govinfo:USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-00888-1

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
WO 
 
 
 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Tiffany Gordwin is a Black woman employed as a Senior Human 
Resources Specialist for Defendant Amazon.com, Inc. ( Doc. 11 ¶¶ 37, 39 ). She alleges 
race-and sex-based employment discrimination. (Doc. 11). After Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss was granted in part, Plaintiff’s remaining claims include hostile work 
environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims pursuant to Title VII, § 1981, and 
the Arizona Civil Rights Act, in addition to an interference claim pursuant to the Family 
and Medical Leave Act. (Doc. 23). 
On April 15, 2022, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Resolution of Discovery 
Dispute (Doc. 38). Plaintiff has served a Rule 45 subpoena on John Felton, Senior Vice 
President of Global Delivery Services (“GDS”) for Defendant. 1 (Doc. 38 -1). Plaintiff 
 
1 Defendant also objects to an anticipated Rule 45 subpoena on Beth Galetti, 
Senior Vice President of People eXperience and Technology for Defendant. But because 
such a subpoena has not been served and has not otherwise been presented to the Court, 
and beca use Plaintiff does not address a subpoena of Ms. Galetti, the Court will not 
Tiffany Gordwin, 
 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
 
Amazon.com Incorporated, 
 
Defendant. 
)
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
No. CV-21-00888-PHX-SPL 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 

 
2 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
seeks documents and information related to employee diversity data for the GDS 
division, which is the division to which Plaintiff provides services —though she herself 
works in the human resources (“HR”) division. (Hearing Tr. at 16:25 –17:7). Defendant 
objects to the subpoena on two grounds: (1) Defendant argues that the GDS diversity data 
that Plaintiff seeks has no relevance to her claims; and (2) Defendant argues that Mr. 
Felton is an improper “apex” witness. The Court held a hearing on the dispute on May 
11, 2022 (Doc. 45) and will now address the issues in turn. 
II. RELEVANCE 
“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant 
to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(b). Re levance in this context “is defined very broadly.” Equal Emp. 
Opportunity Comm’n v. Scottsdale Healthcare Hosps. , No. CV -20-01894-PHX-MTL, 
2021 WL 4522284, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2021) (quoting Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 
F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998) ). Relevant information is that which is “reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. 
Survivor Prods. , 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
“The party seeking to compel d iscovery has the burden of establishing that its request 
satisfies the relevancy requirements . . . .” Id. 
The Court finds that the information related to GDS diversity data that Plaintiff 
seeks easily clears the “relatively low bar” of relevance. Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp. , 
435 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1019 (D. Ariz. 2020). “Statistical evidence is unquestionably 
relevant in a Title VII disparate treatment case” because it may help establish the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case or show pretext. Diaz v. Am. Tel. & Tel. , 752 F.2d 1356, 
1362–63 (9th Cir. 1985). Defendant argues that data regarding the GDS division is 
irrelevant because it is not Plaintiff’s division, but the Ninth Circuit rejected a similar 
argument in Diaz. T here, the plaintiff, who worked in Tucson, sought employment 
statistics for his employer’s entire western region. Id. at 1362. The employer argued that 
 
address its propriety at this time. 

 
3 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
data outside of Tucson was irrelevant. Id. at 1363. The Ninth Circuit held otherwise, 
concluding that br oader data might reveal “otherwise unavailable indications of an 
employer’s conscious or unconscious motives.” Id. As the Court stated, “the promotion 
patterns of the employer, as a whole, are relevant to such an analysis of motive.” Id. 
Likewise, here, da ta regarding the GDS division —a division with which Plaintiff 
regularly works—may be probative of Defendant’s motives in its employment decisions, 
which bear directly on Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the information that Plaintiff seeks 
in her subpoena of Mr. Felton is within the proper scope of discovery. 
III. APEX DOCTRINE 
Rule 26(c) allows courts to limit discovery “to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Pursuant to this 
rule, “[c]ourts have re cognized that seeking the deposition of a high -level executive 
within an organization (an ‘apex’ deposition) creates a tremendous potential for abuse or 
harassment.” Topete v. City of Mesa , No. CV -18-03127-PHX-ROS (ESW), 2020 WL 
8872800, at *1 (D. Ariz. Ap r. 29, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In 
determining whether to allow an apex deposition, courts consider (1) whether the 
deponent has unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge of the facts at issue in this case 
and (2) whether the party seek ing the deposition has exhausted other less intrusive 
discovery methods.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. , 282 F.R.D. 259, 263 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). When it comes to large, multi -national 
corporations with many high -level executives, such as Defendant, the Court must 
consider the deponent’s place within the corporate hierarchy in relation to those factors; 
“the closer that a proposed witness is to the apex of some particular peak in the corporate 
mountain range, and the less directly relevant that person is to the evidence proffered in 
support of his deposition, the more appropriate the protections of the apex doctrine 
become.” Id. Still, “a party seeking to prevent a deposition carries a heavy burden to 
show why discovery should be denied,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and must 
“show good cause by demonstrating harm or prejudice that will result from the 

 
4 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
discovery,” Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Defendant erroneously argues that i t is Plaintiff’s burden to show that Mr. Felton 
has unique first -hand knowledge of the facts at issue and that she has exhausted less 
intrusive discovery methods. (Doc. 38 at 4). It bears emphasizing that once Plaintiff has 
shown that the information sough t is within the scope of proper discovery , it becomes 
Defendant’s “heavy burden” to show that discovery should be denied. See Briggs v. Adel, 
No. CV-18-02684-PHX-EJM, 2020 WL 4003123, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2020). While 
the Court considers Mr. Felton’s k nowledge and the availability of less intrusive 
discovery methods, the Court may deny discovery only if Defendant demonstrates good 
cause to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1063. 
Here, Mr. Felton is one of 19 Senior Vice Presidents within Defendant’s corporate 
hierarchy and falls two levels below the CEO , which certainly places him near the apex . 
(Hearing Tr. at 7:24 –8:3). But Plaintiff argues that her direct supervisor provides the 
GDS diversity data directly to Mr. Felton, who is the person empowered to make 
decisions based on the data. (Hearing Tr. at 9:12 –10:9). Defendant generally disputes this 
characterization (Hearing Tr. at 12:17 –20), but does not argue that Mr. Felton lacks 
knowledge of the data or that anyone else has more , better, or equal knowledge of the 
data and how it is used . Instead, Defendant argued repeatedly at the hearing that Plaintiff 
has not provided any evidence that Mr. Felton has such knowledge. (Hearing Tr. at 7 :8–
9; 19:1–2, 10–11; 21:23–22:1; 26:13–14). As noted, however, it is not Plaintiff’s burden 
to produce such evidence. Moreover, even when pressed by the Court at the hearing, 
Defendant offered no specific examples of less intrusive ways for Plaintiff to ob tain 
information about the GDS data, instead making only vague offers to “meet and confer” 
with Plaintiff regarding other data. (Hearing Tr. at 13:1 –15:10; 21:11 –22). Finally, 
Defendant has failed to show any harm or prejudice that may result from discover y, 
precluding the Court from granting the relief it seeks. ( See Hearing Tr. at 6:2 –8:13). The 
only conceivable prejudice the Court sees is the mere fact that Mr. Felton is near the top 
of Defendant’s corporate hierarchy, but that does not suffice to establ ish good cause. See 

 
5 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
Haggarty v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , No. 10-2416 CRB (JSC), 2012 WL 3939320, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (“A proposed deponent’s status as a busy, high -ranking 
executive is not itself sufficient to justify a protective order.” (inter nal quotation marks 
omitted)). Defendant has not met its heavy burden to show that the apex doctrine applies. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Joint Motion for Resolution of 
Discovery Dispute (Doc. 38) is resolved in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant and Mr. F elton 
shall comply with the subpoena. 
 Dated this 16th day of May, 2022. 
 
 
 
Honorable Steven P. Logan 
United States District Judge 
 
 

Passage view · GavelSight