933 F.3d 1191

OWENS, Circuit Judge, concurring:
Because the majority opinion comports with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit law, I concur (and I do not think reliance on Chevron is necessary). But I continue to believe that the current moral turpitude jurisprudence makes no sense, and I am not a lone wolf in so thinking. See Jordan v. De George , 341 U.S. 223, 232-45, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Barbosa v. Barr , 926 F.3d 1053, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2019) (Berzon, J., concurring); Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker , 914 F.3d 1249, 1251-61 (9th Cir. 2019) (Fletcher, J., concurring); Menendez v. Whitaker , 908 F.3d 467, 475 (9th Cir. 2018) (Callahan, J., concurring); Ortega-Lopez v. Lynch , 834 F.3d 1015, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2016) (Bea, J., concurring); Arias v. Lynch , 834 F.3d 823, 830-36 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring); Ceron v. Holder , 747 F.3d 773, 785-89 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting); Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales , 503 F.3d 1063, 1084-86 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca , 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Until Congress or the Supreme Court intervenes, the present regime will continue to be a black hole for judicial resources. And the experience of our court leaves no doubt about the arbitrariness of the results. For example, we have held that knowing possession of child pornography is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. United States v. Santacruz , 563 F.3d 894, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). But some conduct directly between the defendant and victim is not-such as committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child aged 14 or 15 (with a defendant at least ten years older than the child) with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the defendant or the child, Menendez , 908 F.3d at 472-74, or annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18, motivated by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest, Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey , 523 F.3d 992, 997-1007 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled in part on other grounds by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder , 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
We have also been quick to conclude, under the current framework, that fraud crimes categorically involve moral turpitude, such as making false statements to obtain credit cards, Tijani v. Holder , 628 F.3d 1071, 1075-79 (9th Cir. 2010), but relatively more serious non-fraudulent crimes do not, such as simple kidnapping, Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder , 704 F.3d 1205, 1212-18 (9th Cir. 2013). In addition, we have determined that beating up your wife is morally turpitudinous, Grageda v. INS , 12 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Planes v. Holder , 652 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2011), but beating up your live-in girlfriend does not categorically involve moral turpitude, Morales-Garcia v. Holder , 567 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).
Rather than play the role of a Rorschach psychologist, we should focus on a more objective standard, such as the length of the underlying criminal sentence, before removing someone from the United States. See Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch , 815 F.3d 469, 482-83 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Owens, J., concurring) ("A better mousetrap is long overdue. Rather than compete with Rube Goldberg, we instead should look to a more objective standard, such as the length of the underlying sentence ...."); cf. United States v. Brown , 879 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2018) (Owens, J., concurring) ("A regime based on the length of previous sentences, rather than on the vagaries of state law, is the way to go."). While not perfect, this approach would be far more evenhanded and predictable than what we have now.

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