govinfo:USCOURTS-okwd-5_25-cv-00731-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
 
MARK E. SELLS, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
-vs- 
 
LETISHA PANTOJA, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
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) NO. CIV-25-0731-HE 
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ORDER 
 On April 6, 2026, United States Magist rate Judge Suzanne Mitchell issued a Report 
and Recommendation [Doc. #17], recommendin g the court dismiss plaintiff’s amended 
complaint in its entirety. She further recommended the c ourt deny plaintiff’s motion to 
appoint counsel. After receiving an extensi on of time, plaintiff filed objections to the 
Report and Recommendation [Doc. #21]. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the 
court has conducted a de novo review of th e matter. The court concludes the Report and 
Recommendation should be adopted. 
 Initially, plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s “refusing to file [his] ‘Ex Parte 
Motion for Emergency Relief,’” not allowing a “mandated FRCP Rule 52 ‘Hearing’” and 
forcing him to “refile his Moti on in a different format[.]” [D oc. #21, p. 3]. The court 
concludes these objections are untimely. On July 7, 2025, the magistrate judge entered an 
order requiring to him to f ile “his complaint on the proper form” and denying the “‘ex 
parte’ motion for provisional emergency injunction[.]” [Doc. #5]. Plaintiff filed an 
objection to the order, which the magistrate judge construed as a motion to reconsider and 

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denied the motion [Doc. #10]. Any objection to the order construing the objection as a 
motion to reconsider and deny ing that motion was due within 14 days after plaintiff was 
served with a copy of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The record reflects the order 
was mailed to plaintiff’s last known addre ss and is therefore deemed delivered. See 
LCvR5.4. He did not object on the indicated ground with in the 14 day period and his 
objections are therefore not timely asserted. However, even if plaintiff had timely objected, 
the objections would have been unsuccessful as the challenged rulings were neither clearly 
erroneous nor contrary to law and, in any event, the court concurs in them. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).1 
 Plaintiff additionally objects to the magi strate judge analyzing his claims without 
considering the original complaint, as supplem ented, along with the amended complaint. 
However, the amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See May v. Segovia, 
929 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2019) (“the amended complaint, as the operative complaint, 
supersedes the original comp laint’s allegations[.]”) (emphasis omitted). The magistrate 
judge therefore correctly focu sed on the amended complaint rather than the original 
complaint. 
 Plaintiff also objects to the magi strate judge issui ng the Report and 
Recommendation, asserting he specifically signed a form declini ng to consent to the 
 
1 Despite plaintiff’s assertions, the magistrate judge did not “force” plaintiff to proceed under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 by requiring him to file his compla int on the proper form provided by the court 
clerk. Plaintiff’s initial filing asserted violations of his civil rights, and the magistrate judge was 
authorized under LCvR9.2(a) to require plaintiff to file his complaint on the civil rights complaint 
form. That form did not require plaintiff to rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The form allowed plaintiff 
to rely on different or additional statutes for his claims. 

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handling of the case by a magist rate judge. The consent plai ntiff declined to sign would 
have authorized the magistrate judge to handle all matters in the case without further review 
by this court. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 , 585 (2003) (discussing a referral 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c )(1)). However, the Report and Recommendation at issue 
here was based on a nonconsensual referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) which, as to 
case dispositive matters, leaves this court free to do as it sees fit with the magistrate judge’s 
recommendation. Roell, 538 U.S. at 585. The Report and Recommendation was therefore 
properly issued in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Further, plaintiff’s suggestion 
that the magistrate judge’s recommended ru lings were based on her knowledge that he 
declined to the § 636(c)(1) referral is speculative and unsupported, given that the magistrate 
judge would not have been informed of the declination. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(1). 
 Next, plaintiff objects to the Report a nd Recommendation because the magistrate 
judge only analyzed his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ignored his claims under 18 
U.S.C. § 1595. According to plaintiff, he may pursue a civil cause of action under § 1595 
based on defendants’ violations of federal criminal statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 41, 242, 1581, 
1584, 1589, and 1590. 
 “As a general matter, federal criminal statut es that ‘do not provide for a private right 
of action’ are ‘not enforceable through a ci vil action.’” Serna v. Webster, No. 23-2901, 
2023 WL 6382099, at *2 (10 th Cir. Oct. 2, 2023) (quoting Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 
1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007)). The court acknowledges that § 1595 does create a private 
cause of action for victims of any crime under chapter 77 of title 18 of the U.S. Code (18 
U.S.C. §§ 1581-1594). However, sections 241 and 242 are not included in the chapter 77, 

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and thus, § 1595 does not provide a cause of action for violations of those statutes. The 
magistrate judge correctly concluded that §§ 241 and 242 are not enforceable through a 
civil action. Serna, 2023 WL 6382099, at 2. Sections 1581, 1584, 1589, and 1590 address 
peonage, involuntary servitude, forced labor and/or trafficking in those matters. However, 
even if a private right of action exists as to those statutes, plaintiff has not stated a claim 
under them. Sections 1581-1590 impl ement the Thirteen th Amendment, see Davis v. 
Hudson, No. 00-6115, 2000 WL 1089510, at *3 (10 th Cir. 2000) (unpublished). The 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery or involuntary servitude does not apply to 
prisoners. Dmytryszyn v. Hickenlooper, 527 Fe d. Appx. 757, 760 (10 th Cir. 2013) 
(unpublished); see also , Adams v. Wyoming Department of Corrections Medium 
Correctional Institution Wa rden, No. 25-8018, 20 26 WL 90446, at *2 (10 th Cir. Jan. 13, 
2026) (unpublished) (“It is well-settled that : where a person is duly tried, convicted, 
sentenced and imprisoned for crime in accord ance with law, no issue of peonage or 
involuntary servitude arises . . . Thus, pa ying prisoners less than minimum wage—or not 
paying them at all—for prison jobs does not violate the Thirte enth Amendment.” Id. 
(quotation marks, alterations, and citatio ns omitted). Consequently, the amended 
complaint fails to state a claim under § 1595 upon which relief may be granted.2 
 As to plaintiff’s objections to the magist rate judge’s analysis of his § 1983 claims, 
the court concludes they are without merit. The court substantially agrees with the analysis 
of the magistrate judge and it is unnecessary to repeat it here. 
 
2 As part of his objections, plaintiff asserts he also relies upon 25 U.S.C. § 1302(f) but that statute 
does not provide a private cause of action enforceable through a civil action. 

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 In any event, the court concludes the am ended complaint should be dismissed in its 
entirety. 
 Plaintiff also objects to the Report’s re commendation that his request for counsel be 
denied. Plaintiff, as a civil litigant, has no constitutional right to representation by counsel. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 466 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006). Rather, the court has discretion 
to request an attorney to represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In evaluating a prisoner’s request for appointed counsel, the court is 
to consider “the merits of th e prisoner’s claims, the nature and complexity of the factual 
and legal issues, and the prisoner’s ability to investigate the facts and present his claims.” 
Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1224 (10 th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Here, the factual and legal issues which arise from the amended complaint are 
not unusually complex, and plaintiff has adequately demonstrated in his filings his ability 
to present his claims. Furt her, even having given the co mplaint the liberal treatment 
accorded to pro se litigants, it fails to stat e to state any plausible claim. Therefore, the 
court concludes the appointment of counsel is not warranted. 
 For the reasons stated, the Report and Recommendation [Doc. #17] is ADOPTED 
and plaintiff’s amended complaint is DISMISSED. The motion to appoint counsel [Doc. 
#16] is DENIED. A separate judgment will be entered. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 2nd day of June, 2026. 
 

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