govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cv-02486-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
 
JOSEPH RAYMOND STEIB, SR., 
 
 
 
CIVIL ACTION 
 
VERSUS 
 
 
 
NO: 24-2486 
 
HUNTINGTON INGALLS, INC., et al. 
 
 
 
 
SECTION: T (5) 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
 Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment: one filed by Third- Party 
Defendant Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance Company (“Berkshire”), as an alleged insurer 
of Eagle, Inc. (“Eagle”), R. Doc. 158, and another filed by Defendant and Crossclaim Defendant, 
Eagle, R. Doc. 159. Defendant, Third -Party Plaintiff, and Crossclaimant Huntington Ingalls 
Incorporated (“Avondale”) opposes both motions. R. Docs. 192, 193. Berkshire has filed a reply 
in support of its motion, R. Doc. 204, and Avondale has filed a sur -reply, R. Doc. 208. Eagle has 
also filed a reply in support of its motion. R. Doc. 227. The Court has considered the parties’ briefs, 
the record, and the applicable law. For the following reasons, Berkshire’s Motion (R. Doc. 158) is 
GRANTED, and Eagle’s Motion (R. Doc. 159) is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 This is an alleged asbestos exposure case. Plaintiff,
1 Joseph Raymond Steib, Sr., worked 
for Avondale Shipyards from approximately 1968 to 2011 as a tack welder, pipefitter, and 
 
1 Joseph Raymond Steib, Sr. passed away on January 31, 2026. R. Doc. 181. His heirs filed a 
Motion to Substitute Party Plaintiffs, R. Doc. 186, which the Court granted in part, substituting 
Janai Steib as Plaintiff in this matter in her capacity as Independ ent Executrix of the Estate of 
Joseph Steib, Sr., R. Doc. 217. 

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foreman. R. Doc. 1- 2, p. 14. He alleges that, while employed by Avondale, he “used, handled, 
and/or was in the vicinity of others using and/or handling asbestos and/or asbestos -containing 
products” and “dangerously high levels of asbestos fibers escaped into the ambient air of the work 
place.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that his wife, Elaine Weber Steib (“Mrs. Steib” or “Decedent”), 
developed mesothelioma and later died from the disease because she was exposed to asbestos 
fibers from his work clothes and his personal vehicle.
2 R. Doc. 1-2, pp. 8-9, 15. 
 On August 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a petition for damages against Huntington Ingalls 
Incorporated, formerly known as Avondale Shipyards Inc. (“Avondale”), and other defendants in 
the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. R. Doc. 1- 2, pp. 6- 8. The petition asserts that 
Avondale negligently failed to provide Plaintiff with a safe place to work free from the hazards of 
asbestos, failed to warn Plaintiff, his coworkers, or the Decedent of the dangers of asbestos 
exposure, and failed to implement adequate safety measures to prevent the transportation of 
asbestos fibers home on Plaintiff’s clothing. Id. at pp. 15-18, 19-25. The other named defendants 
in Plaintiff’s petition include Eagle, Inc. (“Eagle”) (formerly known as Eagle Asbestos & Packing 
Co. Inc.), a seller, supplier, and manufacturer of asbestos -containing products, which Plaintiff 
alleges distributed and installed asbestos-containing products at Avondale that Mr. Steib brought 
home on his work clothes, thereby exposing Mrs. Steib to asbestos. Id. at pp. 18-19. 
Avondale subsequently removed the action to this Court, asserting federal officer 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). R. Doc. 1, p. 1. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand, R. 
Doc. 45, which the Court denied, R. Doc. 116. On October 31, 2024, Avondale filed crossclaims 
 
2 Mrs. Steib was diagnosed with mesothelioma on or about April 29, 2024, and died on June 20, 
2024. R. Doc. 1-2, pp. 3, 8. 

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against several co-defendants, including Eagle. R. Doc. 14, pp. 17, 22- 23. Avondale alleges that 
Eagle’s products “were used, installed, removed, and/or repaired at Avondale” and that, if Mrs. 
Steib was exposed to asbestos dust from products during Mr. Steib’s employment at Avondale, 
this exposure “was caused by the fault, negligence, and strict liability of Defendant Eagle and/or 
Eagle’s insurers.” Id. at p. 23. Avondale also asserted third-party demands against multiple alleged 
insurers of Eagle, including Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance Company (“Berkshire”). Id. 
at p. 18. Avondale brings these direct -action claims under La. R.S. 22:1269 and alleges that 
Berkshire, as liability insurer of Eagle, is responsible for Eagle’s liability. Id. at p. 23. 
a. Berkshire’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 158) 
Berkshire filed its motion (“Berkshire’s Motion”) on February 24, 2026, seeking summary 
judgment on the ground that Avondale cannot establish that Mr. Steib was exposed to asbestos 
from Eagle products during Berkshire’s policy periods of August 12, 1974, to August 12, 1975, 
and August 12, 1976, to August 12, 1977. R. Doc. 158- 1, p. 1. Berkshire argues that, absent 
evidence of Eagle-linked exposure during these policy periods, its alleged policies are not triggered 
and, therefore, it cannot be liable as Eagle’s insurer. R. Doc. 158-1, p. 1; R. Doc. 204, pp. 1-2. 
 In opposition, Avondale relies on circumstantial evidence and contends that Mr. Steib 
performed overtime and transfer work aboard cargo ships, including weekend work cleaning 
engine rooms and other shipboard work around insulators. R. Doc. 192, pp. 3-5. Avondale further 
contends that Eagle half-round insulation was used on cargo ships constructed at Avondale in the 
1970s, including LASH vessels;
3 that such insulation work generated dust; and that asbestos from 
 
3 “LASH vessels” refer to “lighter aboard ship” vessels. See, e.g., Bourgeois v. Huntington 
Ingalls Inc., No. CV 20-1002, 2020 WL 2488026, at *2 (E.D. La. May 14, 2020). 

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those products was more likely than not carried home on Mr. Steib’s clothing, thereby exposing 
Mrs. Steib. Id. at pp. 3-8; R. Doc. 192- 1, pp. 2- 4. Avondale also relies on expert testimony and 
historical deposition testimony from former Avondale workers who identified Eagle products 
being used aboard ships and in engine rooms. R. Doc. 192-1, pp. 2-5; R. Doc. 192-11, pp. 3-7. 
 In its reply, Berkshire argues that Avondale’s proof is too general and does not satisfy the 
specific policy-period showing required to proceed against Berkshire as Eagle’s alleged insurer. 
R. Doc. 204, pp. 1- 3. Berkshire emphasizes that Mr. Steib did not identify Eagle products in his 
own testimony and that none of Avondale’s historical witnesses places Mr. Steib himself around 
Eagle products during the policy periods. Id. Berkshire further argues that, based on Avondale’s 
own expert materials, the relevant part of the first Berkshire policy period is effectively narrowed 
to the period between August 12, 1974, and September 23, 1974, because Mr. Steib transferred to 
the shipfitting department on September 23, 1974. Id. at p. 2. Therefore, Berkshire contends that 
Avondale has failed to produce evidence of Eagle-linked exposure during that narrowed interval. 
Id. at pp. 1-3. 
 In its sur-reply, Avondale argues that Berkshire overstates the effect of Mr. Steib’s transfer 
to shipfitting and misreads the opinions of Avondale’s industrial hygiene expert, Brent Levingston. 
R. Doc. 208, pp. 1-2. Specifically, Avondale points out that, although Levingston opined that Mr. 
Steib “did not receive direct or bystander exposure to asbestos while working on the platens ,” 
Levingston also stated that, while assigned to the shipfitting department, Mr. Steib “ occasionally 
worked on vessels and barges , either as short -term transfer work or during weekend overtime 
work,” during which he continued to work around insulators handling asbestos -containing 
materials. Id. at p. 2 (quoting R. Doc. 158-10, p. 20) (emphasis added in original). Avondale also 

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cites Mr. Steib’s testimony that he continued to perform weekend overtime work on ships 
throughout his Avondale career, including after he became a foreman and superintendent, and that 
on those shifts he continued to work around insulation activities. Id. at pp. 2-4 (citing R. Doc. 192-
2, pp. 3-4, 12). Avondale contends that this defeats Berkshire’s attempt to reduce the first policy 
period to less than six weeks. Id. at p. 4. 
b. Eagle’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 159) 
Eagle also filed its motion (“Eagle’s Motion”) on February 24, 2026, originally seeking 
dismissal of all claims asserted against it by Plaintiff and by Avondale. R. Doc. 159. Plaintiff 
subsequently settled its claims with Eagle, R. Docs. 221, 225, and Eagle then withdrew its motion 
as to Plaintiff and reserved its rights as to Avondale’s crossclaim, R. Docs. 227, 228. Accordingly, 
the only issue remaining before the Court is whether Eagle is entitled to summary judgment on 
Avondale’s crossclaim. Eagle argues that there is no evidence that Mr. Steib ever worked with or 
around any product supplied by Eagle and, therefore, no evidence that any alleged household 
exposure sustained by Mrs. Steib was attributable to Eagle. R. Doc. 159- 3, pp. 1- 2, 5-7. Eagle 
emphasizes that Mr. Steib did not identify Eagle, did not identify the supplier of insulation 
materials used at Avondale, and did not know what company supplied insulation materials used 
on cargo ships. Id. at 6-7. Eagle further contends that the mere fact that it sold products to Avondale 
is insufficient to establish product identification or causation. Id. at 5-7. 
In opposition to Eagle’s motion, Avondale argues that Eagle’s Motion should be denied 
because the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material 
fact as to whether Mr. Steib was exposed to asbestos from Eagle’s products during his shipboard 
work at Avondale. R. Doc. 193, pp. 1- 2. Avondale contends that Mr. Steib performed overtime 

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and repair work aboard cargo ships and cleaned up engine rooms aboard those ships from 
approximately 1970 to 1973, working in the presence of insulators who applied half -round pipe 
insulation to steam lines. Id. at pp. 3 -4. Avondale further asserts that Eagle supplied half -round 
insulation products that were used on LASH vessels and other cargo ships constructed at Avondale 
during those years, that the installation and cleanup of those materials generated visible asbestos 
dust, and that such dust contaminat ed Mr. Steib’s work clothing and was carried home to Mrs. 
Steib. Id. at pp. 4 -8. It supports these facts with historical deposition testimony from multiple 
former Avondale workers, who identified Eagle -labeled insulation products being used by 
insulators aboard LASH vessels and in engine rooms, and described the visible dust generated 
when working with those materials. Id. 
Avondale also relies on expert testimony. Its industrial hygienist, Brent Levingston, opines 
that Mrs. Steib was more likely than not exposed to asbestos fibers from Eagle products brought 
home on Mr. Steib’s work clothes and that such exposure more likely than not increased her risk 
of disease. R. Doc. 193, p. 8; R. Doc. 193- 12, pp. 4- 6. Avondale’s medical expert, Dr. Richard 
Kradin, opined that Mr. Steib worked around asbestos -containing materials that more likely than 
not included insulation from Eagle, and that the resulting take -home exposure was a significant 
contributing factor in Mrs. Steib’s development of mesothelioma. R. Doc. 193, pp. 8- 9; R. Doc. 
193-13, pp. 20-21. Plaintiff’s medical expert, Dr. Brent Staggs, similarly testified that exposures 
from Eagle insulation products would have been a significant contributing factor to Mrs. Steib’s 
mesothelioma. R. Doc. 193, p. 9; R. Doc. 193-15, pp. 2-3. 
In its reply, Eagle argues that Avondale’s proof remains insufficient because none of the 
historical witnesses cited by Avondale knew Mr. Steib, worked with him, or otherwise testified 

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that he was present when any product supplied by Eagle was being used. R. Doc. 203, pp. 2 -3. 
Eagle further argues that Avondale’s evidence establishes at most that Eagle sold products to 
Avondale, which Louisiana courts have held is insufficient to establi sh product identification or 
causation, and that the Court should not infer facts that no witnesses have supplied. Id. at p. 3. 
Eagle also emphasizes that Mr. Steib, the only firsthand witness to his own work at Avondale, 
never identified Eagle or any insulation supplier in his deposition, did not see boxes or containers 
from which pipe insulation was taken, and could not identify the vessels on which he performed 
overtime work beyond describing some as cargo ships. Id. at p. 2. 
While both Berkshire’s Motion and Eagle’s Motion concern the issue of whether Mr. Steib 
was exposed to asbestos-containing products from Eagle—in fact, parties raise similar arguments 
in support of and in opposition to each motion —the Court notes that Berkshire’s motion is 
narrower in scope. The key distinction between the two motions lies not in the underlying evidence 
of exposure, but in the additional showing required to trigger an insurer’s policy coverage under 
Louisiana law, as discussed in the Court’s analysis below. 
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
a. Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A court must hold “a 
factual dispute to be ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 
for the nonmoving party and a fact to be ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the suit under 

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the governing substantive law.” Voekel McWilliams Const., LLC v. 84 Lumber Co., 2015 WL 
1184148, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 2015) (quoting Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 
(5th Cir. 1989)). 
When assessing whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, courts “consider 
all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing 
the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 
(5th Cir. 2008) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). 
Accordingly, at the summary judgment stage, courts must view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. See, e.g., Darden v. City of 
Fort Worth, Texas , 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting City & Cnty. Of San Francisco, 
Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 603 (2015); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 
(1986)). 
Of course, “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts 
and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.” 
Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation and 
citation omitted). Although the movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact, if it can carry that burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond 
the pleadings and . . . designat e specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. This burden is not satisfied by a “metaphysical doubt as to the material 
facts” or only a “scintilla” of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 
1994) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Davis 
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)). Summary judgment must thus be 

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entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[i]n such a situation, 
there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning 
an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 
Id. at 322-23. Courts “do not . . . in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party 
could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little , 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). Thus, “summary judgment is appropriate in any case ‘where 
critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in 
favor of the nonmovant.’ ” Id. (quoting Armstrong v. City of Dallas , 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 
1993)) (emphasis in original). 
b. Berkshire’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 158) 
The Court will first consider Berkshire’s Motion. As a threshold matter, the Court must 
address Berkshire’s contention that the relevant window of potential exposure under its first policy 
period is effectively limited to the roughly six -week period starti ng on August 12, 1974, when 
Berkshire’s policy began, and ending on September 23, 1974, when Mr. Steib transferred to the 
shipfitting department. See R. Doc. 204, pp. 1 -2. Avondale avers that Berkshire’s argument 
overstates the effect of Mr. Steib’s transf er because he continued work that could have exposed 
him to Eagle’s asbestos-containing products after moving to shipfitting. R. Doc. 208, pp. 1-2. The 
Court agrees with Avondale on this point: Berkshire’s restrictive framing does not fully account 
for Avondale’s evidence that Mr. Steib continued vessel work after September 23, 1974. 

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Berkshire relies on Brent Levingston’s written expert report for its proposition that Mr. 
Steib “was not exposed to asbestos after he became a shipfitter on September 23, 1974.” R. Doc. 
204, p. 2. However, Mr. Levingston’s report does not reach this conclusion. Instead, he states that, 
once assigned to the shipfitting department, Mr. Steib “did not receive direct or bystander exposure 
to asbestos while working on the platens .” R. Doc. 158- 10, p. 20 (emphasis added). The report 
goes on to note, “While working in the Shipfitting Department, Mr. Steib stated he occasionally 
worked on vessels and barges, either as short -term transfer work or during weekend overtime 
work.” Id. Mr. Levingston further explains that, during such work, Mr. Steib “worked around 
insulators handling asbestos -containing materials,” and thus continued to sustain asbestos 
exposures. Id. 
These conclusions are consistent with deposition testimony from both Mr. Levingston and 
Mr. Steib. First, Mr. Levingston testified that Mr. Steib’s weekend overtime work “more likely 
than not” would have exposed him to asbestos -containing insulation produc ts on LASH cargo 
vessels, approximately twenty of which were constructed at Avondale in the 1970s. R. Doc. 192-
11, pp. 2-3, 5-6. Second, Mr. Steib testified that he continued to perform weekend overtime work 
on ships throughout his entire career at Avondal e, including while assigned to the shipfitting 
department and after he became a foreman and superintendent: 
Q: So kind of the weekend work on the ships, that was something that you did 
throughout your career at Avondale? 
A. Yeah. We worked on weekends. . . . 
Q. So as I appreciate your testimony, even in the capacity as a foreman or a 
superintendent, on occasions you would go back on the ships; is that correct? 
A. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. 

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R. Doc. 192- 2, pp. 3- 4. Mr. Steib provided further testimony that, during his work on ships, he 
continued to work around insulation activities. Id. at p. 4 (“When we are on the ships, we are 
around pipe insulation and that type of material? . . . Yeah. Insulation and all of that.”) 
 Accordingly, Berkshire’s six- week window argument fails. The relevant inquiry is not 
limited to the period between August 12, 1974, and September 23, 1974. Instead, the full span of 
Berkshire’s two policy periods—August 12, 1974, through August 12, 1975, and August 12, 1976, 
through August 12, 1977—remains at issue. 
Having established that the relevant window extends across Berkshire’s full policy periods, 
the Court next considers whether Avondale has produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Steib was exposed to asbestos from Eagle’s products during 
this timeframe. Berkshire’s motion presents a narrow insurer-trigger issue. It does not contend that 
Eagle products were not present at Avondale during Mr. Steib’s employment, but rather that 
Avondale cannot establish that Mr . Steib’s exposure to asbestos both was the result of Eagle 
products and occurred during Berkshire’s policy periods. 
Berkshire correctly notes that, under Louisiana’s exposure trigger rule, a liability insurer’s 
policies are triggered only by exposure to harmful conditions during the policy period. Cole v. 
Celotex, 599 So. 2d 1058, 1076 (La. 1992); Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 200 So. 3d 277, 282 (La. 
2016) (“[T]he ‘occurrence’ that triggers coverage under an insurance policy is the plaintiff's 
exposure to harmful conditions within the policy period.”). Berkshire also correctly observes that 
the party seeking coverage bears the burden of proving that the policy affords coverage for the 
incident at issue. Tunstall v. Stierwald, 809 So. 2d 916, 921 (La. 2002); Smith v. Reliance Ins. Co. 
of Ill., 807 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2003) (citing Barber v. Best , 394 So. 2d 779, 781 

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(La. App. 4 Cir. 1981)). To prevail on its claim against Berkshire as Eagle’s insurer, Avondale 
must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Steib was exposed to asbestos from 
Eagle’s products during the policy periods, that he inadvertently brought those fibers home on his 
clothing, and that this in turn exposed Mrs. Steib to a causative level of asbestos. See Abadie v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 784 So. 2d 46, 89- 90 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2001) (“To prevail, a plaintiff in an 
asbestos case must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was exposed to asbestos 
from the defendants’ products, and that he received an injury that was substantially caused by that 
exposure.”). Berkshire is also correct in its assertion that evidence of the mere presence of Eagle’s 
products at Avondale is insufficient to establish liability. Benard v. Eagle, Inc., 1 So. 3d 588, 593-
94 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2008) (reversing denial of summary judgment where sole evidence connecting 
plaintiff to Eagle products was testimony th at Eagle supplied asbestos to facility); Lucas v. 
Hopeman Bros., Inc., 60 So. 3d 690, 702 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment 
where evidence placed plaintiff at worksite with products from multiple suppliers but did not 
specifically place him around fibers emanating from that vendor's product). Accordingly, t he 
question before the Court is not whether Avondale has assembled a broad historical record 
suggesting Eagle products were used at Avondale at various times, but instead whether that record 
is sufficiently specific as to product and time to create a genuine issue of material fact that Mr. 
Steib was exposed to asbestos from Eagle products during Berkshire’s policy periods. See Cole , 
599 So. 2d at 1076-77. The Court finds that it does not. 
Avondale has submitted evidence that Eagle insulation products were used aboard certain 
vessels at Avondale and that insulation work generated visible dust. R. Doc. 192, pp. 3- 7. It has 
also submitted evidence that Mr. Steib performed weekend overtime and some transfer work 

13 
aboard ships, including cargo ships, and that he worked around insulation activities while doing 
so. R. Doc. 192, pp. 3 -8; R. Doc. 208, pp. 2 -4. While this evidence supports the broader theory 
that Mr. Steib worked in shipboard environments where asbestos -containing insulation work 
occurred, defeating Berkshire’s motion requires a more specific showing. The historical witness 
testimony cited by Avondale includes testimony that Eagle products were used somewhere at 
Avondale, testimony that Eagle products wer e used on certain vessels or in certain engine rooms 
over broad time spans, and testimony describing dusty insulation work generally. R. Doc. 192, pp. 
3-7. Even affording credibility to all of the historical testimony, and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in Avondale's favor, none of it places Mr. Steib himself in proximity to Eagle products 
during Berkshire's policy periods. As Berkshire points out, Mr. Steib gave no testimony regarding 
Eagle during his deposition, he did not identify the name of any company that supplied asbestos -
containing products to Avondale, and he could not identify the vessels on which he worked beyond 
describing some as "cargo ships." R. Doc. 158- 2, p. 2; R. Doc. 204, pp. 2- 3. Berkshire further 
points out, and the Court agrees, that there is no evidence that any of the historical witnesses cited 
by Avondale worked with or even knew Mr. Steib, much less observed him working around Eagle 
products during the relevant periods. R. Doc. 204, pp. 2-3. 
These distinctions are critical. General evidence that Eagle products were used at 
Avondale, even on cargo ships and LASH vessels, is not enough by itself to trigger Berkshire’s 
alleged coverage. Simply put, the evidence submitted by Avondale remains works ite-general and 
era-general, rather than Steib-specific and policy-period-specific. See Benard, 1 So. 3d at 593-94; 
Lucas, 60 So. 3d at 702; Prive v. Eagle, Inc., No. 22-84, 2023 WL 2646433, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 
27, 2023) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff could not identify defendant’s product and 

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evidence did not establish causation with sufficient specificity). Avondale correctly notes that 
Louisiana law permits the use of circumstantial evidence in asbestos cases, and it also 
acknowledges that circumstantial evidence must still be sufficiently sp ecific to make the fact 
sought to be proved more probable than not. R. Doc. 192, p. 10 (citing Rando v. Anco Insulations, 
Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065, 1089 (La. 2009); Danos v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 989 So. 2d 160, 163 (La. 
App. 4 Cir. 2008)). Here, the general evidence of Eagle products’ presence at Avondale does not 
alone make it more probable than not that Mr. Steib specifically encountered asbestos from Eagle 
products during Berkshire’s narrow policy periods rather than the products of any of the other 
multiple suppliers present at Avondale during the same era. 
The expert opinions offered by Avondale do not cure this deficiency. While the testimony 
of Mr. Levingston, Dr. Kradin, and Dr. Staggs may contribute to a finding that Eagle products 
caused harmful take-home exposure that contributed to Mrs. Steib’s mesothelioma, the threshold 
question for purposes of this motion is whether the record establishes that Mr. Steib actually 
encountered asbestos from Eagle products during Berkshire’s policy periods. Where, as here, the 
record does not adequately establish that Mr. Steib encountered Eagle products during Berkshire’s 
policy periods, expert opinions premised on the presumption that such an encounter occurred, 
standing alone, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary 
judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. The product and time gap in Avondale’s proof remains. 
The Court notes that this ruling is narrow. It does not find that Eagle bears no liability, nor 
that Avondale’s claims against other parties lack merit. Instead, the Court finds only that Avondale 
has failed to produce evidence sufficient to trigger Berkshire’s specific policy periods as alleged 
insurer of Eagle. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to non- movant Avondale, the 

15 
Court finds that Avondale has failed to satisfy the policy-triggering burden of producing sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Mr. Steib was exposed to Eagle’s 
asbestos-containing products during Berkshire’s policy per iods. For these reasons, Berkshire’s 
Motion is GRANTED. 
c. Eagle’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 159) 
Next, the Court will consider the merits of Eagle’s Motion. As noted above, the Court’s 
analysis of Berkshire’s Motion addressed only whether Avondale produced sufficient evidence to 
trigger Berkshire’s coverage during specific policy periods as Eagle’s al leged insurer. Eagle’s 
Motion presents a different question: whether Avondale has produced sufficient evidence to create 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Steib was exposed to asbestos from Eagle 
products at all. 
As noted in the previous section, Louisiana law requires a party asserting asbestos-related 
fault to establish (1) that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos from the defendant’s product and 
(2) that such exposure was a substantial factor in causing the al leged injury. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 
1088, 1091; Abadie, 784 So. 2d at 89-90. This burden applies with equal force to contribution and 
virile share claims. See Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1088. Avondale, as the party seeking contribution from 
Eagle, bears the same burden of proof it would face as a direct claimant, and this burden may be 
satisfied through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1089; Williams, 23 F.4th at 512. 
Mere proof that a defendant’s product was present at a worksite is not sufficient by itself 
to establish product identification or causation. Booth , 854 So. 2d at 981 -82; Lucas, 60 So. 3d at 
702; Benard, 1 So. 3d at 593- 94. Evidence that does no more than place a plaintiff at a worksite 
where a defendant's products were used, without specifically placing the plaintiff around asbestos 

16 
fibers emanating from that defendant's product, is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Prive 
v. Eagle, Inc., No. 22-84, 2023 WL 2646433, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 2023). 
Thus, in reviewing Eagle’s Motion, the Court considers whether Avondale has designated 
specific facts sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to infer, more probably than not, that Mr. 
Steib encountered asbestos from Eagle’s products in the course of his work at Avondale. See 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323- 24; Delta & Pine Land Co., 530 F.3d at 398- 99. Eagle’s central 
argument—that Mr. Steib, the only firsthand witness to his work, never identified Eagle or its 
products in his deposition testimony, and that none of Avondale’s historical witnesses knew Mr. 
Steib or could place him in proximity to Eagle products —does point out genuine weaknesses in 
Avondale’s case. However, Avondale does more than simply prove that Eagle sold insulation 
products to Avondale at some point during Mr. Steib’s employment. The historical testimony 
presented demonstrates that Eagle half-round pipe insulation was used by insulators aboard LASH 
vessels and in engine rooms during the 1970s —the same type of vessel, work environment, and 
type of product that Mr. Steib described encountering. R. Doc. 193, pp. 4- 8. Several of these 
witnesses testified that Eagle products were present on every ship on which they worked during 
that period, and that the installation and cleanup of those material s created visible dust that 
contaminated workers' clothing. Id. This is not evidence that Eagle products were present 
somewhere at Avondale in a general sense; it is evidence that Eagle products were present in the 
specific shipboard environments where Mr. Steib described performing his work. 
While Eagle very well may persuade a factfinder that Avondale’s chain of inferences is too 
attenuated to carry its burden at trial, that is not the question at the summary judgment stage. The 
Court must view the record in the light most favorable to Avonda le and draw all justifiable 

17 
inferences in its favor, without weighing the evidence or making credibility determinations. 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Delta & Pine Land Co., 530 F.3d at 398- 99. Viewed in that light, the 
record would permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that Mr. Steib was exposed to asbestos from 
Eagle products because he performed cleanup and overtime work in the engine rooms of cargo 
ships during the same years that multiple witnesses consistently identified Eagle half -round pipe 
insulation as being used in the engine rooms of the same type of vessels. Thus, Eagle has not 
established a complete absence of a triable issue. 
Eagle correctly notes that this Court granted summary judgment in Prive v. Eagle, Inc. on 
similar facts. However, the facts presented in this case are distinct from those in Prive. While the 
Prive plaintiff “was unable to identify a product of either [defendant manufacturer] that he used,” 
the defendant manufacturers also “provide[d] affidavits indicating their product was infrequently 
used in Plaintiff’s type of work,” and “[t]here [were] no other supporting documents, evidence, or 
deposition testimony to indicate any [defendant manufacturer’s] product was used by Plaintiff at 
all, or was present in any materials used by or around Plaintiff.” Prive, 2023 WL 2646433, at *1-
2. Thus, summary judgment in those defendants’ favor was proper. Here, the record is more 
developed. Avondale has presented specific testimony about the type of work Mr. Steib performed 
and the environments in which he performed it, which provides a factual foundation for connecting 
Eagle's products —identified by multiple witnesses as regul arly present in those same 
environments—to Mr. Steib's shipboard exposure. That connection, while circumstantial, is 
sufficient to raise a triable issue. 
As noted in the Court’s analysis of Berkshire’s Motion, expert opinions cannot substitute 
for absent exposure facts. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. That principle drove the Court’s ruling 

18 
on Berkshire’s Motion because the record does not adequately establish by a preponderance of 
evidence that Mr. Steib encountered Eagle products during Berkshire’s specific policy periods . 
That same concern does not apply to Eagle’s Motion because the expert opinions of Mr. 
Levingston, Dr. Kradin, and Dr. Staggs are grounded in circumstantial evidence supporting the 
inference that Mr. Steib’s exposure to asbestos from Eagle products during the entire course of his 
employment. R. Doc. 193, pp. 8-10. 
The Court expresses no view on whether Avondale will ultimately carry its burden at trial. 
It concludes only that the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Avondale, presents a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Mr. Steib encountered asbestos from Eagle products 
during his shipboard work and whether that exposure contributed to Mrs. Steib’s mesothelioma. 
That question is properly reserved for the jury. Therefore, Eagle’s Motion is DENIED. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance Company’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 158) is GRANTED. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Avondale’s claims against Berkshire Hathaway 
Specialty Insurance Company are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Eagle, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 
159) is DENIED. 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23
rd day of April, 2026. 
 
 
 
GREG GERARD GUIDRY 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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