906 F.3d 1100

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 108(c), the Bankruptcy Code's extension provision, applies to fixed periods of time only "for commencing or continuing a civil action ...." Karen Good's secret ORAP lien on personal property, requiring Swintek to appear for a judgment-debtor examination, is simply a different animal. An ORAP lien is merely a tool to enforcing a judgment, which by definition has ended the civil action. And Karen Good had recourse when Swintek filed for bankruptcy. In the precise sentence that allowed her to create the lien through service on the debtor, the statutory language permits her to seek an extension of the lien from the court.
California's ORAP is a unique enforcement tool. After a final judgment, California allows judgment creditors to obtain "an order requiring the debtor to appear before the court ... to furnish information to aid in enforcement of the money judgment." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 708.110(a). Creditors may create a lien on the debtor's personal property by serving the ORAP on the debtor. The ORAP lien begins on the day of service and lasts for one year unless the court extends or terminates it. Id. § 780.010(d). The statute for ORAP liens, unlike most liens, "omits any requirement of a court order to perfect the lien." In re Hilde , 120 F.3d 950, 955 (1997). Sometimes called a "secret lien," ORAP liens can be nearly impossible to locate, requiring creditors to "examine court files for lawsuits in which the debtor has been sued to determine whether a judgment remains unsatisfied." Id. at 956.
These unique judgment enforcement liens do not fit within the scope of the plain meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 108(c). "The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc ., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (quotation and alteration marks omitted). Section 108(c) provides that "a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor" lasts until the later of "the end of such period" or "30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under section 362." 11 U.S.C. § 108(c). The ORAP lien does not involve a "commencement or continuation" of a civil action. Created only after the termination of an action, it involves enforcement, which section 108(c) explicitly does not address. This omission in section 108(c) is particularly persuasive compared to section 362(a) of the bankruptcy statute, which provides an automatic stay on not only "commencement or continuation" but also "enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title." 8 U.S.C. § 362(a). "When a statute omits a specific matter from its coverage, the inclusion of such a matter in another statute on a related subject demonstrates an intent to omit the matter from the coverage of the statute in which it is not mentioned." In re Hilde , 120 F.3d at 955 (citation and alteration marks omitted). The majority is incorrect that we cannot interpret section 108(c) in the context of section 362(a). Even if some actions can be construed as both "commencement and continuation" and "enforcement" under 362(a), this does not change the nature of the ORAP lien, which is a means of "enforcement" only.
In re Spirtos , 221 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) and In re Hunters Run Ltd. P'ship , 875 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1989) are inapposite. Each of these two cases involve renewals of the underlying claim-not priority. Spirtos involved not a lien at all but the underlying judgment. 221 F.3d at 1080. The creditor had obtained a medical malpractice judgment against Spirtos, which became unenforceable after ten years if not renewed. Id. Renewal of the judgment itself is a continuation of the original civil action within the meaning of section 108(c). The majority's expansive reading of our comment in Spirtos that " section 108(c) extends the limitations period so long as the creditor is barred by the automatic stay from enforcing its judgment against the property of the estate" is unavailing. 221 F.3d at 1081. We stated this in the context of an underlying judgment, not an ORAP lien, and the comment simply clarified Spirtos 's holding that tolling applies whether or not section 362(a) applied to stay renewal, in addition to enforcement, of the judgment. Id.
Hunters Run similarly examined a Washington mechanic's lien that would cease to exist unless the creditor brought a foreclosure lawsuit within eight months. 875 F.2d at 1426-27. With the existence of this mechanic's lien statutorily attached to the commencement of a foreclosure lawsuit, the claim at issue in Hunters Run was plainly within the scope of section 108(c)'s "commencing" a civil action.
In both Spirtos and Hunters Run , the judgment and mechanic's lien foreclosure lawsuit were public, recorded events. In both cases, the application of section 108(c) saved the creditor's claim. And in both cases, the judgment and mechanic's lien foreclosure lawsuit constituted "commencing or continuing a civil action." Here, by contrast, the ORAP lien is a secret lien created by service, and the judgment remains valid because the expiration of the ORAP lien only deprives Good of priority. "The purpose of section 108(c) is to prevent a debtor from taking advantage of the bankruptcy scheme by filing for bankruptcy and then waiting for the statute of limitations to run on the creditor's claim," and such a "purpose is not forwarded by the application of section 108(c)" to a case about loss of priority status. Hazen First State Bank v. Speight , 888 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that section 108(c) does not extend the expiration date of a subordination agreement between two creditors). The BAP, in finding for Good, expressed concern that failure to toll Good's ORAP lien would "give the debtor the power to eliminate certain secured claims simply by filing for bankruptcy at the appropriate time and then allowing the limitation period to run while it remained under the protection of the automatic stay." In re Swintek , 543 B.R. 303, 311 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015) (citing In re Morton , 866 F.2d 561, 567 (2d Cir. 1989) ). These concerns present no problem here because the record does not show, and Good does not claim, that the debtor would benefit from Good's loss of priority.
Allowing Good to maintain her priority despite her failure to renew the ORAP lien, on the other hand, creates problems of inequity. The majority's decision to allow ORAP liens, which are by nature temporary tools of judgment enforcement, to become a secured claim in a bankruptcy proceeding without time limitations, would lead to inequitable results among other creditors. This could not have been what Congress intended.
The majority further points to a Second Circuit case, Morton v. Nat'l Bank of N.Y.C. , 866 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1989), which involves a judgment lien. The fact that Spirtos and Hunters Run cite to Morton , is of no consequence. Neither Spirtos nor Hunters Run dealt with liens akin to an ORAP lien.

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