govinfo:USCOURTS-mied-2_92-cr-81127-41

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, Case Number 92-81127 
v. Honorable David M. Lawson 
JOHN GORDON, 
Defendant. 
_____________________________________/ 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
Defendant John Gordon moves for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying his motion 
for compassionate release.  The Cour
t denied Gordon’s motion because he did not demonstrate an 
extraordinary and compelling reason for his re lease and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
counseled against his release.  Gordon now argues th at the Court erred in fi ve ways, but most of 
those arguments merely rehash old contentions that the Court addressed already.   
Gordon ostensibly brings his “motion for r econsideration” under Fe deral Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b), which provides an avenue for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.   
However, Rule 60(b) is a rule of civil procedure.  A motion for compassionate release is “not a 
civil post-conviction action, but rather a continuation of a criminal case.” United States v. Brown, 
817 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir., 2016) (citations omitted).  Because Gordon’s motion for 
compassionate release is a criminal motion,  he cannot seek relief under Rule 60(b).  See United 
States v. Booker, 352 Fed. App’x. 102, 103 (7th Cir. 2009) (“every circuit court that has addressed 
§ 3582(c)(2) has determined that it  is criminal in na ture and therefore c overed only by rules
applying to criminal cases, not civil cases”).  He must seek relief under the Local Rule 7.1 instead. 
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The differences between Rule 60 and Local Ru le 7.1 are material in two respects.  The 
scope of relief is much broader under Rule 60(b)(6), which permit s Courts to relieve a defendant 
from a judgment or order for “any ot her reason that justifies relief.”   Local Rule 7.1, in contrast, 
requires the defendant to demonstrate a palpable defect that misled the Court and the parties, and 
that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.  E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). 
And as relevant here, the dead line by which a party must bring a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) is 
more flexible; such motions “must be made within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).  A 
motion for reconsideration under LR 7.1(h) “must be  filed within 14 days after entry of the 
judgment or order.”  E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(1).   
The Court denied the defendant’s moti on for compassionate release on August 18, 2020, 
but the defendant did not move for reconsideration until September 15, 2020 — nearly one month 
after the Court’s order and two weeks after the deadline imposed by LR 7.1(h) had passed. 
Because Local Rule 7.1 uses mandatory lan guage for its deadline, Gordon’s motion for 
reconsideration is untimely and can be denied on that ground alone.   
But even if this motion were timely, most  of Gordon’s arguments simply attempt to 
relitigate issues previously decided.  A motion for reconsideration is not intended as a means to 
allow a losing party simply to rehash rejected arguments or to introduce new arguments.  See, e.g. 
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler , 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Thus, 
parties should not use [motions to reconsider] to raise arguments which could, and should, have 
been made before judgment issued.”).   
Old arguments re-presented will not justify reconsideration. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3) 
(“Generally . . . the cour t will not grant motions for rehearin g or reconsideration that merely 
present the same issues ruled upon by the court.”) .  Instead, the moving party must show that the 
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Court made a mistake — a “palpa ble error” — based on the record  before it and rectifying the 
mistake would change the outcome .  E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3); se
e Mich. Dep’t of Treasury v. 
Michalec, 181 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (exp laining that a “palpable defect” is a 
defect which is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain) (citations omitted).   
The non-repetitive arguments are contradicted by the record.  And new arguments “raised 
for the first time in a motion for re consideration at the district c ourt generally [are] forfeited.” 
United States v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 331-32 (6th Cir. 2009).   
The defendant argues that the Court erred by concluding that his medical condition, in light 
of the pandemic, does not amount to an extraordinary and compel ling reason for his release. 
However, aside from generally disagreeing with the Court’s decision, he does not point to a 
specific, palpable error.  The parties provided the Court with the defendant’s medical records, 
which the Court reviewed in making its determin ation.  The defendant now points to three 
declarations from medical experts to support his argument that his medical condition constitutes 
an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.  But those three reports were issued in March 
and April 2020, and the defendant could have introdu ced them before the Court issued its ruling. 
See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 146 F.3d at 374) (“parties should not use [motions 
to reconsider] to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before judgment 
issued.”). Regardless, the introdu ction of differing medical opinions  does not reveal a palpable 
error with the decision, particularly where th e Court acknowledged the defendant’s weakened 
condition.  See Order denying Mot., ECF No. 2425, PageID.18997-98. 
Gordon also disagrees with the Court’s conclusion that the section 3553(a) factors counsel 
against his release.  He argues that he poses no danger to the community because he is in frail 
condition and he would be released in Arizona, far away from his co-defendants.  However, the 
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Court already acknowledged that fact in its decision.  The def
endant may not simply relitigate this 
issue.  
The defendant also argues that several defe ndants subject to the sa me indictment were 
released from prison, and that keeping Gordon in prison therefore is manifestly unjust.  However, 
these defendants were released years ago, a nd Gordon does not say why or how that has any 
bearing on the relief requested here: immediate re lease due to the coronavirus pandemic.   The 
omission of facts about other defe ndants that were never raised by the parties does not constitute 
a palpable error.  
The defendant identifies one potential error: that the Court noted incorrectly that Gordon’s 
murder conviction carried a mandatory life sentence.  Instead, the statute under which Gordon was 
convicted imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years in prison with the possibility of life 
imprisonment or death.  However, any error resu lting from that observation was not palpable as 
the sentencing judge (the Honorable Avern C ohn) found Gordon’s conduc t severe enough to 
warrant a life sentence, and the Court considered other factors in finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
does not favor his release.   
Gordon also asserts that the Court erred by finding that he was convicted of conducting a 
continuing criminal enterprise.  But the Court neve r stated that.  Rather, the Court observed that 
Gordon was convicted of “intentional killing in furtherance of conducting a criminal enterprise” 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A).  Order Denying Mot., ECF No. 2425, PageID.18991-92. 
This was accurate.  Judgment, ECF No. 1368; Second Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 882, 
PaegID.10286 (charging Gordon with intentionally ki lling Dwight Farrell “while engaged in and 
working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise and engaging in an offense punishable 
under section 841(b)(1)(A).”).   
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The defendant also alleges th at the Court improperly found th at he was held responsible 
for murdering two people, when no factual findings to that effect were made.  However, the Court 
properly relied on information in the presentence report that described Gordon’s role in the offense: 
27. On September 12, 1993, at 13000 Gratiot, Detroit, MI, at J.R.’s Used Car Lot,
Stacey Culbert set up the killing of Dwight Farrell, a rival drug dealer, at the
direction of Terrance Brown.  John Gor don shot and killed Farrell, and wounded
two others in the car lot.
29. On April 3, 1993, at 14999 Gratiot, Detroi t, Michigan, Walter Daniels [] was
killed by Edward Dale, John Gordon and Gregory Brown . . . with the assistance of
Thomas Carr who drove the getaway car.  At least one witness testified that the
shooters in this case were Edward Da le and John Gordon, while Gregory Brown
was inside a store.
Even if the Court mistakenly found that the defendant was held responsible for the murders of two 
people instead of one, that does not constitute a palpable error.  The Court found the defendant’s 
crime was among “the mo st serious known to th e law.”  Order Denyi ng Mot., ECF No. 2425, 
PageID.18996.  The Court’s observation stands true even if the defendant was responsible for only 
one murder.   
Finally, Gordon argues that the Court relied on faulty or incomplete medical records, which 
suggested that he suffers from antisocial pers onality disorder and possibly manufactured his 
shaking episodes.  However, it is not apparent how jettisoning these findings — that Gordon has 
antisocial personality order and may be feigning the severity of his body shakes — would lead to 
a different result.  Even if Gordon genuinely suffers from body shakes and does not have antisocial 
personality disorder, those facts do not compel a finding that he demonstrated an extraordinary 
and compelling reason for his release or that the section 3553(a) factor s support his release. 
Moreover, the evidence he cites for his position is unhelpful and inconclusive.   
In its order denying Gordon’s motion, the Court stat ed that “some medical notes indicate 
that Gordon may be manufacturing his shaking episodes and suggest he undergo a psychological 
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evaluation due to his behavior.” Order Denying Mot., ECF No. 2425, PageID.18999.  Gordon now 
argues that he, “[i]n fact . . . did undergo a psychological evaluation to follow
 up on this 
suggestion,” and attached the repor t, which he contends disputes the finding that he feigned his 
body shakes.  Mot. Reconsideration, ECF N o. 2426, PageID.19014.  The evaluation concluded 
that no follow up was needed an d that Gordon appeared “alert , oriented, and coherent.” 
Psychology Report, ECF No. 2526-9, PaegID.19057.  But it did not state that the shakes were real; 
rather, the report suggests the opposite: “Gordon explained, due to several medical conditions, his 
body oftentimes shakes.  Gordon reportedly told his medical provider his body and head shake ‘so 
hard that his brains are coming out of his ears.’  Gordon explained he was exaggerating and is 
currently ‘feeling great.’  He stated his medical issues have since been addressed.” Ibid.  
To rebut the Court’s conclusi on that he has antisocial pers onality disorder, the defendant 
refers to a psychology program report from 2012 that indicated he was doing well in the sessions 
and was dedicated to the program’s “pro-soc ial message.”  2012 Psychology Report, ECF No. 
2426-7.   Positive remarks from a 2012 psychology program do little to change the defendant’s 
current diagnosis.   Medical Records dated Sept. 18, 2020, ECF No 2435, PageID.19206 (reflecting 
that the defendant currently suffers from antisocial personality disorder).  Nor does the defendant’s 
antisocial personality disorder diagnosis have much to do with the Court’s ultimate conclusion.   
Gordon has not identified a palp able defect that misled the C ourt and the parties, or that 
correcting such a defect would result in a differe nt disposition of the motion for compassionate 
release.   
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 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant’s motion  for reconsideration (ECF 
No. 2426) is DENIED. 
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge 
Dated:   December 10, 2020 
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