govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cv-02363-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
N. CLARK LLC, ET AL CIVIL ACTION 
VERSUS NO. 24-2363 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HOUSING AND URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT, ET AL 
 SECTION “B” (3) 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
Before the Court are defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ remaining 
FOIA claim (Rec. Doc. 40), plaintiffs’ opposition (Rec. Doc. 44), and defendants’ reply (Rec. Doc. 
45). For the following reasons, 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion (Rec. Doc. 40) is GRANTED, and that plaintiffs’ FOIA 
claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff s’ discrimination claim is DISMISSED 
WITH PREJUDICE. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The facts of this case were set out in the Court’s November 10, 2025 Order and Reasons, 
wherein the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act and the 
Administrative Procedure Act. See Rec. Doc. 30. The Court will provide only a brief summary for 
the adjudication of the instant claim before it. On or about May 13, 2019, the Louisiana Fair 
Housing Action Center (“LaFHAC”), formerly known as the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing 
Action Cen ter (“GNOFHAC”) filed a complaint of housing discrimination to the Louisiana 
Department of Justice (“LaDOJ”), alleging that plaintiff Cresson and her husband discriminated 
against it based on familial status and race in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) 

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and (b). See Rec. Doc. 15 at 4; see also Rec. Doc. 15-4 at 5. On June 14, 2019, the complaint was 
amended in part to include N. Clark LLC, Cresson’s company, as a respondent. See id . Though 
the charge of discrimination was eventually submitted to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the 
DOJ elected to not file suit. Rec. Doc. 15 at 4, 6. The DOJ administratively closed the case, without 
a determination on the merits. Rec. Doc. 21 at 2. 
On March 14, 2024, Cresson submitted a request to the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division 
(“CRT”) for “a copy of the entire file opened and closed on me and my LLC by the DOJ Civil 
Rights Division,” concerning the allegations made against her and her company under the Fair 
Housing Act. Rec. Doc. 40-2 at 3. On March 25, 2024, CRT acknowledged Cresson’s request and 
informed Cresson that it had attached a form for Cresson to verify her identity; however, the form 
was not attached to the letter when sent. Id. at 4. On March 26, 2024, Cresson responded to CRT’s 
letter, noting that the referenced form was not attached. Id . The following day, CRT emailed 
Cresson the form, noting that it had mistakenly failed to attach the form. Id. By February 25, 2025, 
CRT and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) completed 
their search for all responsive records. Id. Between February and July 2025, CRT processed all 
responsive records and made rolling releases to Cresson. Id . In response to Cresson’s FOIA 
request, CRT located and processed a total of 2,680 pages of responsive records and released 608 
pages to Cresson. Id. at 42. Of the 608 pages released to Cresson, 504 were released with redactions 
and 68 were released without any redactions. Id. Further, 1,148 pages were removed as duplicates 
of other records while 924 pages were withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions. Id. at 2, 42. 
On September 27, 2024, plaintiffs filed this action against HUD and CRT, asserting FTCA, 
APA, FOIA, and several state and federal claims against the defendants. Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiffs 
later amended their complaint. Rec. Doc. 15. The defendants moved to dismiss all but the FOIA 

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claim against it. Rec. Doc. 20. The Court granted the defendants’ motion, dismissing all but the 
FOIA claim against defendants. Rec. Doc. 30. On March 17, 2026, defendants moved for summary 
judgment on plaintiffs’ remaining FOIA claim. Rec. Doc. 40. In support of their motion for 
summary judgment, defendants attached declarations from Killian Kagle, the Chief of the Freedom 
of Information/Privacy Act Branch of the CRT, and Robert Doles, the Acting Deputy Assistant 
Secretary in HUD’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, describing the process of 
finding the relevant documents and deciding which should be released to Cresson. Rec. Docs. 40-
2; 40-3. Of note, the agencies relied on several exemptions under FOIA, including 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(3), (5), (6), and (7), when deciding which documents would be withheld. Rec. Docs. 40-2 
at 2; 40-3 at 1. On April 8, 2026, plaintiffs opposed defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 
alleging that defendants acted in bad faith in processing Cr esson’s FOIA claim and stating that 
plaintiffs still have a discrimination claim against defendants pursuant to the Fair Housing Act. 
Rec. Doc. 44. Defendants have replied. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers,
and admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see 
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Material in support or opposition of a 
motion for summary judgment may be considered if it is “capable of being ‘presented in a form 
that would be admissible in evidence.’” LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d 
530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). Courts view all 
facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non- moving party, but “refrain from making 

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credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide 
Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Where the movant bears the burden of proof, it must “demonstrate the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact” using competent summary judgment evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 
However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point 
to an absence of evidence.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994). 
Should the movant meet its burden, the burden shifts to the non- movant, who must show by 
“competent summary judgment evidence” that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Lindsey , 16 
F.3d at 618. Accordingly, conclusory rebuttals of the pleadings are insufficient to avoid summary 
judgment. Bargher v. White, 928 F.3d 439, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2019). An opposing party “may not 
rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleadings, but must, in its response, set out specific 
facts showing a genuine factual dispute for trial.” Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 581 (5th Cir. 
2014). There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party, 
thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Amedisys , 298 F.3d 434, 
440 (5th Cir. 2002). 
Summary judgment is the proper vehicle for resolving FOIA claims. See Cooper Cameron 
Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor , 280 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Summary judgment resolves 
most FOIA cases.”). In a FOIA suit, an agency is entitled to summary judgment once it 
demonstrates that no material facts are in dispute and that each document that falls within the class 
requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable, or is exempt from disclosure. Students 
Against Genocide v. Dept. of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

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B. Analysis
i. The FOIA Claim
Defendants insist that CRT and HUD have complied with Cresson’s FOIA request and 
withheld all documents it was authorized to withhold pursuant to applicable FOIA exemptions. An 
agency may satisfy its burden of proof that it complied with a FOIA request “through the 
submission of affidavits that identify the documents at issue and explain why they fall under the 
claimed exemption.” Mavadia v. Caplinger, 1996 WL 592742, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 1996). The 
affidavits “must be clear, specific and reasonably detailed while describing the withheld 
information in a factual and nonconclusory manner.” Id. Further, an agency can demonstrate that 
it conducted an adequate search of all records “by showing that it used ‘methods [that] can be 
reasonably expected to produce the information requested.’” Gahagan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 
CIV.A. 13-5526, 2014 WL 2158479, at *4 (E.D. La. May 23, 2014). Finally, “[w]ithout evidence
of bad faith, the veracity of the government’s submissions regarding reasons for withholding the 
documents should not be questioned.” Gahagan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 111 F. Supp. 
3d 754, 758 (E.D. La. 2015). 
The material facts in this case are undisputed. Cresson submitted a request to CRT for “a 
copy of the entire file opened and closed on me and my LLC by the DOJ Civil Rights Division,” 
concerning the allegations made against her and her company under the Fair Housing Act. Rec. 
Doc. 40-2 at 3. Defendants have replied to that request, providing to plaintiffs a total of 608 pages 
out of a total of 2,680 that were processed. Rec. Doc. 40-2 at 2. Defendants assert that 1,148 pages 
were removed for being duplicative, and that an additional 924 pages were withheld in full 
compliance with FOIA exemptions. In support of its decision to withhold this information, 
defendants have provided to this Court declarations from two federal employees who were 

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involved with responding to plaintiffs’ FOIA request, and they have explained that the following 
FOIA exemptions apply: 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (5), (6), and (7). Rec. Doc. 40-1 at 11–17. 
The declarations submitted contain exhaustive details about the information withheld and 
the exemption that applied to the withheld information. See Rec. Doc. 40-2 at 60–105; Rec. Doc. 
40-3 at 14–16. After reviewing these declarations, the Court is satisfied that these declarations are
“clear, specific and reasonably detailed ” and satisfy the defendants’ evidentiary burden. See 
Mavadia, 1996 WL 592742, at *1. Further, both declarations set out at length the process that CRT 
and HUD engaged in to find all responsive documents; as such, the Court is also satisfied that the 
agencies here conducted a reasonable search for all documents responsive to Cresson ’s FOIA 
request. See Rec. Doc. 40-2 at 4; Rec. Doc. 40-3 at 2. 
In opposition, plaintiffs do not address the pe rtinent FOIA exemptions that defendants 
claimed authorized them to withh old certain documents, nor do they address any case law 
concerning FOIA exemptions. See Rec. Doc. 44. As such, plaintiffs do not show that the claimed 
exemptions do not apply. Instead, plaintiffs appear to assert in a conclusory manner that defendants 
acted in “bad faith” in handling Cresson’s FOIA claim. Id. at 2. But plaintiffs have not presented 
compelling evidence of bad faith, and the Court does not find any evidence of bad faith. 
First, plaintiffs argue that defendants engaged in bad faith by trying to shut down Cresson’s 
FOIA request prematurely when Cresson’s FOIA claim was closed for her failure to provide a 
certificate of identify form. Rec. Doc. 44 at 2. However, defendants have acknowledged that they 
inadvertently failed to provide Cresson the relevant form and promptly provided the form to her 
when informed of their mistake. Rec. Doc. 40- 1 at 3. Plaintiffs provide no evidence that the 
agencies’ failures here was the result of bad faith. 

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Second, plaintiffs also claim that defendants ’ withdrawal of an affidavit stating that 
Cresson never sent a completed form also constituted bad faith. Rec. Doc. 44 at 2. But the Court 
sees this as nothing more than defendants ’ attempt at correcting an error, not evidence that 
defendants engaged in bad faith. Third, plaintiffs claim that the agencies delayed in responding to 
Cresson’s FOIA request. Id. at 3. However, a plaintiff’s claim that an agency delayed its response 
to a FOIA request is mooted by the agency’s response. See Voinche v. FBI, 999 F.2d 962, 963 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (“Insofar as [plaintiff] challenged the tardiness of the FBI’s [FOIA] response, his claim 
was rendered moot by the FBI’s response to his request.”). 
Finally, plaintiffs claim as “more alleged bad faith” an inoperative thumb drive that HUD 
provided her containing relevant documents and information. Rec. Doc. 44 at 3. There is no 
evidence that the inoperative thumb drive is the result of defendants’ bad faith. Further, defendants 
have provided evidence that the transcript of the relevant audio files were produced and provided 
to plaintiffs in response to Cresson’s FOIA request. See Rec. Doc. 40-1 at 3; Rec. Doc. 40-3 at 2–
3. 
In short, plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of bad faith, and therefore CRT’s and 
HUD’s supporting affidavits and declarations are entitled to the “presumption of legitimacy.” 
Gagahan, 111 F. Supp. 3d at 758. The Court is satisfied, after reviewing the exhaustive 
declarations that defendants have submitted concerning the rationales for applying certain FOIA 
exemptions to the documents withheld, that defendants have satisfied their burden of proof. As 
such, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and plaintiffs ’ FOIA claim is 
therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
ii. The Discrimination Claim

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Plaintiffs assert that they “still have a discrimin ation claim against…[d]efendants alleging 
discrimination” and that they should be allowed to asser t a discrimination claim pursuant to the Fair 
Housing Act. Rec. Doc. 44 at 6. However, this claim was not asserted in either the original or amended 
complaints. See Rec. Docs. 1, 15. As such, the claim is not properly before this Court. See Cutrera v. Bd. 
of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A claim which is not raised in the 
complaint but, rather, is raised only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before 
the court.”). As such, this Court can disregard the newly-r aised claim. 
Even if properly raised, the Court would dismiss the claim. It is well-settled that in order to file 
suit against the United States or one of its agencies, a complaint must identify a statute or law that 
unambiguously waives the sovereign immunity of the United States. Creamer v. U.S., 261 F.App’x 814, 
814–15 (5th Cir. 2008). Despite plaintiffs’ claim that the Fair Housing Act “has waivers that allow 
lawsuits to be commenced against the federal government,” Rec. Doc. 44 at 7, the Fifth Circuit has been 
clear that the Fair Housing Act does not “unambiguously waive” the government’s sovereign immunity 
defense. McCardell v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 794 F.3d 510, 522 n.89 (5th Cir. 2015). 
Further, “granting leave to amend would [be] futile, because ‘the complaint as amended would be subject to 
dismissal’ on the basis of…sovereign immunity.” Aldridge v. Mississippi Dep ’t of Corr., 990 F.3d 
868, 878 (5th Cir. 2021). Therefore, plaintiffs’ discrimination claim is DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
Ne
w Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of April 2026 
_______________________________________ 
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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