govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_20-cr-00038-8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 : 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 : 
 
 v. : Criminal No. DKC 20-38-7 
 Civil Action No. DKC 25-4051 
 : 
JARVIS ANTONIO COLEMAN-FULLER 
 : 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
 Mr. Jarvis Antonio Coleman-Fuller filed a request seeking a 
copy of all electronic communications referencing plea agreements 
between the government and his attorneys and the government and 
counsel for his co-defendants on December 5, 2025. (ECF No. 794). 
On April 24, 2026, he filed a motion seeking to compel his former 
trial counsel to produce the complete case file, including emails 
between counsel and prosecutors, investigation notes and witness 
statements, plea negotiations, motions, drafts, legal research, 
exhibits, transcripts, and related documents. (ECF No. 800). For 
the reasons that follow, Mr. Coleman-Fuller’s requests and motions 
will be denied. 
I. Background 
 On November 17, 2022, Mr. Coleman-Fuller was convicted by a 
jury of conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to 
distribute at least 40 grams of fentanyl and 100 grams or more of 
heroin, possession of a firearm and ammunition by a prohibited 

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person, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug 
trafficking crime. (ECF No. 586). The jury also found certain 
munitions to be subject to forfeiture after finding a nexus between 
the munitions and the offenses. (ECF No. 587). He was sentenced 
to 156 months of imprisonment on March 30, 2023. (ECF No. 681). 
He noted an appeal and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. (ECF Nos, 
778, 779). 
On December 5, 2025, Mr. Coleman-Fuller filed a Motion to 
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255 
(“§ 2255 motion”) and request for copies of all electronic 
communications.
1 (ECF Nos. 793, 794). On April 24, 2026, Mr. 
Coleman-Fuller filed a motion to compel his case file and related 
documents. (ECF No. 800). (There is no indication that Mr. 
Coleman-Fuller has made any request directly to former counsel 
regarding material in any file). 
II. Motion for Discovery 
 “A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in 
federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary 
course.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). “Rule 6(a) 
of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings provides that “[a] party 
may invoke the processes of discovery . . . if, and to the extent 
 
1 Mr. Coleman-Fuller’s § 2255 motion will be decided in due 
course, after full briefing. 

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that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good 
cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise.” In United 
States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382, 402-03 (4th Cir. 2004), the Fourth 
Circuit identified the following as the “proper standard” in 
considering such claims: 
The Supreme Court determined in Harris v. 
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 
L.Ed.2d 281 (1969), and its progeny, Bracy v. 
Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 
L.Ed.2d 97 (1997), that ‘good cause’ for 
discovery exists when a petition for habeas 
corpus establishes a prima facie case for 
relief. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. at 
290, 89 S.Ct. 1082. Specifically, discovery 
is warranted, “where specific allegations 
before the court show reason to believe that 
the petitioner may, if the facts are fully 
developed, be able to demonstrate that he is 
... entitled to relief.” Bracy, 520 U.S. at 
908-09, 117 S.Ct. 1793 (citing Harris, 394 
U.S. at 299-300, 89 S.Ct. 1082). 
 
(quoting Johnson v. Pruett, No. 3:97CV895 (E.D.Va. May 3, 2000). 
The discovery requests may not be so broad and baseless as to 
constitute a “fishing expedition.” United States v. Wilson, 901 
F.2d 378, 381 (4
th Cir. 1990). Moreover, good cause does not exist 
if a defendant premises a discovery request on a claim that fails 
as a matter of law. See Thomas v. Taylor, 170 F.3d 466, 474 (4
th 
Cir. 1999) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying discovery request related to claim that 
failed as a matter of law); Ramey v. United States, 2014 WL 
12661574 (D.Md. 2014). The burden of demonstrating the materiality 

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of information requested through discovery in habeas proceedings 
is on the moving party. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
Mr. Coleman-Fuller has not demonstrated how such discovery 
would result in him being entitled to habeas relief. Ground One 
of Mr. Coleman-Fuller’s § 2255 motion asserts professional 
misconduct in that counsel for another co-defendant, Jeroam 
Nelson, and the government purportedly entered into a plea 
agreement that locked him and other defendants into previous 
offers. In Grounds Two and Three, Mr. Coleman-Fuller asserts that 
counsel for co-defendant Jeroam Nelson negotiated with government 
counsel for pleas for four defendants but entered into a plea 
agreement for Mr. Nelson only, to the detriment of the other three 
defendants. Ground Four asserts that Mr. Coleman-Fuller’s 
attorney was ineffective because he failed to notify the judge of 
the alleged misconduct. (ECF No. 793, pp. 4-8). 
The government filed a response to Mr. Coleman-Fuller’s 
§ 2255 motion on May 27, 2026. (ECF No. 804). Attached to its 
response what it claims is a plea offer that the government 
extended to Mr. Coleman-Fuller when he was represented by Mr. 
Bussard in August 2022 through, if accepted, the parties would 
agree to a 10-year period of incarceration pursuant to 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(C). The government says that it extended 
the same offer again after Mr. Coleman-Fuller fired Mr. Bussard 
and the court appointed Mr. Walsh-Little to represent him. 

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Although Mr. Coleman-Fuller decided to reject the plea offer and 
proceed to trial, the government states that the same offer was 
made to his co-defendant Jeroam Nelson, who accepted the offer. 
Defendant Coleman-Fuller has not established good cause for 
discovery at this stage. The scope of Mr. Coleman-Fuller’s 
requests go far beyond requesting only specific documents, and in 
seeking reproduction of his entire file and confidential 
correspondence between the government and counsel for co-
defendants, his request is overbroad and trends toward the sort of 
“fishing expedition” that the Fourth Circuit cautioned against in 
Wilson. Wilson, 901 F.2d at 381. Moreover, with respect to the 
items Mr. Coleman-Fuller does specify with particularity, he fails 
to articulate how such items would be materially relevant. See 
United States v. Moss, No. 8:05 -0338-GRA, 2008 WL 4442613, *1 
(D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2008) (quoting Hall v. United States, 30 
F.Supp.2d 883, 899 (E.D.Va. 1998)) (“a party ‘must make at least 
a preliminary showing that requested documents contain exculpatory 
or impeaching information in order to compel production.’”). In 
short, Mr. Coleman-Fuller has not established good cause for the 
production of the requested discovery because he has failed to put 
forward any “specific allegations” that, if proved, would 
“entitle[] [him] to relief.” Because Mr. Coleman-Fuller has failed 
to demonstrate the requisite good cause necessary for discovery in 
a § 2255 proceeding, his requests and motions will be denied. 

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III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Coleman-Fuller’s request for 
the production of electronic communications between the government 
and defense counsel referencing plea agreements and motion to 
compel the production of his case file and related papers will be 
denied. A separate order will follow. 
 
 /s/ 
 DEBORAH K. CHASANOW 
 United States District Judge 

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