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govinfo:USCOURTS-mied-2_92-cr-81127-40

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan · 2020-08-18

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
   Plaintiff,    Case Number 92-81127 
v.        Honorable David M. Lawson 
 
JOHN GORDON, 
 
   Defendant. 
_____________________________________/ 
 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
 Defendant John Gordon has filed a motion as king the Court to re sentence him to time 
served under the authority of the compassionate release provision of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), 
as amended by section 603(b)(1) of the First Step Act of 20 18, Pub L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 
5239.  The government contends that  the Court has no ju risdiction to entertai n that request at 
present because Gordon has an appeal pending before  the Sixth Circuit on an unrelated issue.  It 
also argues that any sentence reduction should be di sfavored after consider ing the factors in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and denied because Gordon would be a danger to the community if released.  
The Court has jurisdiction to ad judicate Gordon’s motion, but he has not demonstrated that 
immediate release is appropriate or that he qualifies for release under any other provision of section 
3582(c)(1).  The motion will be denied. 
I. 
 Gordon currently is serving a life sentence for his role in a vi olent drug trafficking 
conspiracy that began on the mid-1980s.  The or ganization, known as “The  Best Friends,” was 
responsible for at least eight homicides.  Gordon was convicted for two of the murders after a trial 
that lasted 32 days and involved around 70 witn esses.  Gordon (and others) was convicted of 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, intentional killing in furtherance of conducting 
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a continuing criminal enterprise, and using a fi rearm during and in relati on to a drug trafficking 
crime.  The Honorable Avern Cohn imposed a mandatory life sentence.  Gordon’s convictions and 
sentence were affirmed.  United States v. Polk, 182 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 1999).  
 Gordon’s post-judgment activity has been robust.  He filed multiple motions and has gone 
to the court of appeals six times.  More recently, he moved for relief under the First Step Act, 
arguing that he should be resentenced because hi s crime involved cocaine base, and the penalties 
for transacting in certain quantities of that su bstance were altered by le gislation.  Judge Cohn 
denied that motion because Gordon was not eligible for relief, and Gordon filed a notice of appeal.  
That appeal is being held in abeyance pending a decision by the court of appeals in another, similar 
case.  Pending in this court is a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which Gordon argues 
that because some of his participation in Best Friends took place when he was a juvenile, , his life 
sentence is unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, --- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).   
 Gordon presently is confined by the Bur eau of Prisons (BOP) at FMC Devens, an 
administrative security federal medical facility with an adjacent minimum security satellite camp, 
located in Ayer, Massachusetts.  As of August 3, 2020, the BOP’s website shows 1 inmate who is 
positive for COVID-19, 1 staff who is positive, 2 inmate deaths, no st aff deaths, 50 inmates 
recovered, and 6 staff recovered.  
 Gordon is a 48-year-old African-American ma le.  His medical reco rds confirm that he 
suffers from chronic kidney disease and self-adminis ters peritoneal dialysis via a catheter in his 
abdomen.  He also has a history of blood clots,  high cholesterol, high blood pressure (benign 
essential), anemia, restless leg syndrome, chronic periodontitis, and antisocial personality disorder.  
He has been prescribed several medications.   
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 Gordon’s prison disciplinary record consists of mostly minor infractions.  His most recent 
infractions were in 2019 for failing to follow safety regulations and being unsanitary.  In 2017, he 
was found guilty of insolence toward staff.   
 Gordon has completed several educational and vocational courses during his incarceration.  
In a supplement to his motion, he has attached several certificates of completion.  He also attaches 
letters from his father and his son asking for his release.  
 If released, Gordon says he w ill reside with his common law wife in Phoenix, Arizona.   
II. 
 As a general rule, “a federal court ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has 
been imposed.’”  United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)).  “But that rule comes with a few exceptions, one of which permits compassionate 
release.”  Ibid.  “The request may come through a motion in federal court filed by the Director of 
the Bureau of Prisons. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  Or it may come through a motion filed by the 
inmate after he has ‘fully exhausted all administra tive rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of 
Prisons to bring a motion on the [prisoner]’s behalf’ or after ‘the lapse of 30 days from the receipt 
of such a request by the warden of the [pri soner]’s facility, whichever is earlier.’”  Ibid. (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).   
 Upon a proper motion via either  avenue, the Court may, “[a]fter ‘considering the factors 
set forth in section 3553(a) . . . reduce the prisoner’s  sentence if it finds that ‘extraordinary and 
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’ or if the ‘[prisoner] is at least 70 years of age,’ has 
‘served at least 30 years,’ and meets certain other conditions.”  Ibid. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii)).  However,  prisoners may not seek judicial  relief before they have sought 
release under this statute from the prison warden.  “Even though [the] exhaustion requirement does 
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not implicate [the Court’s] subject-matter jurisdiction, it remains a mandatory condition,” and “[i]f 
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons does not move for compassionate release, a prisoner may 
take his claim to court only by moving for it on his own behalf.  To do that, he must fully exhaust 
all administrative rights to appeal with the pr ison or wait 30 days after his first request to the 
prison.”  Id. at 833-34 (quotations omitted). 
A. 
 The government argues that Gordon’s pending appeal of the denial of his motion under the 
First Step Act deprives the Court of jurisdiction to consider the present motion for compassionate 
release.  As a general matter, filing a notice of appeal transfers adjudicatory authority over a case 
from the district court to the court of appeals.  United States v. Carman , 933 F.3d 614, 617 (6th 
Cir. 2019).  But a notice of appeal “divests the district court of its control [only] over those aspects 
of the case involved in the appeal.”  Ibid. (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co ., 459 
U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam)); see also United St ates v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373, 1382 (6th 
Cir. 1984).  When the notice of appeal is from a final judgment, “expansion of a district court's 
judgment [is] not permitted while an appeal is pending.” NLRB v. Cincinnati Bronze, Inc ., 829 
F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir. 1987).  Nonetheless, the dist rict court retains juri sdiction to enforce the 
judgment, to “proceed w ith matters that are in  aid of the appeal,” Taylor v. KeyCorp , 680 F.3d 
609, 616 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and act on remedial matters unrelated to the merits 
of the appeal, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res. , 71 F.3d 1197, 
1203 (6th Cir. 1995).  
 Gordon’s compassionate release motion ba sed on the COVID-19 pandemic in no way 
relates to any aspect of his First Step Act motion appeal, which is based on a different sentencing 
issue.  That alone distinguish es the cases that the government  relies on.  For instance, in United 
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States v. Martin , No. 18-CR-834-7, 2020 WL 1819961, at *1–*2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2020), the 
defendant appealed the denial of several of this Court’s orders, including orders denying various 
requests to modify the defendant’s sentence.  In his brief on app eal, the defendant also expressly 
challenged the Court’s order de nying the BOP’s previous motion for compassionate release.  
Similarly, in United States v. Walls, No. 92-80236, 2020 WL 1934963 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2020), 
the district court issued an indicative order denying a compa ssionate release motion, but the 
defendant had a pending appeal of the denial of a previous motion for compassionate release based 
on defendant’s serious physical and mental conditions.   
 Gordon’s pending appeal does not address any as pect of his sentence that falls under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which is  the statute that governs the pr esent motion.  Here, he seeks 
emergency relief based on his medical condition a nd the effects of the global pandemic that may 
jeopardize the health and lives of prison inmates.  Although the Court could address the merits of 
the instant motion by means of an  indicative ruling under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
37(a), there is no need to proceed that way beca use this motion does not involve any “aspects of 
the case involved in the appeal.”  Carman, 933 F.3d at 617.   
B. 
 Under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the Court can or der a reduction of a sentence, even to time 
served, first, “after considering th e factors set forth in section 3553(a)  to the extent that they are 
applicable,” second, if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,” and third, 
if the “reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  Th e Sentencing Commission’s policy statement is 
found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which simply recites the statute.  The commentary adds gloss, which 
does not have the force of law.  United States v. Havis , 927 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir.), 
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reconsideration denied, 929 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that the “commentary has 
no independent legal force — it serves only to interpret the Guidelines’ text, not to replace or 
modify it”).   
 The government offers several r easons for denying release.  It insists that compliance with 
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement is mandatory, and points to one line in section 
1B1.13 that requires the prisoner to prove lack of dangerous ness.  But that requirement is a 
condition of 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).  Gordon has inv oked 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which contains no such 
requirement.   
 That is not to say that dangerousness is irrele vant.  It is a factor incorporated in section 
3551(a), which must be “consider[ed]” before rel ease for extraordinary and compelling reasons 
may be allowed.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (requiring a sentencing court to consider “the 
need … to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”).  And any sentence reduction 
also must account for “the seriousness of the offense,” the need “to promote respect for the law,” 
and “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”  Id. § (2)(A), (C).  These factors are to be 
considered together with the prisoner’s circumst ances to arrive at a conclusion that they are 
sufficiently extraordinary and compelling to justify a sentence reduction.   
 Gordon’s crimes were serious — perhaps the most serious known to the law.  He was 
involved in a dangerous, violent drug trafficki ng organization.  He was held responsible for 
murdering two people.  At sent encing, Gordon denied his conduct,  but the jury had determined 
otherwise.  Gordon joined the Be st Friends gang as a youth, but he remained an active member 
into his adulthood, committing crimes (includi ng the murders) until he was apprehended and 
charged in his early twenties.  He has served over two decades  in prison.  He now expresses 
remorse, takes responsibility, a nd explains that his violent upbringing an d youth resulted in his 
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crimes.  Congress, however, determined that crimes like intentional murder should carry a 
mandatory life sentence.  The Court imposed th at sentence, presumably concluding that the 
sentence was necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing Congress identified in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).  One of the goals — protection of the public — was paramount in this case.  Reducing a 
life sentence to time served would not promote respect for the law.  Although Gordon is less of a 
danger to the community due to his age and medical condition, this  does not take away from the 
very serious nature of his crimes.   Nor does the passage of time diminish the seriousness of the 
crimes for which he received a life sentence.  
 Gordon’s prison record is unremarkable.  He has completed seve ral educational and 
vocational courses to better hims elf, including the Thresholds pr ogram, which, according to the 
certificate, is a seven month program consisting of “coursework, journaling, and requirements for 
the spiritual Re-entry.”  But as commendable as Gordon’s conduct in prison has been, it does not 
alter the historical fact that the Court undoubtedly  imposed a sentence that was not greater than 
necessary to achieve congressional  goals.  Eliminating the balan ce of that sentence would not 
promote respect for the law or provide a just punishment for Gordon’s crimes.  Nor would it serve 
as a significant deterrent to othe rs.  Consideration of the factor s in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) does not 
favor a sentence reduction, but they are not disqualifying.   
 To establish extraordinary a nd compelling reasons for the relief he requests, Gordon points 
to the conditions of his physical he alth, arguing that he is vulnerab le to complications if he were 
to contract COVID-19.  And he  is understandably concerned a bout being infected with the 
coronavirus.  “The COVID-19 virus is highly infectious and can be transmitted easily from person 
to person.  COVID-19 fatality rates increase with  age and underlying hea lth conditions such as 
cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, di abetes, and immune compromise.  If contracted, 
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COVID-19 can cause severe complications and d eath.  Because there is no current vaccine, the 
Centers for Disease Control a nd Prevention (“CDC”) recommend s preventative measures to 
decrease transmission such as physical distancing, mask wearing, and increasing focus on personal 
hygiene such as additional hand washing.”  Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2020).  
“The COVID-19 pandemic is extraordinary and unprecedented in modern times in this nation.  It 
presents a clear and present danger to free soci ety for reasons that need no elaboration.”  United 
States of America v. Ortiz, No. 16-439, 2020 WL 3640582, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2020).   
 Moreover, “the crowded nature of federal detention centers presents an outsize risk that the 
COVID-19 contagion, once it gains entry, will spread.  And, realistically, a high-risk inmate who 
contracts the virus while in prison will face challenges in caring for himself.  For these reasons, in 
the past months, numerous [federal] courts . . . have ordered the temporary release of inmates held 
in pretrial or presentencing custody and, in more  limited instances, the co mpassionate release of 
high-risk inmates serving federal sentences.”  Ortiz, 2020 WL 3640582, at *2  (collecting cases; 
footnotes omitted).   
 Gordon argues that he is at a higher risk  for severe illness from COVID-19 because his 
chronic kidney disease places him at a higher risk of complications.  His medical records show 
that he is in “end stage renal disease” and on “per itoneal dialysis,” which he self-administers.  
However, recent records show he is “doing we ll,” despite occasional noncompliance.  His 
hemoglobin and blood chemistry are monitored re gularly.  Under the controlled conditions of 
confinement, Gordon has refu sed medical treatment.  Alt hough the BOP only provided the 
government with medical records from 2019 and 2020 (which total over 1000 pages), they show 
that Gordon has at times refused lab tests, been a no-show for scheduled visits, refused the flu shot, 
refused dental recommendations, and has not consisten tly taken his blood pr essure medication.  
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He has also at times not admini stered his dialysis treatments.  He has engaged in high impact 
physical activity against medical advice.  He recently refused to go to an emergency room as 
recommended for treatment of his kidney disease via hemodialysis, explaining that his refusal was 
due to the fear of catching the virus at an outside facility.  And although as recently as May of this 
year Gordon has begun complained of having  violent shaking episodes and headaches, all 
examinations have reported him to not be in dist ress.  Some medical notes indicate that Gordon 
may be manufacturing his shak ing episodes and suggest he u ndergo a psychological evaluation 
due to his behavior. 
 Gordon’s renal disease is a risk factor that supports, but does not establish, that 
extraordinary and compelling reasons justify a se ntence reduction.  The common features of the 
recent cases where inmates have been granted judicial relief on motions for compassionate release 
due to the pandemic are either (1) properly ex hausted claims that unreasonably were refused 
despite the existence of severe, chronic, or terminal conditions that could warrant release even in 
the absence of a pandemic, or (2) in cases where the defendants had severe medical conditions that 
placed them at high risk of coronavirus complica tions, were housed at a facility with confirmed 
cases, and had served a large majority of their sentences.    E.g., United States v.  Reads, No.  16-
20827, 2020 WL  2572280, at *3 (E.D.  Mich.  May 21, 2020) (ordering compassionate release of 
33-year-old inmate with severe obesity, se vere obstructive sleep apnea, hypertension, and 
“prediabetes”); United States v. Saad , No. 16-20197, 2020 WL 2065476 (E.D.  Mich.  Apr.  29,  
2020)  (ordering  compassionate  re lease  of  inmate  who  had  served 33 m onths of a 72-month 
sentence for a non-violent drug offense, was 71 year s old, and suffered    from    medical    
conditions    including    kidney    disease,    hype rtension,    pulmonary    hypertension, sleep 
apnea, shingles, diabetes, back problems, a frozen thigh from an overdose of coumadin  given  by  
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prison  officials,  and  who  also  had  a  histor y  of  heart  surgery  and  knee  replacement, and a 
recent diagnosis of kidney cancer); United States v. Nazzal , No. 10-20392, 2020 WL 3077948 
(E.D. Mich. June 10, 2020) (ordering compassionate release of 65 year old defendant with a history 
of heart disease, severe asthma, benign prostate cancer, high blood pressure, type 2 diabetes, who 
served 69% of his sentence for a non-violent fraud offense, had only one minor disciplinary 
incident, and was housed at a facility with several confirmed COVID-19 cases); United States of 
America v. Jajun Omar Gardner , No. 14-CR-20735-001, 2020 WL 4200979, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 
July 22, 2020) (ordering compas sionate release where defendant  reported a number of serious 
medical issues, many of which the government did not dispute, including a history of hypertension, 
a heart condition, stage-two kidney disease, hype rlipidemia, lumbar di sc disease, lumbar 
herniation, spinal cord impingement, an artificial knee joint, an artificial shoulder cup, and sickle 
cell trait).  By comparison, Gordon’s argument does not measure up to the same level of urgency.   
 Even if the Court were to conclude that  Gordon’s health conditi ons coupled with the 
conditions of his confinement did meet the extraordinary-and-compelling threshold, consideration 
of the factors found in section 3553(a) counsel against release.   
 None of this is to minimize the seriousne ss of the coronavirus pa ndemic or the alarming 
rapidity of its spread within federal prisons.  But the pandemic is a global phenomenon and some 
risk is inherent no matter where Go rdon resides, either at home or in prison.  He asserts that his 
risk would be lower at home, but he has not put forth any convincing evidence to demonstrate that 
he is at an especially elevated risk of harm in the present situa tion of confinement.  And Arizona 
has a significant number of conf irmed COVID-19 cases, having b ecome one the nations leading 
hotspots of the pandemic.   
 
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III. 
The Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the present motion to reduc e sentence.  Gordon 
has exhausted his administrative remedies, but he has not demonstrated that compassionate release 
under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is justified.   
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for compassionate release 
(ECF No. 2396)  is DENIED. 
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge 
Dated:   August 18, 2020 
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