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govinfo:USCOURTS-moed-1_23-cv-00120-1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
JEREMY BROTZ, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-00120-MTS
)
CITY OF DEXTER, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Trevor Pulley and Defendant City of Dexter’s
now-supplemented Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants
violated his First Amendment rights when they adopted an unconstitutional policy within
the police department. Docs. [37], [44]. The Motion is fully briefed and ready for
decision. See Docs. [ 46] and [47]. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant
Defendants’ Motion and enter judgment in their favor.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court has set forth many of the undisputed facts and much of the procedural
history for this matter elsewhere. See Doc. [43] at 2–6; 2025 WL 2106972, at *2– 3. In
that prior Memorandum and Order, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Doc. [43] at 16–
17. The Court reasoned that summary judgment was proper because Plaintiff failed to put
forth sufficient evidence of pretext given Defendants’ legitimate, nonretaliatory
justification for Plaintiff’s termination; namely, Defendants’ good-faith belief that Plaintiff
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lied during an internal investigation interview. Id. at 12–17; see also Thomas v. Marshall
Pub. Schs., 152 F.4th 884, 892 (8th Cir. 2025) (“[A]n intervening event that independently
justified adverse disciplinary action can sever any inference that protected activity caused
the adverse action.” (internal quotations omitted)).
The Court also concluded that a fair read of Plaintiff’s state-court Petition showed
an additional First Amendment claim alleging that, when Defendant Pulley issued his
verbal order that prohibited officers from discussing or handling Fraternal Order of Police
(“FOP”) business while on duty, Doc. [39] ¶ 6; Doc. [40] ¶¶ 4–5, he established an
unconstitutional policy that violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, Doc. [43] at 17–
18. Because Defendants did not address this claim in their initial summary-judgment
briefing, the Court ordered supplemental briefing that, at a minimum, needed to address
two issues: (1) whether undisputed facts demonstrated “that Defendant Pulley’s verbal
order was a reasonable response to actual or anticipated disruption to the efficiency of the
Dexter Police Department’s operations”; and (2) whether “Defendant Pulley can be
considered an authorized policymaker of the City of Dexter such that his departmental
order would support a finding of municipal liability.” Id. at 19–20 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)).
To comply, the parties have supplemented the record with the following facts.
1 As
of 2019, the City of Dexter (“City”) Police Department’s productivity levels—specifically,
1 Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are properly supported and uncontroverted pursuant
to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4.01(E) of this Court’s Local Rules.
“All matters set forth in [Defendants’] Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts [have been]
deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
[Plaintiff].” E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(E).
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the number of “self-initiated tickets, arrests and reports”— were low. Doc. [45] ¶ 1. The
City Administrator attributed these low numbers to the fact that police officers were
handling non-police matters while on duty, Doc. [45] ¶ 2, “including [FOP business],” Doc.
[45-1] at 3. He complained about it to Defendant Pulley, then- Chief of Police, Doc. [45]
¶ 3, who himself noticed that officers “were spending significant time doing non-police
activities instead of patrolling the City.” Doc. [45] ¶ 4. To the best of Defendant Pulley’s
recollection, the City Administrator contacted Pulley and instructed him to put a stop to
on-duty, FOP-related discussions and activities because productivity numbers were down.
Doc. [45- 1] at 3–4. Subsequently, according to Defendant Pulley, he “relayed the
information to all the officers,” telling them, “please do police work while you’re working.
When you’re off if you wish to do FOP duty that’s fine, it’s a good organization, it gives
you benefits. Do it off duty, not on duty . . . .” Id. at 4.
2 Prior to that directive, Plaintiff
undertook FOP organizing activities while on duty and used police-department equipment
to do so. Doc. [45] ¶ 5; Doc. [46-1] ¶ 5; Doc. [45-3] at 2–3. Afterward, Plaintiff continued
to conduct FOP business while on duty because he believed Defendant Pulley’s statement
to be an unlawful order. Doc. [45- 3] at 2–3. For example, while Plaintiff was on patrol,
he stopped at the home of a city employee and discussed FOP organizing. Doc. [45-3] at
3. Also while on duty, Plaintiff assisted fellow on-duty officers in locating and completing
FOP applications. Doc. [37-3] at 5–6.
2 According to Defendant Pulley, these instructions—i.e. , to reserve on-duty time for policework—
were given repeatedly at departmental meetings because, for a short time after each one,
productivity numbers would slightly improve. Doc. [45-1] at 2.
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Additionally, the parties have provided information about the City’s governing
structure and the authority of its officials. For example, pursuant to City ordinance, “[t]he
Chief of Police is the director of the Police Department . . . [and has] direct control of the
department, subject to the supervision of the City Administrator and subject to other rules,
regulations and orders as the City Administrator will prescribe.” Doc. [46-1] ¶ 7 (citing
Dexter, Mo., City Code § 200.040)). The City Administrator, in turn, is empowered “to
prescribe such rules and regulations . . . [deemed] necessary or expedient for the conduct
of administrative agencies subject to his/her authority,” and can “overrule any action taken
by a department head and may supersede him/her in the functions of his/her office.” Doc.
[46-4] (Dexter, Mo., City Code § 115.220). The City Administrator may also “revoke,
suspend, or amend any rule or regulation of the administrative service except those
prescribed by the Board of Aldermen.” Id. Despite these significant powers, the City
Administrator “serve[s] at the pleasure of the appointing authority,” and as a result, the
City Administrator may be removed by the mayor “with the consent of a majority of the
Board of Aldermen,” or, in any event, by a two-thirds majority of the Board. Dexter, Mo.,
City Code § 115.200.
Against this backdrop, Defendants seek summary judgment once more. They argue
that Defendant Pulley’s verbal order cannot constitute a First Amendment violation under
the facts of this case. Doc. [44] at 4– 5. Defendants assert the order was a reasonable
response to either actual or anticipated disruption to the efficiency of the Police
Department, especially because it is undisputed that police productivity numbers suffered
from the fact that officers undertook non- police activities while they were on duty, FOP
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activities included. Doc. [45-1] at 3–4. Defendants emphasize Plaintiff’s own
acknowledgement that he was not engaged in law enforcement when conducting FOP
business. See Doc. [44] at 4–5; see also Doc. [45-3] at 2–3. The bottom line, according to
Defendants, is that Plaintiff’s on-duty, FOP-related conduct per se interfered with his
police duties because Plaintiff could not perform both at the same time. Doc. [44] at 4–5.
Further, even if the order violated the First Amendment, Defendants reassert Defendant
Pulley’s entitlement to qualified immunity because, whatever the First Amendment’s
requirements in the context of a police department’s regulation of on-duty conduct, those
requirements have not been clearly established. See Doc. [44] at 3 n.1; see also Doc. [33]
at 13–14. Finally, Defendants argue that municipal liability against the City is unavailable
because Defendant Pulley was not an official policymaker. Doc. [44] at 5–6.
Plaintiff disagrees. He argues that there is no evidence that either his or anyone
else’s FOP activity disrupted Department operations. Doc. [46] at 3–4. Even though
evidence in the record indicates that there was a department-wide productivity issue,
Plaintiff asserts that the order prohibiting on-duty FOP business cannot have been a
reasonable response to address that issue because the order “appears to target only
Plaintiff.” Id. at 4. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the City can be held liable for
Defendant Pulley’s order because it was issued at the City Administrator’s direction. Id.
at 5–6.
II. L
EGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a “court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
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the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “The movant bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and must identify
the portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact.” Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Torgerson v. City
of Rochester, 643 F. 3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1). Once the movant has established a right to judgment as a matter of law, the non-
movant must demonstrate that one or more of the material facts asserted by the movant as
not in dispute is, in fact, genuinely disputed. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986).
III. DISCUSSION
Based on the summary judgment record, the Court concludes that Defendants have
the better part of the argument. Government employees cannot claim constitutional
protection for all conduct undertaken in the name of union activity. See Hanover Twp.
Fed’n of Tchrs. v. Hanover Cmty. Sch. Corp., 457 F.2d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens,
J.); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 3808 v. Kansas City, 220 F.3d 969, 972–73 (8th
Cir. 2000). Under the appropriate balance, and given the “considerable judicial deference”
owed under the circumstances, Tyler v. City of Mountain Home, 72 F.3d 568, 570 (8th Cir.
1995) (quoting Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1345 (8th Cir. 1993)), the verbal
order at issue in this case did not violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.
As a public employee, Plaintiff must “accept certain limitations on [his] freedom
because the government has valid interests as an employer in regulating [his First
Amendment conduct].” Melton v. City of Forrest City, 147 F.4th 896, 902 (8th Cir. 2025)
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(internal quotations omitted). However, a constitutional violation occurs when the
government unreasonably burdens the First Amendment rights of its public employees.
See Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 220 F.3d at 975. Determining whether a particular rule or
regulation imposes an unreasonable burden depends on “a balance between the interests of
the employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest
of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.” United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465–
66 (1995) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968)) (citation modified).
The same balance applies when a rule or regulation restricts a public employee’s
associational rights. See Roberts v. Van Buren Pub. Schs., 773 F.2d 949, 957 (8th Cir.
1985) (“As in the case of speech . . . an associational right must be balanced against, and
may be overridden by, the government’s interest as an employer in efficiency.”); Int’l Ass’n
of Firefighters, 220 F.3d at 973. When courts perform this analysis, they “cannot simply
defer to the government’s decision” to enact the relevant restriction; rather, courts must
“examine its justification, and considering the competing interests, determine whether the
government’s determination is reasonable .” Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 220 F.3d at 974.
Relevant factors include whether the First Amendment conduct at issue “creates
disharmony in the workplace, impedes the speaker’s ability to perform his duties or impairs
working relationships with other employees.” Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 911 (8th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Kincade v. Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 1995)).
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The government’s interests as a public employer are particularly significant when
regulating its public employees’ on-the-job conduct. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 987 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizing the government’s interest “in
maintaining control over [its] employees’ words and actions for the proper performance of
the workplace”). And “[b]ecause police departments function as paramilitary
organizations charged with maintaining public safety and order, they are given more
latitude in their decisions regarding discipline and personnel regulations than an ordinary
government employer.” See Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 971 (8th Cir. 1995); accord
Hicks v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 109 F.4th 895, 901–02 (7th Cir. 2024); cf. Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (noting it is “difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity
in which the courts have less competence” than the “complex subtle, and professional
decisions” surrounding the “composition” and “control” of a military force). When
balancing the relevant interests as described above, a police department’s assessment of
“the potential for disruption . . . as well as [its] response to actual or perceived disruption,
are entitled to ‘considerable judicial deference.’” Tyler, 72 F.3d at 570 (citation omitted).
Of course, those departments must still produce evidence supporting their
justification. A public employer must put forth more than “[m]ere allegations” or
“conclusory statements” of actual or anticipated disruption. See Sexton, 210 F.3d at 912–
13 (withholding qualified immunity from department of public safety officials). But, even
so, either “actual disruption” or “a reasonable belief in the potential for disruption . . . is
usually enough when the government entity is a public safety organization.” Melton, 147
F.4th at 903. Such is the case here.
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It is undisputed that, at the time Defendant Pulley issued his verbal order, the City
police department’s productivity numbers were down because its officers used on- duty
time to complete non-work-related activities. Doc. [45-2] ¶ 3; Doc. [45] ¶ 1.3 FOP-related
activities were one such example. Doc. [45-1] at 3–4. Plaintiff took part in those activities
while on duty, Doc. [45-3] at 2–3, as did several other officers, Doc. [39] ¶ 5; Doc. [37-3]
at 5–6. Plaintiff makes the unremarkable admission that these union-related activities are
mutually exclusive of law-enforcement work. In other words, engaging in one takes an
officer away from the other. At the City Administrator’s direction, Defendant Pulley gave
a verbal order aimed at these circumstances; that is, City police officers could not engage
in FOP business while on duty. Doc. [45-1] at 4.
The Court concludes that this is the type of “actual or perceived disruption” that is
“entitled to considerable judicial deference.” Tyler, 72 F.3d at 570. In the first place, it
was reasonable for City officials to conclude that, when officers perform non-police-related
activities on departmental time, the efficiency of the police department suffers. Given the
evidence cited above, t heir assessment—itself supported by “common sense and human
experience,” HCP of Ill., Inc. v. Farbman Grp. I, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 n.1 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (remarking that judges “are not to ignore” such qualities , even “in summary
judgment proceedings”),—is premised on more than “mere allegations” or “conclusory
statements.” See Sexton, 210 F.3d at 912–13. As such, when balancing the City’s interests
as an employer against those of Plaintiff and his fellow officers, the impediment-to-official-
duties factor weighs heavily in Defendants’ favor. See id. at 911 (setting forth relevant
3 Plaintiff has not specifically controverted this fact. See E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(E).
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factors). This is primarily because , unlike most Pickering-balance cases, Defendant
Pulley’s order expressly targeted his officers’ on-duty conduct, not their off-duty activities
or their organizational membership as a whole. Cf. James v. Texas Collin County, 535 F.3d
365, 380 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[N]eutral governmental employer policies limiting the political
activity of their employees, applicable only to such employees while on duty or on the
governmental employer’s property, will almost always satisfy Pickering balancing.”). But
see, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 220 F.3d at 974–75 (analyzing the reasonableness of a
city ordinance prohibiting management-level public employees from joining the same
union as rank-and-file employees).
Upon review of the summary judgment record, the departmental regulation at issue
in this case was based on a reasonable assessment of harm to departmental efficiency rather
than the “bald assertions . . . based on conclusory hearsay and rank speculation” that other
courts have deemed insufficient. See Melton, 147 F.4th at 904 (quoting Burnham v. Ianni,
119 F.3d 668, 680 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). The Court will therefore give the
“considerable judicial deference” that is owed under the circumstances, Tyler , 72 F.3d at
570, and find that the City’s interests in maintaining an effective, efficient police
department outweighed Plaintiff’s limited interest in conducting FOP business, particularly
while he was on duty. See Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 1992)
(remarking that deference is required because police officers are “paramilitary— discipline
is demanded, and freedom must be correspondingly denied”); Graziosi v. City of
Greenville, 775 F.3d 731, 741 (5th Cir. 2015) (acknowledging “the wide latitude afforded
police departments as paramilitary operations to discipline and otherwise regulate its
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employees”); see also Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (recognizing that, while “there are limits, ” “the Pickering test affords
substantial deference to government employers, particularly in the law enforcement
context”).
As a result, the Court concludes that Defendant Pulley’s verbal order did not violate
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, and Defendant Pulley is entitled to summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s remaining claim. Without an underlying First Amendment violation, the City
is entitled to summary judgment as well. See Bloodworth v. Kan. City Bd. of Police
Comm’rs, 89 F.4th 614, 628 (8th Cir. 2023) (“Because there is no cognizable constitutional
violation, there is no basis for [municipal] liability.”).
IV. C
ONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining claim for violation of his First Amendment rights.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Trevor Pulley and Defendant City of
Dexter’s now-supplemented Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. [44], is GRANTED. A
separate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).
Dated this 2nd day of June 2026.
MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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