govinfo:USCOURTS-mied-2_92-cr-81127-42

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
   Plaintiff,    Case Number 92-81127 
v.        Honorable David M. Lawson 
 
EDWARD DALE, 
 
   Defendant. 
_____________________________________/ 
 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE 
 Defendant Edward Dale has filed a motion asking the Court to reduce his prison sentence 
to time served under the compas sionate release provision of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as 
amended by section 603(b)(1) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239.  
The Honorable Avern Cohn had sentenced Dale in 1996 to life in prison for his part in eight drug-
related homicides.  Dale presents multiple arguments for why extraordinary and compelling 
reasons warrant a sentence reduction, but all must be discounted save for his rehabilitation, which 
appears to be significant and sin cere.  However, that personal  reformation does not amount to 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant su ch a reduction,” as section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) 
requires.  Moreover, the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the seriousness of his 
offenses, counsel against his release.  His motion, therefore, will be denied.   
I. 
 Defendant Edward Dale currently is serving a life sentence for his role in a violent drug 
trafficking conspiracy that began in the mid-1980s.  Dale was a teenager at the time he first joined 
the group.  The organization, known as “The Best Friends,” was responsible for at least eight 
homicides.  Forty-four defendants were indicted as part of the organization, and eight, including 
Dale, eventually went to trial.  The trial lasted 32 days and i nvolved around 70 witnesses.  Dale 
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was convicted of three of the murders (intentional killing in furtherance of conducting a continuing 
criminal enterprise), as well as conspiracy to  distribute cocaine and co caine base, and using a 
firearm during and in relation to a drug traffick ing crime.  Judge Cohn imposed concurrent life 
sentences, which were mandated by the sentencing guideline regime in effect at the time.  Dale’s 
convictions and sentences were affirmed.  United States v. Polk, 182 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 1999).  He 
has been imprisoned for more than 26 years.   
 Dale also has a prior criminal history.  He first became involved in the Best Friends gang 
around the age of 15 or 16.  At 19, he was convicted  of obstructing a police officer and resisting 
arrest.  Two years later, he wa s charged with possession of a load ed firearm in association with 
stealing a vehicle.  He remained involved with th e Best Friends while on parole for that offense.  
He was 22 and 23 years old when he committed the murders in this case.   
 Dale’s post-judgment activity has been robust.  He filed multiple motions and has gone to 
the court of appeals six times.  More recently, he moved for relief under the First Step Act, arguing 
that he should be resentenced because his crim e involved cocaine base, and the penalties for 
transacting in certain quantities of that substance were altered by legislation.  ECF No. 2365.  That 
motion remains pending before this Court. 
 Dale is presently imprisoned at FCI Talladega , a medium-security fac ility in Talladega, 
Alabama.  Mot. for Compassionate Release, ECF No. 2472, PageID.19635, 19649-50.  The facility 
currently houses 943 inmates.   As of January 17, 2022,  49 inmates and 12 staff members were 
infected with COVID-19, five inmates had died from COVID-19, and 272 inmates had been 
infected and recovered from the virus.  Add itionally, 827 inmates (including Dale) and 165 staff 
members have been vaccinated.  See https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/.   
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 Dale is a 52-year-old African American male.  His medical records confirm that he suffers 
from type 2 diabetes, hypertension, and other physical ailments.  Med. Records, ECF No. 2473-1, 
PageID.19717.  He takes several medications to control his diabetes, including Metformin, 
Atorvastatin, Lisinopril, and insulin.  Ibid.   
 Dale contends that he has reformed himself in prison.  His disciplin ary record is nearly 
spotless, with no reported incidents over the last  10 years.  Case Manager Letter, ECF No. 2472-
2, PageID.19658.  He has exhibited a strong work ethic, working at the prison’s education library 
and, currently, as a Health Services Orderly.  Mot. for Compassionate Release, ECF No. 2472, 
PageID.19633.  He has obtained his GED and encourages other inmates to do the same, and he has 
completed extensive vocational and social progr amming, including a number of courses focused 
on preparing fo r reentry.  Ibid.; Program Review, ECF No. 2472-5, PageID.19682.  He has 
submitted more than 20 letters from BOP staff attesting to hi s rehabilitation and noting his 
mentorship, professionalism, positive outlook, peacef ul nature, and preparedness to work in and 
contribute to the civilian world.  Letters from BOP Staff, Ex. B, ECF No. 2472-2; Ex. A, ECF No. 
2485-2. 
 If released, Dale plans to live with his niece in Glendale, Arizona, where his sisters and a 
large number of his extended family members also live.  His sister states that she will employ Dale 
in one of her businesses maintaining properties, and his other sister states that she will provide him 
with other support to help him get back on his f eet.  Other family member s have also offered to 
help him find employment, training, housing, and a community outside of prison.   
 Dale requested a reduction in sentence from the warden at FCI Talladega based on his 
underlying health issues and the length of his sentence.  The warden denied his request on July 7, 
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2020.  Dale then asked the Warden to reconsider, which the warden also denied.  Dale subsequently 
filed the present motion for compassionate release.   
II. 
 By now it is well understood that, generally, “a federal court ‘may no t modify a term of 
imprisonment once it has been imposed,’” United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)), and that this “r ule comes with a few ex ceptions, one of which 
permits compassionate release,” ibid.  The request for such relief must be presented by a motion 
filed in federal court, either by the Director of  the Bureau of Prisons, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), 
“[o]r it may come thr ough a motion filed by the inmate af ter he has ‘fully exhausted all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of th e Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the 
[prisoner]’s behalf’ or after ‘the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden 
of the [prisoner]’s facility, whichever is earlier,’”  ibid. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).   
 Upon a proper motion via either  avenue, the Court may, “[a]fter ‘considering the factors 
set forth in section 3553(a) . . . reduce the prisoner’s  sentence if it finds that ‘extraordinary and 
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’ or if the ‘[prisoner] is at least 70 years of age,’ has 
‘served at least 30 years,’ and meets certain other conditions.”  Ibid. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii)).  Dale relies on subparagra ph (i) of the statute.  Under that provision, the 
Court can order a reduction of a sentence, even to time served, by following a procedure that the 
court of appeals has distilled into three steps.  First, consider whether “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”  Second, determine if the “re duction is consistent 
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”  Third, “consider[] the 
factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”  United States v. Ruffin, 
978 F.3d 1000, 1004-06 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).   
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 The Sentencing Commission’s pol icy statement to be considered under step two is found 
in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which simply recites the st atute.  The commentary adds gloss, which does 
not have the force of law.  United States v. Havis , 927 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir.), reconsideration 
denied, 929 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that the “commentary has no independent 
legal force — it serves only to interpret the Guidelines’ text, not to replace or modify it”).  That 
has led the court of appeals in its evolving guidance on the subject to hold that district courts should 
dispense with step two when the motion for compassionate release comes from a prisoner and not 
the BOP.  United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1109 (6th Cir. 2020) (“We now join the majority 
of district courts and the Second Circuit in holding that the passage of the First Step Act rendered 
§ 1B1.13 ‘inapplicable’ to cases where an imprisoned person file s a motion for compassionate 
release.”) (citing United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020)).  
 More recently, the court of appeals took the explanation a step further.  In United States v. 
Elias, 984 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2021), the court ascr ibed Congress’s amendment of section 
3582(c)(1) to the BOP’s “rare[]” ex ercise of its power to move for sentence reductions, that “the 
program was plagued by mismanagement,” and that “the BOP ‘ha[ d] no timeliness standards for 
reviewing . . . requests.’”  984 F.3d at 518 (quoting United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 231-
32 (2d Cir. 2020)).  It reaffirmed Jones’s holding “that § 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy 
statement for compassionat e-release motions brought directly by inmates, and so district courts 
need not consider it when ruling on those motions.”  Id. at 519-20.  It then held that “in the absence 
of an applicable policy statement for inmate-file d compassionate-release motions, district courts 
have discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’ on their own initiative.”  Ibid.  However, 
the defendant still must satisfy the other two requirement s, and his “failure to meet any one of 
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those criteria” will result in  the denial of his motion.  United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 502 
(6th Cir. 2021). 
A. 
 The government concedes that the request for release has been properly exhausted, so that 
threshold requirement for relief has been satisfie d.  The government cont ends, however, that the 
defendant cannot demonstrate extr aordinary or compelling reasons justifying immediate release, 
and that the factors in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) do not favor immediate release. 
B. 
 Addressing the first element — extraordinar y and compelling reasons — Dale argues that 
four reasons exist for his release that together satis fy that requirement.  Firs t, he argues that his 
youth at the time of the convicted conduct, together with the impact of childhood trauma, rendered 
him unable to make informed deci sions or control his impulses and risk-seeking behavior.  He 
notes that the senten cing guidelines are no longer mandatory, see United States v. Booker , 543 
U.S. 220 (2005), and that courts have considered th is change in the law in finding extraordinary 
and compelling reasons for sentence reductions  where young people were sentenced to long 
incarceration terms and exhibited rehabilitation in prison.   
 Second, Dale argues that the disparity betw een his sentence and th e sentences of his 
codefendants is an extraordinary and compelling reason for reduction.  He observes that four 
codefendants who were involved in the murders — Stacey Culbert, Thomas Carr, Charles Wilkes, 
and Lonnie O’Bryant — are no longer imprisoned or under federal supervision.  He also maintains 
that his sentence is unusually harsh compared to the sentences received by similar defendants 
across the country, both now and at the time he committed the murders.   
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 Third, Dale argues that his reha bilitation is profound, and that his successful efforts toward 
self-betterment may be considered alongside other factors. 
 Fourth, Dale argues that he is showing signs of  severe and accelerated aging.  He notes that 
he suffers from diabetes and hypertension and argues that these conditions put him at high risk of 
severe illness from COVID-19.  He acknowledges that  he has received two doses of the Pfizer 
vaccine, but he argues that the risk of breakthro ugh infections persists and that the BOP does not 
perform sufficient testing.   
 This fourth argument does not help Dale very much.  The Sixth Circuit has all but held that 
the availability of the COVID vaccine undercuts a prisoner’s attempt to show extraordinary and 
compelling reasons for a sentence reduction based on the pandemic.  See United States v. Lemons, 
15 F.4th 747, 751 (6th Cir. 2021).   
 The government contends that the other reasons are insufficient as a matter of law, because 
recent decisions by the court of appeals in United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2021), 
and United States v. Jarvis , 999 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2021), preclud e courts from construing non-
retroactive changes in the law or facts that existed when the defendant was sentenced as 
extraordinary and compelling justifications for sentence reductions.     
 However, since the government filed its brief in  this case, the court of appeals has issued 
rulings that require the Court to consider whether these other factors, together with his remarkable 
rehabilitation and the pandemic, provide extraordinary and compelling reasons for such relief.  See 
United States v. McCall , 20 F.4th 1108, 1115 (6th Cir. 2021).  In  that case, the court of appeals 
clarified that “a court may consider a nonretroactiv e change in the law as one of several factors 
forming extraordinary and comp elling circumstances qualifying for sentence reduction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).”  Id. at 1116.  The court went so far as to say that a district court abuses 
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its discretion when it fails to consider wh ether the combination of  the COVID-19 pandemic, 
rehabilitation efforts, and a nonretroactive change in sentencing law constitute extraordinary and 
compelling circumstances warranting a prisoner’s compassionate release.  Id. at 1113.    
 We have observed on other occasions that the Sixth Circuit “has not traced a consistent 
path when dealing with” the impact of the non- retroactive sentencing reforms on compassionate 
release motions.  United States v. Davenport, No. 91-81019, 2021 WL 3489707, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 9, 2021).  In United States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755, 763 (6th Cir. 2021), the court of appeals 
held that, “in making an individualized determination about whether extraordinary and compelling 
reasons merit compassionate releas e, a district court may include, along with other factors , the 
disparity between a defendant's actual sentence and the sentence that he would receive if the First 
Step Act applied” (emphasis adde d).  Shortly thereafter, differ ent panels published conflicting 
opinions in Jarvis and Hunter, which held that courts may not treat non-retroactive amendments 
in the First Step Act as extraordinary and compelling explanation for a sentence reduction.  Jarvis, 
999 F.3d at 445; Hunter, 12 F.4th at 563.  Instead, the Sixth Circuit held that non-retroactive 
amendments, such as changes to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s stacking provisions, only may be considered 
when balancing the section 3553(a) factors upon a showing of “some other” extraordinary and 
compelling reason for a sentence reduction.  Jarvis, 999 F.3d at 763. 
 Considering this “intra-circuit split,” the McCall court explained that Owens controls.  
McCall, 20 F.4th at 1114.  The court of appeals reasoned that, “[b]ecause Owens was published 
before Jarvis, Owens ‘remains controlling authority’ that binds future panels.”  Ibid. (citing Salmi 
v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs ., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985)).  Thus, “[f]aced with the 
conflict between Owens and Jarvis, courts ‘must follow’ . . . Owens” and consider non-retroactive 
changes in the law as one of several factors warranting compassionate release.  Ibid. 
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 But Dale’s other arguments do not convey h im past the threshold.  He contends that Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012), requires the Court to make individualized consideration of 
factors that were not available to the Court at sentencing.  This is also the thrust of Dale’s argument 
for relief under the First Step Act.  See ECF No. 2365.   
 The government argues that Dale’s age wa s well known to the Court at the time of 
sentencing, and that the cour t of appeals was clear in Hunter, 12 F.4th at 570-71, that age and 
sentencing disparities are among the facts known at sentencing and that courts thus may not weigh 
them to find extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.  See also United States 
v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747, 750 (6th Cir. 2021) (applying Hunter to bar consideration of age upon a 
motion for compassionate release).  But that argument ignores the reality that these were 
mandatory sentences, and these factors could not have impacted the Court’s sentencing decision.  
That does not mean, however, that they are relevant now.   
  The Supreme Court recognized in Miller that juveniles are “constitutionally different from 
adults for purposes of sentenci ng,” 567 U.S. at 471, for several reas ons.  First, their immaturity 
and “underdeveloped sense of respon sibility” is said to lead to  “recklessness, impulsivity, and 
heedless risk-taking.”  Ibid. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67-68 (2010), and Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).  Second, children are thought to be more vulnerable to 
negative peer pressure and other influences and “lack the ability to extricate themselves from 
horrific, crime-producing settings.”  Ibid.  Third, because a child’s character is still developing, 
“his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions le ss likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] 
deprav[ity].’”  Ibid. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).  However, when it comes to sentencing, the 
Sixth Circuit has drawn a bright line base d entirely on chronologica l age, finding that Miller’s 
consideration for juveniles does not migrate to young adulthood.  United States v. Marshall, 736 
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F.3d 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Using chronological age as the touchstone for determining whether 
an individual is a juvenile or an adult is the standard approach in our legal system.”); see 
also Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 571 (observing that “Hunter was not a minor at the time of his offense, 
so his life sentence was legally valid”) (citing Jones v. Mississippi, --- U.S. ---, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 
1317 (2021)).  Even if that were not the case, th ough, it would be difficult to  characterize Dale’s 
crimes as a manifestation of hi s recklessness and impulsivity.  He was not involved in a single-
episode offense; over a span of time, he killed three people who were involved or competed with 
his drug trafficking organization.  That cannot be chalked up merely to recklessness, negative peer 
pressure, or youthful indiscretion.   
 Dale also argues that Hunter does not preclude the Court fr om considering any disparity 
between his sentence and those received by his codefendants, because their sentences and multiple 
resentences came after the trial cour t entered judgment in his case.  Hunter suggests otherwise, 
noting that “[t]he extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons requirement in § 3582(c)(1)(A) cannot be 
met based on a mere difference of opinion regardi ng the significance of the facts that existed at 
sentencing.”  Ibid.; see also United States v. Tomes , 990 F.3d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding 
that a prisoner cannot show that extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranted his release 
based solely on the disparity between th e sentence he received and the sentence they would have 
received if they were sentenced after the First Step Act).  But that disparity still may be considered 
as a factor.  McCall, 20 F.4th at 1113 (indicating that “nonretroactive sentencing disparities could 
support a compassionate-release motion when combined with  other factors”) (citing Owens, 996 
F.3d at 763).  That factor does not weigh much in  the balance here, though.  Dale’s codefendants 
received shorter sentences because they plead ed guilty and cooperated.  “There is nothing 
‘extraordinary’ or ‘compelling’ about a sentence  disparity that results from a co-defendant’s 
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decision to plead guilty and assist the government.”  Hunter, 12 F.4th at 572; see also United States 
v. Conatser , 514 F.3d 508, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Di sparities between the sentences of 
coconspirators can exist for valid reasons, such as differences in criminal histories, the offenses of 
conviction, or one coconspirator's decision to pl ead guilty and cooperate with the government.”)  
Moreover, there was no sentencing disparity betw een Dale and his codefendants who also were 
convicted at trial of intentional killings and also received life sentences due the seriousness of their 
crimes.   
 Dale has offered substantial ev idence of his rehabilitation, which also is a factor that must 
be considered along with all the other relevant  information bearing on the question whether 
extraordinary and compelling reasons justify relief.  McCall, 20 F. 4th at 1113.  Dale’s 
rehabilitation certainly appears profound: he has no disciplinary record to speak of, and the almost 
two-dozen letters he su bmitted from prison staff indicate that he has a strong work ethic and 
exceptional commitment to community service.  But rehabilitation al one cannot provide an 
extraordinary and compelling re ason for compassionate release.  28 U.S.C. § 994(t); McCall, 20 
F. 4th at 1114.  And although this factor weighs heavily in Dale’s favor, it does not combine with 
the other considerations to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief under section 
3582(c)(1)(A).    
C. 
 Even if the defendant has made a satisfact ory showing of extraordinary and compelling 
reasons under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the Court must also consider the relevant factors listed in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 There is no requirement that th e prisoner must establish a lack of dangerousness, as is the 
case for compassionate release applications made by the BOP.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; Jones, 980 
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F.3d at 1109 (“Until the Sentencing Commission update s § 1B1.13 to reflect the First Step Act, 
district courts have full disc retion in the interim to determine whether an ‘extraordinary and 
compelling’ reason justifies compassionate release when an imprisoned person files a § 
3582(c)(1)(A) motion.”); Elias, 984 F.3d at 519-20 (same).     
 That is not to say that dangerousness is irrele vant.  It is a factor incorporated in section 
3553(a), which must be “consider[ed]” before rel ease for extraordinary and compelling reasons 
may be allowed.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (requiring a sentencing court to consider “the 
need . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”).  And any sentence reduction 
also must account for “the seriousness of the offense,” the need “to promote respect for the law,” 
and concerns about “afford[ing] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”  Id. § (2)(A), (C).  These 
factors are to be considered together with the prisoner’s circumstances to  arrive at a conclusion 
that they are sufficiently compelling to justify a sentence reduction. 
 The court of appeals has held that the Cour t’s “initial balancing of the § 3553(a) factors 
during [the defendant’s] sentencing” is presumed to “remai n[] an accurate assessment as to 
whether those factors justify a sentence reduction.”  United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 954 
(6th Cir. 2021).  In this case, however, it does not appear that Judge Cohn evaluated those factors, 
because the life sentences were mandatory at the time.   
 One important factor, of cour se, is the applicable sentencing guideline range, 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(4)(A), which in this case was and still is lif e in prison.  That alone reflects the fact that 
Dale’s crimes were serious — perhaps the most se rious known to the law.  He was involved in a 
dangerous, violent drug traffickin g organization.  He was held responsible for murdering three 
people.  At sentencing, Dale deni ed his conduct, but the jury had determined otherwise.  Dale 
joined the Best Friends gang as a youth, but he remained an active memb er into his adulthood, 
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committing crimes (including the murders) until he was apprehe nded and charged in his early 
twenties.  He has served more than two decades  in prison.  He now expresses remorse, takes 
responsibility, and explains that his violent upbringing and youth resulted in his crimes.  Congress, 
however, determined that crim es like intentional murder should carry a ma ndatory minimum 
sentence of 20 years up to life in prison, and the death penalty also was an option.   21 U.S.C. § 
848(e)(1)(A).   
 The court of appeals has expressed the view that when the crime is murder and the death 
penalty is an option, as here, the seriousness of the offense is the factor under section 3553(a) that 
carries considerable, if not preemptive, weight, United States v. Bass, 17 F.4th 629, 638 (6th Cir. 
2021) (finding that the reduction of a life sentence to “a prison term of twenty-two years does not 
on its face appear proportionate to the seriousness of Bass’s offenses, especially in light of the fact 
that his crimes rendered him eligible for the deat h penalty”), even in the face of an exacting and 
meticulous consideration of the other factors by a district judge, id. at 644 (White, J., dissenting) 
(finding that “the district cour t adequately explained its decisi on and did not abuse its discretion 
in concluding otherwise,” and cautioning that the court of appeals “must apply the same rules on 
review without regard to whether the government or the inmate is aggrieved by the district court’s 
decision”).  That factor weighs heavily here, at least as far as section 3582(c)(1)(A) is concerned.  
The Court imposed a life sentence, which the Sentencing Commission presumably concluded was 
necessary to achieve the goals of  sentencing Congress identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  One of 
the goals — protection of the publi c — was paramount in this case.  Reducing a life sentence to 
time served would not promote re spect for the law.  Although Dale is less of a danger to the 
community due to his age and medical condition, the passage of time does not take away from the 
very serious nature of his crimes.  
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 That is not to say, however, that the passa ge of time cannot change a person who is 
receptive to counselling, reflection, and the insight  that accompanies it.  The evidence Dale has 
presented to the Court easily establishes that he is such a person.  Witness the 20-some letters from 
BOP staff attesting to his rehabilitation; ex tolling his mentorship, pr ofessionalism, positive 
outlook, and peaceful nature; and certifying his pr eparedness to work in and contribute to the 
civilian world.  But that is not enough to auth orize a court to shorten his sentence under the 
compassionate release statute.  Dale may be an  appropriate candidate fo r consideration of an 
executive commutation.  See Dennis v. Terris , 927 F.3d 955, 957 (6th Ci r. 2019) (quoting U.S. 
Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. (“The President . . . sh all have the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offences against the United States.”)).  That  relief, however, must co me from the executive 
through the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney.    
III. 
 Dale again has exhausted his administrative remedies, but he has not  demonstrated that 
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is justified.   
 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant’s second motion for compassionate 
release (ECF No. 2472) is DENIED. 
  s/David M. Lawson  
  DAVID M. LAWSON 
  United States District Judge 
 
Dated:   January 18, 2022 
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