govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_25-cv-02875-0

I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
ESTATE OF STEPHEN P. CROFT, et 
al., 
 Plaintiffs, 
v. C IVIL ACTION FILE 
NO. 1:25-CV-2875-TWT 
 INTERSTATE LOGOS, LLC, 
 Defendants. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
This is a personal injury case. It is before the Court on Defendants 
Interstate Logos, LLC (“Interstate Logos”) and the Lamar Company, LLC’s 
(“Lamar Company”) (collectively, the “Lamar Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss 
[Doc. 45]. For the reasons stated below, the Lamar Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss [Doc. 45] is GRANTED. 
I. Background1
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident. Stephen P. Croft began 
working for Defendant Interstate Logos in 2016. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2 [Doc. 41]). 
During all relevant times, he was also an employee of “Lamar Media 
Corporation.” (Id.). As part of his employment, Stephen used and operated a 
2022 Kenworth T370 truck, otherwise known as a “boom truck,” that had a 
1 The Court accepts the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint as 
true for purposes of the present M otion to D ismiss. Wilding v. DNC Servs. 
Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 1122 (11th Cir. 2019). 

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hydraulic lift and an aerial workstation that was owned, operated and 
presumably maintained by “Lamar Advertising Co.” ( Id. ¶¶ 3, 6). The boom 
truck was designed in a manner so that the hydraulic lift would only operate 
by first engaging the “Power Take Off” and only after engaging the out-riggers 
on the side of the truck. ( Id. ¶ 7). The controls for the aerial lift were on the 
back of the truck and there were controls in the basket of the hydraulic lift. (Id. 
¶ 8). 
Upon information and belief, the truck operated by Stephen was 
regularly down for service repairs and malfunctions. ( Id. ¶¶ 10-11). Some of 
the malfunctions that occurred were: (1) hydraulic lift malfunctions, (2) leaky 
fittings within the hydraulic lift, (3) outrigger sensor failure, (4) cracks in the 
hydraulic lift and broken welds, (5) concerns over the holding valve, (6) needed 
boom repairs, (7) leaks in the hydraulic turntable, (8) boom leaking down when 
unit was shut off, (9) cab guard breaking apart at supports, (10) hydraulic leaks 
at the front left outrigger, (11) lift cylinder leaks, (12) damage within the auger 
rope or bent basket mount and rotation, (13) leaks within the rotation gear box, 
and (14) winch issues. (
Id. ¶ 14). Stephen also experienced problems with the 
hydraulic lift lifting uncontrollably in the fall of 2023, which he brought to the 
attention of management and other workers. (
Id. ¶ 15). This led Stephen to 
believe that the truck was not safe for use. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17). 
 

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On or about April 2024, Stephen operated his truck while traveling 
down the highway. (Id. ¶ 23). While he was driving the truck, the hydraulic lift 
on the truck started to rise unexpectedly and caused a collision with an 
overpass. (Id. ¶ 24). The truck turned over and killed Stephen. (Id. ¶ 25). 
The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the Superior Court of Gwinnett 
County against the Defendants. (See generally State Court Filings [Doc. 1-1]). 
The Defendants then jointly removed the case to this Court. ( See generally 
Notice of Removal [Doc. 1]). After seeking leave to file an Amended Complaint, 
the Plaintiffs did so. ( See generally Am. Compl.). Soon after, the Lamar 
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim , which 
the Court now addresses . (See generally Lamar Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. 
45]). 
II. Legal Standard
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it 
appears that the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief. Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may 
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; however, even if it is 
“improbable” that a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the 
possibility of recovery is extremely “remote and unlikely.”
 Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court 
must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in 

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the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A. 
v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A. , 711 F.2d 989, 994- 95 (11th Cir. 
1983); see also Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc. , 40 F.3d 
247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff 
“receives the benefit of imagination”). Generally, notice pleading is all that is 
required for a valid complaint. See Lombard’s, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc. , 753 
F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only 
give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon 
which it rests. 
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 555). 
III. Discussion 
The Lamar Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them under 
the Amended Complaint because the Plaintiffs’ tort claims are barred by the 
Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act. (Br. in Supp. of Lamar Defs. Mot. to 
Dismiss, at 6 [Doc. 45-1]).2 “The Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act . . . is 
 
2 The Plaintiffs have failed to file any response to the Lamar 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Under the Local Rules of the Northern District 
of Georgia, the “[f]ailure to file a response shall indicate that there is no 
opposition to the motion.” LR 7.1(B), NDGa. The Court nonetheless will 
address the merits of the Lamar Defendants’ motion for the sake of 
completeness. 
See Guimmo v. Olsen , 701 F. App’x 922, 924 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that the “district court abused its discretion by interpreting local rule 
7.1(B) as permitting it to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the 
plaintiffs’ failure to timely file an opposition brief”); 
Dunlap v. Transamerica 
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 629, 632-33 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that, 
although the district court improperly relied on a local rule setting deadlines 

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designed to provide for relief to injured employees, while also protecting 
employers from excessive recoveries of damages.” Savannah Hosp. Servs., LLC 
v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 197 (2019). It should be “liberally construed to 
effectuate its purpose.” Id. (quoting City of Waycross v. Holmes , 272 Ga. 488, 
489 (2000) (quotations omitted)). The Act sets the following limitation on tort 
recovery: 
The rights and the remedies granted to an employee . . . shall 
exclude and be in place of all other rights and remedies of such 
employee, his or her personal representative, parents, 
dependents, or next of kin, and all other civil liabilities 
whatsoever at common law or otherwis e, on account of such 
injury, loss of service, or death. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). 
First, the Court addresses whether the Plaintiffs are subject to this 
provision since Stephen’s estate and wife bring this claim. This is a simple 
issue, as Georgia courts hold that a claim that is derived from an employee’s 
injury that is compensable under the Georgia Workers Compensation Act is 
subject to its provisions, even if the employee is not the one to bring the claim. 
See, e.g., Zaytzeff v. Safety -Kleen Corp., 222 Ga. App. 48, 51 (1996) (holding 
wife’s claim for loss of consortium was barred under the Act because the 
employee would have no tort claim and her claim is derivative of his right) ; 
 
to respond to rule against the plaintiffs on a motion for summary judgment, 
the district court properly addressed the motion on the merits later in the 
order). 

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Smith v. Camarena , 352 Ga. App. 797, 798 (2019) (“Under [the Georgia 
Workers’ Compensation Act], if [the employee’s] death is compensable under 
the Act, then the [mother and estate] cannot pursue their tort action”). Thus, 
the Plaintiffs’ claims rise and fall with whether Stephen’s possible tort claim 
would be prohibited under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). 
For a cause of action to be covered by O.C.G.A. § 34 -9-11(a), “the 
employee’s injury must (a) occur in the course of the employment, and (b) arise 
out of the employment. ” 
Savannah Hosp. Servs., LLC , 350 Ga. App. at 198 
(citing O.C.G.A. § 34 -9-1(4)). The question of whether an injury occurred “in 
the course of the employment” relates to the “time, place, and circumstances 
under which the accident takes place.” 
Id. (quoting Ray Bell Constr . Co. v. 
King, 281 Ga. 853, 854-55 (2007) (quotations omitted)). “[A]n accident arises in 
the course of the employment when it occurs within the period of employment 
at a place where the employee may reasonably be in the performance of his 
duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incidental 
thereto.” 
Id. (quoting Ray Bell Constr. Co. , 281 Ga. at 855 (quotations 
omitted)). Finally, the question of whether an injury arises out of the 
employment “refer[s] to the causal connection between the employment and 
the injury.” Id. (quoting Ray Bell Constr. Co. , 281 Ga. at 855 (quotations 
omitted)). 

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There is little dispute that the allegations within the Amended 
Complaint show both elements. Stephen was employed by the Lamar 
Defendants and in the course of his employment operated the boom truck that 
malfunctioned and led to his death. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3, 23-25). There are 
no allegations that Stephen used the boom truck in contexts outside of his 
employment. All information pertaining to the accident is noted to be under 
the control of the Lamar Defendants. (
See id. ¶¶ 33 -39). Considering these 
facts, the Court easily concludes that Stephen’s death occurred in the course 
of, and arises out of, his employment with the Lamar Defendants. Thus, all of 
the Plaintiffs’ claims against the Lamar Defendants are barred under the 
Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Lamar Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
[Doc. 45] is GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED, this 1st day of June, 2026. 
_____________________________
THOMAS W
. THRASH, JR. 
United States District Judge 
3 The Lamar Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs’ acceptance of 
workers’ compensation benefits bars the Plaintiffs’ tort claims against the 
Lamar Defendants under the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act. (
See Br. in 
Supp. of Lamar Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 10-11). The Court need not address 
this issue because the Lamar Defendants prevail on their first argument. 

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