govinfo:USCOURTS-ncwd-3_24-cv-01069-4

Corpus: 543,223 opinions · 3,177 judges · newest 2026-06-23 · expanding Coverage ↗

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:24-CV-01069-MEO-DCK
CONNIE L. JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

TRANS UNION, LLC,

Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defend ant Trans Union, LLC’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 70). For the reasons explained below, Defendant’s
motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Connie L. Jackson alleges she was the victim of a debt collection
scheme orchestrated by third parties. (Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 5–6, 15). According to Plaintiff,
as part of the scheme, Defendant Trans Un ion, LLC (“TransUnion” or “Defendant”)
furnished a consumer report about Plaintiff to non-party Liberty Credit Management
(“Liberty”) in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (the
“FCRA”). Id. ¶¶ 26–33. Defendant has now move d for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. No. 70). The record establishes, and the parties agree on or
do not dispute, the following facts.1

1 Although the Court summarizes the relevant facts, the Court does not (and need
not) recite all facts the parties contend are applicable to the pending motion. The

A. Defendant and Consumer Reports
Defendant is a national consumer reporting agency (“CRA”) within the
meaning of the FCRA. (Doc. No. 73 at 8); see 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). As a CRA,
Defendant provides consumer reports to its customers under certain circumstances.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a). Prior to providing the consumer reports, Defendant requires
its new customers to go through its credentialing process. (Doc. No. 73-2 at 2). Among
other things, this process seeks to ensure that all new businesses receiving FCRA
regulated data have a permissible purpose to access the data. Id.
B. Liberty’s Relationship with Defendant
In September 2014, Liberty, 2 through its owner Mitchell Evans, applied to
receive consumer reports from Defend ant. (Doc. Nos. 73-4 at 4–6). Liberty
represented that it was a collection agency and intended to use the consumer reports
“[i]n connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the
information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or
collection of an account of the consumer .” (Doc. No. 111-5 at 11). Defendant and
Liberty also entered into a Master Agreement for Consumer Reporting and Ancillary
Services, effective September 12, 2014. (Doc. No. 73-6 at 2). In the agreement, Liberty
made several broad or “blanket” certificatio ns to Defendant. These included that (1)
the nature of Liberty’s business was debt collection; (2) Liberty would only request

Court further notes the parties appear to disagree on several facts. See (Doc. No. 121)
(Defendant’s Appendix discussing ten non- exhaustive examples of “misleading or
incorrect statements of ‘fact’”).

2 In 2014, Liberty was a sole proprietorsh ip. (Doc. No. 73-4 at 22). Liberty later
incorporated in January 2022. (Doc. No. 73-22 at 8).

consumer reports for permissible purposes under the FCRA; (3) Liberty would certify
the permissible purpose for each consumer report it requested; and (4) Liberty would
be responsible for its own compliance with all applicable laws, including the FCRA.
See (Doc. Nos. 73-4 at 4; 73-6 ¶¶ 2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.5).
During the credentialing process, Liberty provided Defendant a copy of its
lease for its business location, information regarding its business phone, bank
account information, trade references, c lient references, it s federal employer
identification number, and a business tax certificate. (Doc. Nos. 73-4 at 15–35; 111-5
at 10). Defendant also obtained a credit report on Evans (Doc. No. 73-4 at 34) and had
a third party inspect Liberty’s office on-site on September 25, 2014.
Id. at 7–14.
A review of Liberty’s application and credentialing documentation from 2014
shows that at the time of Liberty’s applic ation, Evans informed Defendant that he
had established the company on or about September 11, 2014, immediately prior to
applying. Id. at 4. When Defendant requested a “Federal Tax ID,” Evans initially
provided 12-3456789. (Doc. No. 111-5 at 8).3 Although Evans eventually supplied an
email with a business domain, Evans origin ally provided a Gmail account address,
which he used to correspond with Defendant during the credentialing process. Id. at
9, 16. A printout of Liberty’s bank account information, dated October 1, 2014, showed
a single deposit of $100 from a “Co unter Credit” on September 12, 2014. Id. at 10.
Defendant was unable to validate or locate two of the three client references provided

3 Evans later received a notice from the IRS dated September 16, 2014, assigning an
Employer Identification Number for Liberty Credit Management. (Doc. No. 111-5 at
19).

by Evans. (Doc. Nos. 73-4 at 21; 73-8 at 2–3; 111-5 at 154–55). Defendant’s
Membership Checklist for Liberty’s application reflects the following:
• Liberty was not listed in 411 or an online directory;
• Liberty did not provide a website address;
• Liberty was not listed with the Better Business Bureau; and
• no website for Liberty was located during an internet search.4
(Doc. No. 111-5 at 6–7).
Evans signed a lease for office space for Liberty on September 10, 2014. (Doc.
No. 73-4 at 15–17). The location consisted of approximately 212 square feet of office
space for $339.00 per month. Id. at 15. The lease was on a month-to-month basis, and
listed Evans, not Liberty, as the tenant. Id. Evans’s 2014 credit report also included
an “unpaid collection account.” (Doc. No. 73-4 at 34). Public records available at the
time of Liberty’s application show Evans was the named defendant in a lawsuit in
the Superior Court of California. Steiner v. Cornerstone Health & Wellness, Inc .
(Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty., 2013, No. NC058980); (Doc. No. 109-8 at 118). 5 On March 5,
2014, judgment was entered against Evans for $116,659.50 plus costs. Id. at 103. As
part of the Steiner lawsuit, Evans also filed a “Request to Waive Fees” in August 2013
asking the court to waive all court fees be cause he did not “have enough income to
pay [his] household’s basic needs and the court fees.” (Doc. No . 109-8 at 116). The

4 However, the third-party inspector’s re port from 2014 identified a website for
Liberty. (Doc. No. 111-5 at 181).

5 The record is unclear as to whether De fendant was aware of the lawsuit in 2014.
But see (Doc. No. 73-7 at 9) (Comprehensive Report, dated June 19, 2019, referencing
the judgment).

waiver shows Evans had only $200 in a Bank of America account and made a gross
monthly income of $500. Id. at 116–17.
Defendant ultimately approved Liberty’s application to receive consumer
reports in or about October 2014. (Doc. No. 73-4 at 2–3).
After doing business together for several years, Defendant recredentialed
Liberty in 2019. See (Doc. No. 73-9). As part of this process, Liberty again
affirmatively represented itself as a debt collector to Defendant and provided a copy
of its local business license. (Doc. Nos. 73-9 at 18; 73-10 at 2–3). Defendant had a
third party conduct a second on-site inspection of Liberty’s office—the same location
as in 2014.
See (Doc. Nos. 73-4 at 7; 73-9 at 7–16). Defendant also reviewed Liberty’s
website and pulled Evan’s credit report. (Doc. Nos. 73-9 at 20–30; 111-6 at 7–10). A
Dun & Bradstreet report obtained in Febr uary 2019 identified Liberty as inactive,
assigned Liberty a viability score of 0 or “OUT OF BUSINESS OR UNABLE TO
CONFIRM DESIGNATION,” and noted “D&B is unable to confirm active operations
at a specific location due to the business showing limited to no business activity and
multiple signs of inactivity (e.g. disconnect ed phone, vacate address, no longer in a
telephone directory etc.).” (Doc. No. 1 11-6 at 2–3). Ultimately, Liberty passed
Defendant’s recredentialing process. (Doc. No. 73-9 at 2).
In 2020, Liberty applied to furnish cons umer credit information to Defendant
in addition to obtaining credit reports. (Doc. No. 73-11 at 13–16) . As part of that
process, on November 25, 2020, Liberty recert ified that it was a sole proprietorship
in the business of collections. Id. at 5–6. Liberty also subm itted a copy of its local

business tax certification, which note d Liberty was a “collection agency.” Id. at 7.
Liberty provided Defendant with three agr eements reflecting Liberty’s purchase of
accounts for collections. Id. at 59–94.
Defendant has no record of receiving any complaints, challenges, disputes or
concerns from other consumers about Li berty or Mitchell Evans from 2014 until
August 19, 2022. See (Doc. No. 73-16 at 13–14).
C. Plaintiff’s CPE Report
On August 19, 2022, Liberty requested Plaintiff’s Collection Prioritization
Engine (“CPE”) report (the “Report”) from Defendant. (Doc. No. 73-15 at 2). As part
of its request, Liberty certified that it would use Plaintiff’s Report for debt collections.
See (Doc. No. 73-14 at 62:8–23). Defendant provided Liberty a copy of the Report the
same day. See (Doc. No. 73-15 at 2).
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff received a letter from Blackwater Legal Group
(“Blackwater”). (Doc. No. 73-18 at 2). According to the letter, Plaintiff was “severe[ly]
delinquen[t]” on a CashNet USA line of credit account. Id. The letter demanded
Plaintiff pay the outstanding balance allegedly owed on her account to Blackwater
and threatened legal action against Plaintiff, noting that “[a] civil judgment will
immediately be reported to the credit bureaus and will be aggressively enforced.”
Id.
The record indicates that Plaintiff had a CashNet USA line of credit at some point
between 2007 and 2009 but paid it off by 2010. (Doc. 71-20 at 10:2–8).
D. The FTC Action
On or about May 14, 2024, Defendant received a Civil Investigative Demand

(“CID”) from the Federal Trade Commissi on (the “FTC”) seeking information
regarding whether certain persons or entities were “engaged in deceptive acts or
practices in connection with the collection or attempted collection of debts.” (Doc. No.
111-5 at 156–73). The CID specifically identifi ed Blackwater, Liberty, and Mitchell
Evans, among others as the “Subject Customer or Subscriber.”
Id. at 160.
On February 24, 2025, the FTC filed a co mplaint (the “FTC Complaint”) in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California. Compl., FTC v.
Blackrock Services, Inc. , No. 8:25-cv-00363-HDV-ADSx (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2025),
(Doc. No. 1). The FTC Complaint alleged that Liberty and Evans, among others (the
“FTC defendants”), violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692
et seq. (the “FDCPA”) by deceiving and threatening consumers into paying debts that
consumers did not actually owe or the FTC Defendants did not have authority to
collect. Id. at 2, 7. According to the FTC Complaint, “Defendants’ fraudulent scheme
includes sending consumers letters repr esenting that (1) consumers owe some
purported amount from an outstanding pa yday loan; (2) Defendants are law firms
and plan on imminently filing a lawsuit; (3) consumers’ credit scores are being
damaged due to these purportedly outstanding debts; and (4) consumers can avoid a
lawsuit if they pay to settle the purported debt.” Id. at 3.
Defendant suspended Liberty’s membership and access to Defendant’s
information on March 4, 2025. (Doc. No. 73-16 at 14). Ultimately, the FTC defendants
agreed to a Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, Monetary Relief, and
Other Relief in the FTC Action. Order,
FTC v. Blackrock Services, Inc., 8:25-cv-00363-

HDV-ADSx (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2025), (Doc . No. 54). The court ordered the FTC
defendants to pay over eight million dollars and permanently enjoined them from
participating in any debt collection or debt brokering activity.
Id.
E. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit
On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit claiming Defendant violated
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (the “FCRA”) when it provided
Liberty with a copy of her Report. (Doc. No. 1). On October 10, 2025, Defendant moved
for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 70). The Court held a status conference on April 21,
2026 and questioned the parties on the motion. (Doc. No. 128).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment
is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitl ed to judgment as a matter of law.” United
States v. 8.929 Acres of Land in Arlington Cnty., Va., 36 F.4th 240, 252 (4th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)); see United States, f/u/b Mod. Mosaic, LTD v. Turner
Constr. Co., et al., 946 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2019). A factual dispute is considered
genuine “if the evidence is such that a re asonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact
is material if it might affect the outc ome of the suit under the governing law.” 8.929
Acres of Land , 36 F.4th at 252 (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd , 718 F.3d
308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact through citations to the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrog atories, admissions, or affidavits in the
record. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (when the nonmoving
party “has failed to make a sufficient show ing on an essential element of [his] claim
with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof,” summary judgment is warranted);
see also United States ex rel. Gugenheim v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC , 36 F.4th
173, 178 (4th Cir. 2022) (same). “If the mo vant satisfies his initial burden to
demonstrate ‘an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case,’ the
burden shifts to the nonmovant to ‘present specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’”
8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252 (quoting Humphreys &
Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015)).
“The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly support ed motion for summary judgment.” Hixson v.
Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2021) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson, 477
U.S. at 247–48). Rather, the nonmoving party mu st establish that a material fact is
genuinely disputed by, inter alia, “citing to particular parts of the materials of
record,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), and ca nnot rely only on “conclusory allegations,
mere speculation, the building of one infere nce upon another, or the mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence.” 8.929 Acres of Land , 36 F.4th at 252 (quoting Dash v.
Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)).
Still, summary judgment is not intended to be a substitute for a trial of the
facts. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. In determining if summary judgment is

appropriate, “courts must view the eviden ce in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and refrain from weigh[in g] the evidence or mak[ing] credibility
determinations.” Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th
Cir. 2018) (citation modified). “Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because
the court believes that the movant will preva il if the action is tried on the merits.”
Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568–69 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
10A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed. 1998)).
The overall inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant
violated Sections 1681b and 1681e(a) of the FCRA when it provided the Report to
Liberty in August 2022. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Section 1681b Claim
“Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 to pr omote efficiency in the Nation’s
banking system and to protect consumer privacy.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19,
23 (2001) (citing 15 U. S.C. § 1681(a)). In furtherance of those goals, the FCRA
restricts CRAs’ ability to provide consumers’ credit information to third parties. In
particular, under § 1681b of the FCRA, CRAs may only furnish consumer reports for
“certain statutorily enumerated purposes.” TRW Inc. , 534 U.S. at 23 (quoting §
1681e(a) then citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b)). Re levant to this case, CRAs may furnish

consumer reports:
To a person which it has reason to believe—
intends to use the information in connection with a credit
transaction involving the consumer on whom the
information is to be furnished and involving the extension
of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the
consumer[.]

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

The dispute between the parties on Plaintiff’s § 1681b claim is narrow, as the
parties agree on several key facts and legal conclusions. Specifically, the parties agree
on the following. Defendant is a CRA within the meaning of the FCRA. (Doc. No. 128
at 11:21–12:13, 17:16–22). Liberty requested Plaintiff’s Report 6 on August 19, 2022.
Id. Defendant provided the Report to Liberty the same day. Id. At the time of its
request, Liberty certified to Defendant that it intended to use the Report “in
connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information
is to be furnished and involving the extensio n of credit to, or revi ew or collection of
an account of the consumer.”
Id. The parties also agree that whether Liberty
ultimately used the Report for an imperm issible purpose is not determinative of
Defendant’s liability under § 1681b. Id; see (Doc. No. 73 at 23–24).
Thus, the sole question before the Court is whether Defendant had “ reason to
believe” Liberty intended to use Plaintiff’s Report for a permissible purpose when it
furnished the Report to Liberty on August 19, 2022.7

6 Defendant notes that it “does not concede that the CPE Report it provided to Liberty
in August 2022 about [Plaintiff] is actionable under the FCRA. (Doc. No. 73 at 6 n.1).
For the purposes of resolving this Motion , the Court does not opine on whether the
Report is actionable under the FCRA.
7 Defendant asserts that po st-August 2022 events are i rrelevant to the Court’s

Defendant argues it had reason to be lieve Liberty would use the Report for a
permissible purpose and therefore acted reas onably as a matter of law. (Doc. No. 73
at 31). According to Defendant, “blanket certifications . . . alone are sufficient to confer
a reason to believe . . . .” (Doc. No. 73 at 27). Defendant further asserts that “courts
consistently find that a CRA had ‘reason to believe’ that an individual or entity
accessed a consumer report for a permissible purpose where the end user certified its
limited usage; the primary business of the end user involved accessing reports for a
permissible purpose; and the CRA was unaware of any impermissible use by the end
user.” Id. at 24. Defendant believes it meets this standard. The record shows Liberty
made a contractual or “blanket” certification that it would only request consumer
reports when it had a permissible purpose to do so. Liberty specifically certified it had
a permissible purpose to request Plaintiff’ s Report. Liberty represented itself as a
debt collector to Defendant. And at th e time Defendant furnished the Report,
Defendant had not received any complaints regarding Liberty or its purchase of CPE
reports. (Doc. No. 73-16 at 13–14).
In response, Plaintiff argues that De fendant conflates forming a “reason to
believe” with having “no reason to di sbelieve.” (Doc. No. 111 at 24). While
acknowledging that certifications may be important, Plaintiff asserts that “mere
certification by a user does not of itself provide a reason to believe . . . .”
Id. at 27–28.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant had no prior experience with Evans, and

analysis. (Doc. No. 118 at 6–7) . The Court agrees. The rele vant question is whether
Defendant had reason to believe Liberty would use the Report for a permissible
purpose when it provided it to Liberty on August 19, 2022. See Cappetta v. GC Servs.
Ltd. P’ship, 654 F. Supp. 2d 453, 462 (E.D. Va. 2009).

Defendant’s credentialing process revealed numerous “variances from the norm” that
Defendant ignored. Id. at 26. These “red flags”—such as the results of Liberty’s Dun
& Bradstreet report, reference checks, and Evans’ credit report—would have
prevented Defendant from forming a reason to believe Liberty intended to use
consumer reports for a permissible purpose.
Id.
The Fourth Circuit has not defined the circumstances under which a CRA
forms a “reason to believe.”8 In the absence of controlling guidance, both parties lean
on non-binding cases and those from other circuits in support of their arguments. A
review of these cases reinforces that, at its core, whether a CRA forms a “reason to
believe” depends on the specific facts of the case. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sessoms , No.
4:96CV01031, 1998 WL 35305548, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 16, 1998) (finding “reason to
believe” when a user certified its permissible purpose and there was no showing that
the consumer reporting agency had notice of subscriber’s i mproper purpose for
accessing plaintiff’s report); Harris v. Database Mgt. & Mktg. , Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d
509, 517 (D. Md. 2009) (finding “reason to believe” when the record showed an absence
of “credible red flags”); Greenhouse v. TRW, Inc., Civ. A. 96–1495, 1998 WL 61037, at
*2–3 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 1998) (finding “reason to believe” when the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate there was any evidence “dispu ted or not, that [the defendant] had

8 Defendant asserts that “courts unequivoca lly hold that the question of whether a
report has been obtained for a permissibl e purpose is a legal one, which can be
resolved on summary judgment.” (Doc. No. 118 at 7) (citation modified). This
argument addresses the wrong question. The relevant question is whether Defendant
had “reason to believe” Liberty intended to use the Report for a permissible purpose—
not whether the Report was obtained for a statutorily enumerated purpose. The Court
notes that at the hearing, Defendant opined that the “reason to believe” standard “is
one of reasonableness.” (Doc. No. 128 at 9:16–17).

reasonable grounds to believe that [the us er] would use, or di d use, the consumer
report provided for any impermissible purpose”). Accordingly, bright-line rules—such
as certification alone provides “reason to believe”—would be inappropriate.
9
Here, considering all the facts in evid ence, the Court finds a reasonable jury
could conclude that Defendant had “reason to believe” Liberty intended to use the
report for a permissible purpose. However, the record also includes sufficient facts
that could lead a reasonable jury to reject that conclusion. Accordingly, there is a
genuine dispute of material fact, and the Court will deny summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s §1681b claim.
B. Section 1681e(a) Claim
Defendant also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1681e(a) claim.
Section 1681e requires CRAs to maintain reasonable procedures to ensure accuracy
and to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the permissible purposes
enumerated in § 1681b. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e. In relevant part, § 1681e(a) provides:
(a) Identity and purposes of credit users
Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain
reasonable procedures designed to avoid violations of
section 1681c of this title and to limit the furnishing of
consumer reports to the purp oses listed under section
1681b of this title. These proc edures shall require that
prospective users of the info rmation identify themselves,
certify the purposes for whic h the information is sought,
and certify that the information will be used for no other
purpose. Every consumer reporting agency shall make a
reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective

9 At the hearing, Defendant conceded that if Defendant had information showing a
business was engaged in fraud, Defendant may still be liable under § 1681b
regardless of whether Defendant had received a blanket certification. See (Doc. No.
128 at 14:19–25, 15:1–14).

user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior
to furnishing such user a co nsumer report. No consumer
reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any
person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the
consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in
section 1681b of this title.

15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a).

Defendant does not address whether it maintained reasonable procedures.
Rather, Defendant argues solely that “[s]tating a claim under § 1681b is a prerequisite
to asserting a claim under § 1681e(a ).” (Doc. No. 73 at 32) (quoting Baker v.
TransUnion LLC , No. CV-10-8038-PCT-NVM, 2010 WL 2104622 (D. Ariz. May 25,
2010)). Because Defendant’s only argument in support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment on the § 1681e(a) claim relies on the Court granting summary judgment on
its § 1681b claim, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the § 1681e(a)
claim will also be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 70) is DENIED; and this case shall proceed to trial on the merits
in the absence of a voluntary resolution of the dispute among the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: June 2, 2026

Passage view · GavelSight