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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
VICTORIA DIVISION 
 
 
MELANIE GRACE KRAMER, 
 
              Plaintiff, 
 
VS. 
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    CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:26-CV-00006  
  
BELONG / SJRC TEXAS, et al., 
 
              Defendants. 
 
 
ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION  
Before the Court is Plaintiff Melanie Grace Kramer’s complaint (D.E. 1), which is 
subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. §  1915(e)(2), and her Emergency Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order (D.E. 3). On February 26, 2026, United States Magistrate 
Judge Jason B. Libby  issued his Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R), 
recommending that the Court dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims and deny her motion . D.E. 
11. Plaintiff was provided proper notice of, and opportunity to object to, the Magistrate 
Judge’s M&R. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Special Order No. C-2023-1. 
Plaintiff timely filed her objections on March 12, 2026 (D.E. 12). She also filed a “notice 
to the court regarding availability of additional evidence.” D.E. 16. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A district court must review de novo  any portion of a magistrate judge’s proposed 
findings and recommendations on dispositive matters to which the parties have filed 
specific, written objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After considering proper objections, the 
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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district court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, those portions of the 
proposed findings and recommendations. Id. As to any portion for which no objection is 
filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law. 
United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
DISCUSSION  
Fundamentally, this lawsuit is Plaintiff’s attempt to collaterally attack the state court 
proceedings wherein Plaintiff’s children were removed from her custody . The Magistrate 
Judge correctly explained that federal courts generally abstain from hearing claims 
regarding family law matters.  D.E. 11, pp. 8 -9. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim as to each of her alleged federal claims  
due to insufficient factual allegations. Id. at pp. 9-11. Plaintiff now raises several objections 
as to the second of these two reasons for dismissing her claims.  With each objection, 
Plaintiff references exhibits that she claims provide a factual basis for those claims.1 
Falsified Records. In Plaintiff’s first objection, she references two exhibits that she 
claims are evidence of falsified records that Defendant used to “bypass judicial oversight.” 
D.E. 12, p. 2. One exhibit is a text message conversation with her eldest child’s foster 
parent. D.E. 12 -1, p. 5. The other is a “home study” prepared for, or by, the Texas 
Department of Family and Protective Services. Id. at pp. 6-30. Plaintiff explains that while 
 
1   The Court is not required to consider new evidence raised in an objection. Walker v. Savers, 583 F. App’x 474, 475 
(5th Cir. 2014) . However, some of these exhibits were referenced in Plaintiff ’s complaint and during the Spears 
hearing. D.E.  1-2, 13. Further, Plaintiff informed the Court that the Magistrate Judge did not accept physical and 
documentary evidence at the Spears hearing. See D.E. 16. Given the leniency extended to pro se litigants, the Court 
considers Plaintiff’s evidence and objections. See Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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the text messages indicate that her daughter moved into her foster home on December 27, 
2024, the home study lists that date as December 30, 2024.  D.E. 12, p. 2. She also points 
to an “interview” mentioned in the home study which is listed as occurring on Sunday, 
January 5, 2025. Id. Plaintiff contends this is not possible because the company she says 
conducted the interview does not work on Sundays. See D.E. 13, p. 24. 
Plaintiff argues that these “falsified records” are evidence of a procedural due 
process violation. However, Plaintiff does not explain how these records were used, if at 
all, in any proceeding that impacted Plaintiff’s rights or protected interests . See Adams v. 
City of Harahan, 95 F.4th 908, 913 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Adams v. City of 
Harahan, La., 145 S. Ct. 278, 220 L. Ed. 2d 86 (2024). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to 
state a claim for a procedural due process violation. The objection is OVERRULED. 
Medical Negligence and State-Created Danger. In her second objection, Plaintiff 
references a text message from her eldest child, wherein the child tells Plaintiff that she 
had some changes concerning two prescription medications. D.E. 12-1, p. 31. Plaintiff also 
explained that the child was placed in a foster home with her “former Treatment Director,” 
which Plaintiff assert s is a “prohibited dual relationship.”  D.E. 12, p. 2.  Plaintiff objects 
that this evidence shows a Fourteenth Amendment violation for state-created danger. Id. 
State-created danger is not currently a viable theory in the Fifth Circuit. Cundari v. 
City of Pharr, Tex., No. 7:25-CV-00005, 2026 WL 887654, at *6  n.8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 
2026). While a panel did recognize the theory in 2025, that decision was vacated when the 
Fifth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc.  See Sterling v. City of Jackson, Miss. , 167 
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F.4th 806 (5th Cir. 2026). So, Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The objection is OVERRULED. 
Conspiracy and Familial Association . In her third objection, Plaintiff references 
text message conversations with her caseworker concerning two occasions when Plaintiff 
attempted to call her child at allegedly scheduled times, but the child was unavailable due 
to extracurricular activit ies. D.E. 12 -1, pp. 32 -34. In a separate text conversation, t he 
caseworker also told Plaintiff that her child is seeing a “telehealth” therapist. Id. at 35. 
Plaintiff claims that these conversations are evidence that Defendants conspired to block 
Plaintiff’s access to her child in violation of her First Amendment right to familial 
association. D.E. 12, p. 3. 
To state a claim for deprivation of her right to familial association , Plaintiff must 
generally allege an intentional state action that interferes with her family relationships. See 
Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 3d 551, 564 (N.D. Tex. 2016)  (citing Morris 
v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 667 (5th Cir.1999)). Plaintiff has not alleged, and the evidence 
does not show, an intentional action that deprived Plaintiff phone calls with her daughter. 
And to the extent  that Plaintiff generally seeks to collaterally attack the state court child 
custody proceedings and orders, the Magistrate Judge correctly abstained. D.E. 11, pp. 8-
9. The objection is therefore OVERRULED. 
Heck v. Humphrey  and Destroyed Evidence . In her fourth objection , Plaintiff 
offers various exhibits concerning her report to police about alleged surveillance devices 
and blood spatters she found either in or around her home. D.E. 12-1, pp. 1-3. She alleges 
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that she called police when she found these objects, and that police destroyed the 
“evidence” found after their visit. See D.E. 12, p. 3. She also alleges that the police referred 
to her in the police report as a “mental subject.”  Id. Plaintiff argues that these actions 
constitute destruction of evidence,  a “Stigma-Plus” due process violation , and 
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id. She also objects that 
the Magistrate Judge erred in applying Heck v. Humphrey  because she is on deferred 
adjudication and has not been convicted. Id. 
 As to destruction of evidence, Plaintiff has not explained what these items were 
evidence of or how they would be used in any kind of proceeding. See, e.g., United States 
v. Salazar, 317 F. Supp. 3d 935, 937 (W.D. Tex. 2018) (discussing destruction of evidence 
in a criminal proceeding). As to the stigma-plus claim, she has not explained how the police 
report was used , if at all, to interfere  in the child custody proceedings.  See Does 1-7 v. 
Abbott, 945 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2019). And as to the ADA claim, Plaintiff has not 
explained how she was discriminated against . See Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. 
State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 574 (5th Cir. 2018). Finally, Plaintiff does not appear to have 
attempted to state a claim relating to her ongoing criminal proceedings, so the application 
of Heck is irrelevant. See D.E. 11, p. 11.  Because she has failed to state the claims she 
alleges, the objection is OVERRULED. 
CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set 
forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, as well as Plaintiff’s 
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objections and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a de novo 
review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation  to 
which objections were specifically directed, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s 
objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge 
(D.E. 11). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice, and 
her state claims are DISMISSED without prejudice . Further, Plaintiff’s Emergency 
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (D.E. 3) is DENIED. 
 ORDERED on May 8, 2026. 
 
_______________________________ 
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
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