govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_25-cv-01057-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
AARON CHENEVERT CIVIL ACTION 
VERSUS NO. 25-1057 
STOLTHAVEN NEW ORLEANS, LLC, 
ET AL. 
SECTION “O” 
ORDER AND REASONS 
Before the Court is a motion 1 for summary judgment filed by Defendants 
Stolthaven New Orleans LLC and Stolt -Nielsen USA Inc. In a “supplemental 
response and non-opposition”2 to the motion, Plaintiff Aaron Chenevert submits that 
“Plaintiff does not oppose summary judgment as to the moving defendants and as to 
the Louisiana state law claims Plaintiff has brought in the instant lawsuit, based 
only upon the Louisiana statutory employer defense set out in Defendants’ mot ion.” 
Plaintiff concedes his claims must be dismissed due to the statutory employer 
doctrine. The Court agrees, so the motion for summary judgment will be granted. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This personal injury litigation arises from Aaron Chenevert’s claims that he 
suffered burn injuries to his leg when he slipped into a drain containing boiling hot 
fluid while working at the direction of Stolthaven New Orleans, LLC and Stolt -
Nielsen USA, Inc. at Stolthaven’s bulk liquid storage facility in Braithwaite, 
Louisiana.3 
 
1 ECF No. 26. 
2 ECF No. 50. Plaintiff specifically reserves claims he has asserted in a prior lawsuit based 
upon the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. 
3 ECF No. 1-2, p. 2, para. 8. 

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Plaintiff was employed by PSC Group, LLC “(PS C”), which supplied its 
personnel to Stolthaven pursuant to a written Master Service Agreement (“MSA”). 4 
Seeking to recover damages for his injuries, Mr. Chenevert sued Defendants 
Stolthaven New Orleans, LLC and Stolt -Nielsen USA, Inc . in state court asserting 
state-law claims of negligence and premises liability. 5 Defendants timely removed 
the matter to this Court invoking diversity jurisdiction. 6 Defendants moved for 
summary judgment, asserting the statutory employer immunity defense. Following 
discovery pertinent to the defense, Plaintiff does not oppose summary judgment. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE STATUTORY EMPLOYER DEFENSE 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if ‘the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Perry v. VHS San 
Antonio Partners, L.L.C ., 990 F.3d 918, 926 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the 
outcome of the suit.’” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). 
Under Louisiana’s Workers’ Compensation Act, La. R.S. 23:1061, an employee 
injured in an accident while in the course and scope of his employment is generally 
limited to workers’ compensation benefits as his exclusive remedy against his 
employer and may not sue his employer, or any principal, in tort. See Griffin v. Wickes 
Lumber Co., 02–0294, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/02/02); 840 So.2d 591, 594, writ denied, 
 
4 See Affidavits of Clay Lockett, ECF 26-4 and 28-3. 
5 ECF No. 1-2, p. 4-5. 
6 ECF No. 1. 

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03–1338 (La.09/13/03); 853 So.2d 640. The Act applies to a direct employer/employee 
relationship as well as to a statutory employer/employee relationship. Ramos v. 
Tulane Univ. of La. , 2006 -0487, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/07), 951 So. 2d 1267. 
“Although statutory employment renders a principal responsible in workers ’ 
compensation, it also provides corresponding tort immunity.” McBride v. Old 
Republic Ins. Co., 2024-01519 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 452, 469 
Determining statutory employer status is a question of law. See Ramos, 951 
So. 2d at 1270; see also cf. Goodley v. Supreme Rice, L.L.C. , No. 25-30509, 2026 WL 
893183, at *6 and n.40 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam) (observing 
that “[s]tatutory employer status ‘must be determined on the facts of each case’”). An 
employer invoking tort immunity bears the burden of proving entitlement to it. 
Patterson v. Raceland Equip. Co., LLC, 2017-0703, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/18/18), 393 
So. 3d 341, 344, writ denied , 2018 -1018 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 799. A written 
contract recognizing the principal as the statutory employer is a p rerequisite for 
invoking immunity conferred by the statutory employer doctrine. La. R.S. 
23:1061(A)(3). Once proof of a contract recognizing the defendant as the statutory 
employer is presented, a rebuttal presumption of employment arises, which shifts the 
burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the work he performed at the time he was 
injured was not part of the defendant’s trade, business, or occupation. Id.; see also 
Ramos, 951 So. 2d at 1270-71. If a plaintiff fails to produce evidence to establish that 
he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial to rebut the 
presumption, summary judgment is warranted. Fleming v. JE Merit Constructors, 
Inc., 2007-0926 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/19/08), 985 So. 2d 141, 147-48. 

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Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff was a 
statutory employee of Stolthaven at the time of the incident forming the basis of this 
litigation, and as such, Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy lies in workers’ compensation, 
such that the instant state -law claims against Defendants are barred. In support of 
summary judgment, Defendants submit that, u nder the MSA, Plaintiff’s employer, 
PSC, agreed to furnish qualified personnel to perform various services at the Facility, 
including but not l imited to services requested by Stolthaven related to the loading 
and unloading of rail cars.7 On the day of the accident and while working in the course 
and scope of his employment with P SC, Plaintiff was assigned to and worked at the 
Facility under the direction of Stolthaven as provided for under the MSA.8 The MSA 
contains a statutory employment provision which expressly states that Stolthaven 
shall be considered the statutory employer of PSC’s employees and confirms the 
services performed by PSC are an integral part of and essential to the ability of 
Stolthaven to generate its goods, products, and services.9 Consequently, the terms of 
the MSA create a rebuttable presumption of statutory employment, which may only 
be overcome if Plaintiff can demonstrate the work he was performing at the time of 
the incident was not an integral part of or essential to Stolthaven’s business. La. R.S. 
23:1061(A)(3). Furthermore, the uncontested evidence also establishes that Plaintiff 
was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident and 
 
7 See ECF No. 26-4, pp. 3-14 (the MSA). 
8 See ECF No. 28-3. 
9 ECF No. 26-4, p. 5 at § 7(b). 

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that the work he performed falls within those duties necessary to conduct 
Stolthaven’s regular business activities.10 Plaintiff does not dispute this record. 
Though Plaintiff initially filed a response 11 in opposition to the summary 
judgment and Defendants filed a reply12 in support of their summary judgment , the 
parties undertook discovery pertinent to the statutory employer doctrine in 
accordance with a Consent Protective Order .13 After completing discovery, Plaintiff 
supplemented his response14 and notified the Court that “Plaintiff does not oppose 
the summary judgment of the defendants and as to the Louisiana state law claims 
Plaintiff has brought in the instance suit, based only upon the Louisiana statutory 
employer defense.” Plaintiff also included with his sup plemental response 15 a 
proposed order granting the motion for summary. 
Applying the legal standards to the summary judgment record, Defendants are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the statutory employer defense for the 
following reasons: 
(1) The uncontested evidence establishes that Plaintiff was a statutory 
employee of Stolthaven at the time of the occupational accident that forms 
the basis of the instant lawsuit. 
(2) The MSA between Stolthaven and Plaintiff’s direct employer, PSC, was a 
valid written contract which expressly recognizes Stolthaven as the 
statutory employer of the direct employer’s employees. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption of statutory employment under the 
Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act which immunizes the statutory 
employer from tort liability. 
(4) The presumption has not been rebutted by any evidence. 
 
10 ECF No. 26-1 at pp. 11-14 (citations omitted). 
11 ECF No. 32. 
12 ECF Nos. 33, 38. 
13 ECF No. 49. 
14 ECF No. 50. 
15 Id. 

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(5) Stolt-Nielsen is the sole member of Stolthaven, a limited liability company 
and thus is immune from claims asserted against the LLC and, regardless, 
Stolt-Nielsen shares Stolthaven’s immunity under the exclusivity 
provisions of the LWCA. 
 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s 
claims asserted in the instant lawsuit. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Having considered Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the parties’ 
respective submissions, including Plaintiff’s statement of non-opposition to dismissal 
of his Louisiana state-law claims he has brought in the instant suit, and based upon 
the unrebutted Louisiana statutory employer doctrine, 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion 16 for summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiff’s Louisiana state law claims based upon Defendants’ statutory 
employer defense is GRANTED. All claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint 17 are 
hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 28th day of April, 2026. 
BRANDON S. LONG 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
16 ECF No. 26. 
17 ECF No. 1-2. 

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