govinfo:USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-00846-3

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Wanda Elaine Smith-Jeter’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Legal Assistance and Counsel (Doc. 59).
On June 3, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for legal assistance but withheld
ruling on Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to allow briefing
and to hold a hearing on the issue. (Doc. 60). The parties have fully briefed the Motion,
(Docs. 59, 63, 65), and a hearing was held before this Court on June 10, 2022 (Doc. 67).
Having read the parties’ briefs and having heard their arguments, the Court now issues this
Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 11, 2021, Plaintiff, filed her initial Complaint (Doc. 1) in this matter; she
has since filed several Amended Co mplaints (Docs. 6, 37, 55). Plaintiff originally named
as Defendants the City of Scottsdale, Scottsdale Housing Agency, Scottsdale City Attorney
Sherry Scott, Villa Montana Apartments, and Al Angelo Company. (See Doc. 1). However,
Wanda Elaine Smith-Jeter,

Plaintiff,
vs.

City of Scottsdale, et al.,

Defendants.
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No. CV-21-00846-PHX-SPL

ORDER

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only two Defendants remain: City of Scottsdale and Al Angelo Company.1 Plaintiff asserts
claims under several federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982–83 and the Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, et seq. (Doc. 55-1 at 3, 6).
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of her tenancy at the Villa Montana Apartments (the
“Apartments”) in Scottsdale, Arizona , which are managed by Defendant Al Angelo
Company. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff and her husband, Jesse James Jeter—who are ages 70 and 67,
respectively—are “Black/African-Americans” who both live with disabilities and mobility
issues. ( Id.). Plaintiff and Mr. Jeter relocated from Vancouver, Washington, ( Id.), and
entered into a one -year lease at the Apartments from May 1, 2021 to April 30, 2022.
(See Lease, Doc. 63 -1). Plaintiff and Mr. Jeter participated in Section 8’s HUD Housing
Choice Voucher program, a federally funded program for low-income tenants. (Doc. 55-1
at 6). Plaintiff alleges that she and her husband experienced several instances of “race
discrimination and malicious harassment from the very beginning of [their] tenancy.” (Id.).
These discrimination claims are the basis of her Complaint. (Id.).
The present Motion, however, does not directly relate to Plaintiff’s discrimination
claims. Instead, the Motion concerns Plaintiff’s allegation that, on May 27, 2022, she and
her husband were “forcibly removed” from their apartment. (Doc. 59 at 1). She alleges that
they were not served with an eviction notice, in violation of state law. (Id. at 3). As a result,
Plaintiff asserts that they were not afforded an opportunity “to appear in court and defend
[themselves]” or to apply for “a reasonable accommodation due to disability.” ( Id. at 2).
Plaintiff requests that this Court issue a TRO in response to their allegedly illegal eviction.
While it was initially unclear what Plaintiff wanted the TRO to do, Plaintiff indicated at
the June 10, 2022 Hearing that she is requesting an order from this Court overturning the
eviction and ordering that she be permitted back into the apartment unit.

1 Scottsdale Housing Agency and Villa Montana Apartments were terminated as
Defendants after Plaintiff failed to name them in her Amended Complaint (Doc. 6).
Scottsdale City Attorney Sherry Scott was dismissed from the case after the Court granted
Scott’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32).

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II. LEGAL STANDARD
A party seeking injunctive relief under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure must show that: (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in its
favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.2 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard , 775 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9 th Cir.
2014); Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2012); Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales
Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co ., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The basic
function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a determination
of the action on the merits.” Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Ct. Cent. Dist. of Cal. , 840 F.2d 701, 704
(9th Cir. 1988).
A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should
not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (internal quotation omitted) (citation
omitted). Where the mo vant seeks a mandatory injunction, rather than prohibitory,
injunctive relief is “subject to a heightened scrutiny and should not be issued unless the
facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” Dahl v. HEM Pharms. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399,
1403 (9th Cir. 1993).3

2 The Ninth Circuit observes a “sliding scale” approach, in that these elements “are
balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of
another.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus,
by example, an injunction can issue where there are “‘serious questions going to the merits’
and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff… so long as the plaintiff
also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the
public interest.” Id. at 1135.

3 “A mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to take action,” while “a
prohibitory injunction prohibits a party from taking action and preserves th e status quo
pending a determination of the action on the merits.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos
Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). “The ‘status
quo’ refers to the legally relevant relationship between the par ties before the controversy
arose.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2014).

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III. DISCUSSION
The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for a TRO because she has failed to sufficiently
address the Winter factors; most critically, Plaintiff has failed to show that she has a
likelihood of success on the merits of her discrimination and civil rights claims. Moreover,
the record does not indicate that Plaintiff’s eviction was “illegal,” improper, or otherwise
procedurally insufficient. Even if there were questions surrounding the eviction, it is
unclear from Plaintiff’s arguments whether this Court has the jurisdiction or authority to
overturn an eviction ordered by an Arizona state court , at least where Plaintiff has not
availed herself of the state-level appeals process.
First, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood that she will succeed on the merits
of her claims; nor has she shown that there are “serious questions” going to the merits. “To
establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, [a p laintiff] must show ‘a fair
chance of success.’” In re Focus Media Inc., 387 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation
and internal quotations omitted). “A claim can be weaker on the merits if it raises ‘serious
questions’ and the amount of harm the injunction will prevent is very great, but the chances
of success on the merits cannot be weaker than ‘likely.’” Shebanow v. First Magnus Fin.
Corp., No. 3:10-cv-00765-RCJ-RAM, 2010 WL 5390132, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 22, 2010).
Here, Plaintiff’s only argument with respect to this factor is that she “believe[s] and can
show that [she is] likely to succeed on the merits of this case, as soon as the defendants
have ‘Answered’ the Plaintiff’s (3rd) Amended Complaints: the law and the facts clearly
favor the plaintiff.” (Doc. 59 at 2). Such a conclusory argument fails to substantively
explain why Plaintiff is likely to succeed on—or how there are at least “serious questions”
going to the merits of —her discrimination and civil rights claims. Plaintiff’s failure to
make any showing on this factor is detrimental to her request for a TRO.
Even if Plaintiff sufficiently addressed the Winter factors, it is not clear that her
eviction was “illegal” or otherwise improper such that a TRO should issue to overturn it.
Plaintiff’s lease was set to expire on April 30, 2022; after that date, the lease was to convert
to a monthly tenancy. (Doc. 63 -1 at 2, 4). The lease specifically states that “Management

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has the right to non renew this lease and in such cases, Resident agrees to vacate on the
expiration date of the lease.” ( Id. at 4). Defendant Al Angelo Company chose to exercise
this right because it was “[n]o longer participating in the Section 8 Voucher Program”
and—on February 22, 2022 —Defendant provided Plaintiff with 60 -days’ notic e of its
decision to non-renew the lease. (See Sixty-Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy, Doc. 63-2).
While Plaintiff maintains that she never received the notice, the notice was fastened to the
door of her unit and a copy of the notice was sent to Plaintiff by certified mail. ( Id. at 2).
Further evidencing that Plaintiff received the notice is the fact that she herself filed a copy
of the notice in this matter. (See Doc. 31, filed February 28, 2022).
Plaintiff failed to vacate the unit on April 30, 2022 and at that point she became a
holdover tenant. Defendant filed a special detainer action in the McDowell Mountain
Justice Court and an eviction hearing was set for May 17, 2022. The summons and
complaint for this action were served on Plaintiff by a certified process server on May 11,
2022. (Docs. 63 -3 & 63 -4). Again, service was completed by posting the summons and
complaint to Plaintiff’s door and by mailing separate copies of each to Plaintiff by certified
mail. (Id.). Again, such form of service is sufficient under Arizona law. 4 Plaintiff and her
husband failed to appear at the May 17 eviction hearing. (Doc. 63-5). Judgment was entered
against them by default, and they were evicted from the Apartments. In sum, th is Court
finds that the evidence indicates that Plaintiff’s eviction was procedurally correct and there
is no evidence to suggest —despite what Plaintiff claims —that the eviction was illegal or
otherwise improper. As noted above, even if there were questions surrounding the eviction,
it is unclear whether this Court has the jurisdiction or authority to overturn the eviction,
particularly considering that Plaintiff does not appear to have availed herself of the proper

4 Specifically, Arizona law provides that “[t]he tenant is deemed to have received
the summons three days after the summons is mailed if personal service is attempted and
within one day of issuance of the summons a copy of the summons is conspicuously posted
on the main entrance of the tenant's residence and on the same day the summons is sent by
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the tenan t's last known address. ” A.R.S. § 33 -
1377(B) (emphasis added).

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avenue for overturning an eviction—the state-level appeals process.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing to warrant this Court granting
the “extraordinary and drastic remedy” she requests—a TRO ordering that her eviction be
overturned, and that she be permitted back into the unit. Even if she made a stronger
showing as to the Winter factors, this Court would be reluctant to overturn the eviction
because all evidence that has been presented indicates that the eviction was justified and
properly carried out. Moreover, given that Plaintiff has apparently not ava iled herself of
the state-level appeals process, this Court is not the proper forum —at least at this stage—
for Plaintiff to overturn a state-issued eviction. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for
Legal Assistance and Counsel (Doc. 59) —which has already been denied to the extent
Plaintiff seeks legal assistance ( See Doc. 60)—is now also denied to the extent Plaintiff
seeks the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. Thus, the Motion (Doc. 59) is denied
in its entirety.
Dated this 14th day of June, 2022.

Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge

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