govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_25-cv-00503-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
STEPHANIE GABRIELLE NOGALES, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) 1:25CV503 
 ) 
DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES ) 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION ) 
SERVICES, ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge. 
 Plaintiff Stephanie Gabrielle Nogales seeks judicial review 
of the denial of her application for naturalization. Defendant 
Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”) moves to dismiss her complaint pursuant to Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Docs. 8, 9.) USCIS 
contends that, because Nogales was placed in removal proceedings 
before initiating judicial review of the denial of her application 
for naturalization, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
or, at minimum, she fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. (Doc. 9 at 1-2.) Alternatively, USCIS argues that 
the court should stay this case until Nogales’s removal proceedings 
have concluded. (Id. at 2.) Nogales has filed a response in 
opposition (Doc. 10), and USCIS replied (Doc. 12). USCIS also 
filed a notice of supplemental information (Doc. 13), to which 

2 
 
Nogales responded (Doc. 14). For the reasons set out below, 
USCIS’s motion to dismiss will be denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The facts, taken from the complaint and viewed in the light 
most favorable to Nogales, are as follows: 
 Nogales, who resides in Durham, North Carolina, is a native 
citizen and national of Ecuador and Italy. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1.) She is 
also a lawful permanent resident of the United States, and she 
married her husband, a United States citizen, in March 2004. (Id. 
¶¶ 7, 9.) Nogales’s husband is a Marine Corps veteran who served 
in Iraq prior to 2004 and, as a result, suffers from post-traumatic 
stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Id. ¶ 10.) At the demands of her 
husband, Nogales registered to vote and then voted in the 2004 
election – although she alleges that she first explained to polling 
station volunteers that she was not a United States citizen and 
even presented her Italian passport. (Id. ¶¶ 15-20.) Nogales’s 
husband eventually received help for his PTSD, and he and Nogales 
remain together and share four children. (Id. ¶¶ 22-25.) 
 In August 2023, Nogales submitted a Form N-400, Application 
for Naturalization, to USCIS. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) However, after an 
interview, USCIS denied her application because she failed to 
sufficiently demonstrate that she had registered to vote and, 
ultimately, voted in the 2004 election because of coercion from 
her husband. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) Nogales appealed this denial via 

3 
 
Form N-336, Request for a Hearing on a Decision in Naturalization 
Proceedings, in February 2024, and USCIS affirmed the denial in 
April 2025. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 34.) Finally, in May 2025, USCIS issued 
Nogales a notice to appear in immigration court for removal 
proceedings. (Id. ¶ 35; see Doc. 9-1 at 1.) 
 Approximately one month after USCIS issued the notice to 
appear, Nogales initiated the present action seeking review of 
USCIS’s denial of her naturalization application pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1421(c). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 39-40.) Nogales requests that the 
court first “[d]etermine and declare” that she is eligible for 
naturalization. (Id. ¶ 46.) She then asks that the court order 
USCIS to schedule an oath ceremony within 30 days, allow Nogales 
to take the oath, and issue her a naturalization certificate. (Id. 
¶ 47.) In October 2025, USCIS filed the present motion to dismiss. 
(Doc. 8.) The motion is now fully briefed and ready for decision. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 A. Standard of Review 
 1. Rule 12(b)(1) 
 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” in that 
“[t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and 
statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 
375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 
jurisdiction. Id. “When a defendant makes a facial challenge to 
subject matter jurisdiction, ‘the plaintiff, in effect, is 

4 
 
afforded the same procedural protection as he would receive under 
a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.’” Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 
187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 
1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). Accordingly, “the facts alleged in the 
complaint are taken as true, and the motion must be denied if the 
complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter 
jurisdiction.” Id. 
 2. Rule 12(b)(6) 
 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss” pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable of the misconduct alleged.” Id. 
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
“challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint, considered with 
the assumption that the facts alleged are true.” Francis v. 
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
However, pleadings that “are no more than conclu sions[] are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

5 
 
And mere “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of 
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. at 678 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 B. Whether the Court Must Dismiss Nogales’s Complaint 
 Nogales brings this lawsuit pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), 
which grants de novo judicial review of USCIS’s denial of her 
application for naturalization. Specifically, § 1421(c) provides: 
 A person whose application for naturalization under this 
subchapter is denied, after a hearing before an 
immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this title, 
may seek review of such denial before the United States 
district court for the district in which such person 
resides in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5. Such 
review shall be de novo, and the court shall make its 
own findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, 
at the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de 
novo on the application. 
 
USCIS contends that the court should dismiss Nogales’s claim 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1429. (Doc. 9 at 5.) USCIS argues that, 
because removal proceedings against Nogales began prior to her 
filing of this lawsuit, § 1429 either strips the court of 
jurisdiction over this case or bars a meaningful remedy. (Id. at 
7-8.) Nogales counters that § 1429 does not apply because USCIS 
never placed her in removal proceedings pursuant to a warrant of 
arrest. (Doc. 10 at 2-3.) Rather, she alleges that she merely 
received a notice to appear in immigration court. (Id.; Doc. 1 
¶¶ 35-36.) And even if § 1429 applies to her request for judicial 
review, Nogales asserts, the court retains the authority to issue 

6 
 
a declaratory judgment as to her application for naturalization. 
(Doc. 10 at 7 (citing cases).) 
 Under § 1429, “no application for naturalization shall be 
considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the 
applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest 
issued under the provision of this chapter or any other Act.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1429 (emphasis added). The agency tasked with 
interpreting § 1429 has promulgated a regulation that “a notice to 
appear . . . shall be regarded as a warrant of arrest.” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 318.1. 
 Here, the parties agree that Nogales’s removal proceedings 
commenced upon the issuance of a notice to appear, rather than a 
warrant of arrest. (Doc. 10 at 2; Doc. 12 at 2.) The question is 
therefore “whether this regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 318.1, is an 
improper interpretation by an administrative agency of Congress’s 
use of ‘warrant of arrest’ in § 1429.” Murray v. Cissna, No. 18-
cv-2059, 2019 WL 2358951, at *2 (D.S.C. June 4, 2019). 
 Courts must “exercise independent judgment in construing 
statutes administered by agencies.” Loper Bright Enters. v. 
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 406 (2024). Thus, courts no longer proceed 
under the two-step process laid out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984), which required judicial deference to administrative 
interpretations if “Congress has not directly addressed the 

7 
 
precise question at issue.” 
 Even before the Chevron doctrine’s demise, courts often 
determined that the plain terms of § 1429 unambiguously foreclosed 
the agency’s interpretation that Congress’s use of “warrant of 
arrest” encompasses a notice to appear. See, e.g., Yith v. 
Nielsen, 881 F.3d 1155, 1166 (9th Cir. 2018); Adegbesote v. 
Tritten, No. 20-1940, 2021 WL 5995198, at *6 (D. Minn. June 2, 
2021); Calvo v. Garcia, No. 20-CV-2029, 2021 WL 2324176, at *7 
(N.D. Tex. May 7, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 
WL 2315515 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2021); Murray, 2019 WL 2358951, at 
*3; Sanga v. Barr, 706 F. Supp. 3d 803, 815 (S.D. Iowa 2020); 
Kabura v. McNeer, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1281-82 (D. Utah 2020). 
But see, e.g., Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 
2012) (holding that “there’s no logical problem with an agency 
calling its official process a ‘notice to appear’ and a ‘warrant 
of arrest’ at the same time” because “‘arrest’ does not imply 
custody even in police parlance”). Since the Court’s decision in 
Loper Bright, no district court appears to have found § 318.1 to 
be a reasonable interpretation of § 1429. See Samuel v. Bondi, 
812 F. Supp. 3d 931, 935-37 (D. Minn. 2025); Mathin v. Mayorkas, 
746 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2024). 
 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Yith, upon which Nogales 
relies heavily, is persuasive. First, the court noted that a 
“warrant” is defined as “[a] writ directing or authorizing someone 

8 
 
to do an act, esp. one directing a law enforcer to make an arrest, 
a search, or a seizure,” while an “arrest” is defined as “[a] 
seizure or forcible restraint” or “[t]he taking or keeping of a 
person in custody by legal authority, esp. in response to a 
criminal charge.” Yith, 881 F.3d at 1166 (alterations in original) 
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). Second, the 
court defined “warrant of arrest” as “[a] warrant issued by a 
disinterested magistrate after a showing of probable cause, 
directing a law-enforcement officer to arrest and take a person 
into custody.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). “In other words, the plain meaning 
of the term ‘warrant of arrest’ is an order authorizing law 
enforcement to seize and detain a person as necessary for the 
administration of law.” Id. The court therefore concluded that 
a warrant of arrest “is a distinct document” from a notice to 
appear, which is “akin to a summons.” Id. at 1166-67. Indeed, 
the USCIS treats them separately. (Contrast Doc. 9-1 (Form I-862, 
Notice to Appear), with Doc. 10-2 (Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest 
of Alien).) 
 Further, in Yith, the court noted that all removal proceedings 
require a notice to appear. Yith, 881 F.3d at 1167. But only a 
subset of removal proceedings is initiated by the issuance of a 
warrant of arrest. Id. Thus, the court reasoned, “[i]f Congress 
intended to preclude the government’s consideration of a 

9 
 
naturalization petition whenever the applicant was in removal 
proceedings, then it would have had no need to state that § 1429 
is applicable only when a removal proceeding is ‘pursuant to a 
warrant of arrest.’” Id. Indeed, to hold otherwise would be 
“contrary to our general reluctance to treat statutory terms as 
surplusage.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 
U.S. 776, 788 (2011)). 
 USCIS cites Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 806 (4th Cir. 
2010), to argue that the court lacks jurisdiction where the alien 
seeks judicial review of her denied naturalization application 
after the initiation of removal proceedings. (Doc. 9 at 7-8.) 
Notably, the petitioner in Barnes had not received a decision on 
an application for naturalization when the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) commenced removal proceedings. Barnes, 625 F.3d 
at 802-03. The court held that “[a] harmonious reading of 
§ 1421(c) and § 1429 leads to the conclusion that an alien has a 
statutory right to review of his naturalization application, 
unless he is in removal proceedings.” Id. at 806. The court 
further reasoned that “[b]ecause, under § 1429, an alien in removal 
proceedings does not have a right to have his application 
adjudicated, it follows that he cannot possibly have a right to 
have the adjudication judicially reviewed.” Id. 
 Barnes does not direct an outcome in this case, however. 

10 
 
First, the court in Barnes did not include the “pursuant to a 
warrant of arrest” portion of § 1429 in its quotation of the 
statute, let alone address the issue now before this court: whether 
§ 1429 applies where an alien’s removal proceeding is initiated 
via a notice to appear rather than a warrant of arrest. See id.; 
see also Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (“Questions 
which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention 
of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having 
been so decided as to constitute precedents.”).
 Because this court 
finds § 1429 inapplicable where the removal proceedings were 
initiated pursuant to a notice to appear, it need not harmonize 
§ 1429 with § 1421(c). 
 Second, as to the Fourth Circuit’s proposition in Barnes that 
an alien “cannot possibly have a right to have the adjudication 
judicially reviewed” where he “does not have a right to have his 
application adjudicated,” Barnes, 625 F.3d at 806, “[t]he court’s 
point . . . was, simply, that so long as removal proceedings 
remained pending, DHS could not render a decision on [the 
petitioner’s] application, and without a DHS decision, there would 
be nothing for a district court to review under § 1421(c),” Dilone 
v. Nielsen, 358 F. Supp. 3d 490, 502 (D. Md. 2019). Here, unlike 
the petitioner in Barnes, Nogales already received a decision from 
USCIS on her application for naturalization before the initiation 
of removal proceedings. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 30-34.) Accordingly, even if 

11 
 
§ 1429 were to apply, the court’s holding in Barnes would not bar 
her right to have the adjudication judicially reviewed. See 
Kuffour v. Nielsen, 412 F. Supp. 3d 581, 590 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (“At 
best, Barnes answers a specific question in light of a specific 
factual scenario: What is the impact of § 1429 on the right to 
judicial review when a noncitizen files a naturalization 
application after removal proceedings have already begun?”). 
 Ultimately, the analysis of Yith is most persuasive.1 Section 
1429 does not apply because Nogales is not in removal proceedings 
“pursuant to a warrant of arrest,” and thus it does not strip the 
court of jurisdiction or the ability to provide a meaningful 
remedy. 
 C. Whether the Court Should Stay This Action 
 USCIS next argues that, even if not subject to dismissal 
pursuant to § 1429, the court should stay this case to promote 
judicial economy and give effect to Congress’s intent to prioritize 
 
1 USCIS cites both Klene, 697 F.3d at 670, and Gardener v. Barr, No. 18 
CV 620, 2019 WL 1001340, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2019), to argue against 
the conclusion in Yith. Neither court, however, employed any of the 
ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. For example, in Gardener, 
the court described the Ninth Circuit’s approach as “ultimately 
unworkable” before noting that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s conclusion 
basically rests on a finding that ‘warrant of arrest’ has a fixed meaning 
such that any other agency interpretation would, in effect, be 
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.” Gardener, 2019 
WL 1001340, at *6. But the first aim of statutory interpretation in 
fact “is to determine whether [a statute’s] language ‘has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning.’” Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi, 151 F.4th 522, 526 
(4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 802 F.3d 626, 631 
(4th Cir. 2015)). 
 

12 
 
removals over naturalizations. (Doc. 9 at 9.) Further, USCIS 
contends that a declaratory judgment issued while removal 
proceedings are pending against Nogales “would be a futile act and 
only produce an unenforceable advisory opinion.” (Id. at 10.) 
Nogales counters that a stay would “have the same effect as 
granting th[e] motion to dismiss” because her removal proceedings 
could go on for years. (Doc. 10 at 8.) Nogales also asserts that 
the outcome of her removal proceedings is not dispositive of this 
case. (Id. at 11.) 
 “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power 
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes 
on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 
counsel, and for litigants.” Maryland v. Universal Elections, 
Inc., 729 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). “The 
determination by a district judge in granting or denying a motion 
to stay proceedings calls for an exercise of judgment to balance 
the various factors relevant to the expeditious and comprehensive 
disposition of the causes of action on the court’s docket.” United 
States v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 562 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1977) (per 
curiam). Moreover, “[t]he party seeking a stay must justify it by 
clear and convincing circumstances outweighing potential harm to 
the party against whom it is operative.” Williford v. Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1983). 

13 
 
 In support of its request for a stay, USCIS cites Hernandez 
Alvarado v. Jaddou, 20CV538, 2021 WL 7162561, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 
19, 2021), Dilone, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 504, and Murray, 2019 WL 
2358951, at *3. (Doc. 9 at 9.) However, these cases are not 
directly on point because, in each, the plaintiff asked the court 
to adjudicate his or her application for naturalization pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), which permits judicial adjudication of an 
application when USCIS fails to grant or deny the application 
within 120 days of the applicant’s initial examination. Here, the 
Attorney General fully adjudicated Nogales’s application for 
citizenship before USCIS commenced removal proceedings and before 
she initiated this lawsuit, and Nogales seeks judicial review of 
that denial pursuant to § 1421(c).
2 
 The ability to obtain de novo judicial review pursuant to 
§ 1421(c) “ensures that district courts retain the final word on 
naturalization applications.” Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 
386 (4th Cir. 2007). Some courts have concluded that § 1429 does 
not prevent entry of a declaratory judgment of entitlement to 
citizenship when a person seeks review of her application for 
naturalization pursuant to § 1421(c). See, e.g., Klene, 697 F.3d 
 
2 As a result, this case is more like Ghadrdan v. Noem, No. 24-CV-159, 
2025 WL 2058778 (W.D.N.C. July 23, 2025), which Nogales cites. The only 
procedural difference is that, in Ghadrdan, the plaintiffs filed their 
request for judicial review pursuant to § 1421(c) after the denial of 
their applications but before USCIS’s initiation of removal proceedings. 
See Ghadrdan, 2025 WL 2058778, at *3. Here, as already noted, Nogales 
filed this lawsuit after she received her notice to appear. 

14 
 
at 669; Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 
260 (3d Cir. 2012); Kuffour, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 594; see also 
Ngwana v. Att’y Gen., 40 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (D. Md. 1999) (finding 
that the court could issue an order to the Attorney General to 
grant the alien’s naturalization application pursuant to § 1421(c) 
even after the commencement of removal proceedings pursuant to 
§ 1429). Both t he text of § 1429 and the relevant legislative 
history support this conclusion. 
Starting with the statute, § 1429 bars “the Attorney General” 
from considering an application for naturalization if a removal 
proceeding is pending. It places no such restriction on district 
courts. See Kuffour, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 590 (“There is ‘no hint 
in the language of § 1429 that it also applies to the courts.’” 
(quoting De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th 
Cir. 2004))). 
 Next, for much of the twentieth century, the judicial branch 
exercised responsibility over naturalizations, while the Attorney 
General exercised authority over deportations. This division of 
labor created a situation where an alien might “find himself in a 
race against the government, with the alien pressing the court to 
grant him citizenship before the government could order his removal 
from the country.” Dilone, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 495 (citing Shomberg 
v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 544 (1955)). To end this race, 
Congress amended the immigration laws in 1950 to add a priority 

15 
 
provision, which read in relevant part: “[N]o petition for 
naturalization shall be finally heard by a naturalization court if 
there is pending against the petitioner a deportation 
proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest . . . .” See Internal 
Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987, 1015 
(1950). 
 In 1990, “Congress sought to address an altogether different 
problem with naturalization proceedings – specifically, the stress 
they were putting on district courts’ dockets.” Dilone, 358 F. 
Supp. 3d at 496 (citing Etape, 497 F.3d at 386). As part of its 
effort to streamline the naturalization process by shifting 
authority over naturalizations from the judiciary to the Attorney 
General, Congress amended the text of § 1429 to substitute the 
words “considered by the Attorney General” for “finally heard by 
a naturalization court.” See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5041 (1990). But Congress also 
“recognized the long-standing power the district courts had 
possessed over naturalization applications and so provided in the 
new statute that district courts retained their power to review an 
application if an applicant so chose.” Etape, 497 F.3d at 386. 
Congress thus included § 1421(c) “because it did not want to ‘take 
away any of the judicial review rights accorded applicants’ in the 
predecessor legislation.” Id. (quoting 135 Cong. Rec. 16996 
(1989)). 

16 
 
 The Nation’s immigration laws, created over different times 
and modified over the years, are complex and sometimes difficult 
to comprehend. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has noted that “[t]he 
proliferation of immigration laws and regulations has aptly been 
called a labyrinth that only a lawyer could navigate.” Romero v. 
Bondi, 150 F.4th 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2025) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
However, considering Congress’s express prohibition against the 
Attorney General acting once removal proceedings are commenced, 
its maintenance of judicial review, and in light of the historical 
record, it would seem contrary to conclude that Congress intended 
the court to stay the present proceeding and delay judicial review 
of Nogales’s adjudicated application merely because USCIS issued 
Nogales a notice to appear before she filed the present lawsuit 
seeking such review. Indeed, “the judiciary’s authority under 
§ 1421(c) would be rendered void if the Executive Branch could 
defeat any application for naturalization simply by initiating 
removal proceedings.” Sanga, 706 F. Supp. 3d at 821 (citing 
Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at 260-61). And because Nogales’s application 
was fully adjudicated before USCIS commenced removal proceedings, 
this case also presents no risk of restarting the “race” Congress 
once sought to end. See Ghadrdan v. Noem, 24-CV-159, 2025 WL 
2058778, at *4 (W.D.N.C. July 23, 2025) (declining to stay judicial 
review of the petitioners’ applications for naturalization in part 

17 
 
because “[i]gnoring the Court’s clear statutory authority and 
permitting USCIS to be the sole arbiter of naturalization and 
deportation” would contradict “Congress’s intention of protecting 
applicants’ rights via court review”). 
 Moreover, as Nogales points out, USCIS makes no argument as 
to how a stay would not prejudice her. On the other hand, Nogales 
persuasively contends that her removal proceedings could stretch 
on for, at a minimum, months while she awaits a removal decision 
and pursues a separate appeal. (Doc. 10 at 8-9.) This 
indeterminate state of limbo is prejudicial to her desire to timely 
resolve her application. And as for judicial economy, while some 
factual determinations may indeed overlap between her removal 
proceedings and this court’s review of her application for 
naturalization, § 1421(c) nevertheless directs that the court 
“shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law.” See 
Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 335, 347-48 (2017) (“[T]o 
ensure right results are reached, a court can reverse [USCIS’s] 
determination, at an applicant’s request, based on its ‘own 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.’” (quoting § 1421(c))). 
 Next, although USCIS argues the court cannot naturalize 
Nogales if she is removable (Doc. 12 at 8), the cited portion of 
§ 1429 prohibits the naturalization of persons “against whom there 
is outstanding a final finding of deportability pursuant to a 
warrant of arrest.” As already discussed, no warrant of arrest 

18 
 
has been issued against Nogales. Further, neither party disputes 
that she is not yet subject to a final removal order – rather, 
Nogales attended her first master calendar hearing on November 12, 
2025. (Doc. 13; see Doc. 13-1.) 
 Finally, via a single sentence with a single citation in both 
its supporting and reply briefs, USCIS contends that the court’s 
review of Nogales’s application for naturalization while her 
removal proceedings are pending would only produce an 
unenforceable advisory opinion. (Doc. 9 at 10; Doc. 12 at 9.) 
But the cited case, Ebu v. United States Citizenship & Immigration 
Services, 134 F.4th 895, 903 (6th Cir. 2025), is readily 
distinguishable. In Ebu, the Sixth Circuit based its holding that 
“a declaratory judgment would be an unenforceable advisory 
opinion” on the fact that removal proceedings had already begun 
before the plaintiff filed his application for naturalization. 
Ebu, 134 F.4th at 903. USCIS therefore denied the alien’s 
application for naturalization because of the already pending 
removal proceedings rather than its merits. Id. Thus, under Sixth 
Circuit precedent, the district court’s review was “limited solely 
to ‘review of that threshold determination’ of whether USCIS 
properly denied the application under § 1429” based on pending 
removal proceedings. Id. (quoting Zayed v. United States, 368 
F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 Here, by contrast and as repeatedly noted, Nogales received 

19 
 
an adjudication on the merits of her application for naturalization 
before USCIS initiated removal proceedings. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 30-
34.) The court now exercises judicial review over a fully 
adjudicated application pursuant to § 1421(c). Accordingly, even 
if the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Ebu were precedential authority, 
this court would not be limited to the “threshold determination” 
of whether USCIS properly denied Nogales’s application because of 
already pending removal proceedings. 
 As courts across the country have repeatedly acknowledged, 
the declaratory relief sought by Nogales “strikes a balance between 
the petitioner’s right to full judicial review as preserved by 
§ 1421(c) and the priority of removal proceedings enshrined in 
§ 1429.” Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at 260; accord, e.g., Klene, 697 F.3d 
at 668-70; Idris v. Gray, 22-CV-3894, 2023 WL 5719743, at *4-5 
(E.D.N.C. June 9, 2023); Adegbesote, 2021 WL 5995198, at *7; 
Kuffour, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 592-93. The preclusive effect of such 
declaratory relief on Nogales’s removal proceeding is an issue for 
another day, however. At this stage, it is enough to find that 
USCIS has not sufficiently justified a stay. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant USCIS’s motion to 
dismiss (Doc. 8) is DENIED. 
 

20 
 
 /s/ Thomas D. Schroeder 
 United States District Judge 
 
May 8, 2026 

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