govinfo:USCOURTS-ncwd-1_25-cv-00076-0

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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:25-cv-00076-MR-WCM

CATHERINE NICHOLSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
)
HCA HEALTHCARE, INC., JAMIE )
GOSNELL, JARED ALLEN, MEGAN )
TIPTON, HEATHER MCFARLAND )
THORP, KRISTEN TILGHMAN, )
CHRISTOPHER BERRY, KELLY )
BRADY, AMANDA CARVER, NINA )
MURCHISON, EVADORA BOYD, )
JENNIFER MCFADDEN, TERI CLARK, )
and CHARLENE ATKINSON, )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant HCA Healthcare ,
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 48], Defendants Jamie Gosnell, Kristen
Tilghman, Christopher Berry, Kelly Brady, Amanda Carver, Jennifer
McFadden, Teri Clark, Charlene Atkinson, and Evadora Boyd’s Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. 50], Defendant Heather MacFarland Thorp’s Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. 71], and Defendant Nina Murchison’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc.
76].

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 12, 2025, the Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a
Complaint asserting nine employment discrimination claims and a negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision claim against ANC Mission Hospital, Inc.
(“Mission”) and Defendant HCA Healthcare, Inc. (“HCA”), as well as four tort
claims against Defendants Jamie Gosnell, Kristen Tilghman, Christopher
Berry, Kelly Brady, Amanda Carver, Jennifer McFadden, Teri Clark,
Charlene Atkinson, Evadora Boyd, Heather MacFarland Thorp, Nina
Murchison, Jared Allen, and Megan Tipton (collectively, the “Individual
Defendants”). [Doc. 1]. After voluntarily dismissing Mission on April 22,
2025, [Doc. 17], the Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on July 29,
2025 asserting the same claims but without Mission as a defendant.
Two of the Individual Defendants —Jared Allen and Megan Tipton —
have yet to make an appearance in this matter. On March 26, 2026, almost
four months after the Plaintiff’s thrice -extended deadline for service, the
Plaintiff filed a Certificate of Service by Publication asserting that Defendants
Allen and Tipton had been served by March 21, 2026. [Doc. 86]. However,
Defendants Allen and Tipton have not filed an Answer , and no motion
concerning the timeliness or sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s purported service or
Defendants Allen and Tipton’s lack of response is currently before the Court.

HCA and the other eleven Individual Defendants have filed timely
motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, [Docs. 48, 50, 71, 76], and all four motions have been fully
briefed, [Docs. 49, 51, 62, 63, 66, 67, 72, 73, 75, 77, 80, 81]. Accordingly,
these motions are ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To be
“plausible on its face,” a plaintiff must demonstrate “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court must accept the truthfulness of
all factual allegations but is not required to assume the truth of “bare legal
conclusions.” Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2011). “The
mere recital of elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory
statements, is not sufficient to survive a motion made pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012); see also
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is
“a context-specific task,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, which requires the Court to
assess whether the factual allegations of the Complaint are sufficient “to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
As the Fourth Circuit has explained:
To satisfy this standard a plaintiff need not forecast
evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the
claim. However, the complaint must allege sufficient
facts to establish those elements. Thus, while a
plaintiff does not need to demonstrate in a complaint
that the right to relief is probable, the complaint must
advance the plaintiff’s claim across the line from
conceivable to plausible.

Walters, 684 F.3d at 439 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The allegations set forth in the Complaint, giving the Plaintiff the benefit
of all reasonable inferences, show the following.
The Plaintiff is a Registered Nurse who identifies as a Black, White,
and Native American woman over the age of 40. [Doc. 19 at ¶ 38]. In 2024,
the Plaintiff was a n employee of Aya Healthcare, Inc. (“Aya”) , and Aya
contracted with HCA for the Plaintiff to provide nursing services at Mission
for a term of twenty -one weeks, starting on or about February 5, 2024 . [Id.

at ¶¶ 39-41]. At Mission, the Plaintiff was assigned the responsibilities of a
Charge Nurse, which is a leadership position within the hospital’s nursing
team. [Id. at ¶ 43]. This litigation arises from alleged discriminatory and
tortious conduct suffered by the Plaintiff during the period she was providing
nursing services at Mission. [Id. at ¶¶ 44-70].
Regarding her work schedule and duties , t he Plaintiff alleges that
throughout her employment she was assigned to work every weekend
despite repeated requests for a first-shift schedule. [Id. at ¶ 44]. The Plaintiff
further alleges that her manager, Defendant Gosnell, denied her schedule
requests on grounds that first -shift positions were unavailable, but that
“newly hired Caucasian employees” were granted first-shift schedules. [Id.
at ¶ 45]. In May 2024, the Plaintiff requested to step down from her duties
as Charge Nurse, but Defendant Gosnell denied her request on grounds that
the Plaintiff was the only Charge Nurse available on the weekends. [ Id. at
¶ 55]. The Plaintiff subsequently agreed to continue in her role as Charge
Nurse. [Id. at ¶ 56].
Regarding her work environment, the Plaintiff alleges that she
encountered “significant resistance ” from staff that her “Caucasian
counterparts in similar roles” did not face , and that she was “subjected to
several incidents of hostility .” [Id. at ¶ 47]. One such incident occurred on

or about February 9, 2024, when a fellow employee remarked, in a manner
that the Plaintiff perceived as hostile, that the Plaintiff “did not look her age.”
[Id. at ¶ 48]. The Plaintiff “reported incidents of discrimination and
mistreatment” to Defendant Gosnell, but Defendant Gosnell “dismissed her
concerns” as arising from a “generational gap.” [ Id. at ¶¶ 49-50]. The
Plaintiff subsequently learned that her private conversations with Defendant
Gosnell were being discussed by other staff members, giving the Plaintiff the
impression that Defendant Gosnell had disclosed her concerns to other
employees. [Id. at ¶¶ 51-52]. Another incident occurred on or about July 19,
2025 [sic], when a patient used a racially derogatory slur while speaking to
the Plaintiff, and Defendant Tilghman repeated the patient’s statement,
including the derogatory slur, to the Plaintiff. [ Id. at ¶ 53]. The Plaintiff
alleges that she did not file a formal complaint about the incident with
Defendant Tilghman because Defendant Gosnell had dismissed her earlier
reports. [Id. at ¶ 54].
Additionally, on or about June 14, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a “Vigilance
report” regarding the conduct of Defendant Allen on grounds that Allen had
left a patient unattended. [ Id. at ¶ 57]. After filing this report, the Plaintiff
perceived “increased tension” with Defendant Gosnell and “an increase in
hostility” from Defendants Allen, Berry, and Tilghman. [Id. at ¶ 58]. One of

the Plaintiff’s colleagues subsequently told her that at least eight of the
Individual Defendants were “discussing the possibility of removing her from
her Charge Nurse duties and had been discussing a plan to sabotage her
career.” [Id. at ¶ 59].
Finally, on or about July 23, 2024, the Plaintiff was informed that she
had been terminated from her position at Mission due to “clinical
performance concerns.” [Id. at ¶ 60]. On July 24, 2024, the Plaintiff received
notice that a complaint had been filed with the North Carolina State Board of
Nursing (“Nursing Board”) alleging that she had an inappropriate verbal
interaction with a patient on or about July 21, 2024. [Id. at ¶ 61]. The Plaintiff
alleges that the Individual Defendants fabricated the basis for the Nursing
Board complaint, erased or altered exculpatory camera footage of the patient
interaction at issue , and submitted the complaint . [ Id. at ¶ 62]. Upon
investigation of the complaint by the Nursing Board , the Plaintiff was found
not to be at fault, and the complaint was dismissed. [Id. at 63].
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Employment Discrimination Claims against HCA
The Plaintiff’s nine employment discrimination claims against HCA can
be grouped into three categories, each of which contains three claims. The
three categories are: harassment and discrimination creating a hostile work

environment (Claims 1-3); retaliation and wrongful termination (Claims 4-6);
and disparate treatment (Claims 7-9). Each category contains three virtually
identical claims, except that each claim arises under a different statute: Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act (Claims 1, 4, 7); the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (Claims 2, 5, 8); and the North Carolina Equal Employment
Practices Act (Claims, 3, 6, 9). HCA has moved to dismiss all nine claims
solely on the ground that the Plaintiff has not adequately pled that HCA was
the Plaintiff’s “employer,” as defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title
VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the North
Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act (“NCEEPA”). [Doc. 49 at 6].
The Plaintiff alleges that at the time of the conduct alleged in the First
Amended Complaint she was “a direct employee of Aya Healthcare, Inc.”
[Doc. 19 at ¶ 39]. However, the Plaintiff also alleges that HCA was her
“temporary employer” because she was a “temporary ‘employee’ of Mission
Hospital,” and HCA “owns, operates, and manages” Mission. [ Id. at ¶¶ 12-
14].
In the Title VII and ADEA contexts, the Fourth Circuit has adopted the
“joint employment doctrine,” under which “multiple entities could be
employers of a plaintiff,” to “prevent[ ] those who effectively employ a worker
from evading liability by hiding behind another entity, such as a staffing

agency.” Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir.
2015); see also Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 219
n.2 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he operative language in ADEA is identical to the
operative language in Title VII, so the analysis utilized under either act is
interchangeable.”). Because the North Carolina Supreme Court has
“explicitly adopted” Title VII standards and principles of law in the context of
discrimination claims , the Court will also apply the Fourth Circuit’s joint
employment doctrine to the Plaintiff’s NCEEPA claims. 1 See Johnson v.
Crossroads Ford, Inc., 230 N.C. App. 103, 111, 749 S.E.2d 102, 108 (2013);
see also [Doc. 49 at 7 n.3; Doc. 62 at 2].

1 The Court notes, however, that the “plaintiff has cited no authority showing that a private
cause of action exists under the [NCEEPA].” Bendross v. Town of Huntersville, 159 N.C.
App. 228, 582 S.E.2d 726 (2003). The Fourth Circuit has held that “[n]either the North
Carolina Supreme Court nor the North Carolina Court of Appeals has recognized a private
cause of action under the NCEEPA.” Smith v. First Union Nat. Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247
(4th Cir. 2000). Instead, “[i]n enacting the Equal Employment Practices Act, the North
Carolina legislature chose not to provide any remedies beyond those available under
federal discrimination statutes.” Percell v. Int'l Bus. Machines, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 297, 302
(E.D.N.C. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Percell v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 23 F.3d 402 (4th Cir.
1994). Courts have subsequently disagreed as to whether NCEEPA should be
interpreted as establishing legislative recognition of common-law wrongful discharge
claims in North Carolina, and if so, the scope of such claims. See, e.g., Efird v. Riley, 342
F. Supp. 2d 413, 428 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (interpreting NCEEPA and concluding that North
Carolina recognizes “a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on
allegations that a plaintiff was fired because of her sex” but that North Carolina does not
recognize a claim for “wrongful discharge based on retaliatory discharge for complaints
about sex discrimination”). However, because HCA has moved to dismiss the Plaintiff’s
employment discrimination claims solely on the grounds that it cannot be held liable as
the Plaintiff’s employer, the Court need not address the merits of the discrimination claims,
including this issue concerning NCEEPA, at this time.

In Butler, the Fourth Circuit articulated a set of nine factors for courts
to use when applying the joint employment doctrine:
(1) authority to hire and fire the individual;
(2) day-to-day supervision of the individual, including
employee discipline;
(3) whether the putative employer furnishes the
equipment used and the place of work;
(4) possession of and responsibility over the
individual's employment records, including payroll,
insurance, and taxes;
(5) the length of time during which the individual has
worked for the putative employer;
(6) whether the putative employer provides the
individual with formal or informal training;
(7) whether the individual's duties are akin to a
regular employee's duties;
(8) whether the individual is assigned solely to the
putative employer; and
(9) whether the individual and putative employer
intended to enter into an employment relationship.

Butler, 793 F.3d at 414. Although “none of these factors are dispositive,” the
first three factors are “the most important,” and “the common-law element of
control remains the ‘principal guidepost’ in the analysis.” Id. The ultimate
question is “whether a putative employer exercise[s] significant control” over
the individual. Id. at 410.
Here, several key factors weigh in favor of the Plaintiff. T he Plaintiff’s
allegations indicate that HCA was responsible for the day-to-day supervision
of her work. Her manager, Defendant Gosnell, was an HCA employee, and
Gosnell determined the Plaintiff’s work schedule and fielded her complaints

about her work environment at Mission. [Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 44-45, 49-50, 54-56,
58]. Moreover, as a Charge Nurse, the Plaintiff held “a leadership position
within Mission Hospital’s nursing team,” and she was responsible for
providing instructions to other HCA employees. [Id. at ¶¶ 43, 47]. As a result,
the Plaintiff appears to have been integrated into Mission’s nursing team and
performed duties akin to those of regular HCA employees. Therefore,
although the Plaintiff has not alleged facts regarding several of the relevant
factors, the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts for the Court to conclude at
this early stage in the litigation that HCA may qualify as her employer.2
Accordingly, the Court will deny HCA’s motion to dismiss as to the Plaintiff’s
first nine causes of action in the First Amended Complaint.
B. Tort Claims Against the Individual Defendants
The Plaintiff has asserted four tort claims against each Individual
Defendant: (1) defamation per se; (2) civil conspiracy; (3) intentional infliction

2 The parties dispute whether the Plaintiff has alleged that HCA had the authority to fire
the Plaintiff, and none of the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her termination states who
terminated her. See [Doc. 49 at 11; Doc. 62 at 5; Doc 66 at 3]. However, in the context
of the Plaintiff’s negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim, taking the allegations
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, HCA was responsible for her termination. [Doc.
19 at ¶ 222 ( characterizing HCA’s conduct as “failure to address Plaintiff’s concerns
regarding discriminatory behavior and its subsequent termination of Plaintiff” (emphasis
added))]. Because this allegation implies that HCA was responsible for terminating the
Plaintiff, the joint employment factor concerning the authority to fire the Plaintiff also
supports a conclusion, at this stage, that HCA may qualify as the Plaintiff’s employer.

of emotional distress (“IIED”); and (4) negligent infliction of emotional
distress (“NIED”).
1. Defamation Per Se
“To be actionable, a defamatory statement must be false and must be
communicated to a person or persons other than the person defamed .”
Andrews v. Elliot, 109 N.C. App. 271, 274, 426 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1993) . An
actionable defamatory statement that “tends to impeach a person in that
person’s trade or profession” may be defamatory per se. Boyce & Isley,
PLLC v. Cooper, 153 N.C. App. 25, 29, 568 S.E.2d 893, 898 (2002). To state
a plausible claim for defamation per se, “[t]he alleged defamatory statement
or statements made or published by the defendant need not be set out
verbatim in plaintiff's defamation complaint if alleged substantially in haec
verba, or with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine whether
the statement was defamatory.” Andrews, 109 N.C. App. at 274, 426 S.E.2d
at 432; see also King v. Chaffin, 759 F. Supp. 3d 690, 695 (W.D.N.C. 2024).
Because defamation claims are not subject to a heightened pleading
standard, the key consideration on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) is whether the Plaintiff’s allegations are “sufficient to give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Hatfill v. New York Times Co. , 416 F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Plaintiff’s defamation claim is predicated on allegations that
the Individual Defendants communicated false statements about the Plaintiff,
including allegations of patient abuse, to the Nursing Board. [Doc. 19 at
¶¶ 189-93]. Although the Plaintiff does n ot allege the precise content or
timing of the statements at issue , she does identify the basis of her
defamation claim with sufficient particularity : the claim arises from
statements about a physical and verbal interaction between the Plaintiff and
a patient on or around July 21, 2024, as well as related statements regarding
patient abuse by the Plaintiff, that were communicated to the Nursing Board
pursuant to a Nursing Board complaint against the Plaintiff. 3 [Id. at ¶¶ 60-
61, 190-91]; see also [Doc. 63 at 6]. As a result, the Plaintiff’s allegations put
the Individual Defendants “on notice of the crux of plaintiff’s grievance and
the facts [they] will be required to address during discovery.” 4 Collins v. AB

3 While the Individual Defendants note that such Nursing Board complaints are typically
privileged, the relevant statutory privilege contains an exception for circumstances where
the persons making the report “knew the report was false or acted in reckless disregard
of whether the report was false.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-171.47; see also [Doc. 51 at 12-
13]. The Plaintiff’s allegation that the Individual Defendants fabricated the basis for the
Nursing Board complaint is sufficient to allege that the Individual Defendants knew the
report was false and thus trigger the exception to the privilege. [Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 61-63].

4 The Plaintiff’s allegations are inconsistent regarding who made and communicated the
statements: she first asserts that “several individually named Defendants deliberately and

Biodisk N. Am., Inc., No. 5:08-CV-355-H, 2009 WL 10705350, at *6 (E.D.N.C.
Mar. 16, 2009). Accordingly, the Court will deny the Individual Defendants’
motions to dismiss as to the Plaintiff’s claim for defamation per se.
2. Civil Conspiracy
“North Carolina courts do not recognize an independent cause of
action for civil conspiracy. ” Mason v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., LLC , 421 F.
Supp. 3d 237, 248 (W.D.N.C. 2019). Instead, “[a] cause of action for a civil
conspiracy under North Carolina law is really an action for damages caused
by acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and not for the conspiracy itself. ”
Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Commc ’ns of N. Carolina, L.L.C. , 226 F. Supp. 2d
785, 791 (W.D.N.C. 2002). A civil conspiracy claim, therefore, “is premised
on the underlying act.” Piraino Bros., LLC v. Atl. Fin. Grp., Inc. , 211 N.C.
App. 343, 350, 712 S.E.2d 328, 333 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The charge of conspiracy itself does nothing more than associate
the defendants together and perhaps liberalize the rules of evidence to the
extent that under proper circumstances the acts and conduct of one might
be admissible against all.” Shope v. Boyer, 268 N.C. 401, 405, 150 S.E.2d
771, 774 (1966).

falsely accused Plaintiff of patient abuse,” [ Doc. 19 at ¶ 61 (emphasis added)], but she
later asserts that all the Individual Defendants were responsible for the statements, [id. at
¶¶ 190-91, 193]. This inconsistency may also be addressed during discovery.

The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that “a complaint
sufficiently stated a claim for civil conspiracy when it alleged (1) a conspiracy,
(2) wrongful acts done by certain of the alleged conspirators in furtherance
of that conspiracy, and (3) injury as a result of that conspiracy.” State ex rel.
Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 362 N.C. 431, 444, 666 S.E.2d 107,
115 (2008). When the alleged conspirators are all members of a single
corporation, a civil conspiracy claim may be barred by the intra-corporate
immunity rule, which “provides that, because at least two persons must be
present to form a conspiracy, a co rporation cannot conspire with itself, just
as an individual cannot conspire with himself.” Seguro-Suarez by & through
Connette v. Key Risk Ins. Co., 261 N.C. App. 200, 218, 819 S.E.2d 741, 754
(2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit has
recognized, however, that an exception to the intra-corporate immunity rule
may apply if the alleged conspirators possess motives independent of their
employer or the alleged conspiratorial acts were taken outside the scope of
the alleged conspirators’ employment. Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown ,
716 F.3d 342, 353 (4th Cir.2013); see also Seguro-Suarez, 261 N.C. App. at
218 n.6, 819 S.E.2d at 755 n.6.
Here, the Plaintiff alleges that she was “informed by a colleague” that
at least eight of the Individual Defendants “had been discussing a plan to

sabotage Plaintiff’s career.” [Doc. 19 at ¶ 59]. The Plaintiff further alleges
that the Individual Defendants’ plan was “directly related to Plaintiff filing the
Vigilance report against Defendant Jared Allen and raising concerns about
discriminatory treatment” by the Individual Defendants , thereby giving the
Individual Defendants a distinct motive for their actions . [Id.]. Finally, the
Plaintiff alleges that the Individual Defendants put their plan into action by
filing a false complaint against her with the Nursing Board in order to damage
her reputation and career. [Id. at ¶¶ 61-63]. While the Plaintiff’s allegations
border on speculative and conclusory, they provide just enough particularity
to advance the Plaintiff’s claim from conceivable to plausible. Accordingly,
the Court will deny the Individual Defendants’ motions to dismiss as to the
Plaintiff’s claim for civil conspiracy.
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
“To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff
must allege: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct (2) which is intended to
cause and does cause (3) severe emotional distress to another.” Clark v.
Clark, 280 N.C. App. 403, 414, 867 S.E.2d 704, 715 (2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted) . As to the first element, the plaintiff must allege
“conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,

and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). As to the third element, “ severe emotional distress means any
emotional or mental disorder . . . which may be generally recognized and
diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.” Id. at 414-415, 867 S.E.2d at
715 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether conduct meets this
standard is a question of law. ” Bratcher v. Pharm. Prod. Dev., Inc. , 545 F.
Supp. 2d 533, 544 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
“North Carolina courts have been extremely reluctant to find actionable
IIED claims in the employment context, and termination, allegedly in violation
of federal law alone, does not necessarily constitute extreme and outrageous
conduct under North Carolina law.” Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 427
(M.D.N.C. 2004) . Moreover, “acts of discrimination are not necessarily
extreme and outrageous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For
example, when a defendant “threatened to make accusations ” against a
plaintiff, “threw a package of papers” at her, and “filed a complaint of sexual
harassment” against her, the North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that
the “defendant’s behavior was undeniably churlish and ill-mannered” but did
not “rise to the level of the extreme and outrageous conduct which is required
to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Smith-Price
v. Charter Behav. Health Sys., 164 N.C. App. 349, 355, 595 S.E.2d 778, 783

(2004). “Subjecting an employee to internal investigations and disciplinary
actions, even coupled with alleged discriminatory treatment and strained
working relationships, does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct
under North Carolina law.” Stephenson v. Carolina Physicians Network Inc.,
No. 3:21 -CV-103-FDW-DCK, 2021 WL 4558198, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 5,
2021).
Here, the Plaintiff allege s that she was subjected to discriminatory
treatment and that the Individual Defendants fabricated allegations of patient
abuse against her. Nevertheless, accepting the factual allegations as true
and drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, the Plaintiff’s
allegations fall short of the high standard for extreme and outrageous
conduct that is required to state an IIED claim under North Carolina law.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the Individual Defendants’ motions to
dismiss as to the Plaintiff’s IIED claim.
4. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
“To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under
North Carolina law, the plaintiff need only allege that: (1) the defendant
negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such
conduct would cause the plaintiff s evere emotional distress, and (3) the
conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress. ” Demarco

v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 268 N.C. App. 334, 342, 836 S.E.2d
322, 328 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Regarding the fir st
element, the Fourth Circuit has held that the allegations must specifically
implicate negligent conduct: when “the material factual allegations charge
nothing but intention al acts . . . [the court] must conclude that they do not
state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Mitchell v. Lydall,
Inc., 1994 WL 38703, at *3 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Therefore, when the
only acts a plaintiff alleges to support an NIED claim are the “same
intentional acts” the plaintiff alleges to support an IIED claim, the plaintiff’s
NIED claim may be “subject to dismissal.” Bonham v. Wolf Creek Acad., 767
F. Supp. 2d 558, 573 (W.D.N.C. 2011) (emphasis in original) (concluding that
“[t]his manner of pleading negligent infliction has long been held to be
insufficient”).
Here, the only acts the Plaintiff alleges in support of her NIED claim
are identical to those she alleges in support of her IIED claim. Compare
[Doc. 19 at ¶ 206 (alleging intentional conduct that was “extreme and
outrageous” in support of IIED claim) ], with [id. at ¶ 212 (repeating ¶ 206
verbatim except for replacing “ extreme and outrageous” with “negligent”) ].
Moreover, in the paragraph in the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint that
alleges conduct in support of her NIED claim, the Plaintiff alleges that all

such conduct was performed “with the intent to harm Plaintiff’s reputation
and career.” [ Id. at ¶ 212 (emphasis added) ]. Such intentional conduct
cannot sustain the Plaintiff’s NIED claim. Accordingly, the Court will grant
the Individual Defendants’ motions to dismiss as to the Plaintiff’s NIED
claim.
C. Negligent, Hiring, Retention and Supervision Claim
To state a claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, a
plaintiff must allege:
(1) the specific negligent act on which the action is
founded . . . (2) incompetency, by inherent unfitness
or previous specific acts of negligence, from which
incompetency may be inferred; and (3) either actual
notice to the master of such unfitness or bad habits,
or constructive notice, by showing that the master
could have known the facts had he used ordinary
care in oversight and supervision, . . .; and (4) that
the injury complained of resulted from the
incompetency proved.

Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schs., Inc., 293 N.C. App. 330, 353, 900 S.E.2d 352,
369–70 (2024) (quoting Medlin v. Bass, 327 N.C. 587, 591, 398 S.E.2d 460,
462 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted) . North Carolina courts have
“recognized incompetency where employment or retention of employment
is dangerous to others, by previous specific acts of careless or negligent
conduct, or by inherent unfitness ,” but “allegations of ‘animus’ or ‘hostility’
alone are insufficient to prove negligence by the employee, inherent

unfitness, or that retention of the employee is dangerous to others. Id. at
354, 900 S.E.2d at 370. Instead , the Plaintiff must allege that an
“incompetent employee committed a tortious act resulting in injury to plaintiff
and that prior to the act, the employer knew or had reason to know of the
employee's incompetency.” Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co. , 79 N.C.
App. 483, 495, 340 S.E.2d 116, 124 (1986).
Here, t he Plaintiff contends that her negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision claim is predicated on the tort ious act of wrongful discharge.
[Doc. 62 at 5-7]. Wrongful discharge, however, “is a tort committed against
[a] plaintiff by her employer, rather than employees.” Whitfield v. DLP Wilson
Med. Ctr., LLC, 482 F. Supp. 3d 485, 494 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (emphasis added)
(rejecting negligent supervision and retention claim based on wrongful
discharge because such discharge involves “not alleged tortious conduct of
employees, but defendant as employer”). Moreover, to the extent the alleged
wrongful discharge is attributable to an HCA employee, the Plaintiff has
presented no material factual allegations regarding who was responsible for
her discharge , whether the employee responsible for her discharge was
incompetent, or whether HCA knew or had reason to know of that employee’s
incompetence. Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim
for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim predicated on her

alleged wrongful discharge. The Plaintiff makes additional general and
conclusory allegations to the effect that HCA “knew or should have known”
about its employees’ alleged discriminatory treatment of the Plaintiff. [ Doc.
19 at ¶¶ 223-27]. However, the Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant
Gosnell’s dismissals of her concerns about mistreatment were intentional,
not negligent, [id. at ¶ 51], and she does not offer any other material factual
allegations regarding how HCA would know about her concerns .
Accordingly, the Court will grant HCA’s motion to dismiss as to the Plaintiff’s
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim.
V. CONCLUSION
At this early stage in the litigation, the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
that HCA may qualify as her employer, and she has identified the basis of
her defamation and civil conspiracy claims with sufficient particularity.
Accordingly, the Court will allow the Plaintiff’s claims for employment
discrimination, defamation per se, and civil conspiracy to proceed. The
Plaintiff’s claims for NIED, IIED, and negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision will be dismissed.
O R D E R
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant HCA’s Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. 48] is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART .

The motion is GRANTED as to the Plaintiff’s negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision claim. The motion is otherwise DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Jamie Gosnell, Kristen
Tilghman, Christopher Berry, Kelly Brady, Amanda Carver, Jennifer
McFadden, Teri Clark, Charlene Atkinson, and Evadora Boyd’s Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. 50] is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART .
The motion is GRANTED as to the Plaintiff’s IIED and NIED claims . The
motion is otherwise DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Heather MacFarland
Thorp’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 71] hereby GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to the Plaintiff’s IIED and
NIED claims. The motion is otherwise DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Nina Murchison’s Motion
to Dismiss [Doc. 76] is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The motion is GRANTED as to the Plaintiff’s IIED and NIED claims. The
motion is otherwise DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: June 2, 2026

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