govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-02212-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
NELSON F. CROUCH, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
MURIEL BOWSER, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
Civil Action No. 25-2212 (RDM) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff Nelson Crouch, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Muriel Bowser, in 
her official capacity as the Mayor of the District of Columbia (“District”), the Metropolitan 
Police Department (“MPD”), and the U.S. Department of Justice for allegedly arresting and 
prosecuting him in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. See generally Dkt. 
1-2 at 6–17 (Compl.). Pending before the Court are the District and the MPD’s motion to 
dismiss, Dkt. 6, and motion to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply, Dkt. 11. Plaintiff has failed to file 
proof of service on the U.S. Department of Justice, which has not appeared in this action. For 
the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT the District and the MPD’s motion to 
dismiss, will also GRANT their motion to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply, and will DIRECT Plaintiff 
to file proof of service on the U.S. Department of Justice within 45 days. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for the 
purpose of the motion to dismiss. See Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 163–64 
(D.C. Cir. 2015). 

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Plaintiff is a longtime resident of the District of Columbia. Dkt. 1-2 at 6 (Compl. ¶ 1). 
He began attending Sunday services at Westminster Presbyterian Church (“Westminster”) in late 
2023.1 Id. at 6–7 (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 6). He was 74 years old at the time. Id. at 7 (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6). 
“During these services, Westminster’s clergy, visiting clergy, and speakers often expressed 
strong support for [gender-affirming care] for minors.” Id. at 7 (Compl. ¶ 7). Over time, 
Plaintiff came to believe that “there had been insufficient studies on the merits and demerits” of 
gender-affirming care and that “on balance” such care “was doing irreparable harm to the 
nation’s children.” Id. at 7–8 (Compl. ¶ 8). One Sunday, before services, he “wrote a summary 
of his views on a white poster board” and taped it “to a side interior wall of Westminster 
Church.” Id. at 8 (Compl. ¶ 9). By the end of the service, the poster had been removed. Id. 
(Compl. ¶ 10). 
The following week, Westminster Pastor Brian Hamilton invited Plaintiff to meet, and, 
over coffee, he indicated that “Plaintiff had angered some of the members of the church.” Id. 
(Compl. ¶ 11). Pastor Hamilton informed Plaintiff that “because of th[is] anger,” he “might have 
to bar Plaintiff from coming to his church.” Id. at 8–9 (Compl. ¶ 11). The following Sunday, 
three members of Westminster’s congregation prevented Plaintiff from attending the 11:00 a.m. 
service. Id. at 9 (Compl. ¶ 12). “Thereafter, approximately once a month, before Sunday church 
services, Plaintiff would stand for approximately fifteen minutes on the public sidewalk beside 
 
1 Plaintiff’s complaint alternatively uses the spelling “Westminster” and “Westminister” for the 
church. For the sake of consistency, the Court adopts the former spelling, which is also used in 
the District and the MPD’s filings and which matches the spelling used in online materials (such 
as Westminster’s website), which are subject to judicial notice for this limited purpose. When 
quoting from Plaintiff’s filings, the Court replaces “Westminister” with “Westminster” where 
appropriate. 

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Westminster holding a white poster board” stating his opposition to gender-affirming care. Id. 
(Compl. ¶ 13). 
On March 31, 2024, Plaintiff attempted to attend Westminster’s Easter service. Id. at 10 
(Compl. ¶ 15). When he arrived “within 10 yards of the front door to Westminster,” three men, 
including “the church’s Harm Reduction officer,” Mr. Kerr, confronted him. Id. at 9–10 (Compl. 
¶¶ 14–15). Kerr “pushed his chest into Plaintiff’s chest and drove the Plaintiff away from the 
front door,” getting “right in [his] face.” Id. at 10 (Compl. ¶ 15). “During this confrontation, 
four tiny bits of spit from Plaintiff’s mouth landed on the coats of Mr. Kerr and his associates.” 
Id. Kerr “said something to the effect [of] ‘Don’t spit on me!’” Id. Plaintiff “was 
embarrassed . . . and immediately apologized.” Id. He explained that “he no longer could 
control his mouth very well as a by-product of having received six[]months of radiation 
treatment to eradicate . . . tongue cancer four years before.” Id. Because “Plaintiff suffers from 
‘dry mouth,’” he cannot “intentionally spit[]” on others. Id. After this exchange, “Plaintiff left 
the church without further incident.” Id. 
Starting in April 2024, “Plaintiff renewed his practice of holding a white board poster 
while peacefully standing on the sidewalk” beside Westminster. Id. (Compl. ¶ 16). On June 9, 
2024, while Plaintiff was protesting, an MPD officer approached Plaintiff and informed him that 
he had been reported for “intentionally spit[ting] on Mr. Kerr.” Id. at 11 (Compl. ¶ 18). Plaintiff 
acknowledged that he had spit on Kerr but explained that “it was not intentional” and was 
attributable to his cancer treatment. Id. He also told the police officer that he believed that 
“Westminster was not . . . seeking his arrest because he had allegedly spit on one or more of their 
staff members” but, rather, “to stop him from engaging in his peaceful protests” challenging 

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Westminster’s support for gender-affirming care. Id. The officer declined to arrest Plaintiff and 
“told [him] he was free to continue the protest and leave when he wished.” Id. 
Plaintiff walked back to his apartment. When he arrived, he was approached by two 
police officers, neither of whom was the officer who had previously spoken to Plaintiff near 
Westminster. Id. at 12 (Compl. ¶ 21). “One of the[] new officers apologized for the ‘confusion’ 
but said he would have to put Plaintiff under arrest.” Id. Before doing so, the officer called a 
D.C. police lieutenant to discuss the matter. Id. “The first officer [then] appeared and told this 
new officer [that] he did not think Plaintiff should be arrested.” Id. “But the second officer said 
[that] the lieutenant wanted ‘to do things by the book.’” Id. At that point, “a third officer put 
handcuffs on Plaintiff directly in front of his residence, while residents were walking in and out 
of his apartment building.” Id. 
After he was processed at the D.C. police station, Plaintiff was taken to the D.C. jail, 
where he spent the next 27 hours in discomfort. Id. (Compl. ¶ 22). He was then charged with 
simple assault in D.C. Superior Court. Id. at 13 (Compl. ¶ 24). The U.S. Attorney’s Office 
eventually dropped the simple assault charge and charged Plaintiff instead with misdemeanor 
trespassing. Id. at 14 (Compl. ¶ 27). The Department of Justice initially refused Plaintiff’s 
request to transfer his case to the Mental Health Community Court. Id. (Compl. ¶ 28). It also 
twice threatened to invoke D.C. Code § 22-3703, which increases the maximum term of 
imprisonment and fine for covered “bias-related” offenses. Id. (Compl. ¶ 29). After a change in 
administration, however, the Department of Justice did not object to the transfer of Plaintiff’s 
case to the mental health court, and it “did not object when[,] on June 3, 2025, [the] Honorable 
Judge Iscoe (a great American) dismissed the” misdemeanor trespassing charge. Id. at 15 

5 
 
(Compl. ¶ 30). Plaintiff incurred several thousand dollars in legal fees, parking costs, and 
psychiatric treatment before the charges were dropped. Id. at 14–15 (Compl. ¶¶ 25–26, 32). 
On June 6, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action in D.C. Superior Court against the U.S. 
Department of Justice, Muriel Bowser in her official capacity as Mayor of Washington, D.C., 
and the Metropolitan Police Department. Id. at 6 (Compl.). He alleges that the District of 
Columbia, the MPD, and the Department of Justice violated his First Amendment rights by 
arresting and prosecuting him to deter him from voicing his opposition to gender-affirming care. 
Id. at 16 (Compl. ¶ 35). Plaintiff also filed a separate suit against Westminster and Pastor 
Hamilton “for having him arrested on false charges.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 34). On July 11, 2025, the 
MPD and the District removed this case from Superior Court. See Dkt. 1. In their notice of 
removal, they noted that “Plaintiff [had] filed an affidavit of service in Superior Court purporting 
to show that he mailed the Complaint . . . to [the] US Department of Justice at 950 Pennsylvania 
Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530.” Id. at 3 n.3. Plaintiff has failed to file proof of service 
on the Department of Justice, however—nor has he even asserted that a qualified individual sent 
a copy of the summons and complaint to the United States Attorney or designated “clerical 
employee,” as required by Rule 4(i). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A)(i). 
After removing the case, the MPD and the District moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). See Dkt. 6. After the motion was 
fully briefed, see Dkt. 8, Dkt. 9, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply, see Dkt. 10, which the MPD and the 
District moved to strike, see Dkt. 11. The motions are now ripe for decision. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), a defendant may move to dismiss a 
complaint for insufficient service of process. In responding to a motion to dismiss brought under 

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Rule 12(b)(5), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he effected service. Hilska v. Jones, 
217 F.R.D. 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2003). “[U]nless the procedural requirements for effective service of 
process are satisfied, a court lacks authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” 
Candido v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 151, 160 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Gorman v. 
Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). Failure to effect service is 
grounds for dismissal. See id. at 164 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)). The Court can, however, “in 
its sound discretion,” also “direct that service be effected within a specified time.” Wilson v. 
Prudential Fin., 332 F. Supp. 2d 83, 89 (D.D.C. 2004). 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a 
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). To survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). A court must consider the whole complaint, 
accepting factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff. Id. But a court “need not accept as true ‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation,’ nor inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Laughlin 
v. Holder, 923 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Strike 
Before turning the pending motion to dismiss, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to 
strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply. The “decision to grant or deny leave to file a [sur-reply] is committed 
to the sound discretion of the court.” Akers v. Beal Bank, 760 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(citation modified). The Court’s Standing Order provides that parties “may not file a sur-reply 

7 
 
without first obtaining leave of the Court” and requires “a specific showing of good cause.” Dkt. 
3 at 3. Plaintiff filed his sur-reply without first obtaining leave of the Court, and he has not 
shown good cause. Plaintiff’s sur-reply raises arguments that he could have included in his 
opposition brief and opposed arguments that had been conceded. Furthermore, after reviewing 
the contents of Plaintiff’s sur-reply, the Court concludes that it would not alter the outcome of 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
Accordingly, the Court will strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply. 
B. Motion to Dismiss 
The MPD and the District (“D.C. Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on 
several grounds. They first argue that Plaintiff failed properly to serve the Mayor or the MPD 
under D.C. law and has failed to cure that deficiency by effecting service after removal. Dkt. 6 
at 7–8. Second, they argue that the MPD should be dismissed as a defendant because it is non 
sui juris. Id. at 8. Third, they argue that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any First or Fourth 
Amendment violations or any basis for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id. at 9. Finally, they argue that if the Court construes the 
complaint to allege any common law claims, those claims should be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim, for failure to provide statutory notice under D.C. Code § 12-309, and for lack of 
jurisdiction. Id. at 16–17. 
Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional or common law 
claim for relief, it need not decide whether Plaintiff has properly served the D.C. Defendants. 
See Dominguez v. District of Columbia, 536 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2008). 
1. Claims Against the MPD 
 Defendants correctly observe—and Plaintiff does not dispute —that the MPD is non sui 
juris and, therefore, not a proper party to this suit. “[I]n the absence of explicit statutory 

8 
 
authorization, bodies within the District of Columbia government are not suable as separate 
entities.” Scahill v. District of Columbia, 271 F. Supp. 3d 216, 231 (D.D.C. 2017) (alteration in 
original) (citation modified); see also Roberson v. D.C. Bd. of Higher Educ., 359 A.2d 28, 31 n.4 
(D.C. 1976) (explaining that an entity within D.C. government may only be sued if the entity is 
statutorily a separate legal entity). Here, the MDP is an independent agency within the D.C. 
government. 
 Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the MPD. 
2. Constitutional Claims 
The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that the District and the Department of Justice 
worked in concert to violate his First Amendment rights by arresting and prosecuting him to 
deter him from voicing his opposition to gender-affirming care for minors. Dkt. 1-2 at 16–17 
(Compl. ¶¶ 35–36); see also Dkt. 8 at 6. Although it is less clear whether Plaintiff intends to 
press a Fourth Amendment claim, he also alleges that he was arrested on a false charge. Dkt. 1-2 
at 11 (Compl. ¶ 18); Dkt. 8 at 6. Plaintiff does not identify a cause of action in his complaint, but 
the Court assumes that he intends to proceed against the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
provides in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.] 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although § 1983 does not make the District liable for the deeds of municipal 
officers under a respondeat superior theory, it provides a cause of action against local governing 
bodies for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the allegedly unconstitutional 

9 
 
government conduct resulted from a municipal policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91; 
see Jones ex rel. A.H. v. District of Columbia, 805 F. Supp. 3d 218, 234–35 (D.D.C. 2025). 
Beyond violations resulting from an “official policy,” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 
constitutional deprivations caused by “governmental custom” may also give rise to liability 
under § 1983, even if the policy or custom was not formally approved by a decision-making 
authority, id. at 690–91 (citation modified). To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must 
show (1) that there was a “predicate constitutional violation,” and (2) that a government policy or 
custom caused the violation. Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992)). Four types of 
municipal action (or inaction) can establish municipal liability: “(1) express municipal policy; 
(2) adoption by municipal policymakers; (3) custom or usage; and (4) deliberate indifference.” 
Hunter v. District of Columbia, 824 F. Supp. 2d 125, 133 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 
at 690–94). 
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court must at the motion to dismiss stage, 
Gordon, 778 F.3d at 163–64, Plaintiff is understandably frustrated with how he was treated. But 
the Court need not determine whether that treatment amounts to a constitutional violation 
because, even assuming that such a violation occurred, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that a 
District “custom or policy . . . caused the violation.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. To survive a 
motion to dismiss a Monell claim, a plaintiff “must coherently allege[] the existence of a broader 
municipal custom or practice that explains the predicate constitutional violations.” Maldonado v. 
District of Columbia, 924 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 (D.D.C. 2013) (alteration in original) (citation 
modified). “In addition, a plaintiff must allege an ‘“affirmative link,” such that a municipal 
policy was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting Baker, 326 

10 
 
F.3d at 1306). Here, Plaintiff fails at both steps. His complaint recounts only the events 
surrounding his 2024 arrest and subsequent prosecution. It does not posit the existence of an 
official District of Columbia policy or custom to stifle criticism of gender-affirming care for 
minors or that D.C. “policymakers” approved the actions at issue. See, e.g., Jones v. Perkins, 
No. 19-cv-03168, 2020 WL 6887742, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 2020) (dismissing Monell claim 
where the plaintiff’s complaint “merely recount[ed] the events surrounding his 2013 arrest”). 
The only statement in Plaintiff’s complaint that even hints at the District’s policies is the 
allegation that a D.C. police lieutenant directed the officer to arrest Plaintiff and said that he 
“wanted ‘to do things by the book.’” Dkt. 1-2 at 12 (Compl. ¶ 21). This allegation neither 
identifies a specific, official policy, nor explains how that policy was the “moving force” of the 
alleged First Amendment violation.2 Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation 
modified); see Maldonado, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (dismissing Monell claim where plaintiff 
alleged only that “Defendant Officers were acting under . . . policies[] and customs of the 
District of Columbia” (citation modified)). It falls far short of the pleading requirements for a 
§ 1983 claim against a municipality—particularly in light of the fact that Plaintiff acknowledges 
that he did, in fact, spit on Kerr, even if he did not intend to do so, Dkt. 1-2 at 11 (Compl. ¶ 18). 
See, e.g., Givens v. Bowser, 111 F.4th 117, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (affirming dismissal of Monell 
claim where plaintiff “never indicated the contours of any type of municipal policy” (citation 
modified)). In light of the clear deficiencies in his complaint, it is little surprise that Plaintiff 
 
2 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that, according to the MPD’s 2023 Annual Report, 
the police force included 130 lieutenants, 41 captains, and 35 commanders. Metropolitan Police 
Department, 2023 Annual Report 50 (2024), available at https://perma.cc/FTV7-3J9E. A 
decision by one of over 200 high-ranking officers regarding whether to make a specific arrest 
cannot establish a municipal policy for purpose of Monell. 

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denies that he needs to show a municipal policy or custom at all to recover damages from the 
District for a violation of his First Amendment rights. See Dkt. 8 at 4. 
Notwithstanding that argument, Plaintiff contends that he satisfies the requirements of 
Monell for two reasons. He first relies on Executive Order 14075, which declared the Biden 
Administration’s policy “to combat unlawful discrimination and eliminate disparities that harm 
LGBTQI+ individuals and their families, defend their rights and safety, and pursue a 
comprehensive approach to delivering the full promise of equality for LGBTQI+ individuals,” 
Advancing Equality for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex Individuals, 
Exec. Order No. 14075 § 1, 87 Fed. Reg. 37189 (June 21, 2022). Dkt. 8 at 4. Second, he asserts 
that Defendants adopted a policy “that viewed criticisms and condemnations” of gender-
affirming care “as possible hate crimes.” Id. at 5 (citation modified). Because these policies are 
not pleaded in his complaint, the Court need not consider them. A plaintiff cannot amend his 
complaint through an opposition brief. Statewide Bonding, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
980 F.3d 109, 117 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2020). But even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s 
arguments, neither would suffice. 
First, Executive Order 14075 is not a basis to hold the District of Columbia liable under 
Monell. The Order was issued by President Biden as a direction to federal departments and 
agencies, which does not include the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia cannot be 
held liable for the policies of the President.3 Cf. Frey v. Town of Jackson, No. 19-CV-50-F, 
2019 WL 13260492, at *12 (D. Wyo. July 12, 2019) (“The Court cannot hold municipal entities 
liable under Monell where they merely enforce the policies of another governmental entity.”). 
 
3 For the same reason, Plaintiff’s allegation that “the Biden White House had sought [t]o 
demonize people” opposed to gender-affirming care for minors, Dkt. 1-2 at 15 (Compl. ¶ 29), is 
irrelevant to the District’s liability under Monell. 

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But even if the Executive Order constituted a policy of the District of Columbia, Plaintiff has not 
alleged “an affirmative link” of any kind between the Order and his arrest or prosecution. Baker, 
326 F.3d at 1306 (citation modified). The Order’s only instruction related to gender-affirming 
care directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “work[] with [s]tates on expanding 
access to gender-affirming care.” Exec. Order No. 14075 § 7(b). It does not direct the 
Department of Justice (much less the District of Columbia) to arrest, to prosecute, or to harass 
citizens who criticize gender-affirming care for minors. A direction to “promote expanded 
access to comprehensive health care for LGBTQI+ individuals, including by working with States 
on expanding access to gender-affirming care” cannot be equated with a direction—or policy—
to punish those who exercise their First Amendment right to disagree. 
Plaintiff’s second theory for Monell liability falters because Plaintiff has not alleged any 
facts suggesting that the District has a policy of treating “criticisms and condemnations” of 
gender-affirming care “as possible ‘hate crimes.’” Dkt. 8 at 5. Nor has he alleged any facts 
supporting his overarching contention that the District pursued a policy of protecting gender-
affirming care for minors from public criticism. Id. “[M]erely speculating that an unidentified 
policy and uncorroborated practice or custom exists without providing any factual heft to support 
the allegation is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.” Trimble v. District of Columbia, 779 
F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2011). Plaintiff has not alleged any incident other than his own arrest 
and prosecution (for spitting on someone, which he merely contends was inadvertent) that might 
even arguably support the existence of the policies he posits. See City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 
U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) (“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient 
to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by 
an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy . . . .”); see Aubin v. District of Columbia, 107 F. 

13 
 
Supp. 3d 169, 172 (D.D.C. 2015) (explaining that plaintiff’s reliance “upon the one incident of 
his own arrest . . . is legally insufficient to allege a municipal custom or policy”). 
To the extent that Plaintiff relies on the D.C. hate crime law, D.C. Code § 22-3701 et 
seq., as evidence that the District treats criticism of gender-affirming care for minors as a hate 
crime, see Dkt. 8 at 5 (referring to “hate crime statutes” (citation modified)); Dkt. 1-2 at 14 
(Compl. ¶ 29) (referring to the District’s “anti-bias statute” (citation modified)), that law does no 
such thing. It authorizes higher fines and terms of imprisonment if a person is “charged with and 
found guilty of a bias-related crime.” D.C. Code § 22-3703. A “bias-related crime” is defined as 
a covered “criminal act”—such as assault, burglary, or unlawful entry—“that demonstrates an 
accused’s prejudice based on” an “actual or perceived” protected characteristic “of a victim.” Id. 
§ 22-3701(1A)–(2). In other words, D.C. law authorizes enhanced penalties for bias-related 
crimes; it does not impose enhanced penalties for or otherwise criminalize mere criticism of 
gender-affirming care. 
Because Plaintiff has failed to identify any municipal policy or custom that led to his 
arrest or prosecution, the Court will dismiss his Monell claim against the District. 
3. State Law Claims 
It is unclear from the face of the complaint whether Plaintiff intends to bring a common 
law false arrest claim under D.C. law. But to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a common law false 
arrest claim, the District argues (1) that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over that claim; (2) that Plaintiff fails plausibly to allege a false arrest claim; and 
(3) that Plaintiff failed to provide statutory notice as required by D.C. Code § 12-309. Dkt. 6 at 
16–17. In his opposition brief, Plaintiff did not respond to any of these arguments. See Dkt. 8; 
Dkt. 9 at 6–7. Under Local Rule 7(b), “if a party files an opposition to a motion and therein 
addresses only some of the movant’s arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed arguments 

14 
 
as conceded.” Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Court 
concludes that Plaintiff has conceded the District’s arguments against his common law false 
arrest claim. 
Even if Plaintiff had not conceded the District’s arguments, the Court would exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over any common law false arrest claim and dismiss it for failure to 
provide statutory notice. Plaintiff’s common law false arrest claim is derived from the same 
“nucleus of operative fact” as his federal constitutional claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Because the Court is dismissing Plaintiff’s federal claims, it “has the 
discretion to exercise—or decline to exer cise—supplemental jurisdiction over any state -law 
claims that remain.” Deppner v. Spectrum Health Care Res., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 176, 190 
(D.D.C. 2018) (emphasis omitted); see also Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 1088, 1097 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). Guiding that discretion are “[g]eneral equitable factors . . . including judicial 
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Pollard v. District of Columbia, 191 F. Supp. 3d 
58, 82 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation modified). Here, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff’s claims promotes judicial economy and convenience because it eliminates the need for 
a remand to state or local court to resolve the simple and undisputed issue of whether Plaintiff 
failed to provide the District with the required statutory notice of his intent to pursue a false 
arrest claim. 
D.C. Code § 12-309 requires plaintiffs bringing tort claims against the District, as a 
prerequisite to suit, to provide notice to the Mayor’s office within six months of an alleged 
injury, subject to exceptions not relevant here. As the District points out, Plaintiff failed to 
notify the Mayor’s office of his intent to pursue a common law false arrest claim. Dkt. 6-4 at 2 

15 
 
(Craven Decl. ¶¶ 4–5). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s common law false arrest 
claim against the District.4 
C. Claims Against the U.S. Department of Justice 
 Dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against the MPD and the District does not, however, 
resolve the case in its entirety because Plaintiff also sued the U.S. Department of Justice. To 
date, the United States has not appeared in this action, presumably because it has not been 
served. As noted above, Plaintiff apparently sent a copy of the complaint to the U.S. Department 
of Justice, without specifying any office or recipient. See Dkt. 1 at 3 n.3; Dkt. 1-2 at 18, 38. 
Moreover, although he has produced proof of service with respect to the MPD and the Office of 
the Mayor, he has failed to submit any evidence that the Department of Justice was properly 
served. 
As under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the D.C. Superior Court Rules of Civil 
Procedure impose a three-step requirement for serving an agency of the United States: The 
“party must” (1) “deliver a copy of the summons[] [and] complaint . . . to the United States 
Attorney for the District of Columbia—or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical 
employee” designated by the United States Attorney; (2) “send a copy [of those materials] by 
registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States;” and (3) “send a copy of 
the summons[] [and] complaint . . . by registered or certified mail to the agency.” D.C. Sup. Ct. 
Civ. R. 4(i)(1)–(2). Here, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that he satisfied any of these 
requirements or that the Superior Court relieved him of responsibility for effecting service. 
 
4 Plaintiff also checked the box for “libel of information” on the information sheet he filled out in 
Superior Court. Dkt. 1-2 at 24. A libel of information is a vehicle for the District to initiate 
forfeiture proceedings against seized property, see D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 71.1-I, not a cause of 
action that Plaintiff can assert against Defendants. 

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This failure is not dispositive, however, “because the Federal Rules allow for service to 
be effectuated if the applicable state rules are followed.” Alridge v. G4S Secure Sols. USA, Inc., 
No. 19-cv-1360, 2019 WL 2931293, at *2 (D.D.C. July 8, 2019); see also Price v. Auto. Fin. 
Corp., No. 25-cv-2333, 2026 WL 686150, at * 6 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2026) (quoting same). 
Ordinarily, the failure to effect service in a timely manner will result in dismissal of the action 
without prejudice. See D.C. Sup. Ct. Civ. R. 4(m)(4); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). But because 
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and made an effort to serve the Department of Justice, the Court 
will provide him with 45 days to effect service in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the 
complaint is filed, the court . . . must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant 
or order that service be made within a specified time.”). Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that if 
he fails to effect service and to provide the Court with proof of service within 45 days, the Court 
may dismiss his claims against the U.S. Department of Justice and enter final judgment in this 
case.
5 
 
5 Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) directs the Court to serve process in cases in which it has 
authorized the plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, no filing in this case or any filing 
transmitted from the Superior Court satisfies the requirements for proceeding in forma pauperis 
in this Court, and Plaintiff—who effected (or attempt to effect) service himself in Superior 
Court—has not filed a motion seeking in forma pauperis status in this Court. 

17 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the D.C. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 6, is 
GRANTED, their motion to strike sur-reply, Dkt. 11, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff is 
DIRECTED to effect service on the U.S. Department of Justice in the manner required by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 within 45 days of this Order. 
SO ORDERED. 
 /s/ Randolph D. Moss 
 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 
 United States District Judge 
 
Date: May 8, 2026 
 

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