govinfo:USCOURTS-ncwd-3_24-cv-01069-3

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROL
INA 
CHARLOTTE DIVISION 
3:24-CV-01069-MEO-DCK 
CONNIE L. JACKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
 v. 
TRANS UNION, LLC, 
Defendant. 
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification 
of Claims Against Defendant Trans Unio n, LLC (Doc. No. 39). For the reasons 
explained below, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion. 
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) requires that a proposed class satisfy four
criteria in order to be certified as a class action: numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). Additionally, the 
Fourth Circuit has recognized that “R ule 23 contains an implicit threshold 
requirement” of “ascertainability.” Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 643, 
655 (4th Cir. 2019). Under this requirement, “a class cannot be certified unless a court 
can readily identify the class members in reference to objective criteria.” Id. (quoting 
EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair , 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014)). Once these initial 
requirements of 23(a) are sa tisfied, a plaintiff must then demonstrate that the 
proposed class meets the requirements of at least one of the three types of class action 

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enumerated in Rule 23(b). 
A plaintiff see
king class certific ation bears the burden of proof, Int’l 
Woodworkers of Am. v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259, 1267 (4th Cir. 
1981), and must present evidence that the putative class complies with Rule 23. EQT 
Prod. Co. at 357. However, the Court “has an independent obligation to perform a 
‘rigorous analysis’ to ensure that all of the prerequisites have been satisfied.” Id. at 
358 (quoting in part Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011)). To 
satisfy this obligation, the Court may “probe behind the pleadings before coming to 
rest on the certification question.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the decision to certify a 
class action is within the discretion of the Court. Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 
348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003). 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Connie L. Jackson alleges she was the victim of a debt collection
scheme. (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 15). Ac cording to Plaintiff, as pa rt of the scheme, Defendant 
Trans Union, LLC (“TransUnion” or “Def endant”), a consumer reporting agency, 
furnished a consumer report about Plaintiff to non-party Liberty Credit Management 
(“Liberty”) in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 
et seq. (the 
“FCRA”). Id. ¶¶ 13, 26–33. 
A. Defendant’s Relationship with Liberty
In September 2014, Mitchell Evans established Liberty, a sole proprietorship. 
See (Doc. No. 46-2 at 2–3). Sh ortly thereafter, Liberty—through Evans—submitted 

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an application to receive credit reports as a TransUnion subscriber. See (Doc. Nos. 
46-1 at 6; 46-2 at 2–3). Liberty represented itself as a debt collector (Doc. No. 46-2 at 
2) and informed Defendant that it intended to use credit reports “[i]n connection with 
a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be 
furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account 
to the consumer.” (Doc. No. 46-3). 
Before permitting Liberty to obtain consumer reports, Defendant credentialed 
Liberty. (Doc. No. 46-1 at 12). As part of that process, Defendant performed a series 
of checks to evaluate whether Liberty’s intended purpose to access consumer reports 
aligned with a permissible purpose under the FCRA. 
See id. at 5. Among other things, 
Defendant reviewed Liberty’s application and conducted an on-site inspection of 
Liberty’s physical address. Id. at 6–7. Defendant and Liberty also executed a Master 
Subscriber Agreement, certifying that Li berty would not access consumer reports 
without a permissible purpose. Id. at 7. At the time of Liberty’s credentialling in 2014, 
Defendant was unable to find any website or Google results for Liberty. (Doc. No. 42-
4 at 3). Defendant later recredentialed Liberty on at least one occasion in 2019. (Doc. 
No. 46-1 at 12). Between 2020 and 2025, De fendant sold Liberty over 800,000 
consumer reports.1 See (Doc. No. 42-11 at 3–5). 
B. Plaintiff’s Experience 
 In or about September 2022, Plaintiff received a debt collection letter from 
 
1 Plaintiff’s allegations concern Defendant’s collection prioritization engine (“CPE”) 
reports. CPE reports aid debt collectors in prioritizing accounts for collection. (Doc. 
Nos. 46-7 at 9:18–10:1; 46 at 4). 

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Blackwater Legal Group (“Blackwater”). See (Doc. No. 40-2 at 2). In the letter, 
Blackwater claimed Plaintiff owed $980.76 for a line of credit and fraudulent bank 
activity. Id. Unless Plaintiff paid, Blackwater threatened “immediate legal action” 
and warned that it would run Plaintiff’s credit report, which would “significantly 
impact [Plaintiff’s] credit score.” Id. According to Plaintiff, Plaintiff owed nothing to 
Blackwater (Doc. Nos. 53 ¶ 19; 40-21 ¶ 6). After receiving the letter, Plaintiff obtained 
her TransUnion credit report and saw an in quiry from Liberty on August 19, 2022. 
(Doc. No. 40-3 at 2). 
C. FTC Action and Debt Collection Scheme 
 On February 24, 2025, the FTC filed a sealed complaint (the “FTC Complaint”) 
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
2 (Doc. No. 
40-1). The FTC Complaint alleged that Libe rty and Evans, among others (the “FTC 
Defendants”), violated, among other things, the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1692 
et seq. (the “FDCPA”) by deceiving and threatening consumers into 
paying debts that consumers did not actually owe or the FTC Defendants did not have 
authority to collect. (Doc. No. 40-1 at 3–4). According to the FTC Complaint, 
“Defendants’ fraudulent scheme include[d] sending consumers letters representing 
that (1) consumers owe some purported amount from an outstanding payday loan; (2) 
Defendants are law firms and plan on immi nently filing a lawsuit; (3) consumers’ 
credit scores are being damaged due to these purportedly outstanding debts; and (4) 
 
2 Compl., FTC v. Blackrock Services, Inc., No. 8:25-cv-00363-HDV-ADSx (C.D. Cal. 
Date), (Doc. No. 1). 

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consumers can avoid a lawsuit if they pay to settle the purported debt.” Id. ¶ 3. 
 The court subsequently issued an ex parte temporary restraining order 
freezing the FTC Defendants’ assets and appointing a receiver (the “Receiver”). (Doc. 
No. 40-6). On March 13, 2025, the Receiver filed a preliminary report with the court. 
(Doc. No. 40-7). The report detailed how Evans and his brother Ryan ran parallel debt 
collection operations through multiple companies including Liberty. (Doc. No. 40-7 at 
10, 13–15). Under their business model, the FTC Defendants bought debt from a 
broker and “‘scrub[bed]’ [the debt] for bankruptcy via TransUnion and obtain[ed the] 
consumer’s personal information.” Id. at 14. The FTC Defendants then sent letters 
demanding payment and threatening litigation. Id. 
According to the report, Evans acknowledged renting Liberty’s office “only to 
satisfy TransUnion’s physical office requirement.” (Doc. No. 40-7 at 14). The Receiver 
described the office as “tiny, with no equipment, no files, and no personnel.” Id. at 4. 
Evans and his brother also acknowledged th at they had not paid taxes in several 
years and did not use accounting software. Id. at 8. Ultimately, the Receiver 
concluded that “[u]nlawful practices” had been central to the FTC Defendant’s debt 
collection process for years and that they were “incapable of operating a compliant 
debt collection operation.” Id. at 5. The Receiver also noted that the Evans brothers 
destroyed data and records related to their scheme. Id. at 5, 9–11. 
D. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit 
On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed th is lawsuit asserting claims against 
Defendant for violating the FCRA when it provided Liberty a copy of her Report. (Doc. 

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No. 1 ¶¶ 5–6). In the Complaint, Plaintiff se eks to represent a cl ass for Defendant’s 
alleged violations of Sections 1681b and 1681e(a), defined as: 
All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who 
were the subject of a report so ld by Defendant; (b) in the 
five years predating the filing of this Complaint and 
continuing through the date which the class list is 
prepared; (c) in which Defendant furnished the report to a 
user pursuant to a certification asserting a permissible 
purpose under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A); and (d) where 
the user lacked any interest in or authority to collect on any 
account attributable to such person. 
 
Excluded from the class de finition are any employees, 
officers, directors of Defendant Trans Union, any attorney 
appearing in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this 
action. 
 
(Doc. No. 1 at 11, 14). 
On May 20, 2025, Plaintiff moved for class certification. (Doc. No. 39). On June 
23, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and refined the proposed class to: 
All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who 
were the subject of a report sold by Defendant; (b) on or 
after August 12, 2019 and continuing through the date on 
which the class list is prep ared; (c) in which the Trans 
Union subscriber showing in Defendant’s records is Liberty 
Credit Management. 
 
Excluded from the Class are all persons who have signed a 
written release of their claim, and/or are counsel in this 
case, or employed by the Federal Judiciary. 
 
(Doc. No. 53 at 11). The Court held a st atus conference on April 21, 2026, and 
questioned the parties on the outstanding motions in this case. 

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III. DISCUSSION 
A. Merits Arguments and the FCRA 
Defendant opens its brief by arguing the merits of the case. (Doc. No. 46 at 17–
19). However, the “likelihood of the plaint iff[’s] success on the merits . . . is not 
relevant to the issue of whether [class] certification is proper.” Thorn v. Jefferson-
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2006). As the Supreme Court explained, 
a court’s “rigorous” class-certification an alysis “may ‘entail some overlap with the 
merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim.’” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. 
Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465–66 (2013) (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351). But “Rule 23 
grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification 
stage.” 
Id. at 466. Instead, a court should only consider merits arguments to the 
extent they “are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class 
certification are satisfied.” Id. 
 Accordingly, the Court will not opine on Plaintiff’s likelihood of success and 
will consider the merits only to the extent they are relevant to the Court’s class 
certification analysis. With that principle in mind, the Court now turns to the 
relevant legal framework. 
 
The FCRA restricts Consumer Reporting Agencies’ (“CRAs”) ability to provide 
consumers’ credit information to third parties. In particular, under Section 1681b of 
the FCRA, CRAs may only furnish consum er reports for “certain statutorily 
enumerated purposes.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23 (2001) (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681b)). Relevant to this case, CRAs may furnish consumer reports: 

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To a person which it has reason to believe— 
intends to use the information in connection with a credit 
transaction involving the consumer on whom the 
information is to be furnished and involving the extension 
of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the 
consumer. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) (e mphasis added). Whether a consumer report is 
ultimately used for an enumerated purpose—often called permissible purpose—is not 
determinative of a CRA’s liability under § 1681b. 
See Bugoni v. Emp. Background 
Investigations, Inc., No. CV SAG-20-1133, 2022 WL 888434, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 
2022), aff’d, No. 22-1548, 2023 WL 3721210 (4th Cir. May 30, 2023). 
The FCRA also requires CRAs to maintain reasonable procedures to limit the 
furnishing of consumer reports to the pe rmissible purposes in § 1681b. 15 U.S.C. § 
1681e(a). Section 1681e(a) provides: 
Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain 
reasonable procedures designed to avoid violations of 
section 1681c of this title and to limit the furnishing of 
consumer reports to the purp oses listed under section 
1681b of this title. These proc edures shall require that 
prospective users of the info rmation identify themselves, 
certify the purposes for whic h the information is sought, 
and certify that the information will be used for no other 
purpose. Every consumer reporting agency shall make a 
reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective 
user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior 
to furnishing such user a co nsumer report. No consumer 
reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any 
person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the 
consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in 
section 1681b of this title. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). 
 
 Any person who willfully fails to comply with the FCRA is liable to the 

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consumer for “any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure 
or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1). 
The consumer may also recover “such amount of punitive damages as the court may 
allow.” 
Id. § 1681n(a)(2). 
B. Plaintiff’s Proposed Class Definition 
As a threshold matter, Defendant argues in its opposition that the Court 
should not consider Plainti ff’s unpled class definition. (D oc. No. 46 at 19–22). Since 
the filing of the Motion, Plaintiff amended her Complaint to include a revised class 
definition consistent with her motion to certify. 
See (Doc. No. 53). Defendant’s 
argument is, therefore, moot. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Motion, the Court 
analyzes Plaintiff’s proposed class definition from her Amended Complaint: 
All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who 
were the subject of a report sold by Defendant; (b) on or 
after August 12, 2019 and continuing through the date on 
which the class list is prep ared; (c) in which the Trans 
Union subscriber showing in Defendant’s records is Liberty 
Credit Management. 
 
Excluded from the Class are all persons who have signed a 
written release of their claim, and/or are counsel in this 
case, or employed by the Federal Judiciary. 
 
(Doc. No. 53 at 11). 
 
C. Rule 23 Requirements for Class Certification 
The Court now turns to class certification. Rule 23(a) sets four criteria for class 
certification: numerosity, commonality, ty picality, and adequacy of representation. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that 
“Rule 23 contains an implicit threshold requirement that the members of a proposed 

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class be ‘readily identifiable.’” Krakauer, 925 F.3d at 654–55 (quoting EQT Prod. Co., 
764 F.3d at 358). The Court discusses each requirement below. 
1. Numerosity 
Rule 23 requires that a proposed cla ss be “so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Plaintiff estimates that the 
proposed class is over 800,000, and in its opposition, Defendant does not contest that 
the proposed class satisfies Rule 23’s numer osity requirement. Based on the record, 
the Court finds that Plaintiff has met the numerosity requirement. 
2. Ascertainability 
In order to be certified, a class must also be ascertainable. This “mean[s] a 
court can readily identify the class members in reference to objective criteria.” Glover 
v. EQT Corp., 151 F.4th 613, 621 (4th Cir. 2025). “[I]f class members are impossible 
to identify without extensive and individua lized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials,’ then a 
class action is inappropriate.” Id. (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC , 687 F.3d 
583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)). However, a plaintiff “need not be able to identify every class 
member at the time of certification.” Id. 
Here, the Court finds the class members are readily identifiable. Plaintiff seeks 
to certify a class of individuals who were the subject of a report sold by Defendant “in 
which the Trans Union subscriber showing in Defendant’s records is Liberty Credit 
Management.” (Doc. No. 53 at 11). Defendan t maintains both electronic inquiry and 
billing records, which would allow Defendant to identify the subjects of reports sold 
by Defendant to Liberty. (Doc. No. 42-1 at 3–5). 

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Defendant argues, however, that the class is not ascertainable because 
Plaintiff cannot further identify which repo rts were subsequently shared by Liberty 
with its “co-conspirators or to identify th e recipients of fraudulent dunning letters 
sent by [those] co-conspirators and Blackr ock . . . .” (Doc. No. 46 at 22). Defendant 
notes that according to the Receiver’s Report in the FTC Action, the FTC Defendants 
destroyed relevant evidence. Id. And in some instances, Liberty may have owned or 
have been authorized to collect consumer debt. Id. In sum, Defendant argues that the 
class is not ascertainable because there is a possibility Liberty may have had a 
permissible purpose for acquiring some reports or Liberty’s co-conspirators may not 
have used all reports as part of the fraudulent scheme. 
The Court disagrees for two reasons. Fi rst, the record does not establish 
Liberty ever purchased a report for a permissible purpose. In fact, the Receiver 
Report—which is relied upon by both part ies—concluded that “[u]nlawful practices” 
had been central to the FTC Defendant’s de bt collection process for years and that 
they were “incapable of operating a compliant debt collection operation.” (Doc. No. 40-
7 at 5). But even assuming Defendant’s hypothetical held some merit, 
“ascertainability does not require that ever y member of the class must be knowable 
to an absolute certainty.” 
Gaston v. LexisNexis Risk Sols., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 3d 318, 
334 (W.D.N.C. 2020). In other words, Plaintiff need not disprove every hypothetical 
in order to meet her burden on ascertainability. 
Second, Defendant’s argument conflates the threshold question of whether the 
proposed class members are identifiable with Rule 23’s commonality and typicality 

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requirements. Defendant appe ars to be arguing that th e proposed class is not 
ascertainable because Plaintiff cannot identify and then prove that each proposed 
class member had the exact same experience as Plaintiff. Specifically, after receiving 
the report, Liberty improperly shared the proposed class member’s consumer report 
with its co-conspirator, and the co-conspirator then sent a fraudulent dunning letter 
to the consumer. As discussed below, whethe r a proposed class is ascertainable is a 
separate inquiry from whether there are questions common to a class or whether a 
representative’s claims or defenses are ty pical of the class. Here, because the Court 
is able to readily identify the proposed class members in reference to objective 
criteria, the ascertainability requirement is satisfied. 
3. Commonality 
Rule 23 further requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “[A] common question is one where ‘the same evidence 
will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is 
susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.’” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo , 577 
U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (quoting 2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:50, pp. 
196–97 (5th ed. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Common questions 
suffice for class certification where the ‘det ermination of [their] truth or falsity will 
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’” 
Spurlock v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. , 175 F.4th 232, 246–47 (4th Cir. 2026) 
(quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350). “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350–51 

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(citation omitted). 
Plaintiff has advanced at least three questions that fulfill Rule 23’s 
commonality requirement. First, whether Defendant had “reason to believe” Liberty 
had a permissible purpose in obtaining the report. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3). 3 
Second, whether Defendant maintained reasonable procedures designed to limit the 
furnishing of consumer reports to permissible purposes under the FCRA. Third, 
whether Defendant’s purported violations were willful under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 
Here, the Court finds these questions satisfy Rule 23’s commonality 
requirements. With respect to the first question—whether Defendant had “reason to 
believe” Liberty had a permissible purpose in obtaining the report—Defendant 
concedes in its brief that under the FCRA, “[t]he ultimate use by the recipient of the 
consumer’s information is not determinat ive of the consumer reporting agency’s 
liability.” (Doc. No. 46 at 17). Therefor e, the Court need not undertake an 
individualized assessment of what occurred with a specific report. Instead, the 
question will be answered by common evidence showing what Defendant knew about 
Liberty when it approved its application through its credentialing process in 2014 
and what Defendant may have subsequently learned about the company. 
In fact, Defendant’s own merits ar gument demonstrates that whether 
Defendant has a “reason to believe” is a common question. In its brief, Defendant 
argues that Defendant had reason to be lieve Liberty “was requesting consumer 
 
3 The Court has revised the questions in its analysis to more accurately reflect the 
applicable legal standards. For example, in its brief, Plaintiff asserts, “[i]t is a 
common question whether or not Trans Union had a permissible reason to sell class 
member reports to Liberty.” (Doc. No. 42 at 15). 

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reports only when it had a permissible pu rpose” because (1) Defendant credentialed 
Liberty, (2) Liberty certified it was debt collector each time it requested a report, (3) 
Liberty contractually agreed it would only request reports when it had a permissible 
purpose, and (4) there was no evidence Defendant knew Liberty was not using 
consumer reports for permissible purpos es. (Doc. No. 46 at 18). Each of these 
arguments would apply to each proposed cl ass members’ claims. And if Defendant’s 
position is correct, all clas s members’ Section 1681b claims fail—not just Plaintiff’s. 
Similarly, whether Defendant had reasonable procedures or Defendant acted 
willfully will be resolved based on the same common facts (
e.g. the same procedures) 
and the same law for every class member. 
Relying on Stafford v. Bojangles’ Rests., Inc , 123 F.4th 671 (4th Cir. 2024), 
Defendant argues that the putative class is too overinclusive to ensure commonality. 
(Doc. No. 46 at 25–26). Howeve r, Defendant’s reliance on Stafford is misplaced. In 
Stafford, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s certification of 
a class action involving allegations of unpaid off-the-clock work and unauthorized 
edits to employee time records. 123 F.4th at 675. As the Fourth Circuit explained, the 
classes’ “sole defining characteristic” was that they contained “shift managers who 
worked for the company during a three-year period” in either North or South 
Carolina. 123 F.4th at 681. The district court found commonality based on the 
application of a generalized policy to all class members across both states. 
See id. at 
679–80. Specifically, the court estimated that 80% of prospective class members likely 
worked an opening shift during the relevant time period and therefore had conducted 

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off-the-clock pre-shift work while completing tasks on a common checklist. Id. at 679. 
The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that “conclusory assertions” of the application 
of “some highly generalized company policy” were insufficient to show commonality 
across the class. 
Id. at 680. 
Applying Stafford to the facts of this case is a poor fit. The district court found 
commonality in Stafford based on the application of a general policy to the work 
experiences of numerous employ ees across two states and in multiple stores. Here, 
the inquiry is narrowly focused on Defendant’s actions or inactions related to a single 
entity—Liberty—which are dispositive of the proposed class members’ claims. 
Further, the Court’s class definition that is the subject of this Order limits the class 
to consumers for whom a CPE report was provided to Liberty, a smaller category than 
Plaintiff proposed. Accordingly, the Court finds the common questions of law and fact 
in this case satisfy the commonality requirement. 
4. Typicality 
Next, Rule 23 requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “The 
essence of the typicality requirement is captured by the notion that ‘as goes the claim 
of the named plaintiff, so go the claims of the class.’” Deiter v. Microsoft Corp ., 436 
F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 
155 F.3d 331, 340 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are typical of her fellow class members. 
Plaintiff will pursue her claims under th e FCRA based on evidence of (1) whether 

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Defendant had sufficient information to fo rm a reason to believe Liberty would use 
the report for a permissible purpose; (2 ) whether Defendant’s procedures were 
reasonable; and (3) whether any alleged violations were willful. Plaintiff’s claims will 
rise or fall on the same evidence as all other class members. Similarly, Defendant’s 
defenses are typical across a ll the class members. Indeed, all class members’ claims 
fail if Defendant had reason to believe Liberty was using reports for permissible 
purposes and its procedures were re asonable—regardless of whether Liberty 
ultimately used all or some of the reports for impermissible purposes. 
5. Adequacy 
Federal Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the “representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In its opposition, 
Defendant does not contest the adequacy of Plaintiff or her counsel to represent the 
class. Based on the record, the Court si milarly finds that they will fairly and 
adequately represent the prop osed class. Plaintiff has met her burden under Rule 
23(a). 
D. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements 
Because all Rule 23(a) requirements ar e satisfied, Plaintiff now “bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the proposed cl ass fits into one of the specific forms of 
class adjudication provided by Rule 23(b).” Krakauer, 925 F.3d at 655. Here, Plaintiff 
asserts that the proposed class satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements, as “questions of 
law or fact common to class members predom inate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for 

17 
 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The Court 
analyzes each factor. 
1. Predominance 
Predominance and commonality are intertwined. Stafford, 123 F.4th at 679. 
“Predominance presupposes that a commo n question exists and measures the 
question’s significance to the pending litigation.” Id. “While commonality serves to 
ask whether class-wide proceed ings are even possible, predominance ‘tests whether 
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’” 
Id. (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) and Gariety v. 
Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2004)). “The predominance inquiry 
asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more 
prevalent or important than the non-commo n, aggregation-defeating, individual 
issues.” Tyson Foods, 577 U.S. at 453 (citation omitte d). “When one or more of the 
central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, 
the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important 
matters will have to be tried separately , such as damages or some affirmative 
defenses peculiar to some individual class members.” Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, the Court finds the predominance factor is satisfied. Common questions 
as to whether Defendant had reason to be lieve Liberty would use the reports for a 
permissible purpose, whether Defendant’s procedures were reasonable, and whether 
Defendant’s actions were willful predominate over any issues specific to individual 
class members. Defendant’s argument to the contrary is unavailing. 

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Defendant relies on Mott v. Trinity Fin. Servs. LLC, No. 2:1-cv-01754, 2018 
WL 7501128 (D. Nev. Sep. 27, 2018). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy 
predominance, because “whether TransUnion reasonably believed that [Liberty] had 
a permissible purpose to obtain each putative class member’s report is an 
individualized inquiry.” (Doc. No. 46 at 30). But Mott is not binding on this Court, 
and even if it were, the case is inapposite. Mott concerned the liability of a user of a 
credit report under a different provision of the FCRA—not the liability of a CRA like 
TransUnion. 2018 WL 7501128, at *1. The district court did not apply or even 
consider the “reason to believe” standard. 
Id. at *1–2. Additionally, as previously 
explained, whether TransUnion had reason to believe Liberty had a permissible 
purpose in requesting credit reports does not require an individualized inquiry. 
2. Superiority 
In deciding whether a class action is su perior to other methods of litigation, 
courts consider, among other things, the Ru le 23(b)(3) factors: “(A) class members’ 
interests in individually controlling the pros ecution . . . of separate actions; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun . . . ; (C) 
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation in this . . . forum and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action . . . .” Cheng v. Liu, No. 23-1806, 
2024 WL 3579606, at *4 (4th Cir. July 29, 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)), 
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1139 (2025). With these fa ctors, the Court is comparing “the 
possible alternatives to determine whether Ru le 23 is sufficiently effective to justify 
the expenditure of the judicial time and energy that is necessary to adjudicate a class 

19 
action and to assume the risk of prejudice to the rights of those who are not directly 
before the court.” Stillmock v. Weis Mkts., Inc., 385 F. App’x 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting 7AA Wright & Miller’s Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1779 (3d ed. 2005)). 
Here, given the common predominant questions of law and fact, it is far more 
efficient and manageable to resolve these issues through a class action. Moreover, the 
record does not demonstrate that class members have a strong interest in individual 
litigation in this case. The FCRA provides for statutory damages for willful violations 
of “not less than $100 and not more than $1,000” along with “such amount of punitive 
damages as the court may allow.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). Given this modest recovery 
compared to the time and expense of litigation, it is unsurprising that no other cases 
have been filed arising under the same set of circumstances.
4 A class action will also 
help promote consistency of results. Neither party has suggested the current forum 
is undesirable, and this factor is neutral. Based on the Rule 23 (b)(3) factors and the 
record, the Court finds Plaintiff has satisfied the superiority requirement. 
E. Appointment of Counsel
Having concluded that Plaintiff has met her burden on class certification under 
Rule 23, the Court must appoint counsel under Rule 23(g). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1)(B). 
When appointing class counsel, the Court mu st consider the work counsel has done 
in identifying or investigating the potential claims, counsel’s relevant experience and 
knowledge of the applicable law, and the resources that counsel will commit to 
representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). Also, the Court may consider any 
4 See (Doc. No. 46 at 30). 

20 
 
other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). 
Here, the Court has considered all the Ru le 23(g)(1) factors and the record in 
this case. See e.g. (Doc. Nos. 40-19, 40-20). The Cour t finds that Plaintiff’s counsel 
will fairly and adequately represent the inte rests of the class and appoints them as 
class counsel. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification of Claims Against Defendant 
Trans Union LLC (Doc. No. 39) is GRANTED, and the case shall proceed 
as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3); 
2. Plaintiff Connie Jackson is designated as class representative; 
3. The class for Plaintiff’s Claims is defined as: 
All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who 
were the subject of a CPE report sold by Defendant; (b) on 
or after August 12, 2019 and continuing through the date 
on which the class list is pr epared; (c) in which the Trans 
Union subscriber showing in Defendant’s records is Liberty 
Credit Management. 
 
Excluded from the Class are all persons who have signed a 
written release of their claim, and/or are counsel in this 
case, or employed by the Federal Judiciary. 
 
4. The law firms of Consumer Litigation Associates, P.C. and Flores Law, 
PLLC, who are the attorneys of record for the appointed class 
representative, are hereby APPOINTED to serve as class counsel; and 

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5. The Court DIRECTS the parties to con fer and submit, within fourteen
(14) days, a jointly prepared dra
ft Notice to the class consistent with this
order and Rule 23(c)(2). 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed: June 2, 2026

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