919 F.3d 1154

GRABER, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join the opinion, which relies on the general discretionary-immunity statute, California Government Code section 820.2, in full. I write separately to add that the California legislature has provided an even clearer, specific grant of immunity to Defendants in the present circumstances.
California Government Code section 845.8(a) immunizes public employees from "[a]ny injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from determining whether to revoke his parole or release." California Government Code section 846 immunizes public employees from any "injury caused ... by the failure to retain an arrested person in custody."
As recognized by the California courts, the legislature intended those grants of immunity to be specific applications of the general discretionary-immunity statute. E.g. , Whitcombe v. County of Yolo , 73 Cal.App.3d 698, 141 Cal.Rptr. 189, 195 & n.10 (1977). Moreover, when those specific immunity statutes apply, we need not determine whether the underlying acts were "discretionary" or "ministerial" because the legislature "has already concluded that all conduct within [the statutes'] terms is entitled to immunity." Id. at 197 & n.15. "[A] specific legislative mandate of immunity effectively places beyond the pale of liability both discretionary decisions themselves and their ministerial implementations." Id. at 198. Here, as in Whitcombe , "we need not resort to th[e] general discretionary immunity section," because Defendants are immune under the specific immunity statutes. Id. at 197 ; see also Carmack v. Reynolds , 2 Cal.5th 844, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 749, 391 P.3d 625, 632 (2017) ("A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern in respect to that subject, as against a general provision, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provision relates." (quoting Miller v. Superior Court , 21 Cal.4th 883, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 986 P.2d 170, 177 (1999) ) ).
The specific immunity statutes apply here because Plaintiffs' entire claim rests on the manner in which a prisoner was released (he was released without notifying federal authorities). Even adopting Plaintiffs' view that the Memo, and not the release, caused the harm, the California courts have construed sections 845.8(a) and 846 broadly to encompass all "policy decisions ... made prior to and as an integral part of the ultimate basic decision to release." County of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court , 15 Cal.App.3d 751, 93 Cal.Rptr. 406, 410 (1971).
As the main opinion properly acknowledges, the events underlying this case are tragic. And some of Plaintiffs' claims remain to be litigated in the district court.
We hold only that, under California law, the state officials are immune from suit.

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