govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_25-cv-25728-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRJCT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division
Case Number: 25-25728-C1V-M 01V N0
LUIS JIMENEZ,
Plainitff,
S&S DOLPHIN MM L, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING PLM NTIFF'S MOTION TO REM AND TO STATE COURT AND
ORDER DISMISSW G DEFENDANT JOHN DOE m TH PREJUDICE
In this slip and fall case, Plaintiff Luis Jimenez asserts claims of negligence against
Defendant S&S Dolphin Mall, LLC and Defendant Jolm Doe. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants are liable for the injuries he suffered after he slipped and fell while using the public
restroom on the premises. Plaintiff filed the underlying Complaint in the Circuit Court of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Minmi-Dade Cotmty. Defendant removed the Complaint to
tllis Court, arguing that John Doe was fraudulently joined. Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to
remand to state cotu't, arguing that this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction as Plaintiff and Jolm Doe
are both residents of Florida. Because the Court finds below that there is no possibility that Plaintiff
prevails on his claim against John Doe, the Cout't denies Plaintiff s motion to remand, dismisses
Defendant John Doe with prejudice, and asserts its removal diversity jurisdiction over the matter.
Case 1:25-cv-25728-FAM   Document 14   Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2026   Page 1 of 6
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on February 1 1,2024, while on the premises of Sports & Social
Dolphin Mall, he slipped and fell on a hazardous condition while using the public restroom
consisting of liquid, broken glass, and spilled drirlks that had accumulated on the men's restroom
floor. Plaintiff f'urther states that warning signsand cleaning equipment were brought to the
restroom only after he fell. The manager, who Plaintiffrefers to as John Doe, filled out an incident
report and called for an ambulance and police. Plaintiff was then transported to Kendall Regional
Hospital by fire rescue.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed suit against S&S Dolphin Mall, LLC alone on July 8, 2025, in Miami-Dade
Circuit Cotu't. The case was removed to federal coul't on September 2, 2025. Plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed that action without prejudice on November 3, 2025. Thereafter, Plaintiff refiled the
action in Miami-Dade Circuit Cotlrt onNovember 11, 2025, naming both S&S Dolphin Mall, LLC
and John Doe, :1a resident of Minmi-Dade County'' as defendants.
Within thirty days of service, S&S filed its Notice of Removal, arguing that diversity exists
because Plaintiff is a Florida citizen, S&S is a Maryland citizen, and John Doe is fraudulently
joined. Plaintiff then filed the underlying Motion to Remand, arguing that complete diversity does
not exist because Plaintiff atld John Doe are both Florida citizens and that John Doe is not
fraudulently joined.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Jurisdiction
lt is a fundamental constitutional tenet that federal courts are courts of limitedjurisdiction.
f awson v. City ofMiami Beach, 908 F. Supp. 2(1 1285, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Federal courts only
have subject-matter jurisdiction over a case when there is a question of federal 1aw or there is
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EGdivel'sity of citizenship'' between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. j 1331, 1332. Because jurisdiction is
limited, there is a prestlmption that a federal court lacks jurisdiction until it has been demonstrated
thatjurisdiction over the case exists. Unitedstates v. Rojas, 429 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005).
Where, as here, the non-removing party moves to remand, it is the removing party that
bears the burden of showing the existence of federal jurisdiction. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T
Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir.
1996)). The Court must construe removaljtlrisdiction (Gnarrowly and resolve any doubts regarding
the existence of federal jtlrisdiction in favor of the non-removing party.'' I6L
B. Fraudulent Joinder
W here a plaintiff names a non-diverse defendant solely to defeat federal diversity
jurisdiction, the Coul't must ignore the presence of the non-diverse defendant and deny any motion
to remand the matter to state court. Stillwell v. Allstate lns. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (1 1th Cir.
201 1) (quoting Henderson v. Wash. Nat. Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006)). ln such
a case, the plaintiff is said to have (Gfraudulently joined'' the non-diverse defendant. 1d
To establish fraudulent joinder, the removing party must meet the E<heavy'' btlrden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that either: (1) there is no possibility the plaintiff can
establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has fraudulently
pled jmisdictional facts to bring the non-diverse defendant into state court. Id (quoting Crowe v.
Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997(9.
Resolving a fraudulent joinder claim is akin to ruling on a motion for summary judgment:
the Cout't must resolve al1 questions of fact in favor of the plaintiff. Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317,
1322-23 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538; Cabalceta v. StandardFruit Co., 883
F.2d 1553, 1561 (1 1th Cir. 1989:. Before a fact can be resolved in the plaintiff's favor, though, a
question of fact must be raised. ld at 1323. To determine whether a non-diverse party was
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fraudulently joined, the Court looks to the pleadings at the time of removal, and any supplemental
affidavits and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties. 1d at 1322 (quoting Pacheco de
Perez, 139 F.3d at 1380). The Cout't does not, however, weigh the merits of the plaintiff's claim
EEbeyond determining whether it is an arguable one tmder state lam '' Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d
at 1380-81 (quoting Crowe, 1 13 F.3d at 1538).
In short, if there is lçeven a possibility'' that the state coul't would find a cause of action
stated against any of the non-diverse defendants, the Court must find that the joinder was proper,
and then remand the case to state court. See Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1333 (describing standard as GEa
1ax one'').
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction because there is not complete
diversity. The Defendants counter that there is complete diversity because John Doe, who like
Plaintiff is a Florida citizen, was fraudulently joined and thus his citizenship should be ignored
when deciding whether there is diversity jurisdiction.
Against John Doe, the Complaint asserts a single claim for negligence tmder Florida law.
T0 prevail on a negligence claim under Florida law, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant owes
a legal duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the defendant's breach legally
caused injury to plaintiff; and (4) damages resulted from the injuly. See Janis v. Pratt (f' Whitney
Canada, Inc., 370 F.supp.zd 1226, 1229 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing Sexton v. United States, 132
F.supp.zd 967, 974 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Clampitt v. D.J Spencer Sales, 786 So. 2c1 570, 573 (Fla.
2001)).
Under Florida law, corporate officers and employees can be held personally responsible
for their own tortious conduct, even when acting within the scope of their employment. Rossman
4
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v. Moussally, 55 So. 3d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 3d DCA 201 1). However, an employee cannot be held
liable Ctsimply because of his general administrative responsibility for performance of some
f'unction of his employment.'' White v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 918 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1st DCA
2005). Florida courts have held that a corporate officer may owe a duty to a third party when the
corporate officer had some sol4 of personal involvement and/or control over the incident that
caused the third party its injury. See,e.g., id at 358 (holding that store manager could be held
personally liable for customer's injuries because he failed to carly out responsibilities that he was
specifically tasked to perform).
Plaintiff alleges John Doe was the manager on duty at S&S on the date of the incident. (See
Compl. ! 4). According to the Complaint, Jolm Doe owed Plaintiffa duty to maintain the premises
in a reasonably safe condition, adequately inspect the premises, and walm of dangerous conditions,
including liquid, broken glass, and spilled drinlcs that had accumulated on the bathroom foor. (See
id !! 15-16). Plaintiff further alleges that Jolm Doe breached those duties, causing his injuries.
(See fdf ! 16).
But the Complaint contains no factual allegations showing that John Doe was personally
at fault or actively negligent. Plaintiff does nOt allege that John Doe was personally involved in,
or exercised contzol over, the events giving rise to the incident. Nor does Plaintiff allege that Jolm
Doe created the hazardous condition, knew of its existence, was informed of it, or was present in
the area before Plaintiff's injury occurred.
Accordingly, there isno possibility that Plaintiff can prove a cause of action of
negligence- the only claim pleaded at the time of removal- against Jolm DOe under Florida law.
The amended state court complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that John Doe had
the requisite personal involvement or control over the incident. Although Plaintiff alleges that Jolm
5
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Doe, ççgajs the manager on duty'' failed to inspect the premisesadequately, that allegation
establishes, at most, general supervisory or administrative responsibility. It does not bridge the gap
to the ttpersonal involvement and/or control'' required under Florida law. White, 918 So. 2d at 359.
Absent allegations that Jolm Doe Gcpersonally participated in the tortious conduct, he carmot be
held personally liable for negligence under Florida lam '' See Scipione v. Advance Stores Co., Inc.,
No. 8:12-cv-687-T-24-AEP, 2012 WL 3105199, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2012). For this reason,
Defendant has met its high burden of establishing fraudulent joinder, and Jolm Doe's citizenship
will not be considered for puposes of detelnnining diversity jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Where a plaintiff names a non-diverse defendant solely to defeat federal diversity
jurisdiction, CGa district court must ignore the presence of the non-diverse defendant and deny any
motion to remand the matter back to state court.'' Henderson, 454 F.3d at 128 1. In those instances,
a federal court may then appropriately assert its removal diversity jurisdiction over the case. ld.
Accordingly, it is
ADJUDGED that Plaintiff s Motion to Remand is DENIED. lt is further
ADJUDGED that Defendant John Doe is DIMISSED with prejudice. It is further
ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion for Hearing is DENIED AS MOOT. It is further
ADJUDGED that Defendant S&S will file an answer to the Complaint no later than June
24. 2026. VJ 
of June, 2026.DONE A'ND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, thi
FE CO . ORENO
UN
.WIT STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Cotmsel of Record
Case 1:25-cv-25728-FAM   Document 14   Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2026   Page 6 of 6

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