govinfo:USCOURTS-alnd-2_25-cv-01695-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DOSTER CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

EXPERT CLIMATE CONTROL,
LLC,

Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Doster Construction Company, Inc. has sued Expert Climate Control, LLC for
breach of contract and breach of warranty. (Doc. 1). Climate Control has asked the
Court to dismiss Doster’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper
venue. (Doc. 7). Alternatively, Climate Control asks the Court to transfer this action
to the Southern District of Texas or the Middle District of Florida. (Doc. 7).
To address Climate Control’s motion, the Court describes the procedural
standards for Climate Control’s challenges to personal jurisdiction and venue. Next,
the Court summarizes Doster’s allegations against Climate Control and the evidence
the parties have submitted concerning personal jurisdiction and venue. Finally, the
Court describes the legal standards that govern personal jurisdiction and motions to
transfer venue and applies those standards to the record in this case to resolve
FILED

2026 Jun-01 AM 09:37
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

Climate Control’s motion.
I.
Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may challenge a federal court’s authority to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant because of the defendant’s lack of contact
with the federal forum. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). When a defendant moves to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, a defendant typically asserts that it would be unfair
to have to defend against the plaintiff’s claims in the forum in which the plaintiff
filed suit because the defendant is not at home in the forum and has not acted in the
forum in a way that would cause the defendant to expect to have to litigate there.
A plaintiff who sues a non-resident defendant “bears the initial burden of
alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of
jurisdiction.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir.
2009)). A district court must accept as true the jurisdictional allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint unless “a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction ‘by
submitting affidavit evidence in support of its position.’” Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1350
(quoting Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990)). If a defendant
submits jurisdictional affidavits, then the burden returns to the plaintiff to provide
evidence that supports the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant.
Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360

(11th Cir. 2006). When the parties present conflicting evidence, a district court
“must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Stubbs, 447 F.3d
at 1360.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), a party may move to
dismiss a claim for improper venue. When considering a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, a
court “consciously look[s] beyond the mere allegations of a complaint, and, although
[the court] continue[s] to favor the plaintiff’s facts in the context of any actual
evidentiary dispute, [the court] do[es] not view the allegations of the complaint as
the exclusive basis for decision.” Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d
1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012). A district court’s ruling under Rule 12(b)(3) is
reviewed “with some measure of deference.” Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1238–39.
Even when venue is proper in a district, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, a court
may transfer a case to another venue for the convenience of the parties and in the
interest of justice. “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district
court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case
consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
When deciding motions for transfer of venue, a district court may consider
information provided in affidavits. See Marmol v. Adkins, 655 F.2d 594, 596 (5th
Cir. Sept. 8, 1981) (explaining that arguments regarding venue were unpersuasive

because they were “not supported by affidavit or other evidence”); Marbury-Pattillo
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bayside Warehouse Co., 490 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1974)
(describing affidavits in support of and in opposition to motion for change of
venue).1 A district court must take the facts alleged in a complaint as true, “to the
extent they are uncontroverted by defendants’ affidavits,” and the court must
“construe all reasonable inferences” in favor of the plaintiff. Delong Equip. Co. v.
Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir. 1988).
II.
Doster is an Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in
Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 1, p. 1, ¶ 1). Doster has constructed buildings in 33
states and employs more than 200 people. (Doc. 7-3).2 Climate Control is a Texas
LLC with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. (Doc. 1, pp. 1–2, ¶ 2;
Doc. 7-5, pp. 1–2, ¶¶ 3–4). Climate Control has 19 employees. (Doc. 7-5, p. 3, ¶
9).

1 The Marmol and Marbury-Pattillo decisions are binding precedent in this circuit. Bonner v. City
of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (the ‘former Fifth’ or the ‘old Fifth’), as that court existed on
September 30, 1981, handed down by that court prior to the close of business on that date, shall be
binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, for this court, the district courts, and the bankruptcy
courts in the circuit.”)

2 This document is a screenshot of Doster’s website. The webpage is accessible at DOSTER
CONSTRUCTION, Who We Are , https://www.dosterconstruction.com/who-we-are/
[https://perma.cc/NJ3Q-7T6X] (archived March 31, 2026).

Since 2014, Doster and Climate Control have entered nine construction
subcontracts. (Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 8). This action concerns the parties’ eighth contract,
in which Climate Control agreed to perform HVAC work for Doster on a
construction project in Sanford, Florida. (Doc. 1, p. 2, ¶ 3; Doc. 7-5, pp. 2–3, ¶ 6;
Doc. 11-1, p. 4, ¶ 8).3
In June 2021, Doster contracted with CC Parkway Owner, LLC to construct
an apartment complex in Sanford, Florida. (Doc. 11-1, p. 3, ¶ 4; see Doc. 7-5, pp.
2–3, ¶ 6). Doster solicited bids from subcontractors, including Climate Control, for
the project’s HVAC work. (See Doc. 12-3, p. 4, ¶ 11).4 In March 2021, Climate
Control emailed Doster a proposal for the HVAC subcontract work. (Doc. 11-1, p.
4, ¶ 7). Over the next six months, the parties’ negotiated the subcontract’s terms.
(See Doc. 11, pp. 9, 15; Doc. 11-1, p. 4, ¶ 9). During the negotiations, Climate
Control’s representatives in Texas communicated with Doster’s representative in
Alabama via mail and email. (See Doc. 11-1, p. 4, ¶ 9; Doc. 12-3, p. 2, ¶ 6). In
September 2021, the parties finalized an agreement. (See Doc. 11-1, pp. 4–5, ¶ 10).
Jesus Gonzalez virtually signed a subcontract dated July 29, 2021 on behalf of

3 Under the parties ninth contract, Climate Control agreed to work on an apartment development
in Huntsville, Alabama. (Doc. 11-1, p. 6, ¶ 15). The record does not explain the nature and scope
of the parties’ first seven contracts.

4 The parties dispute who initiated the Florida subcontract. (Compare Doc. 11-1, p. 4, ¶ 7 with
Doc. 12-3, p. 4, ¶ 11). During a telephone conference on January 22, 2026, Doster indicated that
it asked several subcontractors whether they planned to bid on the project, and Climate Control
submitted a bid in response. A transcript of the telephone conference is available upon request.

Climate Control. (Doc. 11-1, pp. 4–5, ¶ 10; Doc. 11-1, pp. 22, 55). Then, Mitchell
Jones virtually signed the subcontract on behalf of Doster. (Doc. 11-1, pp. 4–5, ¶
10; Doc. 11-1, p. 22, 55).
Under the September 2021 subcontract, Climate Control agreed to install “all
mechanical heating and cooling systems” for the apartment building units, common
areas, amenities, and related improvements. (Doc. 7-2, p. 14). The subcontract
included a warranty clause, which provides:
Subcontractor warrants the Work to Contractor under the same terms
and for at least the same period as Contractor has warranted the Work.
Subcontractor assumes and shall perform all warranty obligations of
Contractor that relate to the Work, and shall procure any warranties
from others concerning the Work that may be required by the Prime
Contract. Without limiting any of Subcontractor’s warranty
obligations, Contractor and Owner are intended third-party
beneficiaries of any warranties concerning the Work procured or
received by Subcontractor from others. In addition, Subcontractor
warrants that the Work will be performed in strict accordance with all
terms of this Subcontract and in conformity with the best practices of
the construction industry, and that after completion, the Work will
continue to perform and fulfill satisfactorily its intended function and
purpose for a period not less than the maximum duration of any statute
of limitations or rule of repose applicable to any claim or suit against
Contractor or Contractor’s surety arising in whole or in part from
Subcontractor’s Work. Subcontractor further warrants and agrees that
it will exercise due care in the performance of the Work, and will
execute the Work in a non-negligent manner. Subcontractor’s warranty
obligations survive termination of this Subcontract.

All Work is subject to approval by Owner. If any part of the Work is
determined to be defective or otherwise to constitute a breach of any of
Subcontractor’s warranties, Subcontractor, at its own expense, shall
promptly correct or replace the same (as directed by Owner), and shall
repair or replace any other work, materials, or property damaged or

required to be redone as a result of such correction or replacement.
Nothing in this Paragraph may be interpreted to restrict Contractor’s
remedies, or the liability of Subcontractor or its surety, for any breach
of Subcontractor’s warranties.

Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the obligations of
Subcontractor under this Paragraph shall be construed to be a written
express warranty for a term of years after substantial completion of the
Work within the meaning of Ala. Code § 6-5-227 and any similar
applicable statutes. The intent of the parties is that Contractor’s right
and ability to enforce the warranty obligations of Subcontractor and its
surety shall under no circumstances expire or become barred by any
statute of limitations or rule of repose until at least one (1) year after
the date beyond which no person or entity can bring any suit or action,
or enforce any right, against Contractor on account of any defect,
deficiency, non-conformity, or performance failure of or in
Subcontractor’s Work. One Year parts & labor warranty with four
additional years of equipment by manufacturer.

(Doc. 7-2, p. 4).
Climate Control sent Julian Gonzalez to Sanford, Florida, to supervise the
HVAC work on the apartment complex. (Doc. 12-2, p. 2, ¶ 7). Climate Control
ordered materials for the HVAC work through supply houses in Houston, Texas.
(Doc. 12-2, p. 2, ¶¶ 5–6). While working on the apartment development, Climate
Control provided documents to Doster’s representatives in Birmingham via email
and drop box and communicated with Senior Project Manager Tyler Schnell in
Birmingham via email and telephone. (Doc. 11-1, pp. 5–6, ¶¶ 12–13).
In May 2024, Doster completed the apartment complex and turned the
property over to the owner. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 19). On June 4, 2024, Climate Control
executed a “supplemental warranty,” which provides:

In addition to the Warranties or Guarantees provided in the Subcontract
(the “Subcontract”) of the undersigned Subcontractor
(“Subcontractor”) with Doster Construction Company, Inc. (“Doster”)
or the Contract Documents for the Project referenced above (the
“Project”), Subcontractor does hereby WARRANT, REPRESENT, and
GUARANTEE to Doster and to the owner identified above (“Owner”)
that all work and materials furnished by Subcontractor are in strict
compliance with all requirements of the Subcontract and the Contract
Documents for the Project, were completed in a good and workmanlike
manner, and will remain free from defects or deficiencies in materials
or workmanship for a period of one (1) year from date of Substantial
Completion. Subcontractor shall promptly correct and remedy all
defects and deficiencies occurring within that period, and any resulting
damage, at no cost to Owner or Doster. Owner may notify
Subcontractor of any such defects or deficiencies as follows:

Subcontractor agrees to respond within twenty-four (24) hours after
receipt of oral or written notice for emergency items that pose a risk of
imminent injury or damage to life, health, safety, or property. For all
other items, Subcontractor agrees to respond within seventy-two (72)
hours after receipt of written notice.

If Subcontractor fails to comply with the above obligations within the
time required, then after written notification (fax or e-mail) to
Subcontractor by the Owner or Owner’s agent, Subcontractor hereby
authorizes Owner to proceed with having the defects replaced at
Subcontractors expense, and Subcontractor will honor and pay upon
demand the costs reasonably and necessarily incurred by Owner to
repair or correct an item covered by this Warranty.

(Doc. 1, pp. 7–8, ¶ 18) (emphasis omitted); see Doc. 11-1, p. 38).

That summer, Doster received “notices, complaints, and demands concerning
failures and deficient performance” of the apartments’ HVAC systems. (Doc. 1, p.
8, ¶ 20). In July 2024, Doster notified Climate Control that the company had failed
to properly install the HVAC systems and had failed to comply with its warranty

obligations and demanded that Climate Control promptly cure its noncompliance.
(Doc. 11-1, p. 7, ¶ 18). Doster sent Climate Control a second notice of
noncompliance in October 2024. (Doc. 11-1, pp. 7–8, ¶ 19). In late November 2024,
the apartment’s owner demanded that Doster contract with third parties to address
the HVAC systems’ defects. (Doc. 11-1, p. 8, ¶ 21).
In January 2025, Climate Control’s president, a salesman for the products
Climate Control used for the apartment development, and Doster representatives met
in Doster’s Birmingham, Alabama offices to “review the causes and solutions for”
the HVAC issues. (Doc. 11-1, p. 8, ¶ 22). Climate Control refused to perform
additional work on the HVAC systems. (Doc. 11-1, p. 8, ¶ 22).
After the parties’ meeting, Doster notified Climate Control that it would hire
third parties to repair the HVAC systems. (Doc. 11-1, p. 9, ¶ 23). Climate Control
did not “meaningful[ly] respon[d]” to Doster’s notice. (Doc. 11-1, p. 9, ¶ 23).
Doster hired Triad Mechanical Company, Inc. and other third parties to repair the
systems. (See Doc. 11-1, p. 9, ¶ 24).5 Doster has spent more than $400,000 to
remediate the systems. (See Doc. 1, pp. 10–11, ¶ 28).

5 Triad Mechanical is a Georgia Corporation headquartered in Lawrenceville, Georgia. (Doc. 11-
1, p. 9, ¶ 24).

III.
The Court employs a two-part inquiry to determine whether it has personal
jurisdiction over Climate Control. The Court examines whether Alabama’s long-
arm statute authorizes an exercise of personal jurisdiction, and if so, whether that
exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process. Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol,
488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir. 2007). In Alabama, “the two inquiries merge, because
Alabama’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the
fullest extent constitutionally permissible.” Sloss Indus. Corp., 488 F.3d at 925
(citing ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.2(b)); see also Ex parte Edgetech I.G., Inc., 159 So. 3d 629,
633 (Ala. 2014). Therefore, the Court must consider the limits of due process. Mut.
Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Fourteenth Amendment limits a district court’s jurisdiction over a
defendant to instances where the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the
forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.’” Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash.,
Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))
(alteration added). Thus, a district court may adjudicate a cause of action involving
a defendant who has such systematic and continuous contacts with the forum that
the defendant essentially is “at home” in the forum state. See Daimler AG v.

Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (internal quotation omitted). A district court may
exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who is not “at home” in the forum
state only if the defendant’s conduct in the forum “relate[s] to” the plaintiff’s claims
in a manner that establishes “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco
Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 362 (2021).
A district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant if “the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state,” “the plaintiff’s claims ‘arise out of
or relate to’ one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state,” and “the exercise
of personal jurisdiction is in accordance with traditional notions of ‘fair play and
substantial justice.’” Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265, 1275 (11th Cir.
2022) (quotation omitted). Physical presence in a forum state is not required, and
the Supreme Court has “consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical
contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
A defendant does not purposefully avail himself of a forum state when his
“sole contact” is contracting with a forum resident. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc.
v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010); see Rudzewicz,

471 U.S. at 478. A defendant may purposefully avail himself of a forum state when
he contracts with a forum resident and has “further contacts” that connect him to the
forum. Diamond Crystal Brands, 593 F.3d at 1268–69. To determine whether a
party to a contract has purposefully availed himself of the forum state, district courts
consider the contract’s negotiations, terms, anticipated future consequences, and the
parties’ course of dealing. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 479. This ensures that the “quality
of the interstate transaction” is not so “random” or “fortuitous” that the defendant
should not “reasonably anticipate defending a suit there.” Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at
486.
A defendant who “reach[es] out beyond one state and create[s] continuing
relationships and obligations” with a forum resident purposefully avails himself of
the forum state. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 473 (quoting Travelers Health Assn. v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)). In Rudzewicz, a Michigan resident entered a
20-year franchise agreement with a company that was headquartered in Miami,
Florida. The franchisee negotiated the agreement with the Miami headquarters. The
parties’ agreement “provide[d] that the franchise relationship [was] established in
Miami and governed by Florida law.” Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 466–67. Throughout
the parties’ business relationship, the company regulated “virtually every
conceivable aspect” of the franchise operations, Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 465, and
the franchisee paid licensing and other fees to the company’s Miami headquarters.

After the franchisee defaulted on his payments, the company sued him in the
Southern District of Florida. The Supreme Court held that the franchisee
purposefully availed himself of Florida because he “reach[ed] out beyond Michigan
and negotiated with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-term franchise,”
voluntarily accepted “long-term and exacting regulation of his business from [the]
Miami headquarters,” and “caused foreseeable injuries to the corporation in
Florida.” Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 479–80 (quotation omitted).
Viewing the jurisdictional evidence in the light most favorable to Doster,
Climate Control “reach[ed] out beyond” Texas and “negotiated with” an Alabama
corporation to form a financially beneficial relationship. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at
479. Over an eight-year period, Climate Control entered nine contracts with Doster.
When Doster invited bids for HVAC work on the Florida project, Climate Control
communicated with Doster representatives in Birmingham to negotiate and execute
the contract. Climate Control continued communicating with Doster representatives
in Birmingham while performing the HVAC work in Florida. Climate Control knew
that its conduct could cause Doster to experience a financial injury in Alabama.
Thus, the “quality and nature” of Climate Control’s relationship with Doster in
Alabama is not “random” or “fortuitous”; Climate Control could reasonably
anticipate defending a suit in Alabama. See Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 480.

Because Doster has established that Climate Control has sufficient contacts
with Alabama for this district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
company, to succeed on its motion to dismiss, Climate Control must “make a
‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.” Climate Control has not argued that this Court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the company would “violate traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. Accordingly, this Court may exercise jurisdiction over
Climate Control.
***
“When venue is challenged, the court must determine whether the case falls
within one of the three categories set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If it does, venue is
proper; if it does not, venue is improper, and the case must be dismissed or
transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). . . . As a result, a case filed in a district that
falls within § 1391 may not be dismissed under § 1406(a) or Rule 12(b)(3).” Atl.
Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 55–56 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
Section 1391(b) provides that “[a] civil action may be brought in—(1) a
judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the
State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in

which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial
district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with
respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). “An entity with the capacity to be
sued” is “deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in
question.” § 1391(c)(2). Accordingly, this case falls within one of the three
categories set out in § 1391(b).
Because the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the defendants, § 1406 does
not provide a basis for transferring this case to another district. That leaves 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) as a vehicle for transfer. That statute provides: “[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any
district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Here,
the parties have not consented to a particular venue. Therefore, the Court must
consider the following factors to determine whether to transfer this case to the
Middle District of Florida or Southern District of Texas: “the relative ease of access
to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling,
and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Piper Aircraft Co. v.

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241, n. 6 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). Public-
interest factors may include “the administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home;
[and] the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home
with the law.” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241, n. 6 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Court also must give some weight to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum. See
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 62 n.6 (2013). The Court must “weigh the relevant factors
and decide whether, on balance, a transfer would serve ‘the convenience of parties
and witnesses’ and otherwise promote ‘the interest of justice.’” Atl. Marine Const.
Co., 571 U.S. at 62–63 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
From the Doster’s perspective, the Northern District of Alabama is the most
convenient forum. Cobey Everett, Doster’s Senior VP of Field Operations, and
Tyler Schnell, Doster’s Project Manager for the Florida project, reside in Alabama
and work in this district. (Doc. 11-1, p. 6, ¶¶ 13–14). As noted, Doster has its
corporate headquarters in this district in Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 11-1, p. 3,
¶ 4). Doster maintains in Birmingham documents concerning the parties’ contract
and Climate Control’s performance. (Doc. 11-1, p. 9, ¶ 25).

For Climate Control, Texas offers a more convenient forum. Jesus Gonzalez,
Climate Control’s manager and CEO, Humberto Ramirez, Climate Control’s Lead
Sales Manager, and Julian Gonzalez, Climate Control’s on-site supervisor, reside in
Texas and work in Climate Control’s Houston office. (Doc. 12-3, pp. 3–4, ¶ 10).
Climate Control’s principal place of business is in Houston, Texas. (Doc. 7-5, pp.
3-4, ¶ 10). Climate Control maintains in Houston documents regarding the parties’
contract and its performance. (Doc. 12-3, p. 2, ¶ 4). Climate Control identifies a
representative of an HVAC equipment and materials manufacturer, Fernando De law
O, as a key witness who resides in Texas and works in Houston. (Doc. 12-3, p. 3 ¶
10). Climate Control attests that, because the company has only 19 employees, the
travel required for depositions, hearings, and trial for this matter in Birmingham
would impair their operations and impose a substantial financial burden. (Doc. 12-
3, pp. 2 – 3, ¶¶ 3, 9).
Florida offers a third forum option. The construction project at issue, and
Climate Control’s work under the parties agreement, occurred in Florida. (Doc. 7-
5, pp. 2–3, ¶ 6). Therefore, a site visit would occur in Florida, and local inspectors
may have to be deposed in Florida. (Doc. 7-5, p. 4, ¶ 12). The other potential
witnesses the parties have identified do not reside in Florida. The apartment
development’s owner is based in North Carolina, (Doc. 11-1, p. 3, ¶¶ 4–5), the
company that performed most of the remedial HVAC work is based in Georgia,

(Doc. 11-1, p. 9, ¶ 24), and the company that manufactured the materials Climate
Control used for their HVAC work is based in Texas, (Doc. 12-3, pp. 2, 3, ¶¶ 8, 10).
On balance, most of the witnesses with information concerning Doster’s
claims are in this district. Therefore, this district offers the greatest access to sources
of proof. Counsel for Climate Control can travel to Texas to depose witnesses there
and have a videographer record the depositions, giving the defendants the option of
avoiding travel to this district if this case proceeds to trial. The attorneys can manage
the paper discovery for the case electronically, minimizing or obviating
inconvenience related to that work. It would be at least equally inconvenient for
Doster and Climate Control to travel for trial whether the case proceeds in Alabama
or Texas, and both parties likely would travel for trial if the case proceeds in Florida.
Additionally, Alabama law governs Doster’s claims against Climate Control, so this
Court is “at home with the [applicable] law.” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241,
n.6.
On balance, transfer will not serve the convenience of parties and witnesses
or otherwise promote the interests of justice. Thus, Climate Control has not
established a basis for transferring this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
IV.
For the reasons above, the Court denies Climate Control’s motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue and declines to transfer venue

under § 1404. (Doc. 7). The Clerk of Court shall please TERM Doc. 7. Within 14
days of the date of this order, the parties shall please hold a Rule 26(f) meeting, file
a joint report of their planning meeting, and email a joint proposed scheduling order
to chambers.
DONE and ORDERED this June 1, 2026.

_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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