govinfo:USCOURTS-nynd-9_23-cv-00077-3

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 
 
ANDREW JONES, 
 
 Petitioner, 
v. 9:23-CV-0077 
 (LEK) 
T. McGUINNESS, 
 
 Respondent. 
 
 
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL: 
 
ANDREW JONES 
Petitioner, pro se 
01-A-4383 
Shawangunk Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 700 
Wallkill, New York 12589 
 
HON. LETITIA JAMES MICHELLE E. MAEROV, ESQ. 
Attorney for Respondent Ass’t Attorney General 
New York State Attorney General 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
 
LAWRENCE E. KAHN 
Senior United States District Judge 
 
DECISION and ORDER 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Petitioner unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2254. Dkt. No. 1, Petition ("Pet."); Dkt. No. 2, (“Exhibits”); Dkt. No. 7, (“February 2023 
Decision”) (ordering respondent file an answer to petitioner’s claims that, inter alia, his 
Double Jeopardy rights had been violated and that his sentencing and additional 
incarceration had been harsh and excessive); Dkt. No. 10, (“March Order”) (clarifying the 

 
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February Order to update petitioner’s claims for relief and instruct respondent, where a merits 
analysis was appropriate, to answer such claims appropriately); Dkt. No. 13, (“Response”); 
Dkt. No. 15, (“Reply”); Dkt. No. 17, (“February 2026 Decision”) (denying and dismissing the 
Petition in its entirety); Dkt. No. 18, (“Judgment”). 
Presently before the Court is petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision 
and Order denying and dismissing the Petition. Dkt. No. 19, (“Motion”).
1 Respondent 
opposes the motion in part. Dkt. No. 25, (“Response to Reconsideration Motion”). 
 For the reasons which follow, petitioner’s motion is granted to the extent that the Court 
will update its Decision and Order to incorporate the correct claims from the March Order, 
and is otherwise denied. 
II. DISCUSSION 
 Petitioner argues that he is entitled to reconsideration because (1) the Court failed to 
incorporate the March Order, and petitioner’s revised claims, into its Decision and Order 
denying and dismissing the Petition; (2) the Court’s Decision and Order failed to address the 
merits of petitioner’s claim that the state court erred in its sentencing calculations because he 
“was never credited for the time he had served in prison when he returned to the trial court in 
2016”; and (3) the Court failed to address his argument that, given how the state courts 
credited petitioner’s time, the holding in North Carolina v. Pearce binds this Court to find 
petitioner suffered a Double Jeopardy violation, Mot. at 1–3. 
 Pursuant to the Federal Rules, a “court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake 
arising from an oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other 
part of the record.” F
ED. R. CIV. P. 60(a). The Court agrees with the petitioner’s observations 
 
1 Petitioner also timely filed a Notice to Appeal the Decision and Order and Judgement. Dkt. No. 20. However, the 
appeal has been stayed pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court. Dkt. No. 24. 

 
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and the respondent’s acknowledgment that the revisions from the March Order were not 
included in the Decision and Order dismissing and denying the Petition, and they should have 
been. That omission will be corrected by the Court with the filing of an Amended Decision 
and Order which incorporates those facts into said amended decision. 
However, petitioner’s other arguments seeking reconsideration are denied. 
Rule 60(b) provides: 
 
Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order or Proceeding. 
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence, that with reasonable diligence, 
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); 
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; 
(4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it 
is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or 
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; 
or 
(6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
 
F
ED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). "The Supreme Court has recognized that Rule 60(b) applies in 
habeas corpus cases and may be used to reopen a habeas proceeding." Flemming v. New 
York, No. 1:06-CV-15226, 2013 WL 4831197, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013) (citing 
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005)). "Importantly, Rule 60(b) is not a vehicle for 
rearguing the merits of the challenged decision. . . . Rather . . . Rule 60(b) provides relief only 
in exceptional circumstances." Van Gorder v. Allerd, No. 6:01-CV-6538, 2008 WL 822018, at 
*2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (emphasis in original). 

 
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"A motion brought under Rule 60(b) must be made 'within a reasonable time' and 
motions brought under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) must be made within one year after the entry 
of judgment." Flemming, 2013 WL 4831197, at *12 (quoting Lora v. West, 04 Civ.1902 
(RJH)(GWG), 2010 WL 1541339 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010) (Gorenstein, M.J.) (Report 
and Recommendation). “The Supreme Court has interpreted subsection six as requiring a 
showing of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to ‘justify[] the reopening of a final judgment.’” 
Reynolds v. Greene, No. 9:05-CV-1539, 2010 WL 604179, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2010) 
(quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)). 
Here, it appears petitioner seeks relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1). Petitioner’s motion 
was made less than one month after the Decision and Order and Judgment were entered. 
Accordingly, it is timely. 
However, despite being timely filed, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Court 
did not properly address his claims for relief. First, petitioner argues the Court never 
discussed the merits of his state court sentencing claims. Dkt. No. 19 at 2. However, that is 
because the Decision and Order explained that petitioner’s challenges to his sentencing 
claims were not cognizable on habeas review; therefore, no merits review was permitted. 
Dkt. No. 17 at 6–7. Said another way, any and all variations of petitioner’s claims that the 
state courts incorrectly applied New York State sentencing laws in rejecting his challenges to 
how his state court sentences were calculated were not within “the province of [this Court] to 
reexamine [because they challenged] state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Id. 
at 7 (quoting Ortiz v. New York State Parole in Bronx, N.Y., 586 F.3d 149, 158 (2d Cir. 
2009)). 

 
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Similarly, petitioner’s claim that this Court failed to analyze his Double Jeopardy claims 
or the applicability of Pearce’s holding to them, is also meritless. The Decision and Order 
explained why Double Jeopardy principles do not apply to petitioner’s incomplete, aggregate 
sentence, and that Pearce is not controlling because petitioner’s sentence does not involve 
“the imposition of a new sentence after retrial.” Dkt. No. 17 at 8–9 (quoting Rodriguez v. 
Keyser, 2016 WL 264141, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2016)). Accordingly, petitioner’s motion is 
denied. 
 III. CONCLUSION 
 WHEREFORE, it is 
 ORDERED that petitioner’s motion to reconsider the Decision and Order, Dkt. No. 17, 
is GRANTED IN PART. Specifically, the Court will file an Amended Decision and Order 
which incorporates the March Order’s clarification as to what petitioner argued entitled him to 
federal habeas relief. However, the Amended Decision and Order merely corrects an 
omission by the Court and does not change the ultimate outcome that the Petition is denied 
and dismissed in its entirety. The remainder of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is 
DENIED WITH PREJUDICE; and it is further 
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Order on all parties in 
accordance with the Local Rules. 
Dated: June 1, 2026 
 Albany, NY 
 

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