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govinfo:USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-00846-2

U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona · 2022-06-03

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WO 
 
 
 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before the Court is Plaintiff Wanda Elaine Smith-Jeter’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Legal Assistance and Counsel (Doc. 59). 
Plaintiff alleges that, on May 27, 2022, she and her husband were “forcibly removed” from 
their apartment. (Doc. 59 at 1). She alleges that they were not served with an eviction 
notice, in violation of state law. ( Id. at 3). As a result, Plaintiff asserts that they were not 
afforded an opportunity “to appear in court and defend [themselves]” or to apply for “a 
reasonable accommodation du e to disability.” ( Id. at 2). Plaintiff requests that this Court 
issue a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in response to her allegedly “illegal” eviction. 
Plaintiff additionally requests legal assistance and counsel. 
 On May 31, 2022, this Court denied Plaintiff’s initial request for a TRO in part 
because Plaintiff failed to clearly state what she sought out of a TRO. 1 (Doc. 58 at 3). In 
 
1 Plaintiff’s initial request was also denied because Plaintiff failed to sufficiently 
address the Winter factors. (Doc. 58 at 2); see Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 
U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (holding that a party seeking injunctive relief must show th at: (i) it is 
Wanda Elaine Smith-Jeter, 
 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
 
City of Scottsdale, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
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No. CV-21-00846-PHX-SPL 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 

 
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other words, the Court was unable to determine whether Plaintiff sought injunctive relief 
overturning the eviction entirely, ordering Defendants to allow her back into her home to 
retrieve her personal belongings, or otherwise ordering Defendants to take some action or 
to prohibit them from taking some action. 2 (Id.). The denial was without prejudice , and 
Plaintiff was given the opportunity to refile the Motion. ( Id.). In the present Motion, 
however, Plaintiff still has not explained what she wants to achieve with a TRO. If Plaintiff 
seeks mandatory injunctive relief, this Court is left without any idea of what action Plaintiff 
wants to force Defendants to take. If Plaintiff seeks prohibitory injunctive relief, this Court 
is left without any idea of what action Plaintiff wants to prohibit Defendants from taking. 
The Court simply cannot issue a TRO unless Plaintiff specifically explains what she wants 
the TRO to do. 3 Nonetheless, given the nature of the harm alleged and in the interest of 
justice and fairness, the Court will withhold ruling on Plaintiff’s request and exercise its 
discretion to (i) expedite briefing and (ii) hold a hearing on Plaintiff’s request for a TRO. 
 As to Plaintiff’s request for legal assistance and counsel, the Court first notes that 
there is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Johnson v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1991); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Alaska , 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). “However, a court may under 
‘exceptional circumstances’ appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants pursuant to 
 
likely to succeed on the merits; (ii) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
injunctive relief; (iii) the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (iv) an injunction is in the 
public interest). 
 
2 “A mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to take action,” while “a 
prohibitory injunction prohibits a party from taking action and preserves the status quo 
pending a determination of the action on the merits.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos 
Pharma GmbH & Co. , 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). “The ‘status quo’ refers to the legally relevant relationship between the parties 
before the controversy arose.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060–61 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
 
3 Additionally, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is requesting a TRO that would enjoin 
both of the two remaining Defendants —City of Scottsdale and Al Angelo Company —or 
if Plaintiff is merely seeking a TRO against one of them. 

 
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28 U.S.C. § 1 915(e)(1).” Palmer v. Valdez , 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(1) (emphasis added) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any person 
unable to afford counsel.”). “When determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, 
a court must consider ‘the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the 
[litigant] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the comple xity of the legal issues 
involved.’” Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th 
Cir. 1983); see also Terrell v. Brewer , 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “Neither of 
these considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” Palmer, 560 F.3d 
at 970 (citing Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 Having considered both elements, Plaintiff has not shown that exceptional 
circumstances are present that would require the appointment of counse l in this case. 
Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits at this stage, nor has 
she shown that she is experiencing difficulty in litigating this case because of the 
complexity of the issues involved. Instead, Plaintiff is in no different position than many 
pro se litigants. Having failed to show that exceptional circumstances are present, 
Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is denied. 
Accordingly, 
 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order a nd 
Motion for Legal Assistance and Counsel (Doc. 59) is denied in part to the extent Plaintiff 
requests legal assistance and counsel. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will withhold ruling on Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motio n for Legal Assistance and Counsel 
(Doc. 59) to the extent Plaintiff requests a TRO. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall have until no later than 
June 7, 2022 to file any Response to Plaintiff’s Motion; Plaintiff shall have until 
June 9, 2022 to file any Reply in support of her Motion. 
/// 

 
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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Hearing is set for June 10, 2022 at 9:30 a.m. 
before the Honorable Judge Steven P. Logan, United States District Judge, in the Sandra 
Day O’Connor United States Courthouse, located at 401 West Washington Street, Phoenix, 
Arizona, 85003, 5th Floor, Courtroom 501. 
 Dated this 3rd day of June, 2022. 
 
 
 
Honorable Steven P. Logan 
United States District Judge 
 

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