govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_21-cv-00339-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ, 
ET AL. 
CIVIL ACTION 
 NO. 21-339 
VERSUS 
 SECTION: “P” (2) 
A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK A/S a/k/a A.P. 
MOLLER-MAERSK GROUP, ET AL. 
 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
 
Before the Court are the following motions: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack 
of Personal Jurisdiction (R. Doc. 62); (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Transfer Venue (R. Doc. 56); and 
(3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a 
Claim (R. Doc. 63). The Court heard oral argument on the subject motions on May 18, 2026. 
Having considered the motions, the memoranda in support and in opposition to the motions, the 
record, the applicable law, and the parties’ oral arguments, the Court rules as follows. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This action involves claims brought by Plaintiffs under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021, et seq., also known 
as the Helms -Burton Act (“the Act”). Plaintiffs allege they own claims to property that was 
confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959. Plaintiffs seek damages and 
interest from Defendants under the Act based on Defendants’ alleged trafficking in said 
confiscated property.
1 Plaintiffs include Odette Blanco de Fernandez née Blanco Rosell, the estates 
of her four deceased siblings, and the 13 descendants of her deceased siblings. 2 Plaintiffs’ 
 
1 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 1. 
2 Id. at ¶¶ 9–26. 

2 
 
Complaint names four defendants: A.P. Moller -Maersk A/S ; Maersk A/S; Maersk, Inc.; and 
Maersk Agency.3 
Although Plaintiffs filed this case over five years ago, the case has not advanced past the 
pleadings stage due to a series of consent motions to statistically close the case to allow other 
lawsuits impacting this case to progress.4 Now that the case has been reopened, Defendants move 
to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(2).5 Defendants also move to dismiss the case under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing 
that Plaintiffs lack standing and have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 6 At 
oral argument, counsel for Plaintiffs conceded that there is no basis for personal jurisdiction over 
any of the defendants in this Court. But rather than dismissing the case without prejudice, Plaintiffs 
urge the Court to grant their motion to transfer venue to the United Stated District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, when a court “finds there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, 
if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court ... in which 
the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed.”
7 The text of Section 1631 
imposes a mandatory duty to transfer a case when the statute’s requirements are met. 8 Thus, 
transfer is required if: (1) “the transferor court lacks jurisdiction;” (2) “the transferee court would 
 
3 Id. at ¶¶ 27–30. 
4 See R. Docs. 28, 34, and 47. 
5 R. Doc. 62. 
6 R. Doc. 63. 
7 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 
8 Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., Inc., 3 F.4th 788, 796 (5th Cir. 2021). 
 

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have been able to exercise its jurisdiction on the date the action was misfiled;” and (3) “the transfer 
serves the interest of justice.”9 
A. This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. 
As stated above, Defendants moved to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
and Plaintiffs concede that they cannot establish personal jurisdiction in this case in light of the 
affidavits presented by Defendants in support of their motion as well as the intervening change in 
the law in the Fifth Circuit on general personal jurisdiction and Rule 4(k)(2). Upon review of the 
record and the applicable law, this Court agrees it lacks personal jurisdiction over all four 
defendants named in the Complaint. The Court therefore must determine whether to dismiss this 
action, as requested by Defendants, or to transfer the action, as requested by Plaintiffs. 
B. The transferee court would have been able to exercise jurisdiction over Defendants 
Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency on the date this action was filed. 
Plaintiffs assert that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania could have exercised personal 
jurisdiction over Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency at the time this action was filed. Plaintiffs thus 
move the Court to transfer their claims against these two defendants to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.
10 Plaintiffs state they will dismiss their claims against A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S and 
Maersk, Inc. without prejudice if the claims against Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency are 
transferred.11 In essence, Plaintiffs seek to sever their claims against Maersk A/S and Maersk 
Agency and to transfer the action involving those claims to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
and Plaintiffs concede that their claims against A.P. Moller -Maersk A/S and Maersk, Inc. are 
 
9 See Harutyunyan v. Love, Civil Action No. 19-41, 2019 WL 5551901, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2019) (quoting Trejo-
Mejia v. Holder , 593 F.3d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also In re Exclusive Indus. Corp. , 751 F.2d 806, 809 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (listing the same requirements but tailored to the appellate context). 
10 See R. Doc. 56-1 at 4. 
11 Id. 

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subject to dismissal without prejudice. Accordingly, the Court’s Section 1631 transfer analysis is 
limited to Plaintiffs’ claims against Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency. 
Plaintiffs seek to invoke the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency based on 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5301, which states 
that “qualification as a foreign corporation under the laws of [Pennsylvania]” constitutes “a 
sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of [Pennsylvania] to exercise general personal 
jurisdiction” over said foreign corporation.
12 Plaintiffs submit that Maersk A/S and Maersk 
Agency were registered and qualified to do business in Pennsylvania when this action was filed in 
February 2021, and that both defendants have continued to be registered and qualified to do 
business in Pennsylvania at all relevant times.
13 
Defendants do not dispute that they were registered and qualified to do business as foreign 
corporations in Pennsylvania at the time this action was filed, but Defendants contend that under 
Pennsylvania law at the time this action was filed, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania could not 
have exercised personal jurisdiction over Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency. The Court disagrees. 
While the Court acknowledges the challenges to the constitutionality of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 5301 that were occurring in the Pennsylvania courts in the years prior to the filing of this action,
14 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s holding in Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. Int ernational Rug Group, 
LLC, 192 A.3d 1133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018), was the law of Pennsylvania on this issue at the time 
this action was filed in February 2021. 15 And under Webb-Benjamin’s holding, Section 5301 
 
12 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301(a)(2)(i). 
13 See R. Docs. 56-1 at 6; R. Doc. 56-4; and R. Doc. 56-5. 
14 See, e.g., Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 
F. Supp. 3d 278 (M.D. Pa. 2018); Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 2018 WL 3025283 (Pa. Com. Pl. May 30, 2018); 
Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. Int’l Rug Grp., LLC, 192 A.3d 1133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018). 
15 See Kantor v. Hiko Energy, LLC, 100 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (E.D.Pa. 2015) (“The Superior Court’s holding, unless 
and until it is overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is the law of Pennsylvania.”) (citing Commonwealth v. 
Forbes, 867 A.2d 1268, 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)). 

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remained a proper method of exercising general personal jurisdiction over foreign companies 
registered to do business in Pennsylvania.16 It was not until December 2021, in Mallory v. Norfolk 
Southern Railway Company, 266 A.3d 542 (Pa. 2021), that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of Section 5301’s constitutionality and overruled Webb -Benjamin.17 But as 
Plaintiffs point out, Mallory was not the controlling law at the time this action was filed, and it is 
not the controlling law today. In June 2023, t he United States Supreme Court vacated the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Mallory,18 making clear that Pennsylvania’s statutory 
scheme—wh ich requires out-of-state corporations to register with the state before doing business 
there, and which provides that registering to do business in the state will allow Pennsylvania courts 
to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the registered foreign corporations—does not violate 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 Thus, based on the law at the time this 
action was filed, and as the law stands today, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania could have 
exercised general personal jurisdiction over Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency pursuant to 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5301.
20 
C. Transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania serves the interest of justice. 
The parties dispute whether transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is in the interest 
of justice. Having considered the arguments presented in the briefing and at oral argument, the 
Court concludes transfer of Plaintiffs’ claims against Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency to the 
 
16 See Webb-Benjamin, 192 A.3d at 1139 (“[W]e conclude that Daimler does not eliminate consent as a method of 
obtaining personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A . § 5301, Pennsylvania may exercise general 
personal jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] claims against [defendant].”). 
17 Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 266 A.3d 542 (Pa. 2021), vacated, 600 U.S. 122 (2023). 
18 Mallory, 600 U.S. at 146. 
19 Id. at 134–36. 
20 See Vonbergen v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 3d 440, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (“Pennsylvania expressly 
permits its courts to exercise ‘general personal jurisdiction’ over registered foreign corporations, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 5301(a)(2)(i), and the Supreme Court has explained that a foreign corporation consents to this general personal 
jurisdiction by complying with Pennsylvania ’s registration requirements [.]”) (citing Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 
600 U.S. 122, 134–35 (2023)). 

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Eastern District of Pennsylvania is in the interest of justice. First, the Court views Plaintiffs’ filing 
of the Complaint in this Court as one made in good faith based on the evidence Plaintiffs had 
access to at the time and their genuine belief in this Court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over Defendants based on said evidence. Transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as 
opposed to dismissal without prejudice, serves the interest of justice to protect Plaintiffs from the 
forfeiture that could result from the statute of limitations running on Plaintiffs’ claims while the 
action has been pending in this Court.
21 Moreover, even if the statute of limitations has not run, 
transfer also prevents the possible extinguishment of Plaintiffs’ claims that are based on the “70-
Year Concession,” which was allegedly provided in 1955 and would have expired in 2025.22 
The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs have shown a lack of diligence and 
that Plaintiffs inexplicably waited more than four years to seek transfer. As the Court previously 
stated, this case has not yet advanced past the pleadings stage due to the three separate agreements 
between the parties to stay the case while other courts addressed issues relevant to this case. The 
case was reopened in July 2025, and Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to transfer less than three 
months later. The Court finds no undue delay. The Court likewise finds Defendants’ other 
arguments unavailing and insufficient to overcome the interests of justice that are served by 
transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court determines that it lacks jurisdiction over all four 
 
21 See USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp. , 647 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that transfer of the appeal 
rather than dismissal best served the interest of justice because a new appeal would be barred as untimely and there 
was nothing to indicate the appellants acted in bad faith by filing the appeal in the wrong court); Scherbatskoy v. 
Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 292 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding same); see also Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., Inc. , 3 
F.4th 788, 799 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[Section 1631] was specifically designed to protect federal litigants from the forfeiture 
that could result from a statute of limitations running after a plaintiff’s mistakenly filing an action in a court that lacks 
jurisdiction when the interests of justice so demand[.]”). 
22 See, e.g., R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 79–83. 

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defendants—A.P. Moller -Maersk A/S; Maersk A/S; Maersk, Inc.; and Maersk Agency. The Court 
further determines that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
would have been able to exercise jurisdiction over Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency at the time 
this action was filed. The Court further determines that, in the interest of justice, Plaintiffs’ claims 
against Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency should be severed and transferred as their own action to 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over A.P. 
Moller-Maersk A/S and Maersk, Inc. , and because the other requirements for transfer under 
Section 1631 are not satisfied with respect to these defendants, Plaintiffs’ claims against A.P. 
Moller-Maersk A/S and Maersk, Inc. should be dismissed wi thout prejudice pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). And lastly, lacking personal jurisdiction over all defendants, the 
Court makes no determination regarding Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6) (R. Doc. 63). 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Transfer Venue (R. Doc. 56) is GRANTED 
insofar as Plaintiffs move to transfer their claims against Maersk A/S and Maersk Agency to the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
IT IS THEREFORE FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ claims against Maersk A/S 
and Maersk Agency are hereby SEVERED and shall be TRANSFERRED as their own action to 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1631.
23 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
 
23 Pursuant to Local Rule 83.5.1, this transfer order is automatically stayed for 21 days from the date the order is 
entered on the docket. If this order remains in effect at the conclusion of the 21- day stay, t he Clerk of Court shall 
transfer the action without further order from the Court. 

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Jurisdiction (R. Doc. 62) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . The motion is 
granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S and Maersk, 
Inc.; and the motion is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims against Maersk A/S and Maersk 
Agency. 
IT IS THEREFORE FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants 
A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S and Maersk, Inc. are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack 
of personal jurisdiction. 
 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of May 2026. 
 
______________________________________ 
DARREL JAMES PAPILLION 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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