govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-4_25-cv-10193-0

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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
ANTHONY G. DE LA CRUZ, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
SAN MATEO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 
OFFICE, et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No. 25-cv-10193-YGR (PR) 
 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
 
 
 
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Maguire Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se complaint under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Dkt. 
3. A review of the complaint reveals that plaintiff may not have exhausted California’s prison 
administrative process, however. 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to 
provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion of the district court. Ross v. Blake, 
578 U.S. 632, 637-42 (2016); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 
532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 
Section 1073 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations provides county jail 
inmates with a right to appeal and have resolved grievances relating to their confinement. 
Pursuant to Section 1073, San Mateo County has established grievance procedures for inmates at 
Maguire Correctional Facility. An inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies for 
constitutional claims prior to asserting them in a civil rights complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 
McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). If an inmate exhausts a claim after 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
bringing it before the court, his subsequent exhaustion cannot excuse his earlier failure to exhaust. 
Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A prisoner] may initiate litigation in 
federal court only after the administrative process ends and leaves his grievances unredressed. It 
would be inconsistent with the objectives of the statute to let him submit his complaint any earlier 
than that.”) 
Here, plaintiff does not seem to show that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. 
Dkt. 1 at 1-2.1 Furthermore, plaintiff has not presented any extraordinary circumstances which 
might compel that he be excused from complying with PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Cf. 
Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6 (courts should not read “futility or other exceptions” into section 
1997e(a)). Plaintiff states that the reason he has not exhausted his administrative remedies is 
because “[his] grievance was undermin[ed] . . . [and] [his] county complaint was unresponsive.” 
Dkt. 1 at 2. Petitioner also alleges that he did not present his claim through the grievance process 
because there is “no remedies for excessive force.” Id. However, as mentioned above, exhaustion 
is mandatory and not left to the discretion of the district court. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84 (citing 
Booth, 532 U.S. at 739). Courts may not create their own “special circumstances” exceptions to 
the exhaustion requirement. Ross, 578 U.S. 632, 637-40 (reversing Fourth Circuit’s ruling that 
failure to exhaust was justified where prisoner reasonably—even though mistakenly—believed he 
had exhausted remedies). There is no authority for the proposition that a petitioner’s belief that 
there are “no remedies for excessive force” excuses the exhaustion requirement. Thus, this Court 
does not have the authority to create an exception to the exhaustion requirement based on 
plaintiff’s aforementioned reason for not exhausting. Moreover, petitioner did not attach any 
grievance forms. Thus, the Court has no additional basis to assess whether he exhausted his 
admirative remedies prior to filing his suit. 
When the district court concludes that plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies 
on a claim, “the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 
315 F.3d, 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 
 
1 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 
filing system and not those assigned by plaintiff. 

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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). However, here, plaintiff will be provided one final 
opportunity to show cause within twenty-eight (28) days, why this case should not be dismissed 
without prejudice for failure to exhaust. Specifically, to avoid dismissal, plaintiff needs to provide 
proof that extraordinary circumstances existed in order to excuse him from complying with 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See e.g., Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859-60 (identifying “three kinds of 
circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable 
of use to obtain relief.”) Failure to reply will result in dismissal without prejudice. 
Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted in a separate written Order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: 
______________________________________ 
JUDGE YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 
United States District Judge 
May 8, 2026

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