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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
MARCUS SHANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALLSTATE NORTHBROOK 
INDEMNITY CO., et al., 
Defendants. 

 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
(Doc. No. 9) 
 
Before the Court is Defendant Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Company’s 
(“Allstate”) Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, Partial Summary Judgment. 
(Doc. No. 9.) The Court set a briefing sc hedule requiring Plaintiff Marcus Shannon 
(“Shannon”) to file a response on or before February 17, 2026. (Doc. No. 10.) Shannon did 
not respond timely. (Doc. No. 15.) Nevertheless, the Court continued Shannon’s response 
deadline so that it may have the benefit of full briefing. (Id.) The matter is now fully briefed. 
(Doc. Nos. 9; 16; 17.) Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds this matter suitable 
for disposition without further oral argument. 
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Allstate’s motion. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
In 2021, Shannon purchased a 2021 Chevrolet Silverado (the “Truck”). (Doc. Nos. 
9-13 at 3; 9-19 at 26.)
1 
On March 18, 2024, Shannon added the Truck to his Allstate insurance policy. (Doc. 
Nos. 1-2 ¶  8; 1-6 at 3, 5, 7; 9-8 at 2.) In doing so, Shannon only sought comprehensive 
coverage for the Truck. (Doc. No. 9-8 at 8; see also Doc. No. 1-6 at 4–7.) Such coverage 
included protection against accidental loss from theft. ( See Doc. No. 9-6 at 35; see also 
Doc. No. 1-6 at 4–7.) The policy states that it “will not apply to any claim in which an 
insured person has concealed or misrepresent ed any material fact or circumstance.” ( See 
Doc. No. 9-6 at 13.) 
On April 2, 2024, Shannon filed a claim with Allstate reporting that the Truck was 
stolen. (Doc. Nos. 1-2 ¶¶ 12–13; 1-6 at 4, 6–8; 9-2 ¶ 6; 9-9.) 
Allstate began investigating Sh annon’s claim. (Doc. Nos. 9-2 ¶  7; 9-7 at 2.) 2 As a 
part of its investigation, A llstate asked Shannon multiple times if he still had the keys in 
his possession. (See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 9-7 at 8; 9-11 at 4; 9-13 at 2.) Each time Shannon said 
he still had the keys in his possession. (See, e.g. , Doc. Nos. 9-7 at 8; 9-11 at 4; 9-13 at 2.) 
On April 10, 2024, Shannon submitted an Affidavit of Automobile Theft to Allstate, 
indicating therein that he still had the Truck’s keys and providing a photo of two Chevrolet 
keys. (Doc. Nos. 9-13 at 2; 9-14.) 
On April 12, 2024, Allstate asked Shann on to provide the Truck’s keys. (Doc. No. 
9-7 at 9.) Shannon provided two sets of keys. (Doc. No. 9-16 at 14–15; see also Doc. No. 
9-2 ¶ 11.) However, Allstate determined that the keys belonged to a different vehicle—one 
 
1 Page citations refer to the pagination genera ted by the Case Management/Electronic Case Files 
system. 
2 The Court notes that Document Nu mber 9-7 contains extremely small font that is difficult to read 
without technological enhancement. Allstate should consider producing such investigation notes in a more 
user-friendly format in the future. 
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that had been reported stolen by its owner, David Krivasich. (Doc. Nos. 9-2 ¶¶ 11, 13; 9-7 
at 10; 9-15; 9-17.) Allstate consider ed these circumstances suspicious. ( See Doc. No. 9-2 
¶ 7.) 
Given its concerns, Allstate aske d to examine Shannon under oath. (See Doc. No. 
9-2 ¶ 12.) Allstate conducted the exam ination on June 26, 2024. ( Id.; see also Doc. No. 
16-2.) During the examination, Shannon was re presented by counsel Joshua Searcy and 
Shannon stated that he provided the Truck’s keys to Allstate. (Doc. No. 16-2 at 2, 24–26.) 
In a subsequent deposition during which Shannon was also represented by Mr. 
Searcy, Shannon testified that he told Allstate that the keys he pr ovided belonged to the 
Truck. (Doc. No. 9-19 at 4, 28.) When asked “[i]f those keys we re not to that [Truck], it 
would have been untrue for you to say they were for that [Truck], correct?” Shannon 
responded, “[t]hat’s correct.” (Id. at 30.) It does not appear that Mr. Searcy asked Shannon 
to clarify any of his answers. (See generally id.) 
On July 30, 2024, Allstate denied Shannon’s claim. (Doc. Nos. 1-2 ¶ 17; 1-6 at 4, 6, 
8; 9-18.) 
B. Procedural Background 
In August 2024, Shannon initiated this Action in San Diego County Superior Court. 
(Doc. No. 1-2.) Shannon alleges that Allstate breached the terms of their insurance contract 
by denying Shannon’s claim and failing to adequately investigate the purported loss of his 
Truck. (Id. ¶¶ 5–22.) Shannon requests pun itive damages for the alleged violations. (Id. 
¶ 22.) 
Shannon served Allstate with a complaint two months later. (Doc. No. 1-7.) Allstate 
answered the complaint and asked Shannon to identify the potential amount in controversy. 
(Doc. Nos. 1-3; 1-5 at 4; 2.) 
On April 23, 2025, Shannon served Allstate with special interrogatory responses 
indicating that he had suffered approximate
ly $95,000 in special damages and incurred 
approximately $30,000 in attorney fees. (Doc. No. 1-6 at 9–11.) 
On May 2, 2025, Allstate removed the Action to this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) 
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Following an early neutral evaluation and discovery (Doc. No. 7; see also, e.g., Doc. 
No. 9-19), Allstate seeks summary judgment (Doc. No. 9). 
This Order follows. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Granting summary judgment under Federal Ru le of Civil Procedure 56 is proper if 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 327 
(1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substant ive law, it could affect the 
outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute 
about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Rule 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 
case, and on which that party will b ear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 
322. 
The movant has the initial burden of de monstrating that summary judgment is 
proper. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153 (1970). The burden then shifts 
to the opposing party to provide admissible evidence beyond the pleadings to show that 
summary judgment is not appropriate. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 324. The opponent 
must “identify with reasonable particular ity the evidence that precludes summary 
judgment.” Keenan v. Allan , 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). In 
considering evidence during the summary judgment stage, courts do not weigh conflicting 
evidence or make credibility determinations. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 
978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Instead, courts draw all inferences in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. Id. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
A. Count 1 – Breach of Contract 
“The essential elements of a breach of contract claim are the existence of an 
enforceable contract, the defendant’s breach, and damages to the plaintiff caused by the 
breach.” Hickcox-Huffman v. US Airways, Inc., 855 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017). 
Under California law, insurers may deny a claim if the insured party knowingly, 
intentionally, and with the intent to defraud misrepresents or conceals a material fact during 
the presentation of th e insurance claim. Cummings v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 202 Cal. App. 3d 
1407, 1418–19 (1988). A misrepresentation is material if it “concerns a subject reasonably 
relevant to the insured’s investigation, and if a reasonable insurer would attach importance 
to the fact misrepresented.” Id. at 1417; see also Express Textile C onsultants Inc. v. Gen. 
Accident Ins. Co. of Am. , 22 F. App’x 747, 748–49 (9th Ci r. Nov. 5, 2021). Furthermore, 
“the intent to defraud the insu rer is necessarily implied wh en the misrepresentation is 
material and the insured wilfully [sic] makes it with knowledge of its falsity.” Cummings, 
202 Cal. App. 3d at 1418. Courts may find a representation to be knowing and willful even 
absent an admission of known falsity. See, e.g. , Casual 12, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd. , 
No. CV 16-05619-BRO-AGRx, 2017 WL 5624293, at *11–13 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2017). 
Against this backdrop, Shannon alleges that Allstate breached the insurance contract 
because Shannon “performed all the terms a nd conditions of the [contract],” Allstate 
unreasonably asserted that Shannon did not provide sufficient information and 
documentation, and Allstate improperly denied his claim. (Doc. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 13, 16–17.) 
Allstate responds that the insurance c ontract “precludes coverage if [Shannon] 
misrepresents or conceals material facts about his claim.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 9 (quoting Doc. 
No. 9-6 at 13).) 
Shannon opposes summary judgment, arguing that Allstate has failed establish that 
his misrepresentation was made knowingly. (Doc. No. 16 at 8–9.) 
Shannon’s attempt to avoid summary judgment is unavailing. 
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The evidence before the Court shows that Shannon made a misr epresentation to 
Allstate. In its investigation, Allstate asked Shannon to provide the Truck’s keys. (Doc. 
No. 9-7 at 9.) Instead of providing the Truc k’s keys to Allstate, Shannon provided keys 
that belong to someone else’s stolen vehicle. (Doc. Nos. 9-2 ¶¶  11, 13; 9-7 at 10; 9-15; 
9-17.) Shannon neverthele ss insisted under oath that he provided the Truck’s keys to 
Allstate. (Doc. No. 16-2 at 24 –26.) In a subsequent deposition, Shannon conceded that it 
would have been a lie for him to say that the keys belonged to the Truck if they, in fact, 
did not belong to the Truck. (Doc. No. 9-19 at 30.) 
Shannon’s misrepresentation that he provi ded the Truck’s keys to Allstate is 
material. In his opposition, Sh annon contends that this misrepresentation is merely 
relevant, not material, because it “does not necessarily suggest complicity in theft.” (Doc. 
No. 16 at 9.) Shannon adds that “reasonable minds could differ on [the] importance [of the 
misrepresentation] to the claim investigation.” ( Id.) Shannon misunderstands the criteria 
for materiality. Again, a misrepresentation is material if it “concerns a subject reasonably 
relevant to the insured’s investigation, and if a reasonable insurer would attach importance 
to the fact misrepresented.” Cummings, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1417 (emphasis added). 
Here, Shannon acknowledges that the first element is met. ( See Doc. No. 16 at 9.) 
The second element is also met because wh ether the provided keys matched the Truck 
would be important to a reasonable insurer. As Allstate lays out, “[i]f [Shannon] had the 
only keys and his truck was stolen, this sugge sts the theft was legitimate. If, however, he 
didn’t have the keys (and he mi spresented that he did) and his truck was missing, that 
suggests that Shannon was complicit in the alle ged theft.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 11.) Shannon 
does not dispute that his non-po ssession of the Truck’s keys can “suggest complicity in 
theft.” (Doc. No. 16 at 9.) Under these ci rcumstances, it is beyond question that a 
reasonable insurer would attach importance to whether Shannon actually possessed and 
submitted the Truck’s keys. See Cummings, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1417. 
Lastly, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that Shannon 
made the misrepresentation willfully and with the intent to defraud. In ruling on the present 
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motion, the Court need not draw all possible inferences in Sha nnon’s favor, only all 
reasonable ones. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc. , 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 n.10 (9th Cir. 
2002). Here, the only reasonable inference is that Shannon knew that the keys he provided 
to Allstate did not belong to the Truck. 
On March 25, 2024, Shannon parked the Truck near his girlfriend’s home. (Doc. No. 
9-7 at 5.) Shannon then stored at least one of the Truck’s keys in his girlfriend’s home 
while they took a trip to New Orleans. (Doc. No. 16-2 at 21.) When Shannon returned from 
the trip on March 31, the key was in the same location where Shannon left them. ( Id. at 
23.) Shannon then took the key back. (Id. at 24.) 
On April 2, 2024, Shannon reported to Allsta te that the Truck had been stolen and 
claimed he had the Truck’s keys in his possession. (Doc. No. 9-9; see also Doc. No. 9-7 at 
3–5.) On that day, Allstate provided Shannon with an Affidavit of Automobile Theft to 
complete, which asked Shannon if he still had the Truck’s ke ys in his possession. (Doc. 
Nos. 9-7 at 4; 9-13.) Three days later, on April 5, Shannon repeated to Allstate that he had 
both of the Truck’s keys in his possession. (Doc. No. 9-11 at 4.) On April 10, Shannon 
executed the Affidavit of Automobile Theft, reaffirmed that he had both sets of keys in his 
possession, and provided a photograph of two keys to Allstate. (Doc. Nos. 9-13; 9-14; see 
also Doc. No. 16-2 at 25, 27.) Two days later, on April 12, A llstate notified Shannon that 
he would need to provide the Truck’s keys to an investigator. (Doc. No. 9-7 at 9.) 
On April 18, 2024, Shannon provided Allstate two Chevrolet keys. (Doc. Nos. 16-2 
at 24; 9-14; 9-19 at 27.) Notably, Shannon indicated that he did not own another Chevrolet 
vehicle at that time. (Doc. No. 16-2 at 23.) Further investigation also revealed that the keys 
Shannon provided did not match the Truck, but instead belonged to someone else’s vehicle 
that had been reported stolen. (Doc. No. 9-2 ¶ 11.) 
Under these circumstances, it was evident to Shannon that the whereabouts of the 
keys were relevant to Allstate’s investigation. (See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 9-7 at 5; 9-11 at 4; 9-13 
at 2.) Shannon accordingly knew that he would need to keep track of the Truck’s keys’ 
whereabouts from April 2, when Shannon recei ved the Affidavit of Automobile Theft 
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asking if he still had the keys in his po ssession; to April 10, when Shannon provided 
Allstate with a photograph of two Chevrolet keys; to April 12, when Allstate notified 
Shannon that he would need to provide the keys; and to April 18, when Shannon provided 
Allstate with two keys. Yet instead of pr oviding the Truck’s keys, Shannon handed over 
keys that belonged to someone else’s stolen vehicle. (Doc. No. 9-2 ¶ 11.) Shannon does not 
offer any explanation for how he came into possession of a stolen vehicle’s keys. ( See 
generally Doc. No. 16.) 
Based on this information, the only reasonable inferences that can be drawn are that 
Shannon knew he had to keep track of the Truc k’s keys, procured a set of Chevrolet keys 
to show Allstate, and ultimately knew that the keys he provided did not belong to the Truck. 
“It is difficult to imagine that such a misrepresentation could be an honest mistake.” Morris 
v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 16 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2014). This is so especially in 
light of Shannon’s failure to address or explain how and why he had keys that belonged to 
someone else’s stolen vehicle. See id. 
Shannon nevertheless attempts to avoid these inferences by claiming in a new 
declaration that he “informed Allstate .  . . that [he] had multiple se ts of keys and was not 
able to check the ones [he] provided against the [Truck] because [the Truck] was not in 
[his] possession, but [he] believed them to be the correct keys.” (Doc. No. 16-1 ¶  7.) 
Shannon adds that he “keep[s] most of [his] keys in one area, which can be keys for twenty 
or more vehicles at a time, many of which look similar.” (Id. ¶ 8.) 
This last-ditch attempt is unavailing. Even assuming that Shannon was somehow 
confused by the number of keys he possesse d for the various vehicles he owned, any 
claimed confusion completely fails to a ddress how and why Shannon had keys that 
belonged to someone else’s stolen vehicle. 
Under these circumstances, the Court c oncludes that Shannon made a material 
misrepresentation to Allstate when he claime d that the keys he provided belonged to the 
Truck. The Court additionally draws the only reasonable inference based on the av
 ailable 
evidence: Shannon made this misrepresentation knowingly and willfully. Allstate has thus 
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carried its burden to show that summary judgm ent on this count is proper because it was 
entitled to deny Shannon’s claim. Cummings , 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1418–19; Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 322. 
B. Count 2 – Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
An insurer breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it 
“unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured.” Foley v. 
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 683–85 (1988). Thus, an “insurer cannot deny the 
claim without fully investigating the grounds for its denial.” Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. 
Co., 42 Cal. 4th 713, 720 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 
ultimate question in considering such a claim is “whether the refusal to pay policy benefits 
was unreasonable.” Opsal v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1197, 1205 (1991) 
(internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). 
Shannon contends that “Allstate failed to undertake an adequate investigation of the 
claim, focusing on evidence and inferences th at support Allstate’s basis for denying the 
claim while ignoring and disregarding evidence that supports plaintiff’s claim.” (Doc. No. 
1-2 ¶ 19.) 
Allstate responds that Shannon cannot prev ail on this claim because he must first 
establish that benefits were due under the insurance contract. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 11.) 
Alternatively, Allstate asserts that “a genuine dispute over whether [Shannon] was entitled 
to coverage” precludes this claim. (Id. at 11–12 (quoting Chateau Chamberay Homeowners 
Ass’n v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 90 Cal. App. 4th 335, 346–47 (2001); Franceschi v. Am. 
Motorists Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1988)).) 
Here, Allstate’s investigation reveal ed that Shannon made a material 
misrepresentation to Allstate. ( Supra at 6.) That material misrepresentation was knowing 
and intentional. ( Supra at 6–8.) In turn, California law authorized Allstate to deny 
Shannon’s claim. Cummings, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1418–19. Alls tate’s refusal to pay any 
policy benefits was consequently more than reasonable. Opsal, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 1205. 
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The evidence before the Court thus dem onstrates that Shannon cannot prove the 
elements of this claim, and Allstate is entitled to summary judgment on it. Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 322. 
C. Punitive damages 
California law authorizes punitive damages “[i]n an action for the breach of an 
obligation not arising from contract” if a plaintiff proves “by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant has been guilty of oppre ssion, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 3294(a). 
In moving for summary judgment, Allstate asserts that the Court should “eliminate 
[Shannon’s] claim for punitive damages becau se there is no evidence – let alone the 
requisite clear and convincing evidence – to support it.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 12.) 
Shannon responds that Allstate’s decision to perform a “selective investigation” and 
“mischaracterization of facts” “demonstrate[] a willful and conscious disregard for the truth 
and for Shannon’s rights and supports a finding of malice and oppression.” (Doc. No. 16 
at 11.) Shannon adds that Allsta te had made “a deliberate decision to deny the claim and 
then selectively gather evidence to support that decision.” (Id. at 12.) 
Allstate is correct. Shannon does not point to any evidence that Allstate has been 
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). In fact, Shannon does 
not provide a single record citation to support his arguments on this claim. Contrary to 
Shannon’s unsupported arguments, the ev idence shows that Allstate reasonably 
investigated Shannon’s claim by accepting Shannon’s claim submission (Doc. No. 9-9); 
allowing Shannon multiple opportunities to submit information ( see, e.g., Doc. No. 9-7); 
and giving Shannon multiple opportunities—in cluding one with counsel present—to 
explain the underlying bases for his claim a nd to address any inconsistencies in his 
statements (Doc. Nos. 9-11; 16-2) before denying his claim. 
Thus, Shannon has not offered any eviden ce, much less “clear and convincing 
evidence,” that any of Allstate’s actions here constitute “oppression, fraud, or malice.” See 
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Cal. Civ. Code §  3294(a). Accordingly, Allstate is also entitled to summary judgment on 
Shannon’s request for punitive damages. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Allstate’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (Doc. No. 9.) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly 
and to close this case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 1, 2026 
 
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