govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_25-cv-03342-1

IN T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
OVINCE SAINT PREUX, 
 Plaintiff, 
v. CIVIL ACTION FILE 
NO. 1:25-CV-3342-TWT 
 JARED WHEAT, et al., 
 Defendants. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
This is a products liability case. It is before the Court on Plaintiff Ovince 
Saint Preux’s Motion to Stay [Doc. 11] and Motion for Reconsideration 
[Doc. 12] as well as Defendant Hi -Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc.’s (“Hi-Tech”) 
Motion to Strike [Doc. 18] and Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 19]. For the reasons set 
forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Preux’s Motion to Stay [Doc. 11]. 
I. Background1
Plain
tiff Ovince Saint Preux is a professional Ultimate Fighting 
Championship (“UFC”) fighter who claims that two of Defendant Hi -Tech’s 
dietary supplements were mislabeled and deceptively marketed such that they 
caused him to fail a drug test and suffer damages. ( Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–47 
[Doc. 13].) In his Original Complaint [Doc. 1-2], Preux asserted nine counts 
against three named Defendants. Upon motion, the Court dismissed all named 
1 The Court accepts the facts as alleged in the Complaint as true for 
purposes of the present motions. Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 
1122 (11th Cir. 2019). 

2 
Defen
dants except Hi-Tech, two of the nine counts in their entirety (breach of 
express warranty and battery ), and all counts to the extent they request ed 
damages for purely economic losses and the risk of future injury. (Op. & Order, 
Feb. 5, 2026 (“Dismissal Order”), at 19 [Doc. 10].) The Court also allowed Preux 
fourteen days to amend his Complaint “to state a damages amount as required 
by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-107.” (
Id. at 14.) 
Shortly after the Court issued its prior order, Preux moved to reconsider 
the merits of the motion to dismiss , moved to stay this proceeding pending 
resolution of an ongoing criminal case involving some of the Defendants , and 
filed his Amended Complaint. Defendant Hi -Tech then moved to dismiss the 
Amended Complaint and strike certain portions thereof. 
I. Legal Standard
Courts enjoy broad discretion in managing their own dockets, including 
staying proceedings. S.W. v. Clayton Cnty. Pub. Schs. , 185 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 
1371 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706–07 (1997)). 
While “special circumstances . . . in the interests of justice” may require a court 
to stay a civil case pending resolution of a parallel criminal case, “the mere 
existence of parallel criminal and civil proceedings does not compel stay of the 
latter.” 
Id. (citations omitted). C ourts consider a variety of factors when 
assessing whether staying the civil proceeding is warranted, including 
(1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with
those presented in the civil case; ( 2) the status of the case,

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incl
uding whether the defendants have been indicted; ( 3) the 
private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously 
weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 
(4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; ( 5) the
interests of the courts; and (6) the public interest.
Id. at 1371–72 (citation omitted). A court granting a stay must ensure it is not 
“immoderate.” Ortega Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Commc’ns, Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 
1264 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
A court may dismiss an action with prejudice for failure to comply with 
a court order under Rule 41(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). However, such dismissal 
is an “extreme sanction that may be properly imposed only when: (1) a party 
engages in a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt (contumacious conduct); 
and (2) the district court specifically finds that lesser sanctions would not 
suffice.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA , 432 F.3d 1333, 1337– 38 
(11th Cir. 2005) (citation modified) (quoting World Thrust Films, Inc. v. Int’l 
Fam. Ent., Inc., 41 F.3d 1454, 1456 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Stay
Preux seeks a stay of the present case pending the resolution of a
criminal case involving Defendant Hi -Tech and former Defendant Jared 
Wheat. He requests a stay on two grounds: (1) Wheat’s ability to respond to 
discovery in this case would “interfere” with both Defendants’ “constitutional 
and procedural rights’ in the criminal case,” (Pl.’s Mot. to Stay, at 2); and 

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(2) Whea
t’s deposition is necessary for the present case but he “still has a Fifth
Amendment concern through the pendency of an appeal” in the criminal case. 
(id.). 
The Court denies Preux’s Motion to Stay. There are several problems 
here. First, no significant overlap exists between the claim s in this case and 
those at issue in the criminal case. As Hi -Tech points out, the government 
voluntarily dismissed all counts against Hi -Tech and Wheat related to 
controlled substances and adulterated food, (Def.’s Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s 
Mot. to Stay, Ex. B (“Indictment”), at 12–22 [Doc. 16-2]); Def.’s Resp. Br. in 
Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Stay, Ex. C, at 1 [Doc. 16-3]), and the jury found Hi-Tech 
and Wheat not guilty on all counts related to misbranded drugs, (Def.’s Resp. 
Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Stay, Ex. D (“Verdict”), at 6–9 [Doc. 16-4]). While 
the jury found Hi-Tech and Wheat guilty of wire fraud and money laundering 
counts related to the export of dietary supplements from the United States to 
other countries, (see Indictment, at 1–8; Verdict, at 1–3), none of those counts 
concern the sale of supplements in the United States to customers like Preux. 
Moreover, according to Hi-Tech, the post-trial motions pending in the criminal 
case do not concern the sale of supplements in the United States. Preux did not 
file a reply brief contesting these assertions. (Def.’s Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s 
Mot. to Stay, at 5.) 

Seco
nd, the Court has already dismissed Wheat as a party in this case, 
so Wheat’s ability to respond to discovery or invoke his Fifth Amendment 
rights is irrelevant. To the extent Preux seeks to protect Hi -Tech’s Fifth 
Amendment rights, no such rights exist for corporations like Hi-Tech (nor has 
Hi-Tech invoked any such rights). See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 
104–05 (1988); see also id. at 105 (“[A] corporation has no Fifth Amendment 
privilege.”). The Motion to Stay should be denied. 
B. Motion for Reconsideration
In his Motion for Reconsideration, the Plaintiff claims that he did not
receive an email from Defendants’ counsel notifying him of the filing of the 
motion. As set forth in the Defendant’s Response, Plaintiff’s counsel was 
notified of the filing of the Motion to Strike at least four times by opposing 
counsel or CM/ECF. He never responded. This was not a clerical mistake or a 
mistake arising from oversight or omission found in a judgment or the Court’s 
Order. And for the reasons set forth in the Defendant’s Response to the Motion 
for Reconsideration, it was also not excusable neglect . Plaintiff did not bother 
to file a Reply. The Motion for Reconsideration should be denied. 
C. Motion to Dismiss
In its prior O rder, t he Court directed Preux to “file an amended
complaint striking the challenged portions identified, omitting the dismissed 
counts, and stating a damages amount as required by Tenn. Code Ann. 
5 

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§ 29-28-107.
” (Dismissal Order, at 19.) The Court further warned that “[f]ailure
to do so may result in dismissal of the Complaint.” (Id.) While Preux’s Amended 
Complaint omits previously struck paragraphs and omits the previously 
dismissed breach of express warranty and battery counts, it contains a number 
of allegations that this Court has already addressed or dismissed. For example, 
the Amended Complaint erroneously includes previously dismissed parties, 
includes previously dismissed requests to recover purely economic losses and 
future injuri es, fails to state a damages amount, and asserts claims under 
Georgia law that this Court has already ruled are inapplicable.
2 Hi-Tech calls 
out these errors in its recent Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss and now 
seeks dismissal of the entire case with prejudice under Rule 41(b) and Local 
Rule 41.3. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 2.) 
In his R esponse, Preux acknowledges the clear deficiencies in his 
Amended Complaint and asks this Court to grant leave to file a proposed 
Second Amended Complaint. (
See Pl.’s Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to 
Dismiss, at 2. See generally Pl.’s Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, 
Ex. 1 [Doc. 20-1].) As justification for this request, Plaintiff’s counsel cites 
“personal circumstances” that led to this failing, including his wife’s addiction, 
involuntary confinement, and hospitalization, and his new role as sole 
2 Having been filed one day past the Court’s deadline, Preux’s Amended 
Complaint is also untimely. 

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car
etaker of three kids. (Id. at 5, 9; see also Pl.’s Mot. to Stay, at 6.) 
The Court clarifies three matters up front. First, Preux’s request for 
leave to amend is improper, as it was presented in a response brief rather than 
through a motion pursuant to Rule 7(b). Second, the personal circumstances of 
counsel generally do not justify noncompliance with a court’s order. Third, it is 
clear that Preux’s Amended Complaint does not comply with the Court’s prior 
order. The Plaintiff argues without citing any authority that the Motion to 
Dismiss should be denied because he “substantially complied” with the Court’s 
Order. This is not a discovery dispute where substantial compliance may be 
acceptable. It is abundantly clear that the Plaintiff willfully refused to comply 
with the Court’s Order directing him to state a damages amount in accordance 
with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29 -28-17. Under all of the circumstances, there is a 
clear pattern of refusal to comply with the Court’s Order. Thus, d ismissal is 
appropriate here and no lesser sanction would suffice. 
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Pla intiff Ovince 
Saint Preux’s Motion to Stay [Doc. 11] and Plaintiff Preux’s Motion for 
Reconsideration [Doc. 12]. The Defendant Hi -Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc.’s 
Motion to Strike [Doc. 18] and Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 19] are GRANTED. 

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SO ORDERE
D, this day of June, 2026. 
__________________________ __ 
THOM
AS W. THRASH, JR. 
United States District Judge 
1st

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