govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_15-cr-00305-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 v. 
JESSE ALLEN BURNEY, 
 Defendant. 
 
Criminal No. ELH-15-0305 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Defendant Jesse Allen Burney was sentenced on October 14, 2016, to a term of 252 months 
(21 years) of incarceration for armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. ECF 62. 
Burney, while self -represented, filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or 
“Guidelines”). ECF 70 . He asks for a “reduction in term of imprisonment ,” due to the 
“incapacitation of the defendant ’s parent when the defendant would be the only available care 
giver for the parent.” Id. at 1.1 
In particular, defendant asserts that his mother, who is now almost 71 years of age, id., is 
“currently living in a dilapidated house, both mentally and physically disabled and her conditions 
are growing worse with time.” Id. at 7. Further, he maintains that his two sisters are also physically 
and mentally disabled and thus is unable to care for his mother . Id. at 6, 7. Burney also asserts: 
“Me, my mother's only son, who suffers from no physical or mental ailments , strong as an ox at 
the age of 43 am in prison sitting helpless while my mother suffers daily.” Id. at 7. 
 
1 Throughout the Memorandum Opinion, the Court cites to the electronic pagination. 
However, the electronic pagination does not necessarily correspond to the page number imprinted 
on a particular submission. 
 

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The Court subsequently appointed counsel to represent Burney, pursuant to the Criminal 
Justice Act. ECF 72. On November 11, 2025, Burney’s counsel filed a supplemental 
memorandum, with exhibits, in support of Burney’s motion . ECF 81 (sealed version); ECF 84 
(redacted, public version). Counsel asserts that defendant’s “family situation, when combined 
with the other Section 3553(a) sentencing factors, clearly warrant relief.” ECF 81 at 8. In 
particular, he “requests an order reducing [defendant’s] sentence to time served or, in the 
alternative, add some or all of the unserved portion of his original sentence to his term of 
supervised release so that it can be served on home confinement.” Id. at 9. 
I shall refer to defendant’s pro se motion (ECF 70) and the supplemental memorandum 
(ECF 81, ECF 84) collectively as the “Motion.” For privacy reasons, I shall refer to defendant’s 
mother by her initials, K.B. Similarly, I shall refer to defendant’s sisters by their initials, R.H. and 
S.B. 
The Motion is supported by several exhibits. They include the denial by the Bureau of 
Prisons (“BOP”) of Burney’s request for compassionate release (ECF 81-1); the medical records 
of defendant’s mother (ECF 81-2); a letter to the Court from R.H. (ECF 81-3); the medical records 
of R.H. (ECF 81-4); a letter to the Court from S.B. (ECF 81- 5); and the medical records of S.B. 
(ECF 81-6). 
The government opposes the Motion. ECF 85 (the “Opposition”). The Opposition is 
supported by three exhibits. They include the transcript from defendant’s sentencing hearing 
before this Court on October 14, 2016 (ECF 85 -1); the public information inmate data from the 
BOP (ECF 85-2); and defendant’s inmate disciplinary data. ECF 85-3. Defendant did not reply. 
See Docket. 

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 Burney, who was born in June 1982, is now almost 44 years of age. He is currently 
incarcerated at Petersburg Medium FCI . See Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator , 
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search by BOP Register Number 12690-067) (last accessed May 
19, 2026). Defendant has a projected release date of November 3, 2033. See id. 
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that 
follow, I shall deny the Motion, without prejudice. 
I. Background 
Burney was indicted on May 28, 2015, for the robbery of a bank in Maryland on April 27, 
2015. ECF 1. He was charged with Armed Bank Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 
(d), and (f) (Count One); Forced Accompaniment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e); Use and 
Carry of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Three); 
and Felon in Possession of a Firearm, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Four). ECF 1; see ECF 
81 at 1. A Superseding Indictment was filed on March 3, 2016. ECF 33. It omitted the Forced 
Accompaniment charge. See id. 
Pursuant to a Plea Agreement (ECF 43), tendered under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) , 
Burney entered a plea of guilty on July 1, 2016, to Count One, charging Armed Bank Robbery. 
ECF 42. In the Plea Agreement, the parties disagreed about whether defendant qualified as a 
Career Offender. ECF 43, ¶¶ 6(e), (g). Nevertheless, the parties agreed to recommend a sentence 
of 252 months of imprisonment (21 years) as the appropriate disposition of the case. Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. 
The Plea Agreement contains a Statement of Facts, to which Burney stipulated. See ECF 
43 at 9, 10. The agreed facts are as follows. 
On the morning of April 27, 2015, at approximately 10:35 a.m., Burney entered the PNC 
Bank in Whiteford, Maryland (the “Bank”). ECF 43 at 9. He was wearing a motorcycle helmet 

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with the reflective visor down, a tactical vest, a grey sweatshirt, gloves, and a black backpack. Id. 
The backpack contained an AK-47 with a sock over the barrel, which was visible through the top 
of the backpack. Id. 
Upon entering the B ank, Burney withdrew a taser from his pocket and pointed it at the 
tellers, declaring “this is a robbery.” Id. Burney demanded $100,000 from the tellers and 
instructed them to put the cash into a black trash bag. Id. Burney then shouted, “If you don’t open 
the safe in 15 seconds, I will start shooting!” Id. The tellers complied with Burney’s demands 
and gave him money from the Bank’s vault. Id. Burney put the trash bag, which was filled with 
$97,237.00 in U.S. currency, into his backpack. Id. As he was leaving, Burney told the B ank’s 
employees: “If I see any police, I’m going to come back and shoot you.” Id. 
Burney fled the scene on a dirt bike and drove to a black Kia SUV that he had previously 
parked several miles away from the Bank. Id. He hid the bike under a tarp and drove away in the 
SUV. Id. 
The money from the Bank contained a GPS device through which law enforcement officers 
were able to track Burney. Id. As law enforcement officers tracked him, Burney drove the SUV 
into a farm field in Lower Chanceford Township, Pennsylvania. Id. He then exited the SUV, 
which still had the key in the ignition, and hid from the police in the nearby woods. Id. 
A Pennsylvania State Trooper found Burney hiding in the woods. Id. Burney had on the 
black backpack, which contained a loaded AK -47 magazine. Id. at 9, 10. Near Burney, 
investigators located the black trash bag, which contained the money that Burney stole from the 
Bank and the GPS tracking device. Id. at 10. A K-9 search team located the AK-47 thirty yards 
from where Burney was apprehended by the Pennsylvania State Trooper. Id. The AK-47, which 
was fully operable, had a loaded 30-round magazine attached and a round in the chamber. Id. 

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Burney was taken into custody and waived his Miranda rights. Id.; see Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966). He admitted, in a recorded statement, that he carried out the robbery of the 
Bank and had a gun with him at the time. Id. 
During questioning, Burney also informed investigators that he owed $100,000.00 in 
restitution with regard to a federal conviction for a prior bank robbery. Id. at 6. Burney served 
approximately 10 years in prison for the prior offense. Id. 
After the guilty plea proceedings, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Report 
(“PSR”). It is docketed at ECF 46 . But, based on rulings by the Court at sentencing, it was 
subsequently amended. See ECF 61. 
The PSR reflects that defendant had several prior adult convictions. Notably, in 2005, at 
the age of 22, Burney pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
to the offenses of conspiracy to commit bank robbery and possession of a firearm in furtherance 
of crimes of violence. ECF 61, ¶ 51. In particular, Burney committed nine bank robberies between 
December 17, 2001, and December 18, 2003. Id. For most of those bank robberies, defendant did 
not act alone; he was joined by Shawn Powell. Id. And, the pair usually stole cars before robbing 
the banks. Id. Further, during a proffer interview with investigators, “Burney admitted to 
committing three additional bank robberies on his own.” Id. In that case, o n April 26, 2005, 
defendant was sentenced to 144 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Id. 
He was released from prison on May 30, 2014. Id. Of import, defendant was on supervised 
release from that case when he committed the underlying offense. Id.; see also ECF 43 at 10. 
Burney’s prior criminal convictions yielded a subtotal criminal history score of nine points. 
ECF 61, ¶ 52. Two points were added because, at the time the instant offense was committed, 
Burney was on supervised release with respect to the prior bank robbery . Id. ¶ 53. Thus, as 

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calculated by the PSR, Burney had a total criminal history score of eleven points. Id. ¶ 54. That 
would result in a criminal history category of V. Id. ¶ 54. However, if defendant were sentenced 
today, he would have only one status point. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). But, even so, with ten 
criminal history points, defendant’s criminal history category would remain a V. 
In any event, t he initial PSR (ECF 46) determined that Burney qualified as a Career 
Offender. Id. ¶ 55.2 Therefore, five points were added to defendant’s offense level of 29, id. ¶ 33, 
and his criminal history category was increased to VI. Id. ¶ 55. According to that PSR, after three 
deductions under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, defendant had a final offense level of 31 . Id. ¶ 36. With an 
offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of VI, t he initial PSR (ECF 46) indicated that 
the Guidelines for Count One called for a period of incarceration ranging between 188 and 235 
months. Id. at 20. 
On August 31, 2016, the Court ordered the government to supplement its sentencing 
memorandum (ECF 50) to address Burney’s status as a Career Offender. ECF 53. Also on August 
31, 2016, the government filed a letter with the Court, stating : “In light of the Defendant’s desire 
to proceed to sentencing as quickly as possible, the Government withdraws its contention that Mr. 
Burney qualifies as a Career Offender.[]” ECF 52. However, in a letter dated September 12, 2016, 
the government reversed course, renewing its claim that Burney qualified as a Career Offender. 
ECF 56. The defense responded. ECF 58. In any event, a nd as noted, in the Plea Agreement 
(ECF 43) the parties agreed to a total sentence of 252 months of imprisonment , regardless of 
defendant’s Career Offender status. Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. 
 
2 Presumably, this determination was based on the felony drug offense in ECF 46, ¶ 45, as 
well as the conviction for conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery. Id. ¶ 51. 

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Sentencing was held on October 14, 2016. ECF 60. The government argued, erroneously, 
that the defendant’s prior conviction for conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery constituted a 
crime of violence. See ECF 85-1 at 11-36. After a lengthy e xchange with counsel, I concluded 
that defendant did not qualify as a C areer Offender. Id. at 47. Therefore, defendant had a final 
offense level of 26 (ECF 61, ¶ 36), and a criminal history category of V . Id. ¶ 54. On this basis, 
defendant’s Guidelines called for a sentence ranging from 110 to 137 months of imprisonment. 
During sentencing, the Court grappled with why defendant’s proposed sentence in the Plea 
Agreement was far greater than the range under the G uidelines. ECF 85 -1 at 54- 55. The 
government said, in part, id. at 56-57: 
Mr. Burney gets the substantial benefit of a bargain here. The benefit of the 
bargain . . . is, were the Government to proceed to trial, he would not only have a 
25-year mandatory minimum for the § 924(c); he would . . . have a 10 -year 
mandatory minimum exposure for the forced accompaniment. That means, at the 
trial, if convicted, Mr. Burney would face . . . a mandatory minimum sentence of 
35 years. 
 
The government added, id. at 57: “Mr. Burney is getting a substantial benefit . . . 21 years 
is a lot less than 35 years.” 
Defense counsel acknowledged that the defendant’s exposure to the 35- year mandatory 
minimum “drove the bargain . . . .” Id. at 61. The defense added: “We think this is an appropriate 
outcome . . . [W]e’re here to urge the Court to accept [the Plea Agreement].” Id. 
I said, in part, id. at 57-58: 
It seems to me, when I evaluate a (c) plea, I am being asked to determine whether 
it’s appropriate, reasonable, sufficient, but not greater than necessary. And, in order 
to make that analysis in a case like this where, on the face of it, the recommended 
sentence under the terms of the (c) plea is way above the guidelines, I need to know 
something about the why. 
 
* * * 
 

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I have to look at everything. I have to look at: Is this in the interest of the 
Government? It spares the Government a trial. It spares the victims having to come 
to court. The Government had a very big stick it was wielding, et cetera. And then 
I have to look at the considerations as far as the Defendant is concerned, and those 
do take into account the reality of how he was charged and what the Government 
is dropping. 
 
 I think that I’m allowed to consider that. 
 
Further, the Court said, id. at 74: 
My understanding is that the strength of the Government's evidence is 
overwhelming and that, instead of helping, I would actually be harming [the 
defendant if I reject the C plea]. The Defendant would face a conviction on a second 
§ 924(c). Assuming that there is no challenge to the first § 924(c), even if there is, 
he would have a § 924(c) conviction, and, most likely, it would be a second 
§ 924(c). His exposure is so great that I have now understood why the Defense says 
it asks the Court to go along with this sentence. And it is why I am willing to go 
along with the (c) plea in this case. 
 
The Court continued, id. at 74–75: 
 
The Government gave up the right to pursue a far more serious charge with 
a far greater sentence hanging over this defendant's head if the case went to trial 
and he were convicted. And the Defendant, as I understand it through counsel, has 
agreed to the (c) plea rather than run the risk of being convicted of that far more 
serious charge, the second § 924(c), with a potential of a minimum mandatory 35-
year sentence and a potential up to life, and that the bargain, as it was, whic h I'm 
not a part of but I've been asked to bless, if you will, by going along with the (c) 
plea, is what it is. 
 
In accordance with the terms of the Plea Agreement, the Court imposed the agreed upon 
term of 252 months of imprisonment, with credit dating from April 27, 2015. ECF 62 (Judgment). 
It is followed by five years of supervised release. Id. 
The government explains in its Opposition that, given the charges lodged against Burney, 
he “faced a potential mandatory minimum sentence of 35 years—10 years as to Count One and 25 
years as to Count Two.” ECF 85 at 2. With respect to Count Two, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) 
provides: 

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In the case of a violation of this subsection that occurs after a 
prior conviction under this subsection has become final, the person shall— 
 
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years; and 
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device , or is 
equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be sentenced to imprisonment 
for life. 
 
As discussed, in 2005 Burney pled guilty to Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of 
Crimes of Violence , under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c ). And, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)(C) requires a 
mandatory minimum term of 25 years when, as here, the defendant has previously been convicted 
under § 924(c). 
As of October 15, 2025, Burney’s disciplinary records at the BOP reflect thirteen incidents, 
resulting in fifteen sanctions. ECF 85-3. Burney has incurred sanctions, inter alia, for assaulting 
without serious injury, possessing a dangerous weapon, refusing a physical test/examination, 
fighting with another person, refusing to obey an order, and being in an unauthorized area. Id. 
However, BOP disciplinary records indicate that Burney has not received a sanction since 
December 11, 2022. Id. at 2. 
Burney is currently serving at Petersburg Medium FCI . See Bureau of Prisons Inmate 
Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search by BOP Register Number 12690- 067) (last 
accessed May 19, 2026). As noted, he has a projected release date of November 3, 2033. Id. 
Burney has currently served about 132 months of his 252-month sentence, or roughly 52%. 
Additional facts are included, infra. 
II. Standard of Review 
Ordinarily, a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c); see United States v. Davis, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 1291531, at *3 (4th Cir. May 
12, 2026); United States v. Smith, 2026 WL 509318, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 2026) (per curiam); 

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United States v. Moody, 115 F.4th 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 
653 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Brown, 78 F.4th 122, 128 (4th Cir. 2023); United States v. 
Malone, 57 F.4th 167, 173 (4th Cir. 2023); United States v. Bond, 56 F. 4th 381, 383 (4th Cir. 
2023); United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 831 (4th Cir. 2022) ; United States v. Ferguson, 55 
F.4th 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. Hargrove , 30 F.4th 189, 194 (4th Cir. 2022); 
United States v. Chambers , 956 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 2020), abrogated on other grounds by 
United States v. Troy, 64 F.4th 177 (4th Cir. 2023); United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 495 
(4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 2019). But, “the rule of 
finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States , 564 U.S. 522, 526 
(2011). One such exception is when the modification is “expressly permi tted by statute.” See 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); see also Jackson, 952 F.3d at 495. 
A statutory exception is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582, which was first enacted as part of 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 224(a), 98 Stat. 2030 (1984). It is 
commonly termed the “‘compassionate release exception.’” Moody, 115 F.4th at 310; see United 
States v. Osman, 2024 WL 3633573, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024) (per curiam) (unreported) 
(stating that a motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is “commonly referred to as a motion for 
compassionate release. . . .”). Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) authorizes a court, in its 
discretion, to reduce a defendant’s sentence if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such 
a reduction,”; “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission”; and the court has considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. __, 2026 WL 1485476, 
at *7 (May 28, 2026) ; United States v. Washington, 161 F.4th 816, 818 (4th Cir. 2025); United 
States v. Crawley, 140 F.4th 165, 169 (4th Cir. 2025); Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194. 

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As originally enacted, the compassionate release provision permitted a court to alter a 
sentence only upon motion made by the Director of the BOP. See Pub. L. No. 98- 473, § 224(a), 
98 Stat. 2030 (1984). This meant that a defendant seeking compassionate release had to rely on 
the BOP Director for relief. See Bethea, 54 F.4th at 831; see, e.g., Orlansky v. FCI Miami Warden, 
754 F. App’x 862, 866– 67 (11th Cir. 2018); Jarvis v. Stansberry , No. 2:08CV230, 2008 WL 
5337908, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2008) (denying compassionate release motion because § 3582 
“vests absolute discretion” in the BOP). However, the safety valve of § 3582 languished, because 
the BOP rarely filed such a motion on an inmate’s behalf. As a result, compassionate release was 
an infrequent occurrence. See Hr’g on Compassionate Release and the Conditions of Supervision 
Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 66 (2016) (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector 
General, Dep’t of Justice) (observing that, on average, only 24 inmates were granted 
compassionate release per year between 1984 and 2013). 
In 2018, with the passage of the First Step Act, see Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 
5239 (2018) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)), Congress “broadened” the authority of courts 
to grant sentencing modifications pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Malone , 57 F.4th at 173. In 
particular, the FSA authorizes a court to grant compassionate release “upon motion of the Director 
of [BOP], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf 
or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility,” 
whichever occurs first. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also Ferguson, 55 F.4th 
at 268; United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 129 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. McCoy , 
981 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2020). In other words, a federal inmate is now able to file a motion 
for compassionate release directly with the court, as long as the inmate first exhausts administrative 

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remedies. McCoy, 981 F.3d at 275–76. If a defendant has already exhausted administrative 
remedies upon filing a first motion for compassionate release, the defendant does not need to meet 
the bar for exhaustion a second time, should the defendant seek to renew the motion. United States 
v. King, 2025 WL 1692747, at *1 (4th Cir. June 17, 2025) (unreported). 
In Fernandez, 2026 WL 1485476, at *7, the Supreme Court underscored that “Congress 
made compassionate release available only when ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ justify 
it.” And, said the Court, “This is a demanding standard.” Id. It reasoned, id.: “While Congress 
has not defined the ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ that may warrant a reduced sentence, 
these criteria are not empty vessels. ‘Extraordinary’ means ‘most unusual,’ ‘far from common, ’ 
and ‘having little or no precedent.’ ‘Compelling’ means ‘tending to convince or convert by or as 
if by forcefulness of evidence.’” (citations omitted). 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may modify the defendant’s sentence only if 
two criteria are satisfied. Brown, 78 F.4th at 128; Bethea, 54 F.4th at 831. Specifically, “the district 
court must conduct a two- step analysis.” United States v. Centeno- Morales, 90 F.4th 274, 279 
(4th Cir. 2024); see also Bond, 56 F.4th at 383.3 
The first step consists of two parts. The court “must determine: (1) whether extraordinary 
and compelling reasons warrant. . .a [sentence] reduction; and (2) that such a reduction is consistent 
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Malone, 57 F.4th at 173; 
see United States of America, v. Alvis Damon Williams, 2026 WL 752605, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 17, 
2026) (per curiam); United States v. Boyd, 2026 WL 595579, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 2026) (per 
 
3 The Fourth Circuit has said that there are two criteria, and that the first criterion consists 
of two steps. See, e.g., Davis, 2026 WL 1291531, at *3; Malone, 57 F.4th at 173. But, in Crawley, 
140 F.4th at 169, the Fourth Circuit stated that there are three criteria. Whether the criteria are 
counted as two or three, the substance is the same. 

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curiam); Smith, 2026 WL 509318, at *1; United States v. Johnson, 2026 WL 237729, at *1 (4th 
Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) (per curiam); United States v. Pope, 2026 WL 207491, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 
2026) (per curiam); see Moody, 115 F.4th at 310; Davis , 99 F.4th at 653; Bond, 56 F.4th at 383; 
Bethea, 54 F.4th at 831; United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 383 (2021). The court’s analysis of these two parts goes hand in hand. 
United States v. Burleigh , 145 F.4th 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2025). If that first step is met, the court 
then proceeds to the second step. 
Under the second step, the court must determine whether release is appropriate in light of 
the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “to the extent those factors are applicable.” Bethea, 
54 F.4th at 831; see Williams, 2026 WL 752605, at *1; Moody, 115 F.4th at 310; Malone, 57 F.4th 
at 174; Hargrove , 30 F.4th at 194; United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 2021), 
superseded by regulation as stated in Davis, 99 F.4th 647; Kibble, 992 F.3d at 330. “Importantly, 
a court assessing a compassionate release motion is entitled to consider the § 3553(a) factors 
‘[o]nly after’ conducting the first step's analysis.” Osman , 2024 WL 3633573, at *4 (citations 
omitted) (alteration in Osman ); see Malone, 57 F.4th at 173 (stating that the district court may 
consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors only after determining that extraordinary and compelling 
reasons warrant a sentence reduction and that a reduction is consistent with the Sentencing 
Commission's policy statements). 
Generally, “the district court enjoys broad discretion in conducting a § 3582(c)(1)(A) 
analysis.” United States v. Jenkins , 22 F.4th 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2021), superseded by regulation 
as stated in Davis, 99 F.4th 647. Notably, “it weighs against an abuse of discretion—and is viewed 
as ‘significant’—when the same judge who sentenced the defendant rules on the compassionate 
release motion.” Bethea, 54 F.4th at 834; see Smith, 2026 WL 509318, at *2; Washington, 161 

14 
 
F.4th at 820; United States v. Gutierrez , 2023 WL 245001, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2023) 
(unreported); Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 200; High, 997 F.3d at 189. 
But, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that, “when deciding whether to reduce a defendant's 
sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may grant a reduction only if it is ‘consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” United States v. Taylor, 820 
F. App'x 229, 230 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)); see Davis , 99 
F.4th at 653–54. I f there is no applicable policy statement relating to the defendant's 
compassionate release motion, the court has discretion to make its “own independent 
determination of what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” 
Burleigh, 145 F.4th 541, 548 (cleaned up); see also United States v. Johnson, 143 F.4th 212, 215 
(4th Cir. 2025) (explaining that, “[i]n the absence of an applicable policy statement, district courts” 
have the power to “consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release”) (cleaned up). 
The Policy Statement codified at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is titled “Reduction in Term of 
Imprisonment Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)” (“Policy Statement”). “[U]ntil recently,” that 
Policy Statement did not apply to motions filed by prisoners. Davis , 99 F.4th at 654; see McCoy, 
981 F.3d at 281. The Policy Statement began: “Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of 
Prisons under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a term of imprisonment . . . .” 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2021) (emphasis added). Interpreting this language, the Fourth Circuit said in 
McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281, that, “[b]y its plain terms . . . § 1B1.13 does not apply to defendant-filed 
motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Therefore, on the basis of that earlier text, the McCoy Court held: 
“When a defendant exercises his . . . right to move for compassionate release on his own 
behalf , . . . § 1B1.13 does not apply, and thus § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s consistency requirement does not 
constrain the discretion of district courts.” Id. (citation omitted). As a result, district courts were 

15 
 
“empowered . . . to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant 
might raise.’” Id. at 284 (citation omitted). 
Effective November 1, 2023, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 was amended. See Davis, 99 F.4th at 654 
(citing 88 Fed. Reg. 28254 (May 3, 2023)). The Policy Statement now begins: “Upon motion of 
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the 
court may reduce a term of imprisonment . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the Policy Statement is applicable to defendant -filed motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
Davis, 99 F.4th at 658 (directing district court on remand “to revisit [the petitioner's] arguments in 
light of the Sentencing Commission's new policy statement outlining when and how to consider 
changes in law as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction”). As a result, when a 
defendant files a motion for compassionate release, a court must ensure that any sentence reduction 
“is consistent with” the Policy Statement's provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The court 
should apply the Policy Statement that is applicable “at the time the court renders its decision[,]” 
not at the time the motion is filed. Crawley, 140 F.4th at 170. 
The Policy Statement provides, in part, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a): 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the 
defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a term 
of imprisonment (and may impose a term of supervised release with or without 
conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of 
imprisonment) if, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 
to the extent that they are applicable, the court determines that— 
 
(1) (A) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; or 
 
(B) the defendant (i) is at least 70 years old; and (ii) has served at least 
30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3559(c) for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is 
imprisoned; 
 
(2) the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the 
community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); and 

16 
 
 
(3) the reduction is consistent with this policy statement. 
 
Section 1B1.13(b) of the Policy Statement is titled “EXTRAORDINARY AND 
COMPELLING REASONS.” It identifies multiple circumstances that, individually or in 
combination, may provide “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a reduction in sentence. 
See § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6). These include certain medical circumstances of the defendant, such as a 
terminal illness, “serious cognitive impairment,” a medical condition that requires “specialized 
medical care that is not being provided and without which the defe ndant is at risk of serious 
deterioration in health or death”; or the defendant is at imminent risk of being affected by “an 
ongoing outbreak of infectious disease” or “an ongoing public health emergency. . . .”, 
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D); the defendant’s age, along with other factors, § 1B1.13(b)(2); the 
defendant’s family circumstances, § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A), (B), (C), (D); the fact that the defendant, 
while in custody, was the victim of sexual or physical abuse committed by, or at the direction of, 
a correctional officer, § 1B1.13(b)(4)(A), (B); and for a defendant who received an “unusually 
long sentence” and has served at least 10 years of the sentence, a non-retroactive change in the law 
that “produce[s] a gross disparity” in relation to “the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the 
motion is filed. . . .”, § 1B1.13(b)(6). 
In deciding whether a defendant has met the ten-year requirement, district courts can only 
consider the time a defendant has served in prison and cannot adjust that amount with good- time 
credits. Crawley, 140 F.4th at 172–73. But, under § 1B1.13(b)(5), the district court may consider 
“any other circumstance or combination of circumstances . . . similar in gravity to” the 
circumstances “described in paragraphs (1) through (4).” The capacious language in § 
1B1.13(b)(5) underscores that the enumerated circumstances listed in the Policy Statement are not 
an “exhaustive list” of extraordinary or compelling reasons. Johnson, 143 F.4th at 216. For 

17 
 
example, in Johnson, the Court affirmed a district court's decision to reduce a defendant's sentence 
based on the disparity between the defendant's sentence and those of his co-conspirators. Id. at 
215–16. But, in Fernandez , 2026 WL 1485476, at *7, the Supreme Court made clear that “the 
supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ that 
justify compassionate release.” 
Section 1B1.13(c) of the Policy Statement is titled “LIMITATION ON CHANGES IN 
LAW.” It specifies that, “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b)(6),” which concerns an “unusually 
long sentence,” “a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has 
not been made retroactive) shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an 
extraordinary and compelling reason exists under this policy statement.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c). 
“However, if a defendant otherwise establishes that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant 
a sentence reduction under [the Policy Statement], a change in the law (including an amendment 
to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered for purposes of 
determining the extent of any such reduction.” Id.; see Davis, 99 F.4th at 654.4 
Section 1B1.13(d) of the Policy Statement concerns rehabilitation of the defendant. It 
limits the weight a court may assign to a defendant's rehabilitation while serving a sentence. That 
section provides that, “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by 
itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of this policy statement.” U.S.S.G. 
 
4 In Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), the Supreme Court concluded that 
a district court's general obligation “to consider [all] nonfrivolous arguments presented by the 
parties,” id. at 487, required it “to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising [its] 
discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act.” Id. at 500. However, the Court 
acknowledged that “Congress or the Constitution [may] limit[ ] the scope of information that a 
district court may consider in deciding whether, and to what extent, to modify a 
sentence. . . .” Id. at 486. “Thus,” the Court noted, “Congress expressly cabined district courts’ 
discretion [to reduce a sentence] by requiring courts to abide by the Sentencing Commission's 
policy statements.” Id. at 495.
 

18 
 
§ 1B1.13(d). “However, rehabilitation of the defendant while serving the sentence may be 
considered in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what extent a 
reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is warranted.” Id. And, § 1B1.13(e) provides 
that “an extraordinary and compelling reason need not have been unforeseen at the time of 
sentencing in order to warrant” a sentence reduction. 
Even if a defendant prisoner establishes extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief, a 
reduced sentence does not necessarily follow. The court must then consider the sentencing factors 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether, in its discretion, a reduction of sentence is 
appropriate. See Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826–27; United States v. Washington 161 F.4th 816, 821 (4th 
Cir. 2025); Brown, 78 F.4th at 128; United States v. Mangarella, 57 F.4th 200, 203 (4th Cir. 2023); 
Malone, 57 F.4th at 174; Bethea , 54 F.4th at 833; Hargrove , 30 F.4th at 195; High , 997 F.3d at 
186; Martin, 916 F.3d at 397; see also Kibble, 992 F.3d at 329–30 (noting that district court must 
consider § 3553(a) factors when considering a motion to reduce sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A) 
and district court enjoys broad discretion in conducting this analysis); United States v. Trotman, 
829 F. App'x 607, 608 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (recognizing that, when considering a motion 
to reduce sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must consider the sentencing factors under § 
3553(a), to the extent applicable); United States v. Chambliss , 948 F.3d 691, 693–94 (5th Cir. 
2020) (district court must give due consideration to the § 3553(a) factors); see also United States 
v. Jones, 2022 WL 2303960, at *1 (4th Cir. June 27, 2022) (per curiam) (noting that “a court need 
not explicitly make findings on extraordinary and compelling reasons where consideration of the 
§ 3553(a) factors counsels against release”); United States v. Butts, 2021 WL 3929349, at *2 (4th 
Cir. Sept. 2, 2021) (per curiam) (noting that, even if the district court finds extraordinary and 
compelling circumstances, it must consider the § 3553(a) factors to the extent applicable in 

19 
 
exercising its discretion). Notably, the amendments to the Guidelines in November 2023 did not 
alter this requirement. 
The § 3553(a) “factors include ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense’; ‘the history 
and characteristics of the defendant’; and the need for the sentence to ‘provide just punishment,’ 
‘afford adequate deterrence,’ ‘protect the public from further cri mes of the defendant,’ and 
‘provide the defendant with . . . training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.’” Jenkins, 
22 F.4th at 170 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
Additionally, the court may consider the “‘kinds of sentences available,’ and ‘the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct.’” Burleigh, 145 F.4th 541, 548 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), 
(3), (6)). T he Fourth Circuit has observed that “‘many case-specific facts fit under the broad 
umbrella of the Section 3553(a) factors.’” Bond, 56 F.4th at 384 (quoting Jackson , 952 F.3d at 
500). And, district courts “enjoy the discretion to give additional weight to any one factor so long 
as they do not confine their analysis to that factor.” Davis, 99 F.4th at 656; see Washington, 2025 
WL 3559989 at *3; United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 381–82 (4th Cir. 2021). In weighing the 
§ 3553(a) factors, the court may consider the terms of a plea bargain. Bond, 56 F.4th at 384–85. 
In Davis, 99 F.4th at 659, the Fourth Circuit said: “District courts are not required to 
acknowledge and address each of the defendant's arguments on the record when conducting a § 
3553(a) analysis.” But, “‘the record as a whole’” must demonstrate that the judge considered the 
parties’ contentions and had “‘a reasoned basis’” for the exercise of judicial discretion. Malone, 
57 F.4th at 176 (citations omitted); see also Davis , 99 F.4th at 659; United States v. Puzey , 2023 
WL 2985127, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 18, 2023) (per curiam). 

20 
 
In particular, “the court must provide an explanation sufficient ‘to allow for meaningful 
appellate review’ in light of the particular circumstances of the case.” United States v. Cohen , 
2022 WL 2314300, at *1 (4th Cir. June 28, 2022) (per curiam) (quoting High, 997 F.3d at 190). 
And, a district court abuses its discretion when it “act[s] arbitrarily or irrationally,” “fail[s] to 
consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion,” “relie[s] on 
erroneous factual or legal premises,” o r “commit[s] an error of law.” High, 997 F.3d at 187 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Jenkins , 22 F.4th at 167; see also Brown, 78 F.4th at 132 
(criticizing district judge's “cursory” consideration of the § 3553(a) factors); United States v. 
Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018). Moreover, the district court's “discretion is not 
boundless” and “in exceptional case[s]” the district court can abuse this discretion either by 
neglecting to “adequately explain how it weighed the § 3553(a) factors” or by “failing to recognize 
that the relevant § 3553(a) factors clearly favor release.” United States v. Smith, 2025 WL 
1864767, at *3, *4 (4th Cir. July 7, 2025) (unreported) (cleaned up) (finding that the district court 
abused its discretion by failing to acknowledge how the “multiplicity of factors combine to make 
the case for compassionate release”). 
“How much explanation is ‘enough’ depends on the complexity of a given case.” 
Gutierrez, 2023 WL 245001, at *3; see Washington, 161 F.4th at 821; Malone , 57 F.4th at 170; 
United States v. McDonald, 986 F.3d 402, 412 (4th Cir. 2021). For example, “when a defendant 
‘present[s] a significant amount of post -sentencing mitigation evidence, . . . a more robust and 
detailed explanation [is] required.’” Cohen, 2022 WL 2314300, at *1 (quoting High, 997 F.3d at 
190) (alterations in Cohen). 
In any event, as stated, “the court must provide an explanation sufficient ‘to allow for 
meaningful appellate review’ in light of the particular circumstances of the case.” Cohen, 2022 

21 
 
WL 2314300, at *1 (quoting High , 997 F.3d at 190). It is “not difficult” for a district court to 
satisfy this standard. Burleigh , 145 F.4th 541, 550. However, a more detailed explanation may 
be required if a substantial change in the law creates a disparity between the sentence a defendant 
actually received and the sentence he would receive, if sentenced under current law. See Davis , 
99 F.4th at 661; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (directing a court to consider “the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct.”); see Moody , 115 F.4th at 310 (recognizing that a defendant may not 
“challenge the validity of a sentence in a compassionate release” motion but explaining that a court 
may consider whether a defendant's sentence would be shorter “because of changes in law.”). In 
explaining its compassionate release ruling, “a district court is permitted to add to its original, 
sentencing-phase consideration of the § 3553(a) factors . . . .” Bethea, 54 F.4th at 834; see Kibble, 
992 F.3d at 332. 
Davis, 99 F.4th 647, is informative. The Court recognized that a change in the Guidelines 
or the law can produce a sentencing disparity under § 3553(a)(6). Id. at 654–55. And, the Court 
observed that changes in the law since the defendant's sentencing “would [have] lower[ed] [the 
defendant's] guidelines range from a 188–235 months range to [a] 92–115 months range.” Id. at 
661. According to the Court, if the defendant were sentenced under current Guidelines, “it is very 
likely that [the defendant] would already be out of prison.” Id. The Court stated, id.: “That reality 
alone implicates one of the applicable sentencing factors: ‘the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)). 
The Court concluded that the district court was obligated to provide a “detailed 
explanation” of its § 3553(a) analysis, because “[t]his sentence disparity is so stark, and the change 

22 
 
in law so substantial.” Davis, 99 F.4th at 661 (citing Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 
119 (2018)). Nevertheless, in Burleigh, 145 F.4th at 550, 551, the Court recognized that, even if 
a defendant's sentence “would be shorter if issued today,” this fact does not “increase the burden 
on district courts to explain their decision.” 
III. Discussion 
A. Exhaustion 
 Burney asserts that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. ECF 81 at 5 . But, he 
concedes that he filed the Motion with the Court and then exhausted his administrative remedies. 
Id. In particular, Burney states that on July 9, 2025, he “filed an administrative request with the 
Bureau of Prisons for compassionate release.” Id. at 2. Then, “[o]n July 31, 2025, the Bureau of 
Prisons denied his request.” Id. ; see ECF 81-1. As noted, Burney filed the Motion on June 17, 
2025. See ECF 70. 
Burney maintains that “now that he has satisfied that requirement, if the Government elects 
to invoke the exhaustion requirement, the Court should not dismiss and require him to refile.” ECF 
81-1 at 5. Therefore, Burney contends: “The Court should find that Mr. Burney has complied with 
the statutory requirement, or in the alternative, exercise its discretion to waive it.” Id. 
 The government, for its part, expressly “waives any argument that the Defendant's motion 
should be denied for failing to meet the exhaustion requirement.” ECF 85 at 6 n.4. Although the 
government suggests that Burney “has likely not technically met the exhaustion requirement under 
the statute,” because he submitted his BOP request after filing his motion, it acknowledges that 
the “likely outcome would be dismissal without prejudice,” after which Burney could simply refile. 
Id. 

23 
 
The government’s waiver resolves the issue. T he Supreme Court has determined that a 
plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not divest the court of jurisdiction. See 
Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 549 (2019). Rather, exhaustion is a “claim-processing 
rule,” and it is “‘mandatory’ in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party ‘properly 
raises it.’” Id. (quoting Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005)); see Davis, 99 F.4th at 
653 n.2 (“In United States v. Muhammad, we held that § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement 
is a ‘non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule’ that can be waived or forfeited if not timely raised. 
16 F.4th 126, 130 (4th Cir. 2021).”). 
Because the government has affirmatively waived any exhaustion defense, the Court need 
not decide whether Burney’ s post -filing administrative request satisfies § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
Accordingly, I turn to whether Burney has met his burden of showing that there are extraordinary 
and compelling reasons to warrant a reduction in his sentence. 
B. Family Circumstances 
Burney contends that his family circumstance s, namely the incapacitation of his mother , 
K.B., and the fact that he is her only available caregiver, constitute an extraordinary and 
compelling reason that warrants a reduction in his sentence. ECF 70 at 1. 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b) is titled “FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEFENDANT.” 
Section 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) provides for an extraordinary and compelling reason based on “[t]he 
incapacitation of the defendant's parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver 
for the parent.” Therefore, u nder this section, a court examines: (1) The parent's incapacitation; 
and (2) whether the defendant is the only available caregiver. United States v. Villar , LAH-16-
340, 2024 WL 2939018, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2024). 
 

24 
 
1. Incapacitation 
Notably, “incapacitation” is a high bar. The BOP has previously defined incapacitation 
narrowly, i.e., when the family member (1) has “[s]uffered a serious injury, or a debilitating 
physical illness” such that the family member “is completely disabled, meaning that the [family 
member] cannot carry on any self -care and is totally confined to a bed or chair ,” or (2) has “[a] 
severe cognitive deficit (e.g., Alzheimer's disease or traumatic brain injury that has severely 
affected the [family member's] mental capacity or function), but may not be confined to a bed or 
chair.” Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5050.50 at 10 (2019) 
https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5050_050_EN.pdf (alterations added). Moreover, “[c]ourts 
have interpreted incapacitation in this context to mean that the individual is ‘completely disabled’ 
and ‘cannot carry on any self -care’ or ‘is totally confined to a bed or chair.’” United States v. 
Howard, NJR-21-30187-1, 2025 WL 1684262, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 16, 2025) (collecting cases) ; 
see United States v. Gross, HAB-17-37, 2024 WL 4100325, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 5, 2024); United 
States v. Steele, DRC-20-13-14, 2024 WL 1928945, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2024). 
Therefore, an individual does not qualify as incapacitated when the medical conditions 
impact daily life but do not severely impede functionality. See United States v. Swarn, JRT -20-
118, 2025 WL 2306990, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2025) (finding no incapacitation because 
medical records “contain no indication that [defendant's] mother is bedridden, chair -bound, or 
suffering from cognitive decline.” ); United States v. Stayton, LCB-19-255-1, 2025 WL 1359805, 
at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 9, 2025) (finding that “the mere existence of a parent being elderly and who 
has general health issues does not demonstrate incapacitation.”); United States v. Dewalt , 
CCE-20-78, 2025 WL 3213875, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 2025) (“The case law is consistent that 
evidence of an elderly parent with health issues is not sufficient to show incapacitation.”); United 

25 
 
States v. Vaughn, MFU -10-17, 2025 WL 84215, at *6 (W.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2025) (“The court is 
sympathetic to Vaughn's desire to care for his mother, but the evidence submitted does not show 
that her medical conditions are so dire that she has become incapacitated.”); United States v. Bass, 
RLW-19-35, 2024 WL 3552030, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 26, 2024) (finding defendant failed to 
present evidence that his father was incapacitated); United States v. Armstrong, TDC -16-0601, 
2024 WL 1096621, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2024) (no showing of incapacitation based only on the 
allegation that a parent suffered from heart disease and required regular assistance). Furthermore, 
“general claims” from a defendant's mother “that it would be helpful for her son to take care of her 
and cook and clean for her do not suffice to demonstrate incapacity.” Gross , 2024 WL 4100325, 
at *3; see United States v. Wendel , JJH-19-219, 2024 WL 2748493, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 
2024) (“Ms. Wendel's general assertion she is unable to ‘manage her home’ is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that she is incapacitated.”). 
The case of United States v. Stamper, FDW-20-00295, 2024 WL 3512807 (W.D.N.C. July 
23, 2024), is instructive. There, the court wrote, id. at *5 (alterations added): “Defendant states his 
mother lives alone and has hearing loss, vision loss, st[e]nts in her heart, and is suffering from the 
beginning stages of Alzheimer's. She also has [a] history of falls.” A letter from the defendant's 
mother corroborated her health issues and requested the defendant's assistance. However, the court 
ruled that the defendant had not established his mother's incapacity, stating id.: “While the Court 
does not deny his mother's health concerns as legitimate, and empathizes with her difficulties, 
Defendant does not provide additional verifiable medical documentation establishing his mother 
is incapacitated and in need of a full -time caregiver.” Furthermore, the court noted that although 
the “mother's conditions may worsen and eventually need full -time care, she currently is not 
incapable of caring for herself.” Id. 

26 
 
In the Motion, defendant declares: “By any common-sense application of the term, [K.B.] 
is incapacitated.” ECF 81 at 7. She “survived Guillain-Barre syndrome and re -learned how to 
work and function, but suffers from serious cardiac conditions and high cholesterol, issues related 
to high blood pressure and blood sugar and potassium, hypothyroidism, and various forms of 
debilitating pain.” Id. 
In support of the Motion, defendant has submitted K.B.’s medical records with respect to 
six doctor visits. ECF 81 -2 at 3–29. Burney notes that the records “indicate that [ K.B.’s] daily 
regimen includes 10 different medications and vitamins, including the powerful painkiller 
oxycodone-acetaminophen (Percocet).” ECF 81 at 7–8. The medical records are accompanied by 
a cover letter from defendant’s mother , in which she explains that she underwent an MRI on 
October 10, 2024. ECF 81- 2 at 2. The MRI was “ordered by [her] pain management Dr., Dr. 
Lorenzo,” whom she sees “once a month.” Id. Further, she explains: “I retired in Mar. 1995 as a 
mail carrier due to the back and chronic fatigue from Guillian Barre.” Id. 
As of April 4, 2025, the date of the most recent medical records for K.B., her “problem 
list” included: “Gastroesophageal reflux disease without esophagitis”; “Essential hypertension”; 
“Fatigue”; “Hypothyroidism due to Hashimoto’s thyroiditis”; “Hypokalemia”; “Impaired fasting 
glucose”; “Family history of premature [coronary artery disease]”; and “Coronary artery 
calcification seen on CT scan”. Id. at 27–28. Further, the records indicate that as of April 4, 2025, 
the following medications were prescribed for K.B. : “cholecalciferol”; “cyanocobalamin”; 
“ezetimibe”; “hydrochlorothiazide”; “levothyroxine”; “magnesium oxide”; “oxycodone -
acetaminophen”; “pantoprazole”; “potassium chloride”; and “pravastatin”. Id. at 29. 
In the letter from R.H. (ECF 81-3), she explains that her mother’s “health has recently 
deteriorated significantly and her medical needs are chronic, severe, and require supervision and 

27 
 
care.” Id. at 2. Further, she asserts that K.B. “needs care on a daily basis. She needs someone to 
help with getting groceries, managing medications, assisting her to all appointments, prepare 
meals, and help take care of herself and maintain her home. ” Id. According to R.H., her mother 
is “most always in her bed/sleeping. She’s obviously depressed, she has cognitive issues, moderate 
to severe sleep apnea, severe debilitating back pain and doesn’t even want to get out of bed.” Id. 
R.H. recounts that K.B. had “ Gillian Barre” [sic] in 1991, and was “suddenly paralyzed 
and had to learn to walk again . . . .” Id. at 2. Moreover, she was hospitalized during the pandemic 
with COVID 19 and pancreatitis. Id. R.H. states: “[K.B.] has never fully recovered physically 
and mentally after that hospital stay.” Id. She adds that K.B. is “mentally overwhelmed . . . .” Id. 
In addition, R.H. states that her mother is “ in severe pain all the time and not doing well. 
Day to day life is extremely difficult for her.” Id. at 3. And, R.H. asserts that defendant “is the 
only person in the family who can take care of our mother. [K.B.’s] husband, Donald, passed 
away over 42 years ago. I am retired on disability . . . .” Id. She then recounts her own medical 
issues. Id. And, she claims that S.B. is also unavailable “due to her own health issues . . . .” Id. 
According to the government, “ the Defendant has not established that his mother . . . is 
incapacitated.” ECF 85 at 10. The government concedes that K.B.’s medical conditions are “very 
serious”, but maintains that defendant has failed to “provide[] the Court with a sufficient factual 
basis to find that his mother is ‘completely disabled,’ that she ‘cannot carry on any self-care,’ and 
that she is ‘ totally confined to a bed or chair.’” Id. at 11 (quoting BOP Program Statement § 
5050.50 at 10) (emphasis added by government). And, the government contends that it “has not 
been able to identify with in the Defendant’s mother’s medical records any objective criteria 
demonstrating that she is ‘completely disabled,’ incapable of ‘any self-care’ and ‘totally confined 
to a bed.’” Id. (citing ECF 81-2). 

28 
 
I agree with the government. K.B.’s medical records do not support defendant’s assertions 
of incapacitation, which, as noted, “ [c]ourts have interpreted . . . to mean that the individual is 
‘completely disabled’ and ‘cannot carry on any self -care’ or ‘is totally confined to a bed or 
chair.’” United States v. Howard, No. 3:21-CR-30187-NJR-1, 2025 WL 1684262, at *2 (S.D. Ill. 
June 16, 2025) (collecting cases). 
To be sure, K.B. ’s health conditions are significant. And, R.H. represents that K.B. is 
“most always in her bed/sleeping.” ECF 81-3 at 2. But, the existence of a medical condition and 
older age alone do not establish incapacitation. Indeed, “[t]he case law is consistent that evidence 
of an elderly parent with health issues is not sufficient to show incapacitation.” United States v. 
Dewalt, CCE-20-78, 2025 WL 3213875, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 2025) (finding no 
incapacitation despite evidence that father “has some serious health issues and could use 
assistance”); see United States v. Armstrong, TDC -16-0601, 2024 WL 1096621, at *2 (D. Md. 
Mar. 13, 2024) (finding no incapacitation when only allegation was that mother had heart 
disease and needed regular care); United States v. Bartlett, HAB-14-14, 2025 WL 1272136, at *3 
(N.D. Ind. May 1, 2025) (finding no incapacitation despite documented medical conditions 
because “nothing in [defendant's] motion suggests, much less demonstrates, that [his mother] 
cannot . . . provide self-care.”) (alterations added). 
Moreover, with respect to K.B.’s prior diagnosis of Guillain- Barre syndrome, defendant 
represents that “[s]he survived . . . and re-learned how to work and function.” ECF 81 at 7. This 
suggests that the syndrome is no longer an acute medical issue. 
Defendant's desire to care for his mother is admirable. But, I must construe the words of 
the Guidelines in accordance with their ordinary meaning. See United States v. Boler , 115 F.4th 
316, 323 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467, 480 (4th Cir. 2021). Defendant has 

29 
 
not established that K.B. is incapacitated. It follows that he has failed to establish an extraordinary 
and compelling reason for his release on this basis. 
2. Only Available Caregiver 
Assuming, arguendo, that K.B.’s medical status rises to the level of incapacitation, 
defendant must also establish that he is his mother’s sole available caregiver. 
Burney claims that his sisters, S.B. and R.H., “have serious medical conditions that prevent 
them from properly caring for their mother and effectively make Mr. Burney the only available 
caregiver for the parent.” ECF 81 at 8. 
If a defendant relies on a sole -caregiver argument, “courts generally require a showing of 
evidence from several sources indicating that the defendant is the only available caregiver for a 
family member in dire conditions, before concluding that an extraordinary and compelling reason 
has been established.” United States v. Polanco-Gonzalez, VM-17-0688, 2026 WL 177831, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2026); see United States v. Young, MMG-24-00273, 2025 WL 3496277, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2025); United States v. Ruiz-Patozano, JGK-20-686, 2025 WL 3136595, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2025); United States v. Doe, JAW-17-00091-1, 2024 WL 4751731, at *12 (D. 
Me. Nov. 12, 2024); Gross, 2024 WL 4100325, at *3; see also United States v. Figueroa-Gibson, 
RAM-16-802, 2024 WL 376432, at *6 (D.P.R. Jan. 31, 2024) (finding that although defendant 
claimed geographic distance and mental infirmity of family members, without “more evidence as 
to these challenges, the Court cannot find that these other family members are unable to provide 
adequate care.”); United States v. Striganivicz, Y-95-271, 2023 WL 4868100, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 
31, 2023) (explaining that courts have “denied motions for compassionate release premised on 
sick or elderly parents in the absence of strong evidence the petitioner is the sole individual capable 
of caring for the parent.”) (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). 

30 
 
As indicated, defendant submitted a letter from his mother. See ECF 81-2 at 2. In t he 
letter, K.B. states: “Jesse will be a great help to me as my pain increases. He is the only son who 
is healthy. Jesse also has a daughter who’s mother passed Nov. 19 2018 at the age of 44. I took 
care of his daughter after that time. She is 23 now with a 4 yr. daughter. I know having Jesse 
home will help her greatly. She misses her dad.” ECF 81-2 at 2. 
Burney also provides letters from his two sisters, R.H. (ECF 81-3) and S.B. (ECF 81-5), as 
well as their medical records. See ECF 81 -4 (Medical Records of R. H.); ECF 81 -6 (Medical 
Records of S.B.). Both sisters claim that they cannot care for their mother due to their own health 
problems. 
R.H., who is 51 years old (ECF 81-4 at 2), states that she suffers from “generalized anxiety 
disorder with panic attacks and poor short term memory, concentrating, focusing, and other 
cognitive issues.” ECF 81-3 at 3. Moreover, she represents, id.: 
I also have chronic fatigue and I am in severe pain throughout the days as I have 
fibromyalgia, arthritis, sleep apnea, severe shoulder pain, severe neck pain due to 
cervical stenosis, severe lumbar pain, severe hip pain, severe leg pain, chronic 
inflammation throughout my body, and nerve pain which also causes tingling in my 
arms, hands, fingers, and sides of my lumbar spine. My significant other must help 
me with simple daily tasks, getting groceries, and my medications, during hours 
he’s not working. He is also my sole ride, as we don't live close to any family. He 
has to get me to all my appointments as I am unable to drive anymore. 
 
R.H. also writes that the family is “not financially able to hire a professional or have our 
mother go to assisted living. She also refuses and is not ready to leave her home.” Id. She avers: 
“My brother, Jesse, is the only person in the family who can take care of our mother. id. 
S.B., who is 45 years old (ECF 81 -6 at 2), describes her health conditions as “a daily 
struggle” that “make things difficult at times.” ECF 81-5 at 3. In her letter to the Court, she states, 
id. at 2-3 (boldface omitted): 

31 
 
I [S.B.] have a history of ER -positive left breast cancer (treated, on 
aromatase inhibitor, high risk for recurrence) and postsurgical menopause. Major 
comorbidities include obesity, type 2 diabetes (controlled, non -insulin), 
hypertension, mixed hyperlipidemia, and aortic root dilatation, all contributing to 
cardiovascular risk. Additional conditions include Idiopathic Intracranial 
Hypertension, migraines, right -sided tinnitus, obstructive sleep apnea, asthma, 
reflux, and anemia. Mental health history is si gnificant for major depressive 
disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. 
 
S.B. concludes: “I believe with the declining health of myself and my mother Jesse would 
become an integral part of ensuring things are taken care of with us.” Id. at 3. But, of import, S.B. 
resides in the same household as her mother . ECF 70 at 6. Although her letter describes her 
challenging medical history, she characterizes her conditions as ones that “make things difficult at 
times.” ECF 81-5 at 3 (emphasis added). She does not claim that she is never able to assist her 
mother with her daily needs. A nd, her belief that defendant “would become an integral part of 
ensuring things are taken care of ” (id.) falls short of representing that she herself cannot provide 
assistance. 
Moreover, as the government points out in the Opposition (ECF 85 at 12), S.B.’s medical 
records indicate that she suffers from allergies and “[m]ild intermittent asthma .” ECF 81-6 at 7. 
But, the records do not appear to support the conclusion that S.B.’s medical conditions make it 
impossible for her to care for her mother. ECF 81-6 at 7. 
R.H. does not live with K.B. She relies on her partner for assistance with daily tasks. These 
circumstances bear on whether she is well- positioned to serve as K.B. ’s primary caregiver. 
Further, R.H. represents that the family cannot afford professional or assisted -living for their 
mother. ECF 81-3 at 3. 
Notably, the inquiry under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) is not whether the defendant is the 
optimal caregiver. Rather, it is whether defendant is the only available one. 

32 
 
In my view, defendant has not made the “robust evidentiary showing that [he] is the only 
available caregiver,” as the law requires. United States v. Richardson, IFL -18-507, 2020 WL 
2200853, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 6, 2020). The Court does not doubt the sincerity of defendant's 
desire to care for his mother, nor the seriousness of the medical conditions of K.B., R.H., and S.B. 
But, the Guidelines require that defendant be the parent's only available caregiver, U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.13(b)(3)(C). On this record, I conclude that defendant has not carried that burden. 
C. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant established an extraordinary and compelling 
reason for compassionate release, that finding would not end the inquiry. The Court must next 
consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These include: (1) the nature of the offense 
and the defendant’s characteristics; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment; (3) the kinds of sentences 
available and the applicable Guidelines range; (4) any pertinent Commission policy statements; 
(5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; and (6) the need to provide restitution to 
victims. 
In my view, a balancing of the § 3553(a) factors indicates that defendant's release from 
prison is not warranted at this time. 
R.H. represents in her letter to the Court that defendant “has participated in jobs, programs, 
churches, and even became a positive teacher in church and programs.” ECF 81- 3 at 3. But, 
Burney provides minimal information with respect to his rehabilitation efforts. For example, 
Burney does not indicate in the Motion whether he has completed any education courses while in 
BOP custody. 

33 
 
To be sure, Burney acknowledges the severity of his offenses. In the Motion, Burney 
writes: “I know that I am not innocent and that my crimes were serious. I know that I’ve needlessly 
frightened and horrified innocent people, and in no way am I diminishing the role I’ve played in 
all this. It is through my foolishness that my family suffers to this day.” ECF 70 at 7–8. Further, 
he asserts, ECF 81 at 8, 9 (emphasis in original): 
If released, Mr. Burney plans to live with his mother in his native Harrisburg and 
to devote all of his time to finding employment and assisting her, his 22- year-old 
daughter, and his four-year-old granddaughter. He is 43 years old, an age by which 
some offenders have outgrown youthful impulsiveness and foolishness and have 
spent enough time in prison to want to make something of the rest of their lives. 
Mr. Burney will
 be strongly motivated not to place himself in any further situations 
that might cause his return to prison and imperil his mother.[] 
 
The government argues that the sentencing factors “do not support a reduction in the 
Defendant’s sentence, especially to time- served, as requested in the Defendant’s Supplemental 
Memorandum.” ECF 85 at 13. According to the government, “ the nature and circumstances of 
the offense, the history and characteristics of the Defendant, and the need for specific deterrence 
and to protect the public, weigh heavily in favor of not reducing the Defendant’s sentence at this 
time.” Id. In particular, the government emphasizes that “this was Defendant’s thirteenth bank 
robbery”, and he committed the underlying offense while he was on supervised release “ for the 
bank robbery spree that resulted in his criminal conviction in Pennsylvania.” Id. The government 
posits, id.: “Just as the Defendant was not deterred by his prior federal sentence, he also appears 
not to have been deterred by this Court’s 252-month sentence.” 
Where appropriate, the district court “must account not only for the circumstances at the 
time of the original offense but also for significant post-sentencing developments.” United States 
v. Mangarella, 57 F.4th 200, 203 (4th Cir. 2023); see United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 397 
(4th Cir. 2019); Kibble, 992 F.3d at 334 n.3. Courts place significant weight on a defendant's post-

34 
 
sentencing conduct because it “provides the most up- to-date picture” of a defendant's “‘history 
and characteristics.’” Pepper v. United States , 562 U.S. 476, 492 (2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1)). The court must “at least weigh the [defendant's] conduct in the years since the[ ] 
initial sentencing[ ].” McDonald, 986 F.3d at 412; see Martin, 916 F.3d at 397 (requiring an 
“individualized explanation” as to rehabilitative efforts). 
In other words, a defendant’s r ehabilitation efforts should be considered in regard to a 
motion for compassionate release. See United States v. Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171, 175 (2021) (“And 
in considering the § 3553(a) factors, the court can take into account a defendant’s conduct after 
his initial sentencing.”); McDonald, 986 F.3d at 410–12 (noting that on a motion to reduce sentence 
under the First Step Act, the district court must consider defendant’s post -sentencing conduct); 
Martin, 916 F.3d at 397 (requir ing an “individualized explanation” as to rehabilitative efforts); 
United States v. Randall , 837 Fed. App’x 1008, 1009 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[A] district court must 
provide an individualized explanation for denying a sentence reduction motion under the First Step 
Act when the defendant presents evidence of his post-sentencing rehabilitation.”); United States v. 
Rudisill, 834 Fed. App’x 827, 829 (4th Cir. 2021) (finding district judge abused his discretion in 
denying motion under the First Step Act without addressing defendant’s post-sentencing conduct). 
However, “rehabilitation alone cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for 
release.” United States v. Davis, 2022 WL 127900, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 2022). 
As the government emphasizes, Burney’s crime was a very serious one. ECF 85 at 13. At 
Burney’s sentencing, I described the crime as “a particularly egregious one” (ECF 85-1 at 72), and 
“extremely horrific” (id. at 73). Indeed, Burney robbed a bank wearing a tactical vest and 
motorcycle helmet, with a visible AK-47 poking out of his backpack, and holding a taser. ECF 43 
at 9. And, throughout the course of the robbery, he threatened to shoot B ank employees if they 

35 
 
did not cooperate. Id. He then fled the scene with $100,000. Id. Fortunately, no one was injured, 
but such conduct was in complete disregard for the safety of others. In my view, the seriousness 
of the instant offense weighs against reducing Burney’s sentence. 
 Additionally, the Court cannot overlook defendant’s serious criminal history. As 
discussed, this was defendant’s thirteenth bank robbery. ECF 61 at 12. Of import, he committed 
the instant offense while on supervised release for twelve prior bank robberies that resulted in a 
federal conviction in Pennsylvania, for which he received a twelve-year sentence of imprisonment. 
Id. Yet, that lengthy sentence did not deter defendant from the commission of the serious crime 
at issue here. 
Furthermore, I cannot ignore defendant’s disciplinary record while in the BOP . See 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) (A defendant's behavior while in BOP custody is an important indicator 
of whether he remains a danger to the community). As noted, as of October 15, 2025, Burney’s 
disciplinary records at the BOP reflect thirteen incidents, resulting in fifteen sanctions against him, 
which reflect poorly on his adjustment. ECF 85-3. 
For example, in December of 2022, Burney was sanctioned for assaulting without serious 
injury. Id. at 2. And, in November of 2022, Burney was disciplined for possessing a dangerous 
weapon. Id. In January of 2022, Burney was punished for fighting with another person. Id. at 3. 
He has also been disciplined for refusing to obey an order on multiple occasions. Id. at 3, 4. These 
infractions counsel against a finding that Burney has been rehabilitated. 

36 
 
I recognize, on a positive note, that as of October 15, 2025, Burney had not incurred any 
infractions since December 11, 2022. Id. at 2. The Court has considered that Burney has not 
incurred disciplinary infractions in approximately three years, which is meaningful evidence of 
rehabilitation. But, weighed against the gravity of the instant offense, which was committed while 
Burney was on supervised release, the defendant’s prior history of similar conduct, and the failure 
of a substantial prior sentence to deter him from further crime , as well as the need to promote 
respect for the law, I conclude that a reduction in sentence is not warranted at this time. 
For the foregoing reasons, I am persuaded that the § 3553(a) factors weigh against Burney. 
IV. Conclusion 
Given the seriousness of Burney’s offense, a reduction in the sentence would not, in my 
view, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, or deter criminal conduct. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C). Therefore, I shall deny defendant’s Motion, without prejudice to his 
right to renew his Motion at a later time.5 
An Order follows, consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. 
 
Date: June 1, 2026 /s/ 
Ellen Lipton Hollander 
United States District Judge 
 
 
5 The Court recognizes that the Motion has been pending for almost a year. If the medical 
conditions of defendant’s mother and/or sisters have worsened in the interim, defendant certainly 
may ask the Court to reconsider its ruling. If he does so, he should provide the Court with updated 
medical records. 

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