The Supplemental Report (Doc. No. 64-5; 64-6) was submitted and received by Live Nation, yet
Live Nation still argues in its Motion that Mr. Kolins’ methodology is flawed because he did not review all
the depositions at the time of his own deposition, a fact it already knew, and which is corrected in Mr.
Kolins’ Supplemental Report. See Pltf’s Opp’n at 9.

cameras. Id. at 5-6. Mr. Kolins discusses the security planning and protective
measures utilized by Live Nation. Id. at 6-7, 10-11. Finally, he addresses the response
of security personnel to crises and incidents. Id. at 8-9. In each section, Mr. Kolins
references the standards of the security community and analyzes how Live Nation met
or did not meet those standards. A jury can weigh the testimony of Mr. Kolins as well as
the defendant’s experts, in deciding how to apply the expert report to the other pieces of
evidence the jury will hear. Both the plaintiff and defendant will present experts who
draw the jury’s focus to different aspects of their reports. Mr. Kolins, as the plaintiff’s
expert, will likely draw a jury’s attention to his analysis of the deployment of security
personnel, while the defendant will likely focus on the staffing numbers. Mr. Kolins
explains his analysis, methodology, and sources meet the standard required for him to
testify.
C. Mr. Kolins’ Opinions Fit the Facts of the Case
Live Nation argues that Mr. Kolins’ testimony does not fit the facts of the case.
See Mot. to Preclude at 28. Specifically, it argues that Mr. Kolins has no command of
the record at his deposition and issued a supplemental report to try to cover any
deficiencies. Id. Live Nation asserts that the literature cited is dated, and opinions are
boilerplate or general. Id. at 28-29.
Mr. Stanhope argues that Mr. Kolins’ testimony is pertinent to the case regarding
negligent security. See Pltf’s Opp’n at 13. He argues that Mr. Kolins brings specific
examples of negligent security, insufficient crowd management, lack of cameras, and
defendant’s obligations. Id. at 14.
Mr. Kolins offers testimony that is important to the issues of negligence. First, he
provides an overview of the responsibility of venue managers such as Live Nation and

the duties of the facility supervisors regarding security policy and procedures. See Pltf’s
Opp’n at 13-14. Additionally, Mr. Kolins offers his expert testimony as to the crowd
management plans for concert events speaking on the seating arrangement, crowd
flow, density of concertgoers, and prior incidents at the concert. Id. at 14. Finally, Mr.
Kolins offers his opinions as to why the security was inadequate including how no
security appears to have witnessed the assault itself, the lack of video camera
surveillance, and the venue’s responsibility to identify and correct those issues. Id. Mr.
Kolins provides testimony that fits the facts of the case. He describes the
responsibilities, standards, and alleged failings of Live Nation in connection with the
assault on Mr. Stanhope. A jury could credit his expert testimony, and Mr. Kolins is
permitted to testify as to the security standards and alleged breaches of Live Nation.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court denies Live Nation’s Motion to Preclude
(Doc. No. 58).

SO ORDERED.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 11th day of May 2026.

/s/ Janet C. Hall_________
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

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