govinfo:USCOURTS-akd-3_22-cv-00077-2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 
ROBERT GRIFFIN, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
RICHARD STILLIE, JR., in his official 
capacity as chair of the Alaska Public 
Offices Commission, et al., 
Defendants, 
and 
ALASKANS FOR BETTER 
ELECTIONS, INC., 
Intervenor-Defendant. 
 
 
 
 

 
ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL 
Before the Court at Docket 112 is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Full & 
Complete Deposition Responses.1 Defendants responded in opposition at Docket 
116, to which Plaintiffs replied at Docket 118. 2 Oral argument was not requested 
and was not necessary to the Court’s determination. The factual allegations and 
 
1 Plaintiffs are three individual donors, Robert Griffin, Allen Vezey, and Trevor Shaw, and two 
independent expenditure organizations, Families of the Last Frontier and Alaska Free Market 
Coalition. 
2 Defendants are the five members of the Alaska Public Offices Commission (“the APOC”) and 
are sued in their official capacities: Commission Chair Richard Stillie Jr. and Commission 
members Lanette Blodgett, Eric Feige, Dan LaSota, and Walt Monegan. 

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procedural history of this case are set forth in detail in the Court’s order at Docket 
48. The Court assumes familiarity here. 
BACKGROUND 
This case concerns a challenge to three sets of Alaska campaign-finance 
laws passed in November 2020 under Ballot Measure 2.3 The APOC administers 
the state’s campaign-finance laws, among other duties.4 
On August 26, 2025, Plaintiffs served a Notice of Deposition under Rule 
30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to take the deposition of 
Defendants.5 The Notice requested that Defendants “designate one or more 
30(b)(6) witnesses who are knowledgeable and prepared to testify fully on the 
Defendants[’] behalf” on seven topics.6 These included Topics 2, 3, and 7, which 
sought testimony on: “The standards and criteria the APOC uses when evaluating 
complaints” (Topic 2) ; “The standards and criteria the APOC uses when 
determining penalty reductions and tolling periods for enforcement actions” (Topic 
3); and “How the APOC considers First Amendment concerns when interpreting 
the regulations imposed by Ballot Measure 2” (Topic 7).7 
 
3 Docket 1 at ¶ 15; see Docket 56. 
4 Alaska Stat. § 15.13.030 (Duties of the commission). 
5 Docket 112-1 at 4; Docket 112-3 at 2. 
6 Docket 112-3 at 2-3. 
7 Docket 112-3 at 3. 

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On September 17, 2025, Defendants’ counsel wrote to Plaintiffs’ counsel 
stating that they “need to confer about the topics listed in the notice to APOC, as 
required by Rule 30(b)(6). Specifically, we’re not entirely sure what to make of 
topics #2, 3, and 7. It’s probably easiest to chat those through.”8 
On October 2, 2025, Defendants’ counsel identified t he Rule 30(b)(6) 
deponent in an email to Plaintiffs’ counsel and wrote: 
APOC will offer its executive director [Heather Hebdon] as its 30(b)(6) 
deponent on Monday, but to the extent that topics 2, 3, and 7 seek to 
inquire about commission deliberations (which are confidential and 
protected by the judicial/adjudicatory privilege), she will not be able to 
answer those questions. Of course, assuming that is the intent of 
these topics, no deponent could do so. However, APOC regulations 
provide significant guidance regarding the standards and criteria 
employed by APOC when evaluatin g complaints and assessing 
penalties and tolling; and, additionally, APOC decisions are explained 
in written opinions which reveal the Commission’s reasoning. 9 
 
On October 5, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded and stated that the parties 
would “have to have a discussion about the scope of the deliberative process 
privilege if you intend to assert it broadly, but I think we should have plenty to talk 
about that doesn’t fall anywhere under that.”10 
On October 6, 2025, Ms. Hebdon appeared for the 30(b)(6) deposition.11 
Ms. Hebdon testified that she has been the executive director of the APOC for the 
 
8 Docket 116-1 at 2-3. 
9 Docket 116-1 at 2. 
10 Docket 116-1 at 1. 
11 Docket 112-4. 

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past nine years. 12 As the executive director, Ms. Hebdon testified that she 
oversees all aspects of the agency’s day -to-day operations .13 She also 
participates “in drafting advisory opinions,” reviews “all investigation reports before 
they are issued,” and acts “as the go-between between our Commission and staff, 
and many times between the Commission and Department of Law.”14 
During the deposition, when asked about APOC’s consideration of 
compliance burdens when enforcing Ballot Measure 2, Ms. Hebdon stated that she 
was testifying for “APOC as an agency, but not as my Commission , who acts as 
the decision -maker.”15 When asked whether compliance burdens would 
discourage people from speaking, Ms. Hebdon replie d: “from staff's perspective . 
. . it's not our job to analyze constitutional arguments. Our – our job is to enforce 
the statutes and regulations.”16 
Plaintiffs’ counsel then asked: “Is that true of the commissioners as well, as 
APOC, as the Commission, when they make the Commission's decisions, are they 
not taking that into account?”; Ms. Hebdon repli ed that she “can't speak for the 
Commission.”17 Plaintiffs’ counsel then stated, “[W]ith all due respect, ma'am, 
 
12 Docket 112-4 at 5. 
13 Docket 130 ¶ 1. 
14 Docket 112-4 at 5. 
15 Docket 112-4 at 24. 
16 Docket 112-4 at 23. 
17 Docket 112-4 at 23. 

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you're here speaking on behalf of the Commission.” 18 Defendants’ counsel then 
interjected, referenced her October 2 email, and stated “that this witness is not 
able to talk to you about Commission deliberations and analysis .”19 Defendants’ 
counsel also stated that she was unsure whether Plaintiffs’ counsel was “entitled 
to ask those questions because of the adjudicatory privilege” and also described 
the Commission as “a rotating cast of people who may evaluate and analyze these 
things differently.”20 
As the deposition continued, Defendants’ counsel reiterated that Plaintiffs’ 
counsel’s questions sought to “inquire into the deliberative views of . . . the 
Commission, but Ms. Hebdon isn't part of those deliberations, and, therefore, she 
lacks the ability to tell you what the commissioners are thinking . . . .”21 The 
deposition concluded after approximately 4.5 hours.22 
On December 8, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent Defendants’ counsel an email 
seeking answers to the following 16 “supplemental deposition questions”: 
1. Has there been a time when double reporting uncovered 
wrongdoing that wouldn’t have already been apparent from the 
group’s report? If so, what were the details of the wrongdoing and why 
would it not have been discovered without double reporting? 
 
 
18 Docket 112-4 at 23. 
19 Docket 112-4 at 23. 
20 Docket 112-4 at 23. 
21 Docket 112-4 at 24. 
22 Docket 112-4 at 29. 

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2. How many times have the Commissioners rejected the APOC 
staff’s recommendation? What percentage of staff recommendations 
are rejected by the Commissioners? 
 
3. How many times have the Commissioners rejected the staff’s 
recommendation on penalties? What percentage of staff 
recommendations on penalties are rejected by the Commissioners? 
4. What factors does the Commission use when determining 
penalty reductions? 
 
5. What steps did APOC take to correct its future conduct after a 
court found in Alaskans for Honest Elections v. APOC that APOC 
attributed a cash contribution to the wrong person? 
 
6. Is it the Commissioners’ job to analyze constitutional 
arguments, or to enforce the law as written? 
 
7. Does APOC consider compliance burdens at all when enforcing 
Ballot Measure 2? 
 
8. Does APOC consider the potential chilling effect of Ballot 
Measure 2? 
 
9. Does APOC think that the out-of-state disclaimer requirement 
changes voters' perspective of the speaker? 
 
10. Has APOC noted any changes in reported ad quantity or length 
since Ballot Measure 2 went into effect? If so, what did APOC 
observe? 
 
11. Is APOC aware of an instance where the true source reporting 
requirement caused a change in the quantity or length of ads run by 
independent expenditure groups? If so, what did APOC observe? 
 
12. Is APOC aware of an instance where the double reporting 
requirement caused a change in the quantity or length of ads run by 
independent expenditure groups? If so, what did APOC observe? 
 
13. Is APOC aware of an instance where the spoken out -of-state 
disclaimer reporting requirement caused a change in the quantity or 
length of ads run by independent expenditure groups? If so, what did 
APOC observe? 
 

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14. Is APOC aware of an instance where the 24 -hour reporting 
requirement caused a change in the quantity or length of ads run by 
independent expenditure groups? If so, what did APOC observe? 
 
15. Is APOC aware of an instance where the top three donor 
reporting requirement caused a change in the quantity or length of ads 
run by independent expenditure groups? If so, what did APOC 
observe? 
 
16. Is APOC aware of an instance where the printed disclaimer 
reporting requirement caused a change in the quantity or length of ads 
run by independent expenditure groups? If so, what did APOC 
observe?23 
 
On December 10, 2025, Defendants’ counsel responded with four concerns 
regarding the supplemental questions : (1) “[T]his is the first indication plaintiffs 
have given that they believed there were any ‘issues’ with APOC’s 30(b)(6) 
deposition” that had occurred over two months earlier; (2) “Neither your email nor 
your pleading identifies the questions and answers in the deposition that you 
believe justify this ‘supplement’ to that deposition ;” (3) “Nor did you hold the 
deposition open to address any alleged ‘issues’;” and (4) “[M]any of these 
questions are beyond the scope of the 30(b)(6) notice that you served on APOC; 
and others are objectionable for the same reasons that we noted our objection to 
some of the topics that you did include in your 30(b)(6) notice. ”24 According to 
 
23 Docket 116-2 at 1-2; Docket 112 at 3-5. 
24 Docket 116-2 at 1. 

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Defendants, Plaintiffs “never responded to this email, and made no other attempts 
to discuss this issue with APOC.”25 
On December 15, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel. 26 As 
relief, Plaintiffs seek an order directing Defendants to produce a witness for APOC 
to provide full and complete response s to the 16 supplemental deposition 
questions.27 In the alternative, Plaintiffs would be “content with written responses” 
to these 16 questions.28 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) allows a party to move for an order 
compelling another party to make a required disclosure or respond to discovery. 
The moving party must first “in good faith confer[] or attempt[] to confer with the 
person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it 
without court action.”29 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) provides that: 
[A] party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a 
partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity 
 
25 Docket 116 at 6. 
26 Docket 112. 
27 Docket 112 at 5. 
28 Docket 112 at 5. 
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) (“The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good 
faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or 
discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.”); see also D. Alaska L. Civ. R. 37.1 (“The 
certification required by Fed. R. Civ. P . 37(a)(1) must be in the first paragraph of a discovery 
motion.”). 

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and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for 
examination. The named organization must designate one or more 
officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons 
who consent to testify on its behalf; . . . . The persons designated must 
testify about information known or reasonably available to the 
organization. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In their motion, Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Hebdon was not the appropriate 
Rule 30(b)(6) witness.30 Plaintiffs assert that “[i]f Ms. Hebdon was unable to speak 
confidently on behalf of the Commission, she should not have been its witness.” 31 
Plaintiffs also maintain that “[n]one of the sixteen questions they want answers to 
have anything to do with the ‘deliberations’ of the Commission,” but rather, “[e]ach 
of the questions has to do with the basic facts of when and how the Commission 
chooses to take enforcement actions against Alaskans for their political speech.”32 
Defendants respond that Plaintiffs’ motion is procedurally deficient because 
Plaintiffs did not confer in good faith about the matters for examination before filing 
their motion and further, the motion fails on the merits.33 
In reply, Plaintiffs assert that (1) Defendants “refuse to say definitively who 
[Ms. Hebdon] was representing”; (2) Plaintiffs did sufficiently meet and confer; (3) 
 
30 Docket 112-1 at 10 (“The defendants agreed to a deposition of the Commission, and then 
they produced a witness who insisted ‘I don’t speak for the Commission.’ This Court should 
compel the defendants to produce someone who does.”). 
31 Docket 112-1 at 13. 
32 Docket 112-1 at 12. 
33 Docket 116 at 2-3. 

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Defendants misapply the deliberative process privilege; and (4) because Ms. 
Hebdon testified that she did not represent the Commission, Defendants did the 
functional equivalent to “walking out” of the deposition.34 
I. Meet and Confer Requirement 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ “motion is procedurally improper 
because the plaintiffs failed to actively engage in —let alone exhaust —the meet 
and confer requirements found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(1) .”35 
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs “ far overstate[] the minimal ‘meet and confer’ 
attempts the plaintiffs made,” which were merely “a brief discussion during the 
deposition, and a single back-and-forth email exchange two months afterwards.”36 
Plaintiffs respond that “[i]f anyone violated their obligation to meet -and-
confer, it is the defendants.” 37 Plaintiffs emphasize that the “deposition was 
intended for each of the defendants, but changed to a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition out 
of separation-of-powers concerns.”38 They maintain that Defendants’ October 239 
“email was not a good -faith effort, and the plaintiffs’ response politely gave the 
 
34 Docket 118 at 8, 11, 17-18. 
35 Docket 116 at 2. 
36 Docket 116 at 8. 
37 Docket 118 at 8. 
38 Docket 118 at 8. 
39 Defendants’ opposition brief states that this communication occurred on October 3, 2025. 
Docket 116 at 3. This appears to be in error, and the correct date is October 2, 2025. See 
Docket 116-1 at 1-2 (October 2, 2025 email from Defendants’ counsel to Plaintiffs’ counsel). 

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defendants the opportunity to articulate their concerns —which they declined to 
do.”40 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(1) requires that a motion to compel 
“must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or 
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery 
in an effort to obtain it without court action.” 
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ attempts to obtain 
additional discovery after the October 6 deposition before they filed their motion 
were inadequate . Indeed, Plaintiffs’ certification only discusses the October 6, 
2025 deposition, and not any efforts after the deposition to try to resolve the 
dispute.41 
And yet Plaintiffs did contact Defendants’ counsel on December 8, 2025 
asking for the supplemental discovery responses prior to filing their motion.42 And 
while Plaintiffs did not reply to Defendants’ counsel’s December 10 response, 
Defendants’ response may suggest that the parties could not independently 
resolve the discovery dispute as it concludes with the following sentence: “Without 
further explanation from you as to why these questions are proper, the State does 
 
40 Docket 118 at 9-11. 
41 See Docket 112-2 at 1-6. 
42 Docket 116-2 at 1-2. 

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not intend to respond.” 43 Although the Court finds Plaintiffs’ December efforts to 
confer on this discovery dispute before filing its motion to be marginal at best, the 
Court will nonetheless address the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion. 
II. Supplemental Questions (“SQs”) 1, 2, 3, 5, 14, and 15 
Defendants assert that “many of [Plaintiffs’] ‘supplemental questions’ are 
improper because the plaintiffs did not ask these questions during the deposition 
or hold the deposition open.” 44 Defendants contend that SQ1, SQ2, SQ3, SQ5, 
SQ14, and SQ15 “should be rejected because the plaintiffs cannot show that they 
asked these questions at the deposition much less that they received a somehow 
deficient answer.”45 
In neither their reply nor their motion do Plaintiffs identify the specific 
portions in Ms. Hebdon’s deposition where they believe these questions were 
asked. Rather, it appears that Plaintiffs maintain that they were unable to ask 
and/or receive appropriate responses from Ms. Hebdon to the se questions 
because Defendants “ended the deposition against the plaintiffs’ wishes.” 46 
The Court has reviewed the deposition transcript and disagrees with 
Plaintiffs’ characterization of it. The deposition concluded with Plaintiffs’ counsel 
 
43 Docket 116-2 at 1. 
44 Docket 116 at 9, 13. 
45 Docket 116 at 13. 
46 Docket 118 at 18. 

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responding to the videographer’s question “Anything further from anybody?” with 
“I think that’s all from the plaintiffs,” shortly after which the deposition concluded.47 
The Court finds nothing in the transcript to indicate that Defendants ended the 
deposition against Plaintiffs’ wishes. 
Because Plaintiffs have not identified where they posed each of these 
questions to Ms. Hebdon at her deposition and where she refused to answer them, 
Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendants to answer SQ1, SQ2, SQ3, SQ5, SQ14, 
and SQ15 is DENIED. 
III. Supplemental Questions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 16 
Defendants assert that “several of the questions were asked and answered 
during the deposition and the plaintiffs have failed to show that the answers were 
deficient in some way.” 48 Defendants highlight the fact that Plaintiffs’ “motion 
contains no explanation as to how or why those answers” to SQ9 , SQ10, SQ11, 
SQ12, SQ13, and SQ16 were deficient. 49 The Court addresses each of the 
identified supplemental questions in turn: 
SQ9: Does APOC think that the out -of-state disclaimer requirement 
changes voters' perspective of the speaker? 
 
 
47 Docket 112-4 at 29 (“Let me close it out then. This concludes the 30(b)(6) video deposition of 
the Alaska Public Offices Commission by representative Heather Hebdon.”). 
48 Docket 116 at 9. 
49 Docket 116 at 14-15. 

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During Ms. Hebdon’s deposition, Plaintiffs asked the following question: “Do 
you think that -- do you think that having that disclaimer on there might change 
people's perception of the message?”50 Although Defendants’ counsel objects two 
times during this exchange, she does direct Ms. Hebdon to “[a]nswer if you can.”51 
And Ms. Hebdon did ultimately answer the question with the following : “I mean, 
there's many variables. I -- I think it really depends on the subject of the ad, whether 
it's a candidate ad, whether it's a ballot initiative. I mean, there's a lot of variables 
that go into what might change public perspective.”52 At the end of this exchange, 
Plaintiffs’ counsel turns to questions concerning his next exhibit. 53 Having asked 
and received an answer, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants to answer SQ9 is 
DENIED. 
SQ10: Has APOC noted any changes in reported ad quantity or length 
since Ballot Measure 2 went into effect? If so, what did APOC 
observe? 
 
 At Ms. Hebdon’s deposition, Plaintiffs asked: “On the on-air reporting stuff, 
is -- stuff, is APOC aware of any instance in which [. . .] that additional requirement 
has reduced the [. . .] number of ads people are running?” 54 Ms. Hebdon 
responded with “I'm not aware of that, no” and then answer ed “No” several more 
 
50 Docket 112-4 at 26. 
51 Docket 112-4 at 26. 
52 Docket 112-4 at 26. 
53 Docket 112-4 at 26. 
54 Docket 112-4 at 28. 

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times.55 Although Plaintiffs may not be satisfied with this response and 
Defendants’ counsel objected several times, Ms. Hebdon answer ed Plaintiffs’ 
series of questions on this topic. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants to 
answer SQ10 is DENIED. 
SQ11: Is APOC aware of an instance where the true source reporting 
requirement caused a change in the quantity or length of ads run by 
independent expenditure groups? If so, what did APOC observe? 
 
 At the deposition, Plaintiffs asked Ms. Hebdon three questions relating to 
the true source reporting requirement’s impact on the number of ads: (1) “ [I]s 
APOC aware of any instance in which the true source reporting requirement has 
chilled speech?”; (2) “[Is] APOC aware of any instance in which the true source 
requirement has ca- -- has caused the reduction in the number of ads people are 
running?”; and (3) “Have you made inquiry about the – about people running fewer 
ads, the first thing I asked about?”56 Ms. Hebdon responded to each question with 
“No” or that she is “not aware of that” (or equivalent).57 And during this series of 
questioning, Defendants’ counsel did not interrupt or object. Having received an 
answer to these questions, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants to answer 
SQ11 is DENIED. 
SQ12: Is APOC aware of an instance where the double reporting 
requirement caused a change in the quantity or length of ads run by 
independent expenditure groups? If so, what did APOC observe? 
 
55 Docket 112-4 at 28. 
56 Docket 112-4 at 27. 
57 Docket 112-4 at 27. 

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At Ms. Hebdon’s deposition, Plaintiffs first asked: “if APOC aware of any 
instance in which that dual reporting requirement has chilled speech.” 58 Then, 
Plaintiffs asked: “Is APOC aware of any instance in which people have -- in which 
people have decreased their donations because of that” “or just decline to 
participate because that -- declining to give the donations because of the 
compliance burden?”59 In response to all these questions, Ms. Hebdon responded: 
“No” or “I'm not aware of that, no.”60 Because Plaintiffs received answers to these 
questions, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants to answer SQ12 is DENIED. 
SQ13: Is APOC aware of an instance where the spoken out -of-state 
disclaimer reporting requirement caused a change in the quantity or 
length of ads run by independent expenditure groups? If so, what did 
APOC observe? 
 
At Ms. Hebdon’s deposition, Plaintiffs asked: “Is APOC aware of . . . the out-
of-state aspect of the on -air disclaimer, is APOC aware of any instance in which 
that has chilled speech?” 61 After Ms. Hebdon responded “No ,” Plaintiffs’ counsel 
asked a series of follow -up questions concerning “any reduction in participation, ” 
“decrease in donations, ” or “inquiries or investigations,” to which Ms. Hebdon 
responded “No.”62 At that point, Plaintiffs’ counsel concluded his questioning on 
 
58 Docket 112-4 at 27. 
59 Docket 112-4 at 28. 
60 Docket 112-4 at 27-28. 
61 Docket 112-4 at 28. 
62 Docket 112-4 at 28. 

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this topic .63 Having received answer s to their question s, Plaintiffs’ motion to 
compel Defendants to answer SQ13 is DENIED. 
SQ16: Is APOC aware of an instance where the printed disclaimer 
reporting requirement caused a change in the quantity or length of ads 
run by independent expenditure groups? If so, what did APOC 
observe? 
 
At the deposition, Plaintiffs asked Ms. Hebdon whether “requiring extensive 
disclaimers being included in the ad takes up space” and would thus impact the 
substance of the ad.64 Ms. Hebdon responded: “I mean, theoretically, yes.”65 Ms. 
Hebdon later testified that these printed disclaimer requirements do not discourage 
people from running ads: “My experience is that they continue to run the ads and 
they comply.”66 Later in the deposition, Ms. Hebdon testified that she is not aware 
of “people changing the length or size of ads because of the disclaimers . . . 
imposed by Ballot Measure 2.” 67 Having received answer s to their questions on 
this topic, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants to answer SQ16 is DENIED. 
In their opposition brief, Defendants also assert that SQ9 , SQ10, SQ11, 
SQ12, SQ13, and SQ16 are beyond the scope of the Rule 30(b)(6) notice. 68 
 
63 Docket 112-4 at 28 (“I think I'll call it”). 
64 Docket 112-4 at 25. 
65 Docket 112-4 at 25. 
66 Docket 112-4 at 26. 
67 Docket 112-4 at 28. 
68 Docket 116 at 2. 

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Having found that SQ9, SQ10, SQ11, SQ12, SQ13, and SQ16 were all asked and 
adequately answered during the deposition, the Court does not address whether 
these proposed supplemental questions were within the scope of the Rule 30(b)(6) 
notice. 
IV. Supplemental Questions 4, 6, 7, and 8 
With respect to the remaining proposed supplemental questions, Plaintiffs 
maintain that Defendants did not satisfy Rule 30(b)(6) because they provided a 
witness who testified that “I don’t speak for the Commission.” 69 Plaintiffs contend 
that effectively, Defendants “promise[d] to answer everything in depositions, 
schedule[d] a deposition near the end of discovery, and then just cancel[led] at the 
last minute.”70 
Defendants respond that these questions seek to “inquire about the 
Commission’s deliberations, which are protected by the adjudicatory /deliberative 
process privilege, and also are irrelevant to the issues in this case.” 71 
In their reply, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ “brief continues to obfuscate 
about what the Commission is and who Ms. Hebdon was testifying for.” 72 They 
maintain that “[i]f the Commission is some intangible body that ‘exists only as a 
 
69 Docket 112-1 at 10; see also Docket 112-1 at 13 (“If Ms. Hebdon was unable to speak 
confidently on behalf of the Commission, she should not have been its witness.”). 
70 Docket 112-1 at 11. 
71 Docket 116 at 7. 
72 Docket 118 at 4. 

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body and “speaks” only through its decisions, ’ like a legislature or a court, then it 
would not make any sense to have a now -four-year-long legal battle over an Ex 
parte Young doctrine claim.”73 
a. Rule 30(b)(6) Deponent 
Rule 30(b)(6) provides, “[i]n its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the 
deponent . . . a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with 
reasonable particularity the matters for examination.” “The person[] designated 
[by the named organization] must testify about information known or reasonably 
available to the organization.”74 
In Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes , the plaintiffs sought to compel “the Arizona 
Legislature to designate (a) deponent(s) who ‘can testify as to the collective 
knowledge’ of the Legislature.” 75 The district court denied the plaintiffs’ “request 
to compel the Arizona House of Representatives and Senate to prepare a 30(b)(6) 
deponent to testify as to these topics because doing so would intrude upon the 
protections afforded by the legislative privilege.” 76 The court agreed with the 
 
73 Docket 118 at 6 (quoting Virginia Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011)). 
74 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). 
75 691 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1112 (D. Ariz. 2023) (citation omitted). 
76 Id. at 1112 (citing All. for Glob. Justice v. District of Columbia, 437 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 
2006); and then citing Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 314 F.R.D. 664, 671 (D. Ariz. 2016)). 

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Legislature “that a 30(b)(6) deposition of the Arizona Legislature ‘would effectively 
force a waiver of every single legislator's individual legislative privilege.’” 77 
The Court finds that Defendants’ selection of Ms. Hebdon as the 30(b)(6) 
deponent complied with Rule 30(b)(6). Plaintiffs’ deposition notice was sent to the 
five individuals that make up the Commission —not to the organization itself—
because, as noted by Plaintiffs, these individual Defendants, who “collectively run 
the Alaska Public Offices Commission,” have been sued in their official capacities 
under an Ex parte Young theory.78 APOC is a five-member Commission that, as 
noted by Defendants, like other government boards and commissions, “consists of 
a number of appointed commissioners, supported by agency staff.” 79 Similar to a 
state legislature, only a quorum of the APOC Commissioners can speak on behalf 
of the APOC as an adjudicative body. 80 Thus, the Court agrees with Defendants 
that while “an ‘agency’ can be deposed, ” “a quasi-adjudicatory body” cannot be 
deposed, because “[t]he ‘commission’ —as distinct from the agency and staff — 
 
77 Id. at 1111. 
78 Docket 118 at 5 (first citing Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy, 563 U.S. at 255; and then 
citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). 
79 Docket 116 at 9-10; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 908 F.3d 1175, 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(“However, [Commissioner] Ellison and [Commissioner] Wesson were only two people in a 
process that incorporated multiple layers of decisions and alterations from the entire 
Commission, as well as the City Council.”). 
80 Docket 116 at 6. 

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exists only as a body and ‘speaks’ only through its decisions” and “[a]s such, it 
cannot be ‘deposed’ in the way the plaintiffs appear to want.” 81 
In light of the foregoing , the Court finds APOC’s Executive Director is a 
proper Rule 30(b)(6) witness to testify about the agency’s operations and 
processes. 
b. Deliberative process privilege 
Plaintiffs assert that they “have no interest in the internal policy preferences 
of the Commissioners” and “don’t care what happens behind closed doors in the 
Commissions meetings,” but rather “just want to know what possible rationale the 
Commissioners may have for insisting that Ballot Measure 2 can be enforced fairly 
and equally.”82 
Defendants assert that the deliberative process privilege applies and that 
Plaintiffs “have failed to point to any specific questions not inquiring into 
Commission deliberations that Ms. Hebdon declined to answer.” 83 In their 
opposition brief, Defendants quote two cases in support of this assertion. 
Defendants first quote the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens to Preserve 
 
81 Docket 116 at 10 (emphasis in original). 
82 Docket 118 at 8; see also Docket 118 at 9 (“The plaintiffs knew that it was possible the 
Commissioners would claim they engaged in policymaking discussions at their meetings . . . . 
[Plaintiffs] modified their initial deposition request—still labeled as to each of the defendants—so 
it would be conducted under [Rule 30(b)(6)]. This would give the defendants the opportunity to 
present a witness who could talk about the Commission’s enforcement policies in one voice, 
and thus avoid any appearance that the plaintiffs wanted to know what the Commissioners does 
behind closed doors.”). 
83 Docket 116 at 11. 

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Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe for the proposition that “inquiry into the mental 
processes of administrative decisionmakers is usually to be avoided. And where 
there are administrative findings that were made at the same time as the decision 
. . . there must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before such 
inquiry may be made.” 84 Second, Defendants quote from this Court’s decision in 
Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke , for the proposition that “the actual 
subjective motivation of agency decisionmakers is immaterial as a matter of law, . 
. . [j]ust as a judge cannot be subjected to . . . scrutiny . . . so the integrity of the 
administrative process must be equally respected.”85 
Plaintiffs respond that Defendants “are obfuscating what ‘deliberative 
process privilege’ they are asserting; no privilege exists to exempt them from 
answering the plaintiffs’ common sense questions.” 86 According to Plaintiffs, this 
 
84 Docket 116 at 12 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 
(1971) [hereinafter Overton Park], abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 
99, 105 (1977)). 
85 Docket 116 at 12 (Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, Case No. 3:18-cv-00064-SLG, 2018 
WL 8805325, at *4 (D. Alaska Nov. 16, 2018)). 
Here, Defendants combine two quotes by this Court from the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme 
Court. This Court’s order first stated: “The Court finds persuasive the D.C. Circuit's reasoning 
that ‘the actual subjective motivation of agency decisionmakers is immaterial as a matter of 
law—unless there is a showing of bad faith or improper behavior.’” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 
2018 WL 8805325, at *4 (quoting In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, 156 F.3d 1279, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). In the following 
sentence, the order states: “‘Just as a judge cannot be subjected to . . . scrutiny [over which 
documents the judge considers in making decisions and the weight that the judge gives each 
document], . . . so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected.’” Id. 
(quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 407, 422 (1941)). 
86 Docket 118 at 11. 

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information is necessary because Defendants “are the ones asserting that they 
can enforce the law in a constitutional manner (something plaintiffs contend is 
impossible), and the defendants are the ones who produced expert witnesses that, 
in deposition, asserted that any concerns over su bjectivity in the law are negated 
by the wise discretion of the Commissioners in how they choose to enforce (or not 
enforce) the law.”87 
The deliberative process “privilege exempts from discovery information 
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part 
of a process by which government decisions and policies are formulated.” 88 “To 
fall within the deliberative process privilege, a document must be both 
‘predecisional’ and ‘deliberative.’”89 
 
87 Docket 118 at 13. Plaintiffs also provide multiple exhibits that Plaintiffs maintain reveal 
APOC’s practice of giving “preferential treatment to some inquirers over others.” Docket 118 at 
13-14 (citing Docket 118-1 at 22-25 (Emails between Alaskans for Honest Government and 
APOC); Docket 118-1 at 27-28 (Email from Heather Hebdon regarding group formation); Docket 
118-1 at 30 (Excerpt from Final Order in APOC Case No. 24-03-CD); Docket 118-1 at 46-51 
(Emails between Keep It Alaska and APOC)). 
88 Thomas v. Cate, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1019 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing FTC v. Warner 
Commc’ns, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
89 Carter v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 307 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Assembly of 
California v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
While the deliberative process privilege is usually applied to documents, district courts in this 
Circuit have applied the deliberative process privilege to deposition testimony. See Kay v. City of 
Rancho Palos Verdes, Case No. CV 02-03922 MMM(RZ), 2003 WL 25294710, at *16 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 10, 2003) (“Most of the cases dealing with this [deliberative process] privilege involve 
documents, although presumably the protection applies analogously to other communications, 
including oral statements, as well.”); Stott Outdoor Advert. v. County of Monterey, Case No. 
C06-00891 RMW (HRL), 2007 WL 460647, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2007) (“The [deliberative 
process] privilege applies to deposition testimony as well as written documents.”). 

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A predecisional document is one prepared in order to assist an 
agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision, and may include 
recommendations, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and 
other subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions of the 
writer rather than the policy of the agency. A predecisional document 
is a part of the deliberative process, if the disclosure of [the] materials 
would expose an agency's decisionmaking process in such a way as 
to discourage candid discussion within t he agency and thereby 
undermine the agency's ability to perform its functions.90 
 
Plaintiffs quote FTC v. Warner Communications, Inc. for the proposition that 
the deliberative process privilege is a qualified, rather than an absolute privilege.91 
Plaintiffs then cite to American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) v. 
Trump for the proposition that the Ninth Circuit in that case “[reaffirmed] that the 
Warner Communications test remains alive and well, despite its age.” 92 Plaintiffs 
also quote this Court’s decision in Roberts v. City of Fairbanks for the proposition 
that “[t]he deliberative process privilege is generally invoked for adjudicatory 
decisions by the government, such as deciding whether or not to pursue a certain 
plea agreement” and then, “in Alaska, there is also a deliberative process privilege 
 
90 Carter, 307 F.3d at 1089 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Assembly of California, 968 
F.2d at 920). 
91 Docket 118 at 11-12 (quoting Warner Commc’ns, 742 F.2d at 1161). 
The two quoted portions are: (1) “The deliberative process privilege is a qualified one. A litigant 
may obtain deliberative materials if his or her need for the materials and the need for accurate 
fact-finding override the government's interest in non-disclosure”; and (2) “Among the factors to 
be considered in making this determination are: 1) the relevance of the evidence; 2) the 
availability of other evidence; 3) the government's role in the litigation; and 4) the extent to 
which disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated 
policies and decisions.” Warner Commc’ns, 742 F.2d at 1161 (citations omitted). 
92 Docket 118 at 12 (citing Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 163 F.4th 1226, 1230 
(9th Cir. 2026)); see also AFGE, 163 F.4th at 1231 (“There was no error in the district court's 
application of Warner [Communications]”). 

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for ‘internal communications made within the executive branch’ on administrative 
matters.”93 Plaintiffs also cite to the portion of an Attorney General memo that 
states: “The privilege purports to cover internal communications within the 
executive branch at the federal, and state level.”94 
According to Plaintiffs, Overton Park and Center for Biological Diversity are 
not applicable here because “[b]oth of those cases were statutory litigation 
regarding the scope of privileges under the United States Administrative 
Procedures Act in a challenge to federal agency rulemaking.” 95 Plaintiffs stress 
that “[t]his litigation is not an appeal of an adjudicatory decision, and it is not a 
challenge to administrative rulemaking.” 96 Rather, Plaintiffs characterize this 
action as “ litigation on the constitutionality of Ballot Measure 2 ” where “[t]he 
Commissioners are being sued in their capacity as law enforcement officers” 
because they have allegedly “[administered] the law unfairly and arbitrarily.”97 
Plaintiffs are correct that Overton Park was an action brought under the APA 
challenging agency rulemaking. 98 However, Overton Park is nonetheless 
 
93 Docket 118 at 12 (first citing Roberts v. City of Fairbanks, Case No. 4:17-cv-00034-SLG, 2022 
WL 889401, at *9 (D. Alaska Mar. 25, 2022); and then citing Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. 221-92-0553 
(Jan. 1, 1993)). 
94 Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 221-92-0553, at 2 (Jan. 1, 1993) (citing U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974)). 
95 Docket 118 at 12. 
96 Docket 118 at 13. 
97 Docket 118 at 13-14, 16. 
98 Docket 118 at 12 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410). 

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applicable for the proposition that the government may shield from discovery its 
internal deliberations that seek to probe the “mental processes of administrative 
decisionmakers.”99 As the Ninth Circuit explained in In re United States: “Where—
as in Mothers for Peace —an agency is headed by a multi -member board, the 
deliberations among those members are analogous to the internal mental 
processes of the sole head of an agency, and thus are generally not within the 
scope of the administrative record.”100 
Although Plaintiffs maintain that the requested responses to the 
supplemental questions related to the enforcement of Ballot Measure 2’s 
provisions (namely, SQ2, SQ3, SQ4, SQ6, SQ7, and SQ8 ) are necessary given 
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[e]ven where 
a plaintiff must prove invidious purpose or intent, as in racial discrimination cases, 
the [Supreme] Court has indicated that only in extraordinary circumstances might 
members of the legislature be c alled to testify, and even in these circumstances 
the testimony may be barred by privilege.”101 Although in the context of legislative 
privilege, rather than adjudicatory privilege, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “[t]he 
 
99 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. 
100 875 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Portland Audubon Soc. v. Endangered Species 
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1549 (9th Cir. 1993)). In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2017) 
was later vacated on procedural grounds by In re United States, 583 U.S. 29 (2017), but the 
Court still finds the reasoning in the now vacated opinion persuasive. 
101 City of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977)); see also In re U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., 25 F.4th 692, 702, 705 (9th Cir. 2022) (ordering the district court to quash the subpoena 
of the former Secretary of Education). 

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Court prevents inquiry into the motives of legislators because it recognizes that 
such inquiries are a hazardous task. Individual legislators may vote for a particular 
statute for a variety of reasons.”102 
In Lee v. City of Los Angeles , the plaintiffs sought to depose the Mayor of 
Los Angeles, the City Council President, a City Councilmember, and a former City 
Councilmember.103 There, the plaintiffs brought three claims alleging that the city’s 
redistricting plan violated: (1) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; (2) the City Charter; and (3) the California Constitution.104 The Ninth 
Circuit upheld the trial court's barring of the depositions of the city officials involved 
in the redistricting process. 105 The plaintiffs there had argued that the privilege 
should not apply because they claimed an Equal Protection claim of racial 
gerrymandering, and there should be “a categorical exception whenever a 
constitutional claim directly implicates the government's intent .”106 But the Ninth 
 
102 Foley, 747 F.2d at 1297–98 (first citing United States v. O’Brien, 367 U.S. 391. 384 (1968); 
and then citing Michael M. v. Sonoma Cnty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1981)); see also 
Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1885) (“The diverse character of such motives, 
and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, precludes 
all such inquiries as impracticable and futile.”). 
103 908 F.3d at 1181. 
104 Id. at 1181-82. 
105 Id. at 1186. 
106 Id. at 1188. 

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Circuit rejected that argument because such an exception would render the 
privilege “of little value.”107 
SQ4, SQ6, SQ7, and SQ8 are reproduced as follows: 
SQ4: What factors does the Commission use when determining 
penalty reductions? 
 
SQ6: Is it the Commissioners’ job to analyze constitutional arguments, 
or to enforce the law as written? 
 
SQ7: Does APOC consider compliance burdens at all when enforcing 
Ballot Measure 2? 
 
SQ8: Does APOC consider the potential chilling effect of Ballot 
Measure 2?108 
 
Each of these supplemental questions inquire s into the predecisional and 
deliberative process of the APOC as an adjudicatory body. These questions ask 
how the Commission determines penalties (SQ4), APOC’s considerations relating 
to enforcement (SQ6 and SQ7), and APOC’s consideration of the policy impact of 
Ballot Measure 2 (SQ8). These supplemental questions seek to “impermissibly 
inquire into the mental processes of [APOC] Committee members.” 109 Although 
portions of the questions inquire about facts and evidence, which is not 
 
107 Id. (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951)). 
108 Docket 112 at 3-4. 
109 Portland Audubon Soc., 984 F.2d at 1548. 

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privileged,110 “factual material that ‘is so interwoven with the deliberative material 
that it is not severable’ may be encompassed by the privilege.”111 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Supplemental Questions 4, 
6, 7, and 8 are barred by the deliberative process privilege and the motion to 
compel Defendants to answer each of them must be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Full & Complete 
Deposition Responses at Docket 112 is DENIED. 
DATED this 2nd day of June 2026, at Anchorage, Alaska. 
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
110 United States ex rel. Poehling v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., Case No. CV 16-8697 MWF (SSX), 
2018 WL 8459926, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2018) (quoting Warner Commc'ns, 742 F.2d at 
1161) (“[I]t is widely accepted that the privilege protects opinions and deliberations, but 
generally not ‘facts and evidence.’”). 
111 Id. (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

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