govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_26-cv-01463-1

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
ANDREW MALLON, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
DALESSIO AUTO GROUP INC. d/b/a 
SCHUMACHER CHEVROLET BUICK OF 
BOONTON; TILTON AUTOMOTIVE 
L.L.C. d/b/a SCHUMACHER 
CHEVROLET OF DENVILLE; JUDITH 
SCHUMACHER-TILTON a/k/a JUDITH A. 
TILTON, 
 
Defendants. 
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Civil Action No. 26-01463 (SRC) 
 
 
OPINION & ORDER 
 
CHESLER, District Judge 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Tilton Automotive L.L.C. d/b/a 
Schumacher Chevrolet of Denville and Judith Schumacher Tilton a/k/a Judith A. Tilton’s (Denville 
Defendants)1 motion to dismiss the claims against them , pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 11, “Motion to Dismiss”) and motion for sanctions against Plaintiff 
Andrew Mallon (“Plaintiff”) and his attorneys David Ricci and Michael Niznik ( “Plaintiff’s 
Lawyers”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11( c) (Dkt. No . 15, “Mot ion for 
Sanctions”). Plaintiff has not filed a timely opposition brief to either of these motions. The Court 
 
1 References to Ms. Tilton in this opinion should be understood, unless otherwise indicated, to 
refer to her in her capacity as owner or part-owner of Schumacher Denville, and not in her 
capacity as owner or part owner of Schumacher Boonton. PageID:
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has considered all the papers and for the following reasons, both of Denville Defendants’ motions 
are GRANTED. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
a. Factual Background 
The facts relevant to this Motion are drawn from Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1, Exhibit 
A, “Complaint”) and are as follows. In 2025, Plaintiff purchased a used car from a car dealership, 
Dalessio Auto Group Inc. d/b/a Schumacher Chevrolet Buick of Boonton (“ Schumacher 
Boonton”). Prior to the purchase, Plaintiff saw an advertisement for the car and told Schumacher 
Boonton that he would buy the car but would need to register it in Michigan, where he lived. (See 
Complaint at 3 -4). Schumacher Boonton sent Plaintiff sale documents, including a Vehicle 
Buyer’s Order (Complaint, Ex. A, “VBO”). Plaintiff filled out those documents and purchased 
the car. (Id.). The VBO, which is essentially a receipt for the purchase of the vehicle, allegedly 
failed to itemize the specific documentary services included in the $399 fee charged to Plaintiff by 
Schumacher Boonton for providing documentary services (“Doc Fee”). Plaintiff argues this failure 
to itemize violated New Jersey law and regulations. Additionally, after the purchase was 
completed, Schumacher Boonton did not send Plaintiff the Michigan permanent registration or 
license plate that he needed in a timely manner and, as a result, Plaintiff had to obtain the 
registration and license plate on his own and at his own cost. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff alleges this too 
violated New Jersey law and regulations. 
On January 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant putative class action lawsuit in the New 
Jersey Superior Court, Morris County, Law Division. (See Complaint). The Complaint names 
three defendants , all of whom are New Jersey residents : (1) Schumacher Boonton, (2) Tilton 
Automotive L.L.C. d/b/a Schumacher Chevrolet of Denville (“Schumacher Denville”), and (3) PageID:
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Judith Schumacher-Tilton a/k/a Judith A. Tilton (“ Ms. Tilton”). Ms. Tilton is alleged to have a 
controlling interest in both Schumacher Boonton and Schumacher Denville. (Complaint ¶ 9-14). 
Collectively, the Complaint refers to these defendants as “Defendants” and incorporates 
nearly all allegations against them together , asserting that the allegedly unlawful behavior is 
attributable to all three defendants. (See, e.g., Id. ¶¶ 16, 55) (“The practices complained of herein 
are the same at Schumacher Boonton and Sch umacher Denville; ” “Defendants charged for 
Documentary Fees using VBOs that did not itemize each documentary service provided or the fee 
for each documentary service provided in the transactions of Plaintiff and others similarly 
situated.”). Despite ascribing the problematic behavior to all defendants , the Complaint contains 
no factual allegations which indicate that Plaintiff, at any point, had any contact with Schumacher 
Denville. 
The Complaint states four causes of action, all of which allege violations of New Jersey 
law. The first three causes of action, which relate to the Doc Fee, are pled as class claims and are 
directed at all three defendants. Crucially, Plaintiff alleges that both Schumacher Boonton, from 
whom he bought his car, and Schumacher Denville use the same defective VBO and engage in 
identical harmful behavior regarding the Doc Fee. (See Id. ¶¶ 16-19). The fourth cause of action, 
which relates to the alleged failure to deliver title to the vehicle in a timely manner, is pled as an 
individual claim brought only by Plaintiff and appears to be directed only at Schumacher Boonton. 
b. Procedural Background 
On February 12, 2026, Denville Defendants removed this case to federal court. (Dkt. No. 
1, “Notice of Removal”). On March 4, 2026, Denville Defendants sent Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s 
Lawyers a letter notifying them that if the claims against Denville Defendants were not withdrawn 
within three weeks, they would move for sanctions because the Complaint, as pled against Denville PageID:
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Defendants, was both factually and legally frivolous. (Dkt. No. 15-4, “Sanctions Letter”). In the 
Sanctions Letter, Denville Defendants pointed to the Notice of Removal which had provided direct 
evidence that Schumacher Denville does not, in fact, use the same allegedly problematic VBO as 
Schumacher Boonton. (Sanctions Letter at 2). Instead, Schumacher Denville uses a Motor Vehicle 
Retail Order Form which apparently does itemize the Doc Fee. (See Notice of Removal, Ex. 1, 
“MVRO”). 2 Denville Defendants further pointed out to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Lawyers that the 
Complaint “failed to plead any contacts or transaction with Schumacher Denville.” (Sanctions 
Letter at 1). The Letter also contained, as an attachment, Denville Defendants’ proposed, but not-
yet filed, Motion for Sanctions. 
Two days later, on March 6, 2026, Denville Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. 
About a week after that, on March 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Remand, and about two 
weeks after that, on March 27, 2026, Denville Defendants filed the instant Motion for Sanctions. 
To provide the parties with reasonable time to manage these motions and so that briefing 
on the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions would not be due while the Motion to Remand 
was pending, the Court granted requests to adjourn the motion days for both the Motion to Dismiss 
and the Motion for Sanctions to May 18, 2026. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 18). Th ese adjournments pushed 
the briefing schedule s such that the opposition briefs for both motions were due May 4, 2026.
3 
On April 17, 2026, four days after briefing on the Motion to Remand was completed, this Court 
issued its opinion and order denying that motion. (Dkt. No. 20). As of the morning of May 8, 
2026, Plaintiff has not filed any brief opposing either the Motion to Dismiss or the Motion for 
 
2 The Court notes that Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Lawyers apparently found this MVRO so 
believable and compelling that they based the entirety of their motion to remand the case to state 
court on its existence and on its specific terms (See Dkt. No. 12, “Motion to Remand”). 
 
3 U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, 2026 Motions (2026), 
https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/2026Motions.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CYG-5VDQ] PageID:
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Sanctions. Nor have Plaintiff’s Lawyers submitted any letter, notice, or communication to the 
Court explaining the lack of opposition. 
II. DISCUSSION 
a. Motion to Dismiss 
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim 
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 556). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true the well-pleaded facts 
of a complaint and any reasonable inference that may be drawn from those facts but need not credit 
conclusory statements couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A district court 
ruling on a motion to dismiss may “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, 
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims 
are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
To put it plainly, Plaintiff has not come close to pleading sufficient “factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that ” Denville Defendants are “liable for the 
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In fact, Plaintiff 
has not pled any such factual content attributable to Schumacher Denville. As noted above, the 
Complaint only contains factual allegations which describe Plaintiff’s transaction with 
Schumacher Boonton, not Schumacher Denville. (See Complaint 3-5). PageID:
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The fact of the matter is that Plaintiff’s Complaint, which is predicated on a n allegedly 
faulty contract between Plaintiff and Schumacher Boonton, never alleges that he signed a ny 
contract with Schumacher Denville. What’s more, Plaintiff has essentially conceded that the 
contract which Schumacher Denville uses with its buyers does not violate the statutes raised in the 
Complaint. (See Motion to Remand at 5) (Plaintiff arguing against federal CAFA jurisdiction in 
this case because “every transaction [with Schumacher Denville] used an MVRO that properly 
itemized the documentary services and fees. . . .”). The fact that Plaintiff has not opposed Denville 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss further bolsters this Court’s view that Plaintiff agrees that he never 
had a contract, let alone a deficient contract, with Schumacher Denville, and therefore he has not 
stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
It appears that the only two arguable reasons Plaintiff named Schumacher Denville in this 
suit is because both dealerships are owned, at least in part, by Ms. Tilton, and because Plaintiff 
apparently, at least at the time of filing the Complaint, believed that Schumacher Denville uses the 
same allegedly problematic VBO as Schumacher Boonton. (Complaint ¶¶ 9-18). First, Plaintiff’s 
allegation of common ownership, alone, does not present an actionable theory of liability against 
Schumacher Denville based only on the acts of Schumacher Boonton. See Thomas Glob. Grp. 
L.L.C. v. Watkins, 2016 WL 3946774, at *3 (D.N.J. July 19, 2016) (“It is well-established in the 
case law that common ownership or control over multiple corporate entities, without more, does 
not establish an alter ego relationship.”). Second , Plaintiff merely assert s that Schumacher 
Denville uses the problematic VBO, with out providing any factual assertions whatsoever that PageID:
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either (1) this is true or (2) he has any reason to know if this is true.4 The Court need not and will 
not “credit conclusory statements couched as factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
Because Plaintiff has provided no opposition briefing and made no suggestion that the 
deficiencies pointed out by Denville Defendants are curable, the Court infers that Plaintiff agrees 
they are not. See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir.1992) (explaining that if 
a party represented by counsel fails to oppose a motion to dismiss, the district court may treat the 
motion as unopposed). Further, as the Court sees it, Schumacher Denville’s MVRO, which would 
be key to any potential claim against Schumacher Denville, does not contain any of the allegedly 
problematic defects described in the Complaint . (See MVRO).
5 Plaintiff appears to agree, as 
discussed above. 
Accordingly, in the Court’s view, amendment to the Complaint would be futile , and the 
claims against Schumacher Denville, and Ms. Tilton, in her capacity as the owner or part-owner 
of Schumacher Denville will be dismissed with prejudice.6 Alpha Cepheus, LLC v. Chu, 2019 
 
4 Again, the Court also notes that Plaintiff seems to have already agreed and conceded that 
Schumacher Denville does not, in fact, use the allegedly deficient VBO. 
 
5 Though the Court ordinarily does not take notice of material extrinsic to the Complaint, it may 
do so when the document is “undisputedly authentic” and “plaintiff’s claims are based on the 
document.” CareOne, LLC v. Burris, 2011 WL 2623503, at *6 (D.N.J. June 28, 2011) (citing 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 98 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993)). The 
fundamental basis of Plaintiff’s claims against Schumacher Denville is that it uses the same 
allegedly defective VBO as Schumacher Boonton. Further, Plaintiff has not mounted any 
challenge to the authenticity of the MVRO. In fact, Plaintiff seems to have agreed to its 
authenticity by using it as the basis of its Motion to Remand. Accordingly, the Court considers 
the MVRO in its analysis. Harborview Cap. Partners, LLC v. Cross River Bank, 600 F. Supp. 3d 
485, 489 (D.N.J. 2022) (citations omitted). (“[A] plaintiff cannot defeat consideration of an 
integral document on a motion to dismiss unless it can offer a factual basis questioning its 
authenticity.”). PageID:
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WL 7047206, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2019) (“Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where any 
amendment to the complaint would be futile.”). 
b. Motion for Sanctions 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) establishes that “[b]y presenting to the court a 
pleading, written motion, or other paper” an attorney certifies that to the best of their “knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” that: (1) it is 
not being presented for any improper purpose, (2) the claims and legal contentions are warranted 
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extension or modification of existing law; (3) 
the factual contentions have evidentiary support or are likely to have evidentiary support; and (4) 
denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence. Fed . R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis 
added). A “court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party” that 
violates or is responsible for the violation of the certification requirements of Rule 11(b), as long 
as the offending party has been given “notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 11(c)(1). 
The legal standard for “evaluating conduct allegedly violative of Rule 11 is reasonableness 
under the circumstances.” Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 289 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). At a minimum, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 requires “unambiguously that any 
signer must conduct a ‘reasonable inquiry’ or face sanctions.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic 
Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 548 (1991); See also Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 
151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The signature of counsel on a pleading certifies that a reasonable 
 
6 But the Court notes that the claims against Ms. Tilton in her capacity as owner or part-owner of 
Schumacher Boonton survive. See N.J.A.C. 13:21-15.7(c) (“The dealer, all partners, officers, 
directors and/or holders of controlling interests shall be individually responsible for the conduct 
of all business at the dealership and for compliance with all the requirements of the statutes and 
rules governing the business of buying, selling or dealing in motor vehicles.”). PageID:
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investigation of the facts and a normally competent level of legal research support the 
presentation.”). 
Plaintiff’s Complaint and apparent continued prosecution of this case against Denville 
Defendants is without evidentiary or legal support and suggests a failure by Plaintiff’s Lawyers to 
conduct a “reasonable inquiry.” Plaintiff filed a Complaint that alleged, as a matter of fact, that 
Schumacher Denville (which, again, had no relationship with Plaintiff ) used the same allegedly 
problematic VBO as Schumacher Boonton. (Complaint ¶¶16-17). This threadbare assertion was 
essentially the only string tying Schumacher Denville to this lawsuit. Notably, Plaintiff attached 
to his Complaint only the VBO used by Schumacher Boonton, (Complaint, Exhibit A), and not the 
analogous MVRO used by Schumacher Denville. It is not at all clear from the Complaint, or any 
subsequent briefing, that Plaintiff’s Lawyers made any attempt, in the first instance, to determine 
whether this factual allegation had any basis in reality. 
On March 4, 2026, Denville Defendants notified Plaintiff that this conclusory allegation 
was, in fact, inaccurate, and specifically pointed Plaintiff to the MVRO used by Schumacher 
Denville, which Denville Defendants had included in their Notice of Removal. (Sanctions Letter 
at 2). At no point has Plaintiff contested the authenticity or accuracy of this document. In fact, 
Plaintiff has done just the opposite. As discussed repeatedly above, Plaintiff relied on this 
document’s authenticity (as well as the veracity of an accompanying declaration which attests to 
the validity of the MVRO) and, specifically, the ways in which Schumacher Denville’s MVRO 
does not violate the relevant laws, in making his Motion to Remand. (See supra at 7). 
Months later, despite having adequate “notice and opportunity to respond,” Plaintiff has 
still not responded in any meaningful way to Denville Defendants nor has Plaintiff moved to 
amend the Complaint. Plaintiff’s failure to mount any explanation whatsoever is highly probative PageID:
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of the fact that Plaintiff’s Lawyers did not and have not conducted a n investigation which is 
“reasonable[] under the circumstances,” either before or after suing this uninvolved entity. Ford 
Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 289 
In sum, Plaintiff’s claims against Denville Defendants lack any legal or factual basis as 
Plaintiff fails to allege any thing connecting Schumacher Denville to the underlying transaction. 
Further, Plaintiff appears to have failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into its own underlying 
factual contentions, even after having been given notice and ample time to do so. 
Having found a Rule 11(b) violation, the Court may impose a sanction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
11(c)(2). Further, “a sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter 
repetition of the conduct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). 
Somewhat paradoxically, Plaintiff’s Lawyers failure to oppose the Motion to Dismiss 
redounds to their benefit by limiting the impact of their culpable conduct. The Court notes that 
the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter future misconduct and that the awarding of attorney’s 
fees is a disfavored sanction. Accordingly, the Court order s that Defendant’s Lawyers have 
violated Rule 11(b) and are required to complete an additional four (4) credit hours of Continuing 
Legal Education in the area of legal ethics beyond those already required by New Jersey state rules. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Denville 
Defendants are without merit and incurable and ought to be dismissed with prejudice, and that the 
conduct of Plaintiff’s Lawyers in this case rises to the level of sanctionable conduct. Accordingly, 
both of Defendants’ motions will be GRANTED. PageID:
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* * * 
For these reasons, 
IT IS on this 8th day of May, 2026 
ORDERED that Denville Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 11) is GRANTED; 
and 
ORDERED that the claims against Denville Defendants are DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE; and it is further 
ORDERED that Denville Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. No. 15) is 
GRANTED; and 
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Lawyers are required to complete four (4) additional CLE 
hours in the area of legal ethics beyond that already required by the New Jersey state 
rules. 
 
s/Stanley R. Chesler 
STANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J. PageID:
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