govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_25-cv-02902-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
• FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF 
WASHINGTON, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Civil No. 25-2902-BAH 
EZRPACKING CORP., ET AL., * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
* * 
Plaintiff Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. ("Expeditors" or "Plaintiff') brought 
suit against EZR Packing Corporation ("EZR") and Yehi Yul Melamed ("Melamed"} (togetlier 
"Defendants") alleging defamation (Count V) and tortious interference with business relationships 
(Count VI). ECF 59 (amended complaint).' Plaintiff also brought breach of contract (Count I), 
unjust enrichment (Count II), !rover and conversion (Count III), and tortious interference with 
• contract (Count IV) claims against EZR only. Id EZR brought counterclaims against Expeditors 
alleging fraud (Count I) and unjust enrichment (Count II). ECF 65. Pending before the Court are 
four motions: Defendants' motion to dismiss, ECF 64; Expeditors' partial motion to dismiss EZR's 
counterclaims, ECF 70; EZR's motion for disbursement of funds from the registry, ECF 73; and 
Expeditors' cross-motion for release of funds, ECF 76. This memorandum opinion also addresses 
the Court's March 11, 2026 order requiring EZR to have new counsel enter an appearance on its 
1 The original complaint is docketed at ECF 1. 

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behalf or, altemati_velyr to show cause why default should not be entered against it and its 
counterclaims dismissed. ECF 84. 
' ! Several respons;es and replies have been filed to the pending mo\ions. See ECF 67 
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(Expeditors' oppositiorr to ECF 64); ECF 72 (Defendants' reply); ECF 74 (EZR's opposition to· . I . . 
ECF 70); ECF 78 (E~pieditors' opposition to ECF 73); 
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ECF 79 (EZR's reply)' ECF 80 (EZR's 
opposition to ECF 76)j ECF 81 (Expeditors' reply).· All filings either include or incorporate , ' 
separately filed memoribda oflaw, see, e.g., ECF 71 (memorandum in support ofECF 70); ECF 
i 77 (memorandum in support' of ECF 76), and some filings include exhibits.2 The Court has 
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reviewed all relevant filings and finds that no hearing.is necessary. See Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 
2025). Accordingly, ft the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion to dismiss, ECF 64, is 
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GRANTED in part ani DENIED in part; EZR's motion for d_isbursement of funds, ECF 73, is 
DENIED; and Expediiors' cross-motion for release of funds, ECF 76, is DENIED as moot. 
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Default is ENTERED against,EZR and its counterclaims ate DISMISSED. The motion to dismiss 
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the counterclaims, ECFl70, is DENIED as moot. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
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This case arises from a contentious business relationship involving a warehouse facility in 
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Belcamp, Maryland (thb "Facility"). 3 Plaintiff Expeditors is incorporated .in and has its principal 
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place of business in W a'.shington state; EZR is incorporated in New York with its principal place 
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of business in Maryland; and Melamed resides in New York. See ECF 59, at 1-2 .. Beginning in 
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• _2 _T_h_e_C_o_u_rt_r_e_fe_r-en~· c_e_s_tl_ll_fi_1l-ings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-
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generated page numbers at the top of the page. 
3 The facts are drawn frJm Expeditors' amended complaint, which the Court "accept[ s] as true ... 
and construe[s] .. , in tjie light most favorable to the plaintiff." Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'/ Sec. 
Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 708 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 
F.3d 412,422 (4th Cir. 2015)). • 
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March of 2023, "Expeditors began using EZR's services for warehousing space and related 
distribution and services at the" Facility. ECF 59, at 3 ,r 8. The "Facility contains freight for four 
of Expeditors' _distribution customers." Id. ,r 7. In March of 2024, Expeditors and EZR entered 
into a Service Provider Agreement ("SP A"), "pursuant to which EZR agreed to provide 
warehousing space .and related distribution and storage services" at the Facility. Id. at 2 ,r 7. The 
SPA was to be in effect for one year, and then would continue from year to year until terminated 
by either party. ECF 59-1 (copy of the SPA dated March 15, 2024), at 2. In January of 2025, 
"EZR notified Expeditors ofitsintent not to renew the SPA as ofMarch 15, 2025." ECF 59,-at 3 
,r 10. Although "EZR provided Expeditors with a proposal for new terms of service," those "terms 
were rejected by Expeditors." Id. Nevertheless, from April through August of 2025, Expeditors 
continued to make payments totaling over $ 1 .2 million to EZR "in accordance with the parties' 
prior practices and based on the rates provided in the SP A." Id. at 3-4 ,r 11. EZR accepted the 
payments "without objection," continued to provide Expeditors with access to the Facility, and 
also "continued to provide related distribution and storage services to Expeditors." Id. at 4 ,r 12. 
"On August 22, 2025, EZR sent a demand to Expeditors for alleged past due amounts" 
totaling over $ 1.5 million. Id. at ,r 23. According to Expeditors, the basis for this demand is 
• ·"unknown." Id. Then, on September 2, 2025, EZR suddenly denied Expeditors' employees access· 
to the Facility. Id. at 5 ,r 17. At that time, property owned by Expeditors' clients-Smiths Devices, 
Hammond, Mitac, and Ori Biotech-was stored at the Facility, totaling approximately $19 million 
in value. Id. at 4 ,r,r 14-16. EZR also denied Smiths Devices' representatives access to the Facility 
and to Smiths Devices' property. Id. ,r 18. 
The next day, on September 3, 2025, Expeditors filed this action and sought an emergency 
order to gain access to the Facility. ECF 59, at 5 ,r 19; see also ECF 1 (original complaint); ECF 
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6 ( emergency motion). The parties, "each negotiating through counsel, were able to agree to the 
terms of an" order' (the '!Agreed Order") granting Expeditors access to the Facility "for a period of 
30 days" with an \'opticin to extend" for an additional 30 days. ECF 59, at 5 ,r,r 20-21; see also 
ECF 9 (Agreed O~der). The Agreed Order was entered on September 5, 2025. ECF 9. Pursuant 
to it, Expeditors was required to pay $235,135.46 per month for access to the Facility, and the 
"[flee itselfproviqed o1ly access to the MD Facility, and no related se~ices." ECF 59, at 6 ,r 22. 
Expeditors was also required to "deposit $100,000 into the Court's registry as security for I . 
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additional damages (if Jny) to be determined by the Court in due course or by mediation." ECF 
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9, at 2. Expeditqrs made the deposit, and the Court has held $100,000 in the registry since 
September 12, 20'.?5. 
Expeditors alleges that after the entry of the Agreed Order, "EZR constantly harassed . I . . 
Expeditors' employees land contractors" while they worked in the Facility. ECF 59; at 6 ,r 23. 
Because of this, Expeditors sought an immediate status conference with the Court on October 10, I . , 
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2025, ECF 12, whichtlie Court held on October, 14, 2025. ECF 59, at 6 ,r 24; see also ECF 16. . I 
After the status conferfnce, "the :parties were temporarily able to resolve the issues raised _by 
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Expeditors." ECF 59, at 6,r 24. 1 
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On October 17) 2025, counsel for Expeditors received several emails from Melamed, 
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accusing Expeditors of failing to pay a $90,000 deposit, failing to drug test contractors operating 
heavy machinery, and clusing "deterioration" of the Facility. Id. at 6-7,r 25: That same day, EZR 
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again locked Expeditors out of the Facility. Id. at 7 i! 27. When Expeditors was denied access on 
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the morning of Octobei 20, 2025, it filed a motion for contempt. Id. ,r 28; ECF 17 (motion for . . I 
order to show cau~e for 6ontempt); ECF 18 (memorandum in support). Then, on October 21, 2025, 
Melamed sent emails tj three of Expeditors' customers; "making numerous false accusations and 
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damaging Expeditors' business relationships with the Customers." ECF 59, at 7 1 29. The 
allegedly false accusations included drug use by Expeditors-affiliated personnel and failure to 
remove garbage from the Facility. Id. at 8135, at 9140. Expeditors filed a motion for a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction. ECF 21. The Court held a hearing on those motions 
and the motion for contempt, and the parties then agreed to the terms of an amended agreed order. 
ECF 59, at 11 145; ECF 45 (order amending the agreed order). Pursuant to the amended order, 
EZR agreed to provide Expeditors with access to the Facility until November 7, 2025. ECF 59, at 
11146. 
Prior to vacating the facility, Expeditors noticed that some business records belonging to 
Expeditors' client, Hammond, were missing from the Facility. Id. 1 47. Expeditors alleges that 
prior to being locked out in October of 2025, Hammond's records were located "near a portion of 
the[] Facility controlled by EZR." Id. 148. After the lockout, Hammond's records were missing. 
Id. According to Expeditors, "the Hammond Records remain missing" to date. Id. 149. 
On December 29, 2025, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, ECF 64, and EZR also 
filed its counterclaims, ECF 65. On January 20, 2026, Expeditors filed a partial motion to dismiss 
the counterclaims. ECF 70. Then, on January 23, 2026, EZR filed a motion for disbursement of· 
funds, ECF 73, and on February 6, 2026, Expeditors filed a cross-motion for release of the funds, 
ECF 76. These motions are all fully briefed. 
On March 9, 2026, Michael Lentz, Jaime' Luse, Jessica Bustamente, and Tydings & 
Rosenberg LLP moved to withdraw as counsel for both EZR and Melamed. ECF 82. The motion 
was granted, and Melamed now proceeds pro se. ECF 84. However, because EZR can appear in 
this court on,ly through a licensed attorney; see Loe. R. IO 1.2(b) (D. Md. 2025), the Court ordered 
EZR, by April 8, 2026, to either have new counsel enter an appearance on its behalf or show cause 
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why default should nof be entered against it and its counterclaims dismissed. ECF 84, at I. 
Through former couns~l, the Court subsequently received an email from Melamed averring that 
"[Expeditor's] release [bf] the escrow funds to EZR" is "a critical step" and alleging that EZR and 
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Melamed cannot "proc~ed as expected" without the release of the funds. ECF 86-1, at I. I . 
i II. LEGALSTANDARD 
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A. Federal :Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(2) 
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"[A] Rule 12(b)(2) challenge" to personal jurisdiction "raises an-issue for the court to 
resolve, generally as a ~reliminary matter." Grayson v. Anderson, 816 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 
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2016) (citing Combs v.
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Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)). "Under Rule 12(b)(2), a 
defendant must affirmatively· raise a personal jurisdiction challenge, but the plaintiff. bears the I . 
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burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction at every stage.following such a challenge." Id. "[A] 
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court has broad discreticin to determine the procedure that it will follow in resolving a Rule l 2(b )(2) 
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motion." Id. at 268. "[N]either discovery nor an evidentiary hearing is required in order for the 
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court to resolve amotioh under Rule 12(b)(2)." Jones v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp. 3d 
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537, 544 (D. Md. 2022/ "When 'the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed factual questions 
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the court may resolve the Ourisdictional] challenge on the basis of a separate evidentiary hearing, 
or [it] may defer ruling Jending receipt at trial of evidence relevant to the.jurisdictional question."' 
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Id. (quoting Combs, 886 F.2d at 676). 
I "When personal jurisdiction is addressed under Rule 12(b )(2) without an evidentiary 
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hearing, the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
jurisdiction." Hawkins l. i-TV Digitalis Tavkozlesi zrt., 935 F.3d 211,226 (4th Cir. 2019). "This 
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'prima facie case' anal}sis resembles the plausibility inquiry governing motions to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim hnder Rule l 2(b )( 6)." Id. "The court must determine whether the facts I • 
proffered by the party aJsertingjurisdiction-assuming they are true-make out a case of personal 
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jurisdiction over the party challenging jurisdiction." Aerotek Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Solar 
Energy, Inc., Civ. No. JRR-24-177, 2024 WL 47921 !(i, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2014) (citingSneha 
. Media & Ent., LLC v. Associated Broad. Co. P Ltd., 911 F.3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2018)). In 
resolving a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(2), "a court may look beyond the complaint to 
affidavits and exhibits in order to assure itself of personal jurisdiction." UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Kurbanov, 963 F.3d 344,350 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Grayson v. Anderson; 816 F.3d 262,-267 (4th 
Cir. 2016)). 
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(6) 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to "state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.". In considering a motion under this rule, courts discount legal 
conclusions stated in the complaint and "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in 
the complalnt." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009). A court then draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and 
considers _whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face. Nemet Chevrolet, 
Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). "A,claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
"The complaint must offer 'more than labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of 
the elements of a cause of action[.]"' Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App'x 745, 747 
(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell.At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007)). At the same time, 
a "complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiffs] 
claim to show th<!t [the plaintiff] has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits." 
Owens v. Bait. City State's Att'ys Off, 767 F.3d 379,396 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure SS(a) 
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C. 
Pursuant to Federal Rule. of Civil Procedure 55(a), "[w]hen a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmativt relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend; and that failure is. 
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shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." The Court may conduct 
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hearings or make refe~als when necessary to determine the damages, establish the truth of any 
allegation by evidence, !or investigate any other matter. Fed. R. ~iv. P. 55(b)(2). There~fter, the 
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court may enter default iludgment at the plaintiffs request and with notice to the defaulting party. 
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Id. 
I Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has announced a 
"strong policy" in favor! of deciding cases on their merits, United States v. Schaffer Equip. Co., .l I 
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FJd 450,453 (4th Cir. 1993), default judgment may be appropriate when a party is unresponsive. 
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S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 35
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9 F. Supp. 2d 418,421 {D. Md. 2005) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636_F.2d 
831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). A piaintiff, however, is not automatically entitled to default judgment 
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simply because the defJndant has:not responded. Rather, entry of default judgment is left to the 
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sound discretion of the court. See, e.g., Choice Hotels Int'/, Inc. v. Jai Shree Navdurga, LLC, Civ. 
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No. DKC-11-2893, 2012 WL 5995248, at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2012); see also Choice Hotels Int'/, 
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Inc. v. Austin Area Hospitality, Inc., Civ. No. TDC-15-0516, 2015 WL 6123523, at *1 (D. Md. 
Oct. 14, 2015). 
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III. ANALYSIS I 
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A. EZR a~~ Melamed's Motion to Dismi~s (ECF 64) 
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The Court first dddresses EZRand Melamed's motion to dismiss, ECF 64, whi~h was filed 
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• at a time when both parties had counsel. 
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I. Melamed' s l 2(b )(2) Motion 
Melamed argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him as he is domiciled in 
New York and did not engage in conduct directed at Maryland. ECF 64-1, at 6. "Absent consent, 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with the requirements of the Due Proces~ 
Clause: valid service of process, as well as . . . minimum contacts with the forum so that the 
exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 
Fidrych v. Marriott Int 'l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124, 131 ( 4th Cir. 2020)(intemal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Hawkins, 935 F.3d at 228). ·"The nature and quantity of forum-state contacts required 
depends on whether the case involves the exercise of 'specific' or 'general' jurisdiction." Id. 
"General jurisdiction permits the court to hear any and all claims against the defendant, regardless 
of where the claims arose or the plaintiffs citizenship." Id. _ It "may be exercised when 
the defendant has contacts with the forum jurisdiction that are 'so constant and pervasive as to 
render it essentially at home in the forum State."' Id, at 131-32 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014)). For "an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is the individual's domicile." Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137. Here, Expeditors does 
not suggest that Melamed is domiciled in Maryland or that the Court has general jurisdiction over 
him. ECF 67, at 6. Expeditors instead argues that personal jurisdiction is proper_ based on 
Melamed's allegedly tortious conduct directed at the Facility located in Maryland. Id. at 5. 
Accordingly, the Court will confine its analysis to whether it has specific jurisdiction over 
Melamed. 
"Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(l )(A), a federal court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant in the manner provided by state law." Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. 
Carejirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390,396 (4th Cir. 2003). Thus, in o_rder for "a district 
court to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two conditions must be satisfied: 
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(I) the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized under the state's long-arm statute; and (2) the 
• ·f •• d· •. J "hhd . fh exercise o Juris 1ct101:1 must comport wit t e ue process reqmrements o t e Fourteenth 
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Amendment." Id (citi*g Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Nolan, 259 I . • 
F.3d 209,215 (4tl\. Cir. Q.OOl)r 
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Maryland's lon~-arm statute is codified at Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. ("CJP") § 6-, I . 
' 103(b ). The statute "lirilits specific jurisdiction to cases where the cause of action 'aris[ es J from 
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any act enumerat~d in the statute itself."' Phillips v. Brit. Airways, 743 F. Supp. 3d 702, 711 (D. 
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Md. 2024) (alteration ib Phillips) (quoting CJP § 6-103(a)). Such acts include, in relevant part, 
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"caus[ing] tortiou~ injcl-y in the State by an act or omission in the State," or "caus[ing] tortious • ' I • , . 
injury in the State 'or outside of the state by an act or omission outside the.State ifhe re~ularly does 
. I or solicits business," or !'engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State[.]" CJP §§ 
6-103(b)(3)-(4). 
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"Ma~land courts have consistently held that the state's long-arm statute is 
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coextensive with' the hmits of personal jurisdiction set by the due process clause of the 
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Constitution." 'Cdrefirs~ of Md, 334 F. 3d at 396 (citing Mohamed v. Michael, 370 A.2d 551, 553 
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(Md. 1977)). "The statutory and constitutional requirements thus 'ultimately collapse into 
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virtually the same analysis."' Bradley v. DentalPlans.com:, 617 F. Supp. 3d 326, 333 (D. Md. 
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2022) (quoting Mylan Lbb ys,Jnc. v. Akzo, N. V., 2 F.3d 56, 61 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993)). "Although the 
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inquiry under the Maryl~nd long-~rm statute 'merges with [the] constitutional inquiry,"' the Court 
still must analyze ;the l~ng-arm statute. Id '(quoting Dring v. Sullivan, 423 F. Supp. 2d 540, 544 
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(D. Md. 2006)). 
i Where a "defendant does not have sufficient contacts to be at home in the forum, the court 
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may exercise specific jci-isdiction if the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with the 
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forum state and the clai\ns at issue arise from those contacts with the forum state." Fidrych, 952 ' i 
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F.3d at 132 (citing Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 126-27). "When there is no such connection, specific 
jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant's unconnected activities in the State." 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 264 
(2017). "The Fourth Circuit has formulated a three-part test for use in determining whether there 
is specific jurisdiction over a defendant. The three prongs are: '(1) the extent to which the 
defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) 
whether the plaintiffs' claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.'" Jones v. Muta! of Omaha 
Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp. 3d 537, 549 (D. Md. 2022) (quoting Consulting Eng'rs Corp. v. Geometric 
Ltd., 561 F.3d 273,278 (4th Cir. 2009)). The first prong requires that ''personal jurisdiction must 
be based on an individual's personal contacts with or purposeful availment of the forum state." 
Harte-Hanks Direct Mktg./Balt., Inc. v. Vari/ease Tech. Fin. Group, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 505, 
513 (D. Md. 2004). 
With respect to the Maryland long-arm statute, "a plaintiff must identify a specific 
Maryland statutory provision authorizing jurisdiction." Parker v Cartwright, Civ. No. JRR-23-
1628, 2024 WL 622077, at.*4 (D. Md Feb. 13, 2024) (quoting Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp. 
v. Al Reem Gen. Trading & Co. 's Rep. Est., 374 F. Supp. 2d. 465, 472 (D. Md. 2005)). Here, 
Expeditors argues that specific jurisdiction is proper under CJP §§ 6-103(b)(3) and (4). ECF 67, 
at 2; see also Parker, 2024 WL 622077, at *4 (noting the requirement can be satisfied in "a 
complaint or in opposition to a 12(b)(2) motion"). Expeditors brings two claims against 
Melamed-defamation (Count V) and tortious interference with business relationships (Count 
VI).4 ECF 59, at 16-18. These claims are based on the allegation that on "October 21, 2025, 
4 These two claims are also asserted against EZR. ECF 59, at 16-18. 
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Melamed began sending emails ... to at least three of Expeditors' Customers, making numerous 
false accusations ,:ind d\lmaging Expeditors' business relationships with the Customers." Id. at 7; 
see also ECF 59-4 (copies ofMelamed's emails to Expeditors' customers). 
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Melamed is the!President and resident agent ofEZR. See ECF 59, at 1; ECF 59-2, at 7; 
see also Maryland Stlte Department of Assessment and Taxation, Business Entity Search, 
https://egov.maryland.gov/BusinessExpress/EntitySearch/Business 
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[https://perma.cc/XHK2-
A Y6U]. "In assessing!whether a non-resident corporate officer or agent is subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the forum state, the general contacts of the company 'are not attributed to a corporate 
agent for jurisdictional purposes,' but such a corporate agent may be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the forum state if that individual 'had sufficient contacts' with the state, 'even if 
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those contacts were mape ostensibly on behalf of the company." Tsai v. Inspire, Inc., Civ. No. 
' TDC-25-1774, 2025 WL 3264127, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2025) (quoting ePlus Tech., Inc. v. 
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Ahoud, 313 F.3d 166, 177 (4th Cir. 2002)). "A non-resident corporate agent may be subject to 
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personal jurisdiction u1der the Maryland long-arm statute under the same circumstances." Id. 
(citing W Contracting Corp. v. Bechtel Corp., 885 F.2d 1196, 1199-200 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
i.: Personal Jurisdiction under§ 6-103(b)(3) 
As noted, '§ 6-le3(b )(3) authorizes jurisdiction over any person who "[ c ]auses tortious 
injury in the State by ari act or omission in the State." CJP § 6-103(b)(3). "Courts have held that 
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this subsection require~ that both the tortious injury and the tortious act must have occurred in 
Maryland." Hart v. Carver, Civ. No. JRR-23-3499, 2024 WL 4025837, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 3, 
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2024) (citing Dring, 42,3 F. Supp. 2d at 546). While Expeditors alleges that Melamed's emails 
caused injury in the state, it does not allege that Melamed's injury-causing acts-i.e., sending the 
emails-occurred in Maryland. Instead, it asserts that"[ e ]ven assuming the Customer Emails were 
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sent from New York to: other jurisdictions, the damaging effects were felt by Expeditors and its 
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customers in Maryland." ECF 67, at 5. But specific jurisdiction under§ 6-103(b)(3) may not lie 
unless the injury-causing act also occurred in Maryland. Cf Monbo v. Evans, Civ. No. GLR-22-
1171, 2022 WL 19920467, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 7, 2022) (finding no personal jurisdiction under§ 
6-103(b)(3) where defamatory text messages were not alleged to have been sent from Maryland), 
aff'd, No. 23-1010, 2023 WL 3597578 (4th Cir. May 23, 2023). And relevant here, "[h]armful 
speech occurs in the state where the speech originates." Winter v. Pinkins, Civ. No. JKB-14-2125, 
2014 WL 5500393, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 29, 2014) (emphasis in original). Expeditors does not allege 
that Melamed's allegedly harmful emails were sent from Maryland. 
Expeditors also argues that personal jurisdiction is proper under § 6-103(b)(3) because 
"Melamed directed the Lockouts, which occurred in Maryland, and which caused damage to 
Expeditors' business relatio~ships, as asserted in the Complaint." ECF 67, at 5 (emphasis added). 
While this allegation does not appear in the complaint, see ECF 59, at 5 ("EZR denied the 
Expeditors' employees access to the MD Facility and the Property."), at 7 ("EZR determined that 
it would again wrongfully lock Expeditors out of the MD Facility .... "), Expeditors does point to_ 
an email wherein Melamed is accused of"instruct[ing] EZR staff to terminate Expeditors'. access 
to the warehouse," ECF 59-3, at 20. Nevertheless, even if Melamed himself directed the lockouts, 
personal jurisdiction is still improper under§ 6-103(b)(3) as Expeditors fails to allege thai any of 
Melamed's alleged acts in this regard occurred in Maryland. Cf Hart, 2024 WL 4025837, at *5 
(finding no personal jurisdiction under § 6-103(b)(3) where the plaintiff did not allege that 
defendant made any tortious social media post_s in Maryland). Accordingly, the Court canno! 
exercise personal jurisdiction over Melamed under this subsection of Maryland's long-arm statute. 
Cf Aqua Acceptance, LLC v. Pelican Grp. Consulting, Inc., Civ. No. JRR-20-2802, 2022 WL 
2275465, at *5 (D. Md. June 23, 2022) (finding no personal jurisdiction under§ 6-103(b)(3) where 
13 

the complaint did not allege that a defendant's action of sending letters and correspondence Jo ' ' 
Maryland occurred within Maryland). 
I 
ii' Personal Jurisdiction under§ 6-103(b)(4) 
Section 6-103(~)(4) provides a basis for personal jurisdiction over any person who 
"[c]auses tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State 
if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the 
State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food, services, or manufactured products used or 
consumed in the State." CJP § 6-103(b)(4). "[J]urisdiction under§ 6-103(b)(4) 'has been found 
' by some judges to have the attributes of general jurisdiction."' Micro Focus (US), Inc. v. Am. Exp. 
Co., Civ. No. PWG-14-2417, 2015 WL 3441991, at *4 (D. Md. May 27, 2015) (quoting Gimer v. 
Jervey, 948 F.2d 1280,: 1991 WL 237931, at *3 (4th Cir. 1991)). •"[E]ven those judges who 
conclude that establis~ing a persistent course of conduct under section 6-103(b )( 4) is not 
tantamount to establishing general jurisdiction, nonetheless agree that § 6-103(b)(4) require[s] 
greater contacts that those necessary to establish jurisdiction under other subsections of 
I 
Maryland's Jong-arm statute." Id. (citation modified); see also Johnson v. House o/LaBeija LLC, 
Civ. No. MJM-24-71, 2026 WL 858120, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2026) ("While subsection (b)(4) 
extends jurisdiction to 'certain tortious acts that occur outside of Maryland, it requires greater 
contacts than those nec~ssary to establish jurisdiction und,er other subsections of Maryland's Jong­
arm statute." ( citation modified)). 
' 
As noted, Expeditors alleges that Melamed. caused tortious injury in Maryland by sending 
defamatory emails to Expeditors' customers. ECF 67, at 4. However, there is no allegation that 
Melamed derives any revenue from "goods, food, services,' or manufactured products used or 
I 
consumed in the State.!' See CJP § 6-103(b)(4). Therefore, whether personal jurisdiction over 
Melamed exists based ,on subsection (b )( 4) of the Jong-arm statute turns on whether Melamed 
14 

"regularly does or solicits business" in Maryland or "engages in any other persistent course of 
conduct in the State." See.id. 
Expeditors argues that Melamed regularly does or solicits business in Maryland because 
he "own[s] a company which leases and operates the MD Facility." ECF 67, at 5. While EZR 
unquestionably does business in Maryland, Melamed's ownership of EZR does not necessarily 
mean that Melamed himself does business in Maryland. "It is an accepted legal tenet ... that an 
individual and a corporation of which that individual is the principal are separate legal entities." 
Stokes v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, Civ. No. JFM-11-2620, 2012 WL 527600, at *4 (D. Md. 
Feb. 16, 2012); see also Birrane v. Master Collectors, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D. Md. 1990). 
And "mere ownership of a company does not confer personal jurisdiction over the owner." Waskey 
v. O'Neal, Civ. No. PX-18-2824, 2019 WL 2502389, at *4 n.4 (D. Md. June 17, 2019) (citing 
Stokes, 2012 WL 527600, at *4); see also Sibert v. Flint, 564 F. Supp. 1524, 1529 (D. Md. 1983) 
("The acts of a corporate representative, transacting corporate business, are not a basis for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporate representative in his individual capacity."). 
Further, Expeditors' conclusory assertion that Melamed "regularly transacts business in" 
Maryland is insufficient. ECF 59, at 2; ECF 67, at 5; see also Murray v. Bierman, Geesing, Ward 
& Wood, LLC, Civ. No. RWT-11-1623, 2012 WL 4480679, at*! (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2012) 
("Conclusory statements or bare allegations alone are insufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction."). Expeditors "must allege specific facts connecting [Melamed] with the forum." 
Lolavar v. de Sant/banes, 430 F.3d 221, 230 (4th Cir. 2005). Outside of Melamed's role as an 
owner of EZR, Expeditors fails to proffer any facts to show that Melamed, as an individual, 
regularly does business in Maryland. Cf KogokCorp. v. Johnson, Civ. No. CV DKC-06-0862, 
2006 WL 8457068, at *6 (D. Md. Oct. 12, 2006) (finding personal jurisdiction over al) individual 
15 

owner of corporations limproper where the plaintiff only alleged that the individual defendant 
"authorized facsimile 'transmissions to Maryland" and "the transmissions originated from 
Michigan"). 
Expeditors does: not argue that Melamed has engaged in a persistent course of conduct in 
Maryland. See ECF 67i at 5. Nevertheless, given Melamed's ownership ofEZR and his aUegedly 
personal involvement (n the tortious conduct outlined in the operative complaint, the Court 
examines this issue andf concludes that Expeditors has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that 
Melamed engaged in any persistent course of conduct in the state. Maryland courts have not 
clearly defined the term "persistent course· of conduct" as it relates to the state's long-arm statute, 
but Maryland's highest! court has observed that the term to have a "relatively flexible quality." 
Pandit v. Pandit, 808 F. App'x 179, 186 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gee/hoed v. Jensen, 352 A.2d I . 
818, 822 (Md. 1976)). 'j[T]he Fourth Circuit, interpreting Maryland law, has held that the standard 
requires that 'the contacts resulting from the conduct must be continuous over a long period of ' . . 
time."' Fide/is CybersJcurity, Inc. v. Partner One Cap., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 3d 614,633 (D. Md. 
2025) (quoting Pandit, 808 F. App'x at 187). "Personal jurisdiction under§ 6-103(b)(4) typically 
requires that a defendant had contacts with the State of Maryland spanning multiple years and 
' 
encompassing the fulfillment of multiple contracts." Id. "In other instances, courts have declined 
I -
to exercise personaljuri~diction under§ 6-103(b )( 4) where contact consisted of a handful of emails 
. i . . 
or phone calls over a period of only a few months." Id. ( collecting cases). 
' I 
Here, the facts presented by Expeditors are insufficient to support a prima facie finding 
that Melamed has engaged in a persistent course of conduct in Maryland. Expeditors' allegations 
' 
against Melamed involye conduct that occurred over a period of just a few days in October of 
2025. Specifically, E,xpeditors alleges that Melamed sent a "series of bizarre emails" to 
16 

Expeditors' counsel beginning on October 17, 2025, ECF 59, at 6, "instructed EZR staff to 
terminate Expeditors' access to the" Facility on that same day, ECF 59-3, at 10, and then ~ent 
allegedly defamatory and damaging emails to Expeditors' customers on October 21, 2025, ECF 
59, at 7. Expeditors fails to proffer additional facts showing Melamed engaged in a persistent 
course of conduct in Maryland "spanning multiple years" or resembling "the fulfillment of 
multiple contracts." Fidelis Cybersecurity, 771 F. Supp. 3d at 633. The only facts before the 
Court regarding Melamed's Maryland contacts reflect just "handful of emails or phone calls over 
a period of only a few months." Id; see also Pandit v. Pandit, Civ. No. PX-18-1136, 2018 WL 
5026373, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2018) (holding that "isolated and sporadic association" with 
Maryland including "sending a handful of emails and letters to individuals in Maryland" did "not 
amount to a persistent course of conduct"), ajf'd, 808 F .. App'x 179 (4th Cir. 2020). 
While EZR and Expeditors have had a business relationship over a number of years, see 
ECF 59-1, at 3 (showing Melamed's signature on the SPA dated March 13, 2024), Expeditors fails 
, to provide any information showing that Melamed himself had any continuing course of conduct 
in Maryland, whether it be related or unrelated to EZR's business. See Bass v. Energy Transp. 
Corp., 787 F. Supp. 530,534 (D. Md. 1992) ("The contacts listed in section (b)(4), however, need 
not arise from or relate to the plaintiffs cause of action."). Moreover, "[i]t would be anomalous 
to hold that while defendant _has committed no act in Maryland within the meaning of subsection 
(b)(3), it has engaged in a persistent course of conduct within the meaning of subsection (b)(4)." 
Craigv. Gen. Fin. Corp. of Illinois, 504 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (D. Md. 1980). As such, Expeditors 
fails to meet its burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under § 6-
103(b )( 4). • 
17 

i i. . Consiitutional Analysis 
I . 
• The Court '.is liktwise skep1ical that the current record supports a constitutional exercise. of 
' I • 
personal jurisdicti9n ovbr Melamed. Expeditors contends that "specific jurisdiction is proper when 
a defendant commits ad intentional act express;y. aimed at the forum causing harm the defendant 
·I knows is likely to;be felt in the forum," and cites to Calder v. Jones,A65 U.S. 783 (1984) and its 
"effects test" in supportf ·ofthis argument. ECF 67, at 5. In Calder; "the Supreme Court held that 
a court may exercise spbcific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant acting outside of I . . . 
i 
the forum when t~e defendant has intentionally directed his .tortious conduct toward the· forum 
state, knowing that thai conduct would cause harm to a forum resident." Carefirst of Md, 334 
I . . • 
F.3d at 397-98 (citing talder, 465 U.S. 789-90). "This 'effects test' of specific jurisdiction is 
typically construe~ to t equire that the plaintiff establish that: (1) the d~fendant committed an 
intentional tort; (2) the ~laintifffeltthe brunt of the harm in the forum, such that the forum can be 
said to be the foe~! poiJt of the harm; and (3) the defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct 
at the forum, such that ~e forum can be said to be the'focal point of the tortious activity._" Id at 
398 n.7. I 
The Fourth Cir6uit "followed Calder closely in First American First, Inc. v. National 
I . . 
Association of Bank Wdmen, 802 F.2d 1511 (4th Cir. 1986)." Cole-Tuve, Inc. v. Am. Mach. Tools : I . 
i . 
Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 367 (D. Md. 2004). In First American, the Fourth Circuit held "that 
allegedly libelous Jette), written in Illinois and distributed throughout the country, whose 'primary 
I 
and most devastating elfects' were felt in Virginia, were sufficiently directed at Virginia to allow 
an exercise of specific j\.rrisdiction there." Id ( quoting First American, 802 F.2d at 1517). Since I . . 
then, however, "tJ:ie Fo~rth Circuit has seemed to require more than the Calder 'effects-test' to 
• I 
hold exercises of jurisdiction over foreign tortfeasors constitutional." Id In ALS Scan, Inc. v. I , 
, I 
Digital Service Consult'fmfs, 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002), "the Fourth Circuit addressed whether 
I • 
18 

a 'person electronically transmitting ... information via the internet to Maryland, causing injury 
there, subjects the person to the jurisdiction ofa court in Maryland."' Id. (quotingALS Scan, 293 
F.3d at 712). Judge Niemeyer, writing for a unanimous panel, held that a state may exercise 
persohaljurisdiction over a foreign defendant where the person "(1) directs electronic activity into 
the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the 
State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause of action 
cognizable in the State's courts." ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714. Thus, relevant here, "[i]fa defendant 
is alleged to send a defamatory email while outside of the forum state, there is personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant if the email is sent to recipients in the state and the defendant knew that the 
recipients were in the state." Birara v. Kele!, Civ. No. TDC-17-3241, 2019 WL 3208685, at *4 
(D. Md. July 16, 2019) (emphasis added) . 
. Expeditors argues that the Calder effects test is satisfied because "Maryland was the-focal 
point of the conduct and the harm," and Melamed expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum 
through his emails that "accused Expeditors of misconduct at the MD Facility, announced 
restrictions on freight movement tied to the MD facility, and are addressed to specific customers 
storing freight there." ECF 67, at 5. "Although the place that the plaintiffJeels the alleged injury 
is plainly relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry, it must ultimately be accompanied by the 
defendant's own sufficient minimum contacts with the state if jurisdiction is to be upheld." 
Carejirst of Md., 334 F.3d at 401 (citation modified) (quoting Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 
F.3d 256,262 (4th Cir. 2002)). While it is accurate to note that Expeditors alleges it suffered the 
harm arising out of Melamed's emails in Maryland, the facts proffered in support of personal 
jurisdiction fail to show that Melamed .directed any electronic activity to Mary land. Expeditors is 
not organized or headquartered in Maryland. ECF 59, at 1. And although its customers who 
19 

received the allegedly tortious correspondence stored freight in Maryland, Expeditors does not ' . 
allege that any of these customers are based in Maryland or received the relevant communications 
in Maryland. See ECF 72, at 3 n. l (arguing that Expeditors does not provide any information ' 
regarding "where the customers, or the specific recipients of the email, were located"). Further, 
! 
Expeditors does not c!a\m that Melamed sent the defamatory emails "to recipients in" Maryland 
or knew "that [any] recipients were in the state." See Birara, 2019 WL 3208685, at *4 ("When 
the defamatory statemtjnt is communicated over the internet, the plaintiff must show tha( the 
defendant targeted others in the state, rather than alleging solely that the defendant shared the 
defamatory statement on the internet and the plaintiff felt its effects in the state." ( emphasis 
added)). Accordingly, the Court finds-based on the facts and evidence provided by Expeditors­
that exercise of persona) jurisdiction over Melamed would not be constitutionally reasonable. Cf 
Kogok Corp., 2006 WL: 8457068, at *6 (finding "limited contacts" such as "the sending of fewer ,. 
than a half-dozen facsijniles" did "not show that Defendant purposefully availed himself of the 
privilege of conducting business in Maryland"). As Expeditors has failed to establish specific 
personal jurisdiction over Melamed, all claims against Melamed must be dismissed to be raised 
again, in ever, in the proper forum. 
2. EZR's 12(b)(6) Motion5 
EZR moves to d_ismiss Expeditors' unjust enrichment (Count II), tortious interference with 
contract (Count IV), apd tortious interference with business relationships (Count VI) claims 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(~). ECF 64-1, at 8. The Court addresses each claim in turn. 
5 "Sitting in diversity, a federal court applies the substantive law of the forum state, which, in this 
I 
case, is Maryland." Dominion Financial Services, LLC v. Pavlovsky, 673 F. Supp. 3d 727, 741 
(D. Md. 2023); see also ECF 59, at 2 (alleging diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
' § 1332(a)). Neither party disputes that Maryland's substantive tort and contract law applies to 
Expeditors' claims. See, e.g., ECF 64-1, at 9-13. 
20 

i. Unjust Enrichment (Count JI) 
"A claim for unjust enrichment has three elements: (I) a benefit conferred upon the 
defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and 
(3) acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit without the payment of its value." Singh 
v. Lenovo (United States) Inc., 510 F. Supp. 3d 310, 328 (D. Md. 2021) (citing Hill v. Cross 
Country Settlements, LLC, 936 A.2d 343,351 (Md. 2007)). "[A] claim for unjust enrichment may 
not be brought where the subject matter of the claim is covered by an express contract between the 
parties." Cnty. Comm 'rs of Caroline Cnty. v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, If!c., 747 A.2d 600, 607 
(Md. 2000) (quoting FLF, Inc. v. World Publications, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 640,642 (D. Md. 1998)). 
That is because unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual cause of action, intended "to provide relief 
for a plaintiff when an enforceable contract does not exist but fairness dictates that the plaintiff 
_receive compensation for services provided." Id (quoting Dunnaville v. McCormick& Co., 21 F. 
Supp. 2d 527, 535 (D. Md. 1998)). _But "[w]hile an action for unjust enrichment is typically not 
available where the claim is governed by an express contract, exceptions apply in instances [ ] . ' 
where 'there is evidence of fraud or bad faith, there has been a breach of contract or a mutual • 
recission of the contract, when recission is warranted, or when the express contract does not fully 
address' the entire subject matter of the claim." FT! Consulting, Inc. v. Orszag, Civ. No. BAH-
23-3200, 2025 WL 2085761, at *12 (D. Md. July 24, 2025) (quoting Cnty. Comm 'rs of Caroline 
Cnty., 747 A.2d at 608-09). 
Expeditors rests its unjust enrichment claim on the $235,135.4.6 fee that Expeditors paid 
EZR pursuant to the Agreed Order for access to the Facility from September 8 to November 6, 
2025.6 ECF 59, at 12; see also ECF 9, at 1-2: EZR contends, and Expeditors does not dispute, 
6 Expeditors added this claim in their amended complaint, which was filed after the Agreed Order 
was entered in this case. See ECF 59; ECF 9. 
21 

i that the Agreed Order, as a consent order, is considered a valid contract. ECF 64~1, at 9-10; ECF , I . I 
I 
67, at 7; see also In re :Baltrotsky, Civ. No. DKC-2004-2643, 2004 WL 2937537, at *5 (D. Md. 
I 
Dec. 20, 2004) (descri~ing a cons,ent order as a contract). EZR therefore argues that Expeditors' 
' 
unjust enrichment claint must be dismissed "becaus~ an express agreemenl'between the parties"­
the Agreed Order-go~erns the scope of the claim. ECF 64-1, at 10. 
I 
Expeditors sets iforth three main arguments opposing dismissal of its unjust enrichment 
claim. First, it argues ihat the Agreed Order ''did not provide for comprehensive warehousing 
I 
I . 
services" and thus did n,ot "'fully address' the subject matter of the parties' business relationship." 
! 
ECF 67, at 7. But whet~er the Agreed Order addressed the subject matter of the parties' business 
• I 
relationship is irrelev~t. The A:greed Order covers the scope of the unjust enrichment claim 
I 
because it governs the parties' obligations with respect to the fee and "access to the MD Facility, I . 
use of computers and inventory systems, forklifts, and insurance." ECF 9, at 1-2. Whether EZR 
! 
' was required to provi1e ''comprehensive warehousing services" during the period at issue is 
subject matter governed by the Agreed Order. Cf First Flight Ltd. P 'ship v. All. Tech: Grp., LLC, 
! 
I 
Civ. No. TDC-18-0720) 2019 WL 343250, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2019) (finding that a lease and 
business agreement add~essed the subject matter of an unjust enrichment claim where the plaintiff 
I 
sought to recover ·a rent payment and the lease and business agreement had provisions governing 
I 
the payment of that rerit). Because there is an express contract governing the claim, an unjust , I 
I • 
enrichment claim is unavailable unless an exception applies. 
I 
Expeditors argu~s ,that the bad faith exception applies because EZR acted in "bad faith 
I 
leading up to the entry pf the Agreed Order." ECF 67, at 7. Butto sustain an unjust enrichment 
i . . 
claim under this circu~stance, Expeditors must allege EZR engaged in "fraud or bad faith in the 
I 
formation of the contratt." J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v. S.R.P. Dev. Ltd. P'ship, 115 F. Supp. 3d 593, 
! ! • 
I • 
22 

608 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Jones v. Pohanka Auto N, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 554, 573 (D. Md. 
2014) ). Nowhere in the complaint does Expeditors allege EZR engaged in bad faith while forming 
that agreement that resulted in the Agreed Order. Instead, the complaint provides that "the parties 
to this action, each negotiating through counsel, were able to agree to the terms of' the Agreed 
Order. ECF 59, at 5120. Expeditors thus fails to sufficiently allege that this exception applies. 
Expeditors also argues that it "entered into the [ Agreed Order] under duress" and so it "is 
subject to recission." ECF 67, at 7. "The legal standard for establishing 'duress' under Maryland 
law requires 'a wrongful act which deprives an individual of the exercise_ of his free will."' TECH 
USA, Inc. v. Evans, 592 F. Supp. 2d 852, 859 (D. Md. 2009) (quoting Eckstein v. Eckstein, 37_9 
A.2d 757, 761 (Md. App. 1978)). "There are generally two type of cases in which Maryland courts 
have found an agreement was made under duress, physical inducement and improper threat." 
Wilson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Civ. No. GLR-13-1176, 2013 WL 5276543, at *7 (D. Md. 
Sept. 18, 2013) (citing Emp'rs Ins. a/Wausau v. Bond, Civ. No. HAR-90-1139, 1991 WL 8431, 
at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 25, 1991)), aff'd, 561 F. App'x 253 (4th Cir. 2014). "An improper threat is 
found where the threat 'leaves the victim with no reasonable alternative other than.to execute the 
agreement."' Id. (quoting Bond, 1991 WL 8431, at *2). "This form of duress most often arises ... 
in the form of economic duress." Id. (quoting the same). 
While Expeditors alleges that EZR engaged in a wrongful act by locking it out of the 
Facility prior to the Agreed Order, there is no allegation present in the complaint that Expeditors 
was deprived of its free will in forming the Agreed Order. For example, Expeditors does not claim 
that there was any physical inducement or improper threat. See ECF 67, at 8 (arguing that "EZR's 
unlawful action of initiating the First Lockout effectively left Expeditors with no reasonable 
alternative when-it decided to agree to the terms of the Agreed Order"). Instead, Expeditors 
23 

expressly alleges in the amended complaint that "the parties to this action, each negotiating through ' 
counsel, were able to agree to the terms of' the Agreed Order. ECF 59, at 5 1 20 .. Even if 
Expeditors felt it had "no reasonable alternative when it decided to agree to the terms of the Agreed 
I . 
Order," ECF 67, at 8, Elpeditors still "maintained [its] rightto exercise [its] free will throughout . i . 
the negotiation" and does not allege otherwise. See TECH USA, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 859 ("Even if 
Mr. Evans rightly believed that his professional interests required him to accede to TECH USA's 
! . 
terms, he maintained his right to exercise his free will throughout the negotiation."). Because the . i . 
agreement regarding a~cess to the Facility is subject to an express contract and no exception 
applies, Expeditors' unj\1st enrichment claim must be dismissed. 
i( Tortious Interference with Contract (Count IV} 
"To establish a claim for wrongful interference with a contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
I . 
'(I) [t]he existence of~ contract or a legally protected interest between the plaintiff and a third 
party; (2) the defendant'.s knowledge of the contract; (3) the defendant's intentional inducement 
. ' 
of the third party to bn,:ach or otherwise render impossible the performance of the contract; ( 4) 
• ' 
without justification on
1
the part of the defendant; (5) the subsequent breach by the third party; and 
(6) damages to the plaintiff resulting therefrom."' Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 FJd 
342, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Blondell v. Littlepage, 968 A.2d 678, 696 (Md. 2009)). 
I 
Expeditors alleges that "EZR's conversion of the Hammond Records [during the October 
' 
' 2025 second lockout] niade it impossible for Expeditors to perform its contracts with Hammond." 
ECF 59, at 15 1 71. J;lZR argues that this allegation fails to state a tortious interference. with 
I 
contract claim because it was Expeditors, not Hammond, that breached its contract with 
Hammond. ECF 64-1, at 11. EZR rests its argument on Judge Chasanow's opinion in Service 1st 
Vending, Inc. v. Compass Group USA, inc., Civ. No. DKC-20-3723, 2021 WL 131.2906 (D. Md. I . . 
Apr. 8, 2021 ). In that !case, Judge Chasanow explained that "Maryland caselaw has repeatedly 
24 

stressed that it is the defendant's 'intentional inducement of the third party to breach or otherwise 
render.impossible the performance of the contract' followed by 'the subsequent breach by the third 
party' that is prohibited as a 'Tortious Interference with Contracts."' Service 1st, 2021 WL 
1312906, at *5 (emphasis in Service 1st) (quoting Finley Alexander Wealth Mgmt., LCC v. M&O 
Mktg., Inc., Civ. No. GJH-19-1312, 2020 WL 1322948, at *13 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2020)). As such, 
"failure to allege that [the third-party] was even in breach is fatal to this type of tortious 
interference claim under Maryland law." Id. at *4. 
Expeditors concedes that Hammond did not breach any contract but 9ontends that 
"Expeditors' breach of its contract with Hammond was caused by EZR's wrongful interference 
with the Hammond Records" and urges the Court to permit the claim to "move to discovery." ECF 
67, at 9. Expeditors' own allegations establish that it, not a third-party, breached an agreement. 
"Some states do allow a [ d]efendant' s induction of a plaintiff's breach of an agreement with a 
' 
third-party to constitute a tortious interference claim .... Maryland law, of course, ~oes not 
recognize this version." Service 1st Vending, Inc., 2021 WL 1312906, at *5 n.6 (emphasis in 
original) ( citation modified); see also Mo/or v. Lyft, Inc., No. 1486, Sept. term 2023, 2025 WL 
2450881, at *8 (Md. App. Aug. 26, 2025) (describing the elements ofa tortious interference with 
contract claim as including. a "breach by the third party"). Accordingly, Expeditors has failed to 
state a plausible tortious interference with contract claim because Expeditors does not allege that 
the third-party, Hammond, was induced by EZR to breach its contract with Expeditors, but instead 
alleges that circumstances resulted in Expeditors breaching its contract with Hammond. See 
Maryland Industrial Group, LLC v. Bluegrass Materials Co., LLC, 2018 WL 3006354, at *7 (Md. 
25 • 

I 
I 
! 
I 
App. 2018) ("A claim lor tortious interference with contract must fail in the absence of a breach 
by the third party.}'). Efpeditors' tortious interference with contract claim must be·dismissed.7 
I . - • 
iii. Tortious Interference with Business Relationships (Count VJ) 
I 
Expeditors brinb its tortious interference with business relationships claim against both 
. , I - . • . 
EZR and Melamed. ·see ECF 59, at 17. As the Court has already determined that it lacks personal 
I , 
I 
jurisdiction over Melamed, the Court confines its analysis to whether Expeditors has stated a 
I 
I plausible tortious interference with business relationships claim against EZR. "Under Maryland 
. I . • 
law, tortious. interferende with economic relations requires a claimant to show '(1) intentional and 
willful acts; (2) calcula~ed to caus\: damage to tlie plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) done with 
the unlawful pnrppse to! cause such damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part 
of the defendants-(whidh constitutes malice); and (4) actual damage and loss resulting."' First_ 
I 
' Data Merck Servs. Corp. v. SecurityMetrics, Inc., 672 F. App'x 229,236 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
I . . 
Alexander & Alexrnder
1
Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 650 A.2d 260,269 (Md. 1994)). 
I 
EZR argues on!~ that Expeditors fails to state the fourth element of its claiin. Specifically, 
I . EZR contends that "Expeditors has not alleged with any specificity any actual damage or resulting 
loss with respect t~ any of its business relationships." ECF 64-1, at 13. But Expeditors identifies 
three customers that received allegedly defamatory emails, alleges that the emails damaged 
' I I I 
I. 
Expeditors' business relationships with these customers, and alleges a: loss of income of$100,000 
' I 
from those customers rdsulting from their receipt of the emails. ECF 59, at 7 'I[ 29, at 17. Drawing 
: I . 
all reasonable inferenc~s _-in Expeditors' favor, th~ Court concludes Expeditors has plausibly 
I • . 
alleged, with the requis,ite specificity, the fourth element of a: tortious interference with business 
I 
' I , . 7 As for the argument that the claim should still "move to discovery," ECF 67, at 9, Expeditors 
provides no legal. citatibn or argument to support its contention that this outcome is warranted 
I 
when a plaintiff has failed to state a plausibk claim. • I • 
I 
26 

relationships claim. Cf Lifestyle Realty, LLC v. Kirn, Civ. No. MJM-23-629, 2024 WL 3784487, 
at *9 (D. Md. Aug. 13, 2024) (finding a plausible tortious interference with a prospective economic 
advantage claim where the plaintiff alleged the nature of the unlawful acts and that those acts 
"caused [the plaintiff! to lose many of its cultivated business relationships and expected 
commissions"). Given that EZR does not contest the plausibility of any of the other three elen:ients, 
the Court finds that Expeditors has adequately stated a tortious interference with business 
relationships claim. 
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss at ECF 64 is granted in part and denied in part. All 
claims against Melamed are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Expeditors' unjust 
enrichment (Count II) and tortious interference with contract (Count IV) claims are dismissed. 
The following claims against EZR survive: breach of contract (Count I), trover and conversion 
(Count III), defamation (Count V), and tortious interference with business relationships (Count 
VI). 
B. EZR's Counsel 
With all claims against Melamed dismissed, EZR is the only remaining Defendant. As 
previously noted, EZR's counsel moved to withdraw from representation on March 9, 2026. ECF 
82. "It 'has been the law for the better part of two centuries ... that a corporation may appear in 
the federal courts only through licensed counsel.'" J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Maryland 
Food & Entm 't, LLC, Civ. No. ELH0 11-3344, 2012 WL 5289790, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2012) 
(quoting Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201 
(1993)); see also Loe. R. 101.l(a) (D. Md. 2025) ("All parties other than individuals must be 
represented by counsel."). If, within 30 days of the filing of a motion to withdraw, new counsel 
has not entered an appearance for a corporate defendant, the Court may take appropriate actions, 
"including granting the motion to withdraw and dismissing any affirmative claim for relief ass~rted 
27 

by the party and/or direcjting the party to show cause why a default should not be entered on claims 
i 
asserted again~t it." Lof. R. 101.2(b) (D. Md. 2025). 
As such, the Cofrt granted counsel's motion to withdraw and ordered EZR to have new 
counsel enter an appearance by April 8, 2026, or show cause why default should not be entered 
I 
and EZR's counterclairtls dismissed. ECF 84. On March 11, 2026, one ofEZR's former counsel, 
• I 
Michael Lenz, informed the Court that he received an email from Melamed purporting to address 
the show cause order. ! ECF 86, at 1. Melamed wrote to Mr. Lenz that Expeditors' refusal to 
"release the escrow fu0:ds to EZR ... has prevented EZR from moving forward with the matter 
I 
and from completing th~ necessary steps related to this case" and "[w]ithout the completion of this 
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' 
step, it has been impossible for [EZR and Melamed] to proceed as expected." ECF 86-1, at 1. It 
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is not clear whether M~lamed intended for this email to serve as EZR's response to the order to 
show cause given that Melamed writes that he "respectfully ask[s] the Court to take this matter I . 
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into consideration." Id. j Nevertheless, Melamed, as a non-attorney, may not represent EZR in this 
' 
case, and alleged "eco~omic hardship is no exception to the bar on pro se representation of 
organizations." Perez~- Silva, 185 F. Supp. 3d 698, 706 (D. Md. 2016). EZR has not filed on the 
I 
docket any response to ithe order to show cause, and new counsel has ·not entered an appearance ' • 
on EZR's behalf The time to do so has long expired. 
Without counsei, EZR is not permitted to defend any claims brought against it, nor litigate I • . 
any counterclaims. Se~ Induction Therapies, LLC v. Ingenes, LLC, Civ. No. DKC-21-604, 2023 
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WL 4407581, at *2 (D. !'1d. July 7, 2023}("Because Defendant Ingenes, LLC must be represented 
by counsel in ~his couh and is not, it has failed to appear and its default will be entered."). 
Accordingly, EZR's default will .be entered, and its counterclaims necessarily dismissed, The 
I 
28 

motion to dismiss the counterclaims, ECF 70, will be denied as. moot. Cf id ( entering default and 
dismissing counterclaims based on the defendant's failure to have counsel enter an appearanc!!). 
The Clerk will be directed to enter default against EZR, and Expeditors shall file a motion 
for default judgme.nt with respect to the surviving claims against EZR within twenty-one (21) days 
after the Clerk enters default. 
C. Disbursement of Funds (ECF 73; ECF 76) 
While still represented by counsel, EZR filed a motion for disbursement of the funds being 
held in this Court's registry.8 ECF 73. Along with its opposition to the motion for disbursement, 
ECF 78, Expeditors filed a cross-motion to release the deposit back to Expeditors, ECF 77. EZR 
opposes Expeditors' motion and contends that "[t]he Cross Motion is unnecessary" because if"the 
Court either denies in whole or in part EZR's Motion for Payment, EZR does not dispute that any 
remaining Deposit funds not distribu.ted to EZR would be returned to Expeditors." ECF 80, at 2. 
For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny EZR's motion, release the funds back to 
Expeditors, and deny Expeditors' cross-motion as moot. 
EZR argues the $100,000 in funds being kept in this Court's registry should be released to 
EZR because of damages caused by Expeditors. ECF 73-2,, at 2-3. More specifically, EZR 
contends that Expeditors damaged EZR' s forklifts, removed EZR' s internet hardware, and forced 
EZR to incur costs associated with supervising Expeditors' move-out and repairing EZR's 
network. • Id EZR asserts that its damages associated with Expeditors' move out totals 
$141,788.25, and EZR includes invoices in support of this figure. Id. at 6; see also ECF 73-3 
through ECF 73-12. The invoices submitted are from Eastern Lift Truck Co., Ins, for forklift 
8 As discussed above, the $100,000 was deposited by Expeditors in the Court's registry as a term 
of the Agreed Order, which permitted Expeditors to regain access to the wan:house subject to this 
and other conditions, See ECF 9, at 2. 
29 

. I . . 
repair, see ECF 73-3 through ECF 73-9; from Onnick Corp. for cable replacement and network 
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repair, see ECF 73-1 O; and from EZR for wages of employees that oversaw Expeditors' move out 
I 
I • 
of the warehouse,'see ECF 73-11 through ECF 73-12. Also included is an invoice for renewal of • I . 
Tydings & Rosenberg) LLP's ThompsonReuters subscription. ECF 73-5, at 4. Expeditors 
' : 
contends that EZR provides insufficient evidence in support of the purported damages, and that. 
! 
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the warehouse sustained "nothing more than minor wear and tear . . . none of which can be ' • 
conclusively attributed 1to Expeditors." ECF 77, at 3; ECF 78, at 4-5. Moreover, Expeditors 
' 
asserts that the "damagrs" contemplated by the Agreed Order that the $100,000 registry deposit 
I 
was meant to cover doe~ not include the types of damages asserted by EZR. ECF 78, at 2. 
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"Under Federal!Rule of Civil Procedure 67, money paid into a court registry 'must be 
deposited and withdrav.fn in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041 and 2042 and any like statute."' 
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. : • 
Bartch v. Barch, <;:iv.1-fo. BAH-23-0101, 2024 WL 5146010, at *2 (D. Md. 2024) (quoting Fed. 
' 
R. Civ. P. 67(b))., "ThJ relevant portion of 28 U.S.C. § 2042 provides that no money deposited 
into a court registry 'sh~ll be withdrawn except by order of court.'" Id. "Courts have recognized 
' 
that district courts' do n9t have 'carte blanche' to 'dispose of deposited funds as [they] see fit' but 
must disburse the.funds, 'to their rightful owner' and 'in accordance with the law."' Id. (quoting 
• . : 
I , 
Alstom Caribe, Inc. v. George P. Reintjes Co., 484 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
I 
Here, the Court ~grees with Expeditors that EZR provides insufficient evidence to support 
! 
disbursement oftlie registry funds to EZR. Although EZR provides invoices for certain repairs, it 
I 
supplies no evideµce byYond accusations to support its claim that Expeditors caused any of the 
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alleged damage that resµlted in these expenses. See ECF 73-2, at 3-5. As another alternative to 
' 
denying the motion, Expeditors argues that the Court should allow the parties to conduct limited 
discovery on the purported damages. ECF 78, at 2. EZR agrees to discovery but contends that 
30 

any discovery on this issue "should proceed in the ordinary course of the litiga[ti]on." ECF 79, at 
3. But no form of discovery can proceed now that EZR is not represented by counsel and is 
considered in default. Given that EZR has not provided sufficient evidence to support its claimed 
damages and "does not dispute that any remaining Deposit funds not distributed to EZR would be 
returned to Expeditors/' ECF 80, at 2, the Court sees no justifiable reason to delay the release of 
the funds indefinitely. The Court will deny EZR' s motion at ECF 73 and release the funds back 
to Expeditors.9 Expeditors' cross-motion to release the funds,ECF 77, will be denied as moot. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss, ECF-64, is GRANTED in part 
and DENIED in part. All claims against Melamed are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. • 
EZR's motion for disbursement of funds, ECF 73, is DENIED, and Expeditors' cross-motion for 
release of funds, ECF 76, is DENIED as moot. The Court will direct the Clerk to release the funds 
held in the registry back to Expeditors. Because _EZR is no longer represented by counsel and did 
not respond to the Court's order to show cause, the Clerk is directed to enter default against EZR, 
and its counterclaims are dismissed. The motion to dismiss the counterclaims, ECF 70, is DENIED 
as moot. Expeditors is directed to file a motion for default judgment with respect to the survivirg 
claims against EZR within twenty-one (21) days after the Clerk enters default. 
A separate implementing order will issue. 
Dated: June 1, 2026 Isl 
Brendan A. Hurson 
United States District Judge 
9 The Court's decision to release the funds to Expeditors at this time does not preclude EZR from 
later seeking the alkged damages either in this litigation or otherwise if EZR retains counsel. 
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